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c h a p te r  1
THE CHINESE BACKGROUND
" N e v e r th e le s s ,  I  do not f o r g e t  the  lo n e ly  rem o ten ess ’ 
of your is la n d  cut o f f  from the  world by in t e r v e n in g  
wastes of sep, nor do I  o v e r lo o k  your excusable  
ig n o ran ce  of th e  ussges of Our C e l e s t i a l  E m p i r e . . . "
1
wrote th e  Emperor of China to  George I I I  In  1793. And th e  
Chinese name f o r  t h e i r  own co u n try  -  "The M id d le  Kingdom" -  
r e f l e c t s  t h e i r  v iew th a t  i t  was the  c e n tre  of the  world  and 
t h a t  beyond th e re  were only b a r b a r ia n s .  These n o t io n s  in d ic a t e  
th e  l i m i t e d  n a tu re  of Chinese now ledge of the r e s t  of th e  
world ana of t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  i t .  l e t  China had n o t ,  as 
sometimes seems to  be the  sugg estio n , developed i n  complete  
i s o l a t i o n  from th e  r e s t  of the  world, and these concepts were 
not slTiply f ig m e n ts  of the  Chinese im a g in a t io n  but re p res e n te d  
the  t r u t h  of t h e i r  e x p e r ie n c e . The in h a b i ta n ts  of th e  vast  
re g io n s  b o rd e r in g  th e  s e t t le d  area cf Chins p ro p er  were b a rb a r ia n  
t r i b e s  and the  peop le  of th e  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  which made up the  
F a r  E a s te rn  w o rld , a ltho ugh  not b a rb a r ia n s ,  were p a t e n t ly  
i n f e r i o r  to  the  Chinese i n  every r e s p e c t .  The r e s u l t  of th e  
marked i n f e r i o r i t y  of a l l  the  c o u n t r ie s  w ith  which China had 
come i n t o  c lo se  touch wes to  encourage a b e l i e f  in  th e  
i n f e r i o r i t y  of a l l  f o r e ig n e r s .  Nor was t h i s  d is p e l le d  by th e
1. H .F .  MacWalr, Modern Chinese H is t o r y :  S e le c te d  Readings.
[ 1 9 2 3 ] ,  5.
manners of th e  W esterners  whose d i r e c tn e s s  end abruptness  
stiocked and p a in ed  the  Chinese vkio set so much s to re  by t h e i r
own code of i n f i n i t e l y  fo r m a l  p o l i t e n e s s .
The Chinese moreover had none of the  Western Id e a s  of 
n a t io n a l  s o v e re ig n ty .  They could only conceive of the  e x is te n c e  
of one supreme p o l i t i c a l  a u th o r i t y  on e a r th  and t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
th e o ry  n e ld  t h a t  th e  Em peror's  j u r i s d i c t i o n  extended to  al 1
mankind and t h a t  i n  h i s  r i t u a l  s a c r i f i c e s  b e fo re  the  A l t a r s
of heaven and E a rth  he re p re s e n te d  a l l  p e o p le .  Everyone was 
jx p e c te u  to  acknowledge t h i s  w ith  p ro p e r  re s p e c t  -  by the  
perform ance of the  kotow and the payment o f t r i b u t e .  And the  
pre -em inence  of Chinese power i n  the  F a r  East had i n  f a c t  
enabled them to  e s t a b l is h  a t r i b u t a r y  system on these l i n e s  
and to  conduct a l l  t h e i r  f o r e ig n  r e l a t i o n s ,  and i n c i d e n t a l l y  a 
la r g e  p a r t  of t h e i r  f o r e i g n  t r a d e ,  w i th in  i t s  fram ew ork . I t  
was w i t h in  th e  game framework th a t  th e  Chinese wanted to  
c o n f in e  u h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  England and the  o th e r  W estern  
Powers. T h is  t r i b u t a r y  system was not a source of p r o f i t  -  
the  e n te r ta in m e n t  of the  t r i b u t e  m is s io n s , th e  g i f t s  sent to  
the  r u l e r s  whom th e y  re p re s e n te d ,  and the  r e g u la r  f i n a n c i a l  
support by the  Manchus of the Mongol p r in c e s  a l l  cost as much 
i f  not more th a n  the  t r i b u t e  r e c e iv e d .  The im p o rta n t  f e a tu r e  
of th e  system from  the  Chinese p o in t  of v iew  was a p p a re n t ly  
the  acknowledgement of t h e i r  s u p e r io r i t y .  Thus t o  th e  C hinese ,
1
C hina  was "a world  i n  i t s e l f ,  not a n a t io n  among n a t io n s " .
I n  C h in a , th e  West was coming in t o  c o n ta c t w ith  a country  
w ith  a lo n g e r  p e r io d  of recorded  h i s t o r y  th a n  any o th e r  coun try  
in  the  w o rld , a long h i s t o r y  moreover of h igh  c i v i l i z a t i o n .
The long course of Chinese h i s t o r y  i s  rem arkab le  on th e  one 
hand f o r  i t s  re p e a te d  changes and on th e  o th e r  hand f o r  i t s  
c o n t i n u i t y .  Many of the  f e a tu r e s  of Chinese s o c ie ty  and 
government as th e y  e x is te d  In  the 19 th  c e n tu ry  had been 
e s ta b l is h e d  as much as 2000 ye ars  b e fo r e .  Yet a g a in  and aggi n 
i n  t h a t  t im e  th e re  had been p e r io d s  of complete d is r u p t io n  
when tho r u l i n g  d y n a s ty ,  h a v in g  grown weak, f a i l e d  to  m a in ta in  
i t s  h o ld  on tho c o u n try  i n  fa c e  of i n t e r n a l  d is c o n te n t  or 
f o r e ig n  in v a s io n  -  th e  one o f te n  encourag ing  th e  o th e r .  
E v e n tu a l ly  some group would emerge from the  chaos to  e s t a b l is h  
a new d y n a s ty  -  and to  p e rp e tu a te  v e ry  much the  same form  of 
government as had e x is te d  under p re v io u s  d y n a s t ie s .
The d y n a s t ie s  e s ta b l is h e d  by b a rb a r ia n  in v a d e rs  were
2
not an e x c e p t io n  to  t h i s  tendency and th e  a l i e n  Manchu d ynasty  
which ru le d  China i n  the  19th  c e n tu ry  was t r u e  to  fo rm . The 
Manchus were o r i g i n a l l y  a n o r th e a s te rn  Manchurian t r i b e  vtio,
1. J .K . F a ir b a n k ,  The U n ited  S ta te s  and C h in a , [ 1 9 4 8 ] ,  13.
Cp. a ls o  J . i l .  P a irb a n k  and S .Y . T e n ^  On the  C h ' in g  
T r ib u t a r y  System", H arvard  J o u rn a l of A s ia t ic  S tu d ie s .  
v o l . 6 ,  [ 1 9 4 1 ] ,  1 3 5 -2 4 6 .
2 . Known a l t e r n a t i v e l y  as th e  Ch’ in g  d y n a s ty .
h a v in g  expanded and gained c o n t r o l  of M anchuria , e s ta b l is h e d  
them selves  as the  r u l i n g  d yn as ty  in  China i n  1644. They  
adopted almost w holesa le  the  a d m in is t r a t iv e  system of t h e i r  
pre d ec ess o rs  the  Mings, on ly  g r a d u a l ly  a d a p tin g  i t  to  s u it  
t h e i r  own p a r t i c u l a r  needs, and th e y  r e l i e d  to  a la r g e  e x te n t  
upon Chinese o f f i c i a l s  i n  t h e i r  government of the  c o u n try .
Some of th e  f e a tu r e s  of government p e c u l i a r  to  t h e i r  r u le  arose  
however from  the f a c t  th a t  they  were not a n a t iv e  d y n a s ty .
Thus, a lth o u g h  by the  19th  c e n tu ry  Manchus o n ly  f i l l e d  one 
f i f t h  of a l l  the o f f i c i a l  p o s i t io n s  i n  the Empire, th e y  h e ld  
a t  le a s t  h a l f  of th e  Wgher p o s ts  and i n  t h i s  were a b le  to
e x e rc is e  a c a r e f u l  s u p e rv is io n  over th e  Chinese a d m in is t r a t io n .  
Each of th e  s ix  Boards a t  P e k in g  f o r  example had one Manchu 
p r e s id e n t  and one Chinese p r e s id e n t ,  two Manchu and two 
Chinese v ic e - p r e s id e n t s .
On th e  o th e r  hand, a p a r t  from  the  necessary  c o -o p e ra t io n  
i n  governm ent, the  Manchu r u l e r s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  t r i e d  t o  keep  
t h e i r  own peop le  e n t i r e l y  separa te  from  th e  C h in ese . A l l  Manchus 
were e n r o l le d  i n  one of th e  e ig h t  "banners" which made up the  
Manchu m i l i t a r y  o r g a n iz a t io n .  T h is  served two purposes,  
p r o v id in g  the d ynasty  w ith  a f o r c e f u l  means of m a in ta in in g  t h e i r  
c o n t r o l  over th e  Chinese and at tho  same t im e  fo rm ing  an 
o r g a n iz a t io n  f o r  the government of the  Manchus, who were e n t i r e l y  
exempt from  the j u r i s d i c t i o n  of Chinese c i v i l  a d m in is t r a t io n .
1 . cp. F ra n z  M ic h a e l ,  The O r ig in  of Manchu Rule i n  C h in a .
[ 1 9 4 $ ] .
a
The Manchu dyn a s ty  hoped by t h i s  s e g re g a t io n  to  avoid the  
d e g e n e ra t io n  vh ich  seemed t o  have fo l lo w e d  upon th e  a b s o rp t io n  
of s a r l i e r  b a r b a r ia n  in v a d e rs  by the  Chinese and to  have caused 
t h e i r  d o w n fa l l .  The a ttem pt was not a l to g e th e r  s u c c e s s fu l .
Host of the  Manchus, dependent i:pon an in c r e a s in g ly  in ad eq uate  
pens io n  and fo rb id d e n  to  engage i n  o rd in a ry  p u r s u i t s ,  had 
become v e ry  d egenera te  by th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry .
Â dominant f a c t o r  of long s ta n d in g  i n  Chinese p o l i t i c s  
was th e  p e c u l i a r l y  in t im a te  conn ectio n  of th e  Chinese Government 
and C o nfuc ian ism . C onfuc ian  te a c h in g s  had g r a d u a l ly  become 
almost th e  e x c lu s iv e  su b jec t of study f o r  c a n d id a te s  i n  the  
p u b l ic  e x am in a tio n s  by means of Wiioh government o f f i c i a l s  
were r e c r u i t e d .  O f f i c i a l  p o s i t io n  was h e ld  in  v ery  h i ^  regard  
by th e  Chinese end was th e  n a t u r a l  a m b it io n  of e v e ry  one of
a b i l i t y .  Thus the  whole Chinese educated c la s s  grew up
steeped in  a knowledge of C onfuc ian  te a c h in g s  -  and of almost 
n o th in g  e ls e .  One c f  the  th in g s  which C onfuc ius  had s tressed
was the  im portance  of r i t u a l  and th e  Chinese b e l ie v e d  t h a t  by
the  p ro p er  observance of cerem onies th e y  oo Id  p re s e rv e  a s ta te  
of harmony between Heaven, n a tu re  and mankind. Indeed th e  
Emperor was as much a r e l i g i o u s  as a p o l i t i c a l  le a d e r  and among 
h i s  most im p o rta n t  d u t ie s  were th e  perform ance of v a r io u s  
cerem onies.
In  th e  rea lm  of government th e  Emperor was t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
a l l  p o w e r fu l .  A l l  m a tte rs  were cons idered  to  be w i t h in  the  
p u rv ie w  of Im p e r ia l  a u t h o r i t y .  The v e ry  e x te n t  of h i s  power
: owe ver e n t a i le d  so much business  t h a t  th e  Emperor had necess­
a r i l y  to  r e l y  to  a c o n s id e ra b le  e x te n t  upon h i s  o f f i c i a l s  in  
a e s i in g  w ith  i t .  Moreover th e  g re a t  d is ta n c e s  i n  C hina,  
aggravated  by in ad eq u a te  means of communication, made i t  
im p o ss ib le  to  govern th e  country  e f f e c t i v e l y  by means of an 
e n t i r e l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  a d m in is t r a t io n .  C onsequently  c o n s id e ra b le  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and i n i t i a t i v e  was a llo w ed  t o  the  p r o v in c i a l  
governments i n  the  a c tu a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  of a f f a i r s .
The e x te n t  of th e  in f lu e n c e  r e a l l y  e x e rc is e d  by th e  
Emperor i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  d e te rm in e , p a r t i c u l a r l y  since h i s  two 
c h ie f  means of do ing  so -  h i s  s u p e rv is io n  of a l l  business by 
th e  in s p e c t io n  of a l l  m em orials and h i s  power i n  th e  a p p o in t ­
ment and th e  prom otion  or d e g ra d a t io n  of o f f i c i a l s  -  were 
e x e rc is e d  t o  a la r g e  e x te n t  i n  c o -o p e r a t io n  w ith  th e  Grand 
C o u n c il  and a ls o  th e  Grand S e c r e t a r i a t .  The Grand S e c r e t a r ia t  
had been th e  Governm ent's  Supreme C o u n c i l  under th e  Ming 
d y n a s ty .  Under th e  Manchus i t  d e a l t  o n ly  w ith  th e  more r o u t in e
m a tte rs .  N e v e r th e le s s  i t  was s t i l l  " th e  apex o f the  r o u t in e  
1
a d m in is t r a t io n "  and an im p o rta n t  l i n k  between th e  p r o v i n c i a l  
governments and th e  c e n t r a l  a d m in is t r a t io n .  The Grand C o u n c il  
waa a c r e a t io n  of th e  Manchus. I t  was o r i g i n a l l y  form ed, i n  
th e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f th e  18th  c e n tu ry ,  to  d e a l w ith  m a tte rs  of 
s t ra te g y  d u r in g  th e  campaigns I n  the  n o rth w e s t .  But i t  
developed in t o  th e  supreme c o u n c i l  of th e  Manchu Government,
1 . J .K .  F a irb a n k  and S .Y . Teng, On th e  Types end Uses o f  
C h 'in g  Documents, H a rv a rd  J o u rn a l o f A s ia t ic  S tu d ie s ,  
v o l . 5, [ 1 9 4 0 ] ,  6 .
e v id e n t l y  m eeting  a need # i ic h  had been f e l t  f o r  a smsl 1 and
in fo r m a l  body which could  work in  com parative  secrecy . I t s
membership was s m a l l ,  c o n s is t in g  of from  fo u r  to  s ix  p e o p le ,
1
and was a p p a re n t ly  co n fin ed  to  Manchus. A l l  i t s  members h e ld  
h ig h  p o s i t io n s  i n  o th e r  departm ents  of government making i t  
i n  e f f e c t  a c a b in e t .  There  was almost a lways at le a s t  one of 
the  Grand S e c r e ta r ie s  on i t ,  p r o v id in g  a l i n k  between th e  two  
b o d ie s ,  and a f t e r  th e  fo rm a t io n  i n  1861 c f  th e  T s u n g l i  Yamen 
to  d e a l  w ith  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s  th e re  were almost always members 
of th e  T s u n g l i  Yamen on th e  Grand C o u n c il  to o .
Business was brought up i n  th e  form  of m em orials  to  the  
Bmperor from  o f f i c i a l s  I n  th e  p ro v in c e s  or i n  the  v a r io u s
1 . Morse says th a t  membership of th e  Grand S e c r e t a r ia t  was
th e  "h ig h e s t  d i s t i n c t i o n  a t t a i n a b le  by Chinese o f f i c i a l s "  
(H .B . Morse, The T rade  and A d m in is t r a t io n  of C h in a .
[1 9 0 B ] ,  56) which im p l ie s  t h a t  Chinege could  not become 
members of th e  Grand C o u n c i l .  N e v e r th e le s s  th e r e  were 
Chinese o f f i c i a l s  who gained a v e ry  p o w e r fu l  p o s i t io n  
i n  th e  government of C hina, u s u a l ly  i n  th e  o f f i c e  of 
v ic e r o y ,  L i  Hung-chang, who p la y e d  an im p o rta n t  p a r t  i n  
Chinese f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  i n  th e  l a t t e r  p a r t  of th e  
c e n tu ry ,  i s  an example. L i  f i r s t  came in t o  prominence i n  
th e  suppress ion  of the  T a ip in g  r e b e l l i o n .  I n  1870 he  
was ap p o in ted  to  the  im p o rta n t  p o s i t io n  of V ic e ro y  o f  
C h i h l i ,  th e  m e tr o p o l i ta n  p ro v in c e  o f th e  E m p ire .
D u r in g  h i s  te n u re  of t h a t  o f f i c e  he p layed  a le a d in g  
p a r t  i n  th e  n e g o t ia t io n  of th e  Chefoo C onvention  of 
1876 w ith  B r i t a i n  and of th e  1885 C onvention  w ith  
France r e g a rd in g  Tongking . He was a ls o  s p e c ia l ly  
charged w ith  th e  s u p e rv is io n  of Corean a f f a i r s  and i n  th a t  
c a p a c i ty  concluded a c o n v en tio n  w ith  Japan i n  1885 re g a rd ­
in g  C orea . He was h e ld  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  the  Chinese d e fe a t  
i n  th e  S ino-Japanese war, d ism issed from  the po st of 
V ic e ro y  and d e p r iv e d  of many of h i s  honours. He was however 
appo in ted  Chinese p le n ip o t e n t ia r y  f o r  th e  n e g o t ia t io n  of 
peace w ith  Japan and signed th e  T r e a t y  of  Ghimonosekl. I n  
1896, as Chinese r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  t o  th e  c o ro n a t io n  of th e  
T s a r ,  he made a to u r  of Europe and th e  U n ite d  s t a t e s ,  d u r in g  
Tihich he concluded the  a l l i a n c e  w ith  R u s s ia . I n  1897 he 
was made a member of the  T s u n g l i  Yamen but i n  1898 was 
dism issed  from  t h i s  p o s i t io n .
8o f f i c e s  i n  the c a p i t a l .  The r e p ly  took  th e  form  of & simple  
endorsem ent, or of a r e s c r i p t ,  which l i k e  th e  endorsement was 
w r i t t e n  on the o r i g i n a l  memorial but vh ich  a ls o  in c lu d e d  some 
comment, or of an Im p e r ia l  E d ic t ,  M em oria ls  on r o u t in e  m a tte rs  
went to  the Grand S e c r e t a r i a t ,  The s e c r e ta r ie s  th e re  d r a f te d  
a proposed r e p ly  f o r  the  c o n s id e ra t io n  of th e  Grand S e c r e ta r ie s  
who th e n  p re sen ted  i t  to  th e  Emperor f o r  h i s  ap p ro va l at t h e i r  
d a i l y  auaience w ith  h im . A memorial t o  the  Grand S e c r e t a r ia t  
seldom re q u ire d  an e d ic t  i n  r e p ly  but i f  i t  d id  the  e d ic t  was 
u s u a l ly  d r a f t e d  by the  Grand C o u n c i l ,  M em oria ls  on more 
im p o rta n t  m a tte rs  were th e  p ro v in c e  of th e  Grsnd C o u n c i l .  
A p p a re n t ly  th e  Emperor o f te n  saw th ese  m em orials  b e fo re  th e  
Grand C o u n c i l lo r s .  Some he sou Id  s im p ly  endorse. O thers  
he marked f o r  f u r t h e r  c o n s id e r a t io n .  These were then  considered  
by th e  Grand C o u n c i l lo r s  a f t e r  which they  or th e  s e c r e ta r ie s  
of th e  Grand C o u n c il  d r a f t e d  proposed r e p l i e s  which were con­
s id e re d  a t  the  d a l l y  audience of th e  C o u n c i l lo r s  w ith  the  
1
Emperor.
D is c u s s io n  a t  th e se  audiences was a p p a re n t ly  q u i te  f r e e  
and th e  Grand C o u n c il  seems to  have had a la r g e  share i n  the  
fo r m u la t io n  of Im p e r ia l  p o l i c y .  On th e  o th e r  hand i t  i s  a lso  
c le a r  th a t  the  Em peror's  p a r t  was f a r  from  b e in g  a p a s s iv e  
one. See ing  e v e r y th in g  # i i c h  came b e fo re  the  Grand C o u n c il
1 . On these qu es tio n s  of procedure  cp. J .K .  F a irb a n k  end 
S .Y . Teng, "On the T ran sm iss io n  of C h ' in g  Documents", 
H arv a rd  J o u rn a l of A s ia t ic  S tu d ie s , v o l . 4 ,  [ 1 9 3 9 ] ,  1 2 -46 ;  
and "On the Types nnd Uses of C h 'in g  Documents", l o c . c i t , . 
v o l .  5, [ l 9 4 o ] ,  1 -7 1 .
9and th e  Grand S e c r e t a r ia t  and h o ld in g  d a i l y  aud iences w ith  
both th e se  b o d ie s , he was i n  a p o s i t io n  to  e x e rc is e  a very  
c lo s e  s u p e rv is io n  of th e  conduct of a f f a i r s .
Th ere  was a ls o  a t  P ek ing  a la r g e  number of Boards, 
D epartm ents  and Committees # i ic h  c o n s t i tu te d  the c e n t r a l  
a d m in is t r a t io n  of the  Em pire . Most im p o rta n t  were the  s ix  
Boards -  th e  Board of Revenue; the  Board of Yar; th e  Board of 
Ceremonies; th e  Board of Works, which was concerned w ith  
o f f i c i a l  re s id e n c e s  r a t h e r  than  p u b l ic  works; th e  Board of 
C i v i l  O f f ic e  which d e a l t  w ith  th e  appointm ents to  p o s ts  above 
t h a t  of d i s t r i c t  M a g is t r a te  and which kep t note  of th e  s ta tu s  
and re c o rd  of a l l  o f f i c i a l s ;  and th e  Board of Punishm ents, 
concerned w ith  c r im in a l  law  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w ith  th e  p u n is h ­
ment o f g u i l t y  o f f i c i a l s .  O ther im p o rta n t  departm ents  were 
th e  O f f ic e  of T ra n s m is s io n , ishlch fo rw arded  memorials from  
o f f i c e s  i n  th e  c a p i t a l  to  th e  Grand S e c r e t a r ia t  -  s c r u t in i z i n g  
them f i r s t  to  see th a t  th e y  were I n  p ro p e r  fo rm , and th a t  
p e c u l i a r l y  Chinese i n s t i t u t i o n ,  th e  Court o f Censors, w h ic h  
rev iew e d  and c r i t i c i z e d  a l l  the  p roceed in gs  of the  Government.
I n  a d d i t io n  to  th e s e , th e r e  were a h o s t  of o th e r  o f f i c e s  
a t  Peking  a l l  concerned w ith  v a r io u s  aspects  of the  c e n t r a l  
a d m in is t r a t io n .  A conspicuous f e a t u r e  of t h i s  whole e la b o ra te  
o r g a n iz a t io n  i s  however th e  e x te n t  to  i^hich i t  was concerned  
w ith  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  as i t  were, of a d m in is t r a t io n  -  w ith  
appo intm ents  and prom otions and w ith  the  s u p e rv is io n  of o f f i c i a l  
a c t io n s .  T h is  in d ic a t e s  the im portance of th e  P r o v in c i a l
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Governments i n  th e  r e a l  conduct of a f f a i r s .  The same th in g  i s  
i l l u s t r a t e d  by th e  fa c t  th a t  h a r d ly  any of th e  departm ents  of 
government at P ek ing  had su b o rd in a tes  throug hou t th e  c o u n try  
d e a l in g  w ith  t h e i r  branch of a f f a i r s  -  e v e ry th in g  was channe lled  
through the p r o v i n c i a l  government and d e a l t  w ith  by the  appro­
p r i a t e  o f f i c i a l  in  th a t  h ie r a r c h y .
Each of th e  e ig h te e n  p r o v in c i a l  governments i n  China had 
an e la b o r a te  h ie r a r c h y .  The h i p e s t  ra n k in g  p r o v i n c i a l  o f f i c i a l  
was th e  V ic e ro y  who u s u a l ly  had j u r i s d i c t i o n  over a group of
1
two or th re e  p ro v in c e s  each of which had a Governor of i t s  own. 
The V ic e ro y  was cons id ered  r a th e r  as a s u p e r io r  c o l le a g u e  than  
as a s u p e r io r  of th e  Governor and th e y  c o -o p era te d  on equa l  
term s i n  any a c t io n  which th e y  took  to g e th e r .  Below th e  
Governor th e r e  were the  p r o v i n c i a l  t r e a s u r e r ,  the  p r o v in c i a l  
judge , th e  s a l t  in te n d a n t  who was i n  charge of the  Governm ent's  
s a l t  monopoly, and i n  tw e lv e  p ro v in c e s  th e  g r a in  in te n d a n t  
who was i n  charge of th e  c o l l e c t i o n  of th e  g r a in  t r i b u t e  f o r  
th e  Im p e r i a l  Government, T o g e th e r  these  f o u r  c o n s t i tu te d  a
2
" d e l ib e r a t in g  and e x e c u t iv e  Board of p r o v i n c i a l  governm ent".
The a d m in is t r a t iv e  u n i t  i n  p r o v i n c i a l  government was th e  h s le n  
or d i s t r i c t ,  and the  d i s t r i c t  m a g is t ra te  was the  o f f i c i a l  in
1. The p ro v in c e s  of C h ih l i  end Szechuan were each under the
j u r i s d i c t i o n  of a V ic e ro y  and had no G overnor. The 
p ro v in c e s  of Shantung, Shansi and Honan were not w i t h in  
th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  of any V ic e r o y .
2 . H .B . Morse, The T rad e  and A d m in is t ra t io n  of th e  Chinese
E m p ire . [ l9 C © J , 6 5 .
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c lo s e s t  touch w ith  th e  p e o p le .  H is  d u t ie s  were v a r io u s  and
in c lu d e d  th e  maintenance of o rd e r ,  th e  d is p e n s a t io n  of ju s t i c e
and the c o l l e c t i o n  of reven u e . Rut in  China many of the
f u n c t io n s  which o f te n  fall to government, notably r e l i e f ,  were
perform ed by the  u n o i f I c l a l  v i l l a g e  government or by the  f a m i ly
and often the Chine se official was, in Morse's words, " le s s  an
1
a d m in is t r a to r  than a tax collector".
The Government was supported by n v a r i e t y  of ta x e s .  The
most im p o rta n t  of those ?/as the land t a x  which u n t i l  th e  19th  
c e n tu ry ,  when growing e x p e n d itu re  made I t  inadequate, p ro v id ed  
about t r o - t h i r d s  of the Governm ent's  revenu e. T r ib u t e  p a id  i n  
hind to o l s e v e ra l  fo r n s ,  the  most Im p o rta n t  of which was th e  
g r a in  t r i b u t e .  A f t e r  the  T a ip in g  r e b e l l i o n  in  the m iddle  of 
th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  however a number of the  p ro v in c e s  which 
were s .p r osed, t c  send g r a in  commuted their t r i b u t e  to  an annual 
money paym ent. The Customs s ta t io n s  both a t  the  p o r ts  and i n  
the  I n t e r i o r  were another source of revenu e. One of th e  most 
l u c r a t i v e  po sts  i n  China was t h a t  cf th e  "hoppo" at Canton vho 
c o n t r o l le d  the  t ra d e  of Canton and of a l l  the o th e r  p o r ts  on 
th e  coast and r i v e r s  of the  p ro v in c e  of Kwangtung. The Govern­
ment a ls o  p r o f i t e d  from  i t s  monopoly of s a l t  which was h e a v i l y
taxed  a t  a l l  s tages of p ro d u c t io n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n .  The  
a d d i t io n a l  e x p e n d itu re  vh ich  was necessary  i n  o rd e r to  suppress  
th e  T a ip in g  r e b e l l i o n  i n  the  m iddle  of the  19th  c e n tu ry ,  and 
th e  f a i l u r e  of o th e r  sources of revenue a t t h a t  t im e ,  led to  th e  
i n t r o d u c t io n  of a new ta x  known as l i k in  which was an i r r e g u l a r
le v y  upon t r a d e  i n  t r a n s i t . _____________ _________________ _
1 . H .B . Morse, The Trade end A d m in is t ra t io n  of the  Chinese  
E m pire . [ 1 9 0 8 ] ,  8 1 . — —
12
The c o l l e c t i o n  of revenu e , l i k e  e v e r y th in g  e ls e ,  was 
managed through the p r o v in c i a l  governments: the  Im p e r ia l
Government had no revenue vh ich  had not been re c e iv e d  from  
p r o v i n c i a l  o f f i c i a l s .  The Chinese revenue system was one which 
had been common i n  Europe i n  the m iddle ages . O f f i c i a l s  
r e c e iv e d  p u re ly  nom inal s a la r i e s ,  the  assumption be ing  th a t  
they  would charge f o r  the  v a r io u s  s e rv ic e s  which th e y  perform ed  
f o r  peop le  and th a t  th e y  would keep p a r t  of the  money which 
th e y  c o l le c t e d  as ta x e s  f o r  them selves . I t  was e system vh ich  
le n t  i t s e l f  e x c e p t io n a l ly  e a s i ly  to  c o r r u p t io n .  There  was 
l i t t l e  to  d e te rm in e  or c u r t a i l  h o # much an o f f i c i a l  should  
keep f o r  h im s e l f  -  except perhaps th e  p ro s p e c t of the  wrath  
of h i s  s u p e r io r  i f  W  re ce iv e d  le s s  th a n  he had hoped f o r  and 
t h a t  p ro b ab ly  only spurred th e  ju n io r  o f f i c i a l  to  c o l l e c t  as 
much as he cou ld  from  th e  people i n  the f i r s t  in s ta n c e .  The 
p re s e n ts  wirilch o f f i c i a l s  had to  g ive  to  t h e i r  s u p e r io rs  and 
t o  th e  Emperor i n  o rd er  to  h o ld  and t o  advance t h e i r  p o s i t io n  
a ls o  made i t  necessary  f o r  them to  get as much as th e y  could  
f o r  them selves . A la r g e  p a r t  o f the  c r i t i c i s m  of o f f i c i a l  
p r a c t ic e s  in  t h i s  m a tte r  however should be d i r e c te d  le s s  
a g a in s t  the  o f f i c i a l s  as in d iv id u a ls  th a n  a g a in s t  the  system 
of wkilch th e y  were an accepted p a r t .  The system was u n s a t is ­
f a c t o r y  i n  more ways th an  one: an unreasonab ly  la r g e  amount
of money was  ^ o f te n  e x to r te d  from  th e  peop le  w h i ls t  an in ad eq uate  
amount was f i n a l l y  re tu rn e d  to  the Im p e r ia l  Government.
13
The r e l a t i v e  p o s i t io n ,  on b a la n c e , of the  P r o v in c ia l
Governments ana the Im p e r ia l  Government i s  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to
assess d e f i n i t e l y .  "The Chinese id e a " ,  wrote S i r  Robert H a r t
i n  1371, " i s  f o r  the  l o c a l i t y  t o  i n i t i a t e  and f o r  th e
c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  to  (1 )  wink a t ,  (2 )  t a c i t l y  p e r m i t ,
(3 )  open ly  a l lo w , (4 )  o f f i c i a l l y  re c o g n iz e ,  and 
(5 )  c r y s t a l l i s e .  I t  i s  use les s  t o  a ttem p t -  except  
where o u ts id e  fo r c e  does i t  -  to  gat the  c e n t r a l  
o f f i c e s  to  o rd er  th e  ad o p tio n  of n o v e l t i e s " .T
So much of the  a c t u a l  government of th e  c ou ntry  was in  the  
hands of the  P r o v in c ia l  Governments, so much i n i t i a t i v e  and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was a llow ed to  them t h a t  in e v i t a b l y  t h e i r  
p o s i t io n  was a v e ry  p o w e rfu l  one. On th e  o th e r  hand the  
Im p e r ia l  Government ex e rc is e d  a v e ry  c lo s e  and a c t iv e  super­
v is io n  of the conduct of a f f a i r s .  There  were moreover a number 
of r e g u la t io n s  e x p re s s ly  designed to  guard a g a in s t  the  dgn. g e r ,  
in h e re n t  in  the  amount of independence a llowed to  th e  P r o v in c ia l  
Governments, of th e  development of a r i v a l  a u t h o r i t y .  An 
o f f i c i a l  could not h o ld  o f f i c e  i n  h i s  n a t iv e  p ro v in c e ;  he 
could not h o ld  lend or merry w i th in  h i s  J u r is d ic t io n ;  he 
could not serve under a n e a r  r e l a t i v e .  Appointments were f o r  
a p e r io d  of th re e  y e a rs  o n ly ;  i f  th e y  were renewed i t  was 
seldom f o r  more th a n  another th r e e  y e a rs ,  a f t e r  which the  
o f f i c i a l  would be t r a n s fe r r e d  to  a p o s i t io n  in  an o th er  p ro v in c e .
I n  e f f e c t ,  th e  P r o v in c ia l  Governments seem to  have enjoyed  
c o n s id e ra b le  l a t i t u d e  as long as th e y  adhered to  th e  main l in e s
1. H .B . Morse, The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e la t io n s  of the Chinese  
E m p ire , [1 9 1 0 -1 9 1 8 J, 1 , 6 .
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of Im p e r ia l  p o l i c y .  S i m i l a r l y ,  in d i v i d u a l  o f f i c i a l s  do not
seem t o  have been m olested so long as th e y  k e p t  w i t h in  th e
bounds set by custom, p re ced en t and th e  p r e ju d ic e s  Which
anim ated the  Im p e r ia l  Government. However th e y  h e ld  o f f i c e
on ly  et the  E m peror 's  p le a s u re  and i t  i s  t h i s  p re c a r io u s
r e la t io n s h ip  between the o f f i c i a l s  and th e  Im p e r ia l  Government
which seems t o  have been the g re a t  source of the l a t t e r * s  power.
The whole system i s  perhaps summed up es w e l l  as i t  can be i n
tho statem ent in  an annual r e p o r t  of th e  China A s s o c ia t io n
th a t  "a la rg e  measure of p r o v in c i a l  independence c o - e x is t s  w ith
1
a la r g e  power c f Im p e r ia l  c o n t r o l " .
D u r in g  much of the  19th c e n tu ry  however Im p e r ia l  c o n t r o l
was conspicuously  i n e f f e c t i v e .  The Manchu dynasty  was by th a t
t im e  i n  a s ta te  of d e c l in e .  The d y n a s ty 's  re c o rd  i n  th e
e ig h te e n th  c e n tu ry  had been e b r i l l i a n t  one. T h e i r  conquests
d u r in g  the s ix t y  y e a r s ’ r e ig n  of the  g re a t  Emperor C h ' le n  Lung
had extended th o  b o u n d a rie s  of tho Chinese Empire f u r t h e r  th a n
e v er  b e fo re .  But by th e  end of the  cen tury  th e re  was a lre a d y
growing c o r r u p t io n  in  the a d m in is t r a t io n  and minor r e b e l l i o n s ,
c h ro n ic  in  C h in a , were in c r e a s in g  i n  number. C h ' ie n  Lung 's
successors seemed n e i t h e r  i d l l i n g  nor ab le  t o  ta k e  d r a s t ic
a c t io n  to  d e a l  w ith  th e  s i t u a t io n  -  " lu x u ry  and the  environment
of the  p a la c e  were s o f te n in g  the f i b r e  of the  once hardy  
2
Manchus".
1 . Annual Report of the  China A s s o c ia t io n ,  1 8 9 6 -1 8 9 7 , i n
P 0 1 7 /1 2 9 0 . The u n d e r l in in g  i s  mine.
2 . K .3 .  L a t o u r e t t e ,  The C hinese; T h e i r  H is to r y  and C u l tu r e ,
[ I 9 3 3 j ,  I ,  347 .
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The as tound ing  success of the  T a ip in g  r e b e l l i o n  in  th e  
m iddle of the  cen tury  bore s t r i k i n g  w itness  to  the  e x te n t  to  
which the  Im p e r ia l  Government had lo s t  i t s  g r ip  cn the c o u n try .  
O r ig in a t in g  in  the  southern p ro v in c e s  of China where d is c o n te n t  
was always r i f e ,  th i. s was p a r t l y  a r e l i g i o u s  movement. I t  drew  
some of i t s  id e a s  from  C h r is t ia n  te a c h in g s  and i t s  le a d e r  had 
p ro c la im ed  h im s e lf  the  T h ird  Person of th e  T r i n i t y .  The r e b e ls ,  
h a v in g  gained c o n t r o l  of a la rg e  p a r t  of Kuangtung and K uangsi,  
advanced northw ards  to  the  Yangtze v a l l e y  and th en  tu rn e d  
eastw ards  end i n  March 1853 cap tured  Msnliing -  at one p o in t  
in  the f o l lo w in g  w in te r  th e y  even th re a te n e d  T i e n t s i n .  They  
e s ta b l is h e d  t h e i r  c a p i t a l  at Nanking sno f o r  a while  bade f a i r  
to  supp lan t th e  Manchus as th e  r u l e r s  of C h in e . I n  t h i s  th e y  
d id  not succeed but f o r  ta n  ye ars  th e y  c o f ie d  Im p e r ia l  
a u t h o r i t y  i n  h a l f  tho  p ro v in c e s  of the Em pira .
The Moslems i n  th e  W estern p ro v in c e s  of the  Empire were 
a ls o  i n  r o v o l t  a t t h i s  t im e w h i ls t  i t  was i n  these  same y e ars  
t h a t  th e  Chinese had to  meet t h e i r  g r e a te s t  c h a lle n g e  of a l l :  
the  p res su re  of England and o th e r  w estern  c o u n t r ie s  f o r  eq u a l  
and more e x te n s iv e  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  C h ina. The Chinese Government 
was a lre a d y  siiaken by i t s  d e fe a t  in  the 1839 -1842  war w ith  
England #].on c o n fro n te d  w ith the mounting t i o e  of r e b e l l i o n  at  
home. And th e n  i n  t u r n ,  d is t r a c t e d  and weakened by these  
i n t e r n a l  d is o r d e r s ,  i t  was i n  a poor c o n d i t io n  to  cope w ith  
th e  renewed p re s s u re  of th e  European c o u n t r ie s  at the  end of 
th e  1850a. China was d e fe a te d  in  the 1858 war w ith  England
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and Prance and h e r  r e s is ta n c e  I n  1859 to  th e  exchange at 
Pek ing  of the  r a t i f i c a t i o n s  of the T r e a t y  of T i e n t s i n  o n ly  
la d  to  a f r e s h  A nglo-French e x p e d i t io n  i n 3860 which r e s u l te d  
i n  the  occupatio n  of P ek ing  and the  bu rn in g  of the  Summer 
P a la c e .  Meanwhile the  Emperor had f l e d  w ith  h i s  c o u rt  to  
J e h o l,  an unusual step vvtiich caused much p a n ic .  And h i s  
d e a th  th e r e  a y e a r  l a t e r  gave r i s e  to  sharp r i v a l r y  f o r  the  
c o n t r o l  of th e  Government d u r in g  the  m in o r i ty  of h i s  successor, 
Ti'ang H s i ,  iflho was th e n  o n ly  f i v e  y e a rs  o ld .  A lthough in  
th e  even t I t  survived the  c r i s i s ,  i n  1860 and 1861 th e  Chinese  
Government was p e r i l o u s l y  n e ar  the  p o in t  of c o l la p s e .
P a r a d o x ic a l ly  th e  p res su re  of the  Western Powers on 
C hin a , %hich c o n tr ib u te d  to  a c o n s id e ra b le  e x te n t  to  the  
underm in ing  of Im p e r ia l  a u t h o r i t y  a t t h i  s t im e ,  had one r e s u l t  
which added in  some measure t o  th e  pow ers, or at le a s t  to  the  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  of the  Im p e r ia l  Government. F o r  t h e i r  
in s is te n c e  upon h a v in g  d i r e c t  d ip lo m a t ic  r e la t io n s ^ t h a t  
Government compelled i t  to  ta k e  the  conduct of th e  f o r e ig n  
r e l a t i o n s  of the  Em pire, which i t  had been accustomed to  
conduct through o f f i c i a l s  s ta t io n e d  f a r  from  P e k in g , i n t o  i t s  
own hands. F o r  t h i s  purpose a new o f f i c e  was c re a te d ;  th e  
T s u n g l i  Yamen.
The T s u n g l i  Yamen was the Chinese M in is t r y  of F o re ig n  
A f f a i r s ,  the  body w ith  whom th e  fo r e ig n  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  a t  
P ek ing  were to  have most of t h e i r  d e a l in g s  in  tho next f o r t y  
y e a r s .  I t  s membership v a r ie d  i n  number from  5 to  10 and
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c o n s is te d  of o f f i c i a l s  h o ld in g  o th e r ,  m d U B u a lly  f a i r l y
im p o rta n t ,  p o s ts  in  the  Government. Th ere  were almost always
members of th e  Grand C o u n c il  end of the  Grand S e c r e t a r ia t  on
th e  T s u n g li  Yamen -  in  1878 i t  in c lu d e d  e l l  the  members of
th e  Grand C o u n c i l .  The T s u n g l i  Yamen was h a r d ly  rem arkab le
f o r  i n t e l l i g e n c e  or f o r  e f f i c i e n c y .  I t s  d e la y  and evasion  in
th e  h a n d l in g  of a f f a i r s  in d ic a te d  th a t  i t  s u f fe re d  from th e
p a r a ly s is  and la c k  of e d a p t i b i l l t y  which a f fe c te d  most o f the
Chinese Government a t  the  end of the  19th  c e n tu ry .  I t s  members
o f te n  d is p la y e d  conspicuous ig norance  of the  a f f a i r s  w ith
which th e y  were supposed t o  be d e a l in g .  They were moreover
i n  the  in v id io u s  p o s i t io n  which was the  lo t  of Chinese who had
a n y th in g  to  do w ith  w e s te rn e rs , f o r  th e  old b e l i e f s  about
f o r e ig n e r s  d ie d  v e ry  h a rd ,  N e v e r th e le s s  the  mere e x is te n c e
of such an o f f i c e  was a r e v o lu t io n a r y  change and th e  s i t u a t io n
was a f a r  c ry  from  th e  t im e  when th e  Emperor C h ' ie n  Lung
w r i t i n g  t o  George I I I  had asked "%hy th e n  should f o r e ig n  n a t io n s
advance t h i s  u t t e r l y  unreasonable  request t o  be re p re s e n te d  at
my C ourt?"  and had d e c la re d  th a t  " th e  t h in g  i s  u t t e r l y  
1
im p r a c t ic a b le * .
1 . H .F .  M acN air , Modern Chinese H is to r y ;  S e le c te d  R ead ings. 
[ 1 9 2 3 ] ,  3 .
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THE BRITISH POSITION IN  CHINA IN THE 19TH GENTXTRY
I t  was t r a d e  Miich f i r s t  lu re d  B r i t i s h  s u b je c ts  out to
China and t ra d e  was s t i l l  th e  main b a s is  of B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t  in
China a t the end of the  19th c e n tu ry .  I n  the course of th e
c e n tu ry  -  by the t r e a t y  s e t t le m e n ts  of 1342-43  and of 1853, by
t i le  Chefoo C onvention  of 1876 and by o th e r  agreements w ith  the
Chinese -  the  B r i t i ^ i  g r a d u a l ly  b u i l t  up a system f o r  th e
1
conduct of t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  C h in a . T h is  system, whose 
v a r io u s  f e a tu r e s  were designed to  solve the  problem s a r is in g  
from  th e  e x is te n c e  of t r a d in g  r e l a t i o n s  between f o r e ig n e r s  and 
the  C h inese , p ro v id ed  a framework f o r  the  p r o t e c t io n  and 
expansion of B r i t i s h  t r a d e .
The ta s k  of the  B r i t i s h  government had been a d i f f i c u l t  
one. They had t ^ :e n  over the s u p e rv is io n  of B r i t i s h  t r a d e  w ith  
China i n  1833 on the a b o l i t io n  of th e  Cast In d ia  Company's 
monopoly. T h e i r  new r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  made them anxious to  
e s t a b l is h  fo r m a l  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  th e  Chinese government and a ls o  
to  r e v is e  the c o n d it io n s  govern ing  th e  conduct of f o r e ig n  t ra d e
1 . F o r  a h i s t o r i c a l  survey of the  development of B r i t i s h
p o l i c j  in  China in  th e  im p o rta n t  p e r io d  from  1833 to  1860  
cp. W.C. C o s t in ,  G reat B r i t a i n  and C h in a , 1 85 3 -1 8 6 0 .  
[ 1 9 3 7 ] .  Cp. a ls o  H .B . Morse, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e la t io n s
of th e  Chinese Em pire. [ 1 9 1 0 -1 9 1 8 ] ,  v o ls .  1 & 2.
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which had become in c r e a s in g ly  u n s a t is f a c t o r y  i n  th e  l a s t  ye ars
of the  monopoly. But th e re  had been no comparable change i n  the
Chinese approach to  the s u b je c t .  Indeed th e  Chinese d i s l i k e d
th e  new tu r n  of e v e n ts , p r e f e r r i n g  the  w e l l  r e g u la te d  p a t t e r n
of the  o ld  system, and t h e i r  fu nd am enta l o p p o s it io n  t o  e q u a l,
d i r e c t ,  and more e x te n s iv e  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  w estern  c o u n tr ie s
hampered th e  B r i t i s h  e f f o r t s  in  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  C onsequently
th e  v e ry  e x is te n c e  of norm al d ip lo m a t ic  r e l a t i o n s  between the
two  c o u n t r ie s  -  th e  means by which th e y  were l a t e r  ab le  to
a rra n g e  th e  q u es tio n s  a t  iss u e  between them -  rep res en te d  a
h a rd  won tr iu m p h .
The B r i t i s h  had f i r s t  t o  break down th e  Chinese in s is te n c e
upon c o n s id e r in g  a l l  fo r e ig n e r s  as t r i b u t a r i e s  and to  e s t a b l is h
t h e i r  c la im  to  be t r e a t e d  as the  e q u a ls  of the  C hinese . T h is
was f o r m a l ly  conceded i n  th e  T re a ty  o f Nanking. The T r e a t y 's
p r o v is io n s  f o r  d i r e c t  in te r c o u r s e  on eq u a l term s between B r i t i s h
and Chinese o f f i c i a l s  and i t s  p r e s c r ip t io n  of the  p ro p e r  form s
of communication between those o f f i c i a l s  d id  en ab le  th e  B r i t i s h
consuls  who were appo inted  a t each of th e  T r e a ty  p o r ts  to  c a r r y
out t h e i r  work. But th e  a t t i t u d e  of the  Chinese had not r e a l l y
changed v e ry  much. An Im p e r ia l  E d ic t  i n  1843 which d e c la re d
t h a t  " th ese  f o r e ig n e r s  h a v in g  but newly been brought back to  
peace, e bo rd er q u a r r e l  must not be s u ffe re d  aga in  
t o  break  out"  was o n ly  one in d ic a t io n  of t h i s .  1
D i r e c t  B r i t i s h  approaches to  th e  Peking  Government about t h e i r
g r ie v a n c e s  were a l l  re b u f fe d  w ith  the  rem inder t h a t  f o r e ig n
1 . W.C. C o s t in ,  op. c i t . , 112.
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a f f a i r s  were i n  the  charge of the  H igh Commissioner a t Canton. 
More and more however the  B r i t i s h  e xp e rien c e  o f d e a l in g  w ith  
o f f i c i a l s  i n  tha  p ro v in c e s  convinced them thfit th e  s o lu t io n  of 
t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  la y  i n  e s t a b l is h in g  d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  
th e  Im p e r ia l  Government a t F a k in g . T h is  th ey  achieved by th e  
T r e a t y  of T i e n t s i n  i n  1858 and the  subsequent co n ven tio n  of  
I 8 6 0 ,  and in  1861 S i r  F r e d e r ic k  Bruce went to  P ek ing  as the  
f i r s t  B r i t i s h  M in is t e r  to  ta k e  up re s id e n c e  t h e r e .
B e fo re  th e  T r e a ty  of Nanking i n  1842 th e  Chinese had 
only p e r m it te d  the  B r i t i s h  t o  t ra d e  i n  China su b jec t t o  v e ry  
narrow  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  At t im e s  d u r in g  th e  17th end 18th  
c e n tu r ie s  B r i t i s h  t r a d e  had been a llow ed a t  p o r ts  on the  Chinese  
coast o th e r  than  Canton and th e  e x te n s iv e  smuggling which was a 
f e a t u r e  of th e  f i r s t  h a l f  of th e  19th  cen tu ry  took p la c e  a t  a 
number of p o r ts  on th e  coast as f a r  n o r th  as Shanghai. But a l l  
th roug h  th e  l a s t  p e r io d  of th e  East In d ia  Company's monopoly 
and th e  f i r s t  few  y e a rs  of the  B r i t i s h  Governm ent's  s u p e rv is io n ,  
th e  t ra d e  was o f f i c i a l l y  co n fin ed  to  Canton. Moreover B r i t i s h  
m erchants th e re  were supposed to  dea l on ly  w ith  th e  smd. 1 group 
of Co-hong m erchants who p re s c r ib e d  a r b i t r a r i l y  the  p r ic e s  which 
th e  B r i t i s h  were to  pay and r e c e iv e  f o r  t h e i r  goods and who a ls o  
r é g u l â t 6Q a l l  the  o th e r  aspects  of th e  B r i t i s h  m erchants ' 
a c t i v i t y  -  where they  were to  l i v e ,  th e  Chinese se rv a n ts  th e y  
were t o  employ and so on.
The T r e a ty  of Nanking ended these  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  I t  named 
f i v e  p o r ts  which were to  be opened t o  f o r e ig n  t r a d e  and which
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became known as ' t r e a t y  p o r t s * .  N ine more were opened by the  
T r e a ty  of T ie n t s in  i n  1858 and o th e rs  a t i n t e r v a l s  t h e r e a f t e r .
I t  was s t ip u la te d  i n  th e  T r e a ty  of Nanking th a t  B r i t i s h  su b jec ts  
at the  t r e a t y  p o r ts  were e n t i t l e d  to  d e a l  w ith  any Chinese  
merchants th e r e ,  s e t t l i n g  p r ic e s  f r e e l y  between them, and to  
arrang e  them selves  where th e y  would l i v e  and what s e rv an ts  they  
world employ.
Im m unity from  Chinese l e g a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  was perhaps th e
most ch e r ish e d  p r i v i l e g e  of the B r i t i s h  s u b jec t In  C h in a .
The B r i t i s h  had been plagued w ith  th e  problem  of how to  d e a l
w ith  B r i t i s h  s u b je c ts  who offended a g a in s t  the  law  imhile i n
China from  th e  beg in n in g  of t h e i r  in te r c o u r s e  w ith  the  Chinese.
The o p p o r tu n i t ie s  f o r  d is p u te s  between B r i t is h ;  and Chinese
in c re a s e d  immensely w ith  th e  c lo s e r  and more widespread c o n ta c t
between them # i lo h  fo l lo w e d  from  th e  concessions of th e  1842 -43
and 1858 t r e a t i e s .  The methods of Chinese law and th e  abuses
in  i t s  a d m in is t r a t io n  rendered  i t  un acceptab le  to  th e  B r i t i s h
%nd consequen tly  th e y  had always sought to  exempt B r i t i s h
s u b je c ts  from  Chinese j u r i s d i c t i o n .  But exem ption alone was
not enougti. C a p ta in  C h a r le s  S l l i o t ,  th e  S u p erin ten d en t of
T rade  in  China from  1836 t o  1839, had p leaded f o r  ''adequate  
powers f o r  th e  re as o n ab le  c o n t ro l  of men whose rash  
conduct cannot be l e f t  t o  the  o p e ra t io n  of Chinese law s,
w ith o u t the  utmost inconven ience  and r i s k ,  and whose
im p u n ity  i s  a l i k e  i n ju r io u s  to  B r i t i s h  c h a r a c te r  and 
dangerous t o  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s * . !
By th e  t r e a t i e s  i t  was e s ta b l is h e d  th a t  a person accused 
of an o f fe n c e  in  China should be t r i e d  by th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  and
1. W.C. C o s t in ,  op. c i t . ,  4 7 .
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acco rd in g  to  th e  laws of h i s  own co u n try  and g r a d u a l ly  p rocedure
was developed to  make tbs  o p e ra t io n  of t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  e f f e c t i v e .
A l l  E r i t i s i i  n a t io n a ls  i n  China were d e c la re d  to  be sub jec t to
B r i t i s h  laws and to  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  a t  f i r s t  of the  Supreme
Court at Hong Kong and subsequently  of the  Supreme Court f o r
China and Japan e s ta b l is h e d  a t  Shanghai i n  186 5. B r i t i s h
cons i l s  in  China were g iv e n  j u d i c i a l  a u t h o r i t y .  The numerous
OraerS’- ln -C o u n c i  1 end C onsu lar Ordinances issued i n  the  course
of the  c e n tu ry  d e f in in g  the  c o n s u ls ’ powers and d e a l in g  w ith
o th e r  aspects  of procedure  bear w itn e s s  to  the  amount of
experim ent re q u ire d  i n  the  development of B r i t i s h  e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l
1
j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  C h ina.
I t  was a c t u a l l y  o n ly  i n  th e  case of c r im in a l  o ffe n c e s  
t h a t  th e  f i r s t  t r e s t l e s  d e f i n i t e l y  s t ip u la t e d  th a t  an accused 
person  should be t r i e d  by h i s  ovn a u t h o r i t i e s .  There  had indeed  
been very  l i t t l e  o p p o r tu n i ty  b e fo re  the  T r e a t y  of Hanking f o r  
c i v i l  d i  sputa 3 to  a r is e  between f o r e ig n e r s  and C hinese . I n  
1B43 i t  was s im ply p ro v id e d  th a t  i n  such mixed casas th e  consul  
should t r y  to  e f f e c t  an am icable s e tt le m e n t and, i f  t h i s  was 
u n s u c c e s s fu l,  th a t  the  m a tte r  ski ou Id  be s e t t le d  by the  consul 
and th e  Chinese a u t h o r i t i e s  j o i n t l y .  The T r e a ty  o f T i e n t s i n ’ s 
s t i p u l a t i o n  on t h i s  p o in t  was almost i d e n t i c a l  end i t  was not 
u n t i l  th e  Chafoo Agreement of 1876 th a t  i t  was d e f i n i t e l y  
s t ip u la te d  th a t  a l l  mixed oases should be t r i e d  by an o f f i c i a l
1 . On t h i s  g e n e ra l  q u e s t io n  op. G.W. K eeton , The Development 
of E x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y  i n  C h ina, [ 1 9 2 8 ] .
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of th e  d e fe n d a n t ’ s n a t i o n a l i t y .  By th a t  t im e ,  however, t h i s  
procedure  had a lre a d y  become th e  g e n e ra l  p r a c t i c e .
I n  the system th u s  ev o lv ed , B r i t i s h  c o u r ts  in  China had 
J u r is d ic t io n  in  a l l  cases in  which B r i t i s h  s u b je c ts  were 
d e fe n d a n ts ,  whether a g a in s t  o th e r  B r i t i s h  s u b je c ts ,  o th e r  
f o r e ig n e r s  or C h inese . By th e  same p r i n c i p l e ,  cases i n  i^ iich  
a B r i t i s h  s u b je c t  was p ro s e c u t in g  another f o r e ig n e r s  were t r i e d  
i n  the a p p ro p r ia te  f o r e ig n  co u rt  and ones i n  which a Chinese  
was b e in g  p ro secu ted  were t r i e d  in  Chinese c o u r ts .
On the  whole the  system worked v e ry  w e l l ,  -inhere i t  most 
o f te n  broke down was in  those cases i n  which a B r i t i s h  su b jec t  
had a g r ie v a n c e  a g a in s t  a Chinese end which co n seq u en tly  came 
w i th in  Chinese j u r i s d i c t i o n .  The s tro n g  p r e ju d ic e  üh lch  th e  
Chinese s t i l l  f e l t  a g a in s t  f o r e ig n e r s  and the d e la y  and abuse 
which c h a r a c te r is e d  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  of Chinese law combined 
t o  make s s a t is f a c t o r y  s e t t le m e n t  of these  cases v ery  d i f f i c u l t .
T h is  problem was to  some e x te n t  so lved  a t S h a n ^ a i  where 
i t  had ta k e n  an acute fo rm . The n e u t r a l i t y  of th e  f o r e ig n  
s e tt le m e n t  th e r e  d u r in g  the  T a ip in g  r e b e l l i o n  had le d  t o  a huge 
i n f l u x  of Chinese which made i t  im p e ra t iv e  f o r  the  m u n ic ip a l i t y  
to  ta k e  some s teps  f o r  the  p re s e rv a t io n ,  of o rd e r .  The r e s u l t  
was th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a Mixed Court in  which a Chinese  
o f f i c i a l  as judge was a s s is te d  by f o r e ig n  Assessors, drawn from  
th e  C onsu lar s e rv ic e s , as c o - ju d g e s .  The experim ent was a 
success, i f  not an u n q u a l i f ie d  one. I t  was not however extended  
d u r in g  the  19th c e n tu ry  to  p la c e s  o th er  th a n  Shanghai. Elsewhere  
th e  C onsu ls ’ a c t i v i t y  seems to  have been the  c h ie f  assurance
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of a p ro p e r  re g a rd  f o r  B r i t is h  in t e r e s t s  in  cases t r ie d  in
C hinese C o u rts . A member of th e  B r i t is h  L e g a tio n  a t P ek ing
noted  in  1399 th a t  "under p re s e n t o lroum stanoes v e ry  few  cases  
of any Im p o rta n c e , where th e  d e fen d an t is  C h in ese , 
are l e f t  to  the u n fe t te re d  d e c is io n  of a n a t iv e  C o u rt,
The fo r e ig n  p l a i n t i f f ’ s Consul i s  alm ost in v a r ia b ly  
o b lig e d  to  in t e r f e r e  on h is  b e h a lf ,  and th e  m a tte r  i s  often  
s e t t le d  w ith o u t coming in to  C ourt a t a l l ,  or i f  i t  does 
come to  a h e a r in g  th e  judgment i s  n o t t r e a te d  as f i n a l  
u n less  th e  Consul I s  s a t is f ie d , of I t s  s u b s ta n t ia l  
ju s t ic e .  . . . "  1
The problem  of p r o te c t in g  B r i t is h  s u b je c ts  in  C hina was
g r e a t ly  in c re a s e d  when they  acq u ired  th e  r ig h t  to  t r a v e l  in
th e  i n t e r i o r  of th e  c o u n try . The T re a ty  o f Nanking had eased
th e  p re v io u s  c lo s e  r e s t r ic t io n s  on t h e i r  movements by p ro v id in g
th a t  th e y  m i ^ t  go a d a y 's  jo u rn ey  from  any o f th e  T r e a ty  P o r ts .
But th e  g re a t g a in  came w ith  th e  T r e a ty  of T ie n ts in  vhioh
p ro v id e d  t h a t  fo r e ig n e r s  m l# it  t r a v e l ,  but not r e s id e ,  anywhere
in  the i n t e r i o r  of C h in s , f o r  p le a s u re  or f o r  t r a d e ,  as lo ng
as th e y  had a p a s s p o rt.
The T r e a ty  p ro v id e d  a t  the  same tim e  th a t  th e  "Chinese
a u t h o r i t ie s  s h a ll  at a l l  t im e s  a f fo rd  th e  f u l l e s t  p ro te c t io n
to  th e  persons and p ro p e r ty  of B r i t is h  s u b je c ts  Whenever th ese
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s h a ll  have been su b jec ted  to  in s u l t  end v io le n c e " . But th e
1 . Memorandum by Mr. Gockburn (C hinese S e c re ta ry , B r i t is h
L e g a tio n , P e k in g ) commenting upon correspondence from  th e  
C hina A s s o c ia tio n  re g a rd in g  th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of th e  ad o p tio n  
of E code of m e rc a n t ile  law  in  C h in a . G.W. K eeton, o p . c i t . . 
I I ,  3 7 4 . T h is  correspondence I s  a ls o  p u b lis h e d  in  
A. & P . . L 1 6 9 9 ],C IX ,
2 . A r t .  X V I I I ,  T re a ty  o f T ie n t s in ,  B .F .S .P . . 1 8 5 7 -1 8 5 8 , X L V I I I ,
[ 1 8 6 6 ] ,  51.
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lo c a l  Chinese a u t h o r i t ie s  were o fte n  th e  peop le  most vehem ently  
opposed to  th e  presence o f fo r e ig n e r s .  They were f r e q u e n t ly  
rem iss  in  p r o h ib i t in g  the  p o s tin g  o f In fla m m a to ry  p la c a rd s  and 
were o fte n  th em selves  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  s t i r r i n g  up the lo c a l  
p o pu lace  a g a in s t th e  " fo re ig n  d e v i ls "  in  t h e i r  m id s t. The 
degree to  which th e  mass of the  Chinese were r e a l l y  h o s t i le  to  
fo r e ig n e r s  has been much c o n te s te d . C e r ta in ly  th e y  were 
unaccustomed to  w e s te rn ers  whose customs o fte n  provoked Chinese  
s u p e r s t i t i t lo n s  end whose ways were sometimes so d i f f e r e n t  from  
those  of th e  Chinese as to  be o f fe n s iv e . Fem ale m is s io n a r ie s  
in  p a r t ic u la r  were th e  source of much s u s p ic io n . On th e  o th e r  
hand many fo r e ig n e r s  who had t r a v e l le d  in  C hina emphasized  
t h a t  th e y  had been re c e iv e d  in  a v e ry  f r i e n d l y  fa s h io n . In  any 
e v e n t, a s i tu a t io n  e x is te d  in  which r i o t  and massacre was 
alw ays a p o s s ib i l i t y .  S ince th e  c o n tin u in g  a n t i - f o r e ig n  
f e e l in g  among th e  Chinese made th e  s t ip u la t io n s  o f th e  t r e a t i e s  
in s u f f ic ie n t  f o r  th e  p r o te c t io n  which th e y  had been designed  
to  p ro v id e , the  B r i t is h  were l e f t  w ith  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  
th e  s a fe ty  of B r i t is n  s u b je c ts  in  th e  i n t e r i o r  and th e  presence  
of gunboats became a necessary  support o f e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l  
p r iv i l e g e s .  These c ircu m stan ces  c u r t a i le d  any in c l in a t io n  on 
th e  p a r t  o f th e  B r i t is h  Government to  lend  s ip p o rt to  th e  
p e r e n n ia l wish of B r i t is h  m erchants f o r  the r ig ^ t  to  re s id e  as 
w e ll  as to  t r a v e l  in  th e  i n t e r i o r .
The opening of t r e a t y  p o r ts  a lone brought la r g e r  and 
la r g e r  s e c tio n s  of China w ith in  th e  range of th e  B r i t is h  
m erchant. By th e  T re a ty  of N anking Shanghai, N ingpo, Foochow
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and Amoy as w e ll  as Canton had been d e c la re d  t r e a t y  p o r ts ,
th u s  opening the  c o a s ta l c o u n try  between th e  West R iv e r  and
th e  Y angtze  to  fo r e ig n  t r a d e .  And upon th e  opening of
Wenchow and Swatow by th e  T r e a ty  of T ie n ts in  in  1858, th e re
was a t r e a t y  p o r t  at each p o in t  upon th a t  coast where a r i v e r
flo w e d  in to  th e  sea.
The la rg e  t ra d e  th a t  developed 30 r a p id ly  a t Shanghai
was ev idence o f th e  g re a t p o s s ib i l i t i e s  f o r  tra d e  in  the
Y angtze  v a l le y .  The 1858 t r e a t i e s  p ro v id e d  f o r  th e  opening of
fo u r  p o r ts  r ig h t  on th e  Y a n g tze . The ones chosen ware
G h in k ia n g , a t the  ju n c t io n  of th e  Grand C anal and th e  r iv e r ;
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N an king , th e  p r o v in c ia l  c a p i t a l  o f K langsu; K iu k ia n g , n ear  
# ia r e  th e  Y angtze  jo in e d  th e  Poyang Lake and th roug h  i t  th e  
r iv e r s  which d ra in e d  most of th e  p ro v in c e  of K ia n g s i; and 
Hankow, a g re a t c e n tre  f o r  Chinese t ra d e  s itu a te d  a t th e  
ju n c t io n  o f th e  Y angtze  and th e  Hnnkiang w hich, w ith  i t s  
t r i b u t a r i e s ,  d ra in e d  a la rg e  p a r t  of th e  p ro v in c e  of Hopeh and 
a ls o  tapped southw estern  Honan and southern  S h en s i. C h in k ian g  
was to  be opened w ith in  a y e a r but th e  o th e r p o r ts  chosen were 
no t to  be opened u n t i l  o rd e r was re s to re d  in  th e  p ro v in c e s  
to u c h in g  th e  Y angtze  no r were fo r e ig n  v e s s e ls  to  be a llo w ed  to  
n a v ig a te  th e  r i v e r  u n t i l  th a t  t im e . I n  1861 however B r i t is h  
m erchants induced Bruce to  a rran g e  f o r  th e  im m ediate e x e rc is e  
of th e  r ig h t  to  n a v ig a te  th e  Y angtze  and the re v is e d  re g u la t io n s
1 . N anking was not opened u n t i l  1898,
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on t h is  s u b je c t p rom ulgated  in  1863 rem ained in  fo rc e  u n t i l  
1898 . The Ohefoo C onventio n  o f 1876 d e s ig n a te d  s ix  p la c e s  on 
th e  lo w e r Y angtze  as p o r ts  o f c a l l  f o r  th e  fo r e ig n  steam ers  
n a v ig a t in g  th e  r i v e r .  I t  a ls o  p ro v id e d  f o r  th e  opening of 
Wubu adding a n o th er t r e a t y  p o rt  on th e  lo w er Y a n g tze . The 
opening, of Ic h an g  in  th e  same y e a r  brought th e  upper reaches  
of th e  Y angtze  w ith in  d i r e c t  reach  of fo r e ig n  tra d e  f o r  th e  
f i r s t  t im e . The B r i t is h  were a ls o  g iven  p e rm is s io n  to  ap p o in t 
a consu l a t Chungking, beyond Ichang  and above th e  Y angtze  
go rg es , but on th e  u n d ers ta n d in g  th a t  i t  was no t to  be opened to  
fo r e ig n  tra d e  u n t i l  i t  was a c c e s s ib le  to  fo r e ig n  stegmers. In  
1890 however t h is  c o n d it io n  was waived and Chungking was opened, 
g iv in g  more d i r e c t  access to  th e  r e p u te d ly  w e a lth y  p ro v in ce  
of Szechuan.
The T r e a ty  o f T ie n t s in  had broken o th e r  new ground and
had opened n o rth e rn  C hina to  fo r e ig n  tra d e  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e .
Newchwang, a t th e  mouth o f th e  Hun-ho #11 ch d ra in ed  s o u th ea s te rn  
M an ch u ria , and C h ef0 0 , on th e  n o rth e rn  coast of th e  p e n in s u la  
of th e  p ro v in c e  o f Shangtung, became t r e a t y  p o r ts .  And in  1860  
T ie n t s in ,  from  which i t  was p o s s ib le  t o  tap  th e  tra d e  of th e  
m e tro p o lita n  p ro v in c e  of C h ih l i  and of th e  re g io n  beyond, was 
a ls o  opened to  fo r e ig n  t r a d e .
On th e  Chinese coast south of Canton th e re  were two 
t r e a t y  p o r ts  -  Kiungchow on the Is la n d  of H a in an  opened in  1858 
and Pakhoi opened in  1876. But th e  i n t e r i o r  of southern China
and the south we s te rn  p ro v in c e s  d id  not b eg in  to  be opened to
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fo r e ig n  tra d e  u n t i l  some tim e a f t e r  th e  r e s t  of C h in a . E f fe c ­
t i v e  steps f o r  the opening of t h is  area were on ly  ta k en  in  th e  
la t e  e ig h t ie s  and th e  n in e t ie s .  Then however i t  became one 
of th e  g re a t c e n tre s  of a t te n t io n  and throiogh th e  a c t iv e  in t e r e s t  
of th a  French and B r i t is h  in  g a in in g  access to  i t  was g ra d u a lly
op u'led to  fo r e ig n  t r a d e . Lung chow and Mengtze ware d e c la re d
t r e a t y  p o r ts  by th e  1387 P ran co -C h in esa  C o n ven tio n , Szemao by
th e  1895 C o n ven tio n , and Nanning and Momein by th e  B r i t is h
1
C onventio n  w ith  China in  1897.
One prob lem  to  be d e a lt  w ith  in  d e v e lo p in g  a system f o r  
th e  oonouct o f w estern  tra d e  w ith  China was th e  ta x a t io n  of 
fo r e ig n  goon s . I t  was th e  i r r e g u l a r i t y  and u n p r e d ic t a b i l i t y  
q u ite  as much as th e  amount of ta x e s  on t r a c e  in  C hina which 
i r r i t a t e d  w estern  m erchants and. th e  'A o lo  o b je c t of th e  t r e a t y  
arrangem ents In  t h is  re s p e c t was to  d e f in e  as e x a c t ly  as 
p o s s ib le  th e  amount of th e  dues to  which fo r e ig n  goods were 
l i a b l e .  A t a r i f f  of the  d u t ie s  to  be p a id  was drawn up and
a tta c h e d  to  th e  T r e a ty  of N anking , most of th e  d u t ie s  b e in g
set a t about b% o f th e  va lu e  of th e  goods. W ith in  a few  y e a rs  
how ever changes in  p r ic e  and th e  r a te  of exchange had in  most 
cases made th e  a c tu a l amount of the  d u t ie s  « lith e r  c o n s id e ra b ly  
more or le s s  th a n  of th e  va lu e  of the  goods. A re v is e d
1 . The a c tu a l opening of Nanning was th e  s u b je c t o f much
n e g o t ia t io n  between the  B r i t is h  and Chinese and was not 
f i n a l l y  ach ieved u n t i l  1899 . Momein, a l t e r n a t iv e ly  known 
as Tengyueh, was not opened u n t i l  1902.
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t a r i f f  was n e g o tia te d  a f t e r  th e  T r e a ty  of T ie n t s in  and, w ith  
c e r t a in  e x c e p tio n s , th e  d u t ie s  on each a r t i c l e  were ag a in  set 
a t about ^  of i t s  vdL.ua. P ro v is io n  was made f o r  r e v is io n  of 
th e  t a r i f f  e v ery  te n  y e a rs  but none a c tu a l ly  to o k  p la c e  u n t i l  
1902 and t h is  t a r i f f  rem ained In  fo rc e  u n t i l  th e  end o f th e  
c e n tu ry .
D e f in i t io n  of th e  d u t ie s  to  be p a id  a t th e  tim e  and 
p la c e  o f Im p o rt o r e x p o rt was however o n ly  one p a r t  of th e  
p ro b lem . A l l  goods go ing  any d is ta n c e  in  C hina had to  pass  
a number of Customs s ta t io n s  a t each of which th e y  were l i a b le  
to  th e  le v y  o f f u r t h e r  d u t ie s .  The T r e a ty  of Nanking had 
in c lu d e d  a p ro v is io n  th a t  payment of a c e r ta in  amount of th ese  
t r a n s i t  dues should e n t i t l e  fo r e ig n  goods to  be ta k e n  anyndiere 
in  C hina w ith o u t f u r t h e r  paym ent. But i t  had proved im p o ss ib le  
to  d e c id e  what th a t  amount should be and in s te a d  i t  had s im ply  
been s t ip u la te d  th a t  " th e  f u r t h e r  amount of d u ty  s h a ll  not 
exceed th e  p re s e n t r a te s  which a re  on a m oderate s c a le " . In  
th e  f i f t i e s  however th e  cost o f t r y in g  to  suppress th e  T a ip in g  
r e b e l l io n  le d  to  an in c re a s e  of the  ta x e s  le v ie d  on goods 
p a s s in g  throug h  th e  I n t e r i o r  which made th e  scale  f a r  from  
m oderate . The vague manner in  which the  su b jec t had been 
s e t t le d  in  1343 became in c r e a s in g ly  u n s a t is fa c to r y  and the  
q u e s tio n  was ta k e n  up ag a in  in  th e  n e g o t ia t io n  o f th e  T re a ty  
of T ie n t s in .  T h is  t im e  i t  was la id  down t h a t  fo r e ig n  im p o rts  
and Chinese produce in ten d ed  f o r  e xp o rt should be f r e e d  from  
th e  payment of any t r a n s i t  dues i f  th e y  p a id  a 2g-  ^ d u ty  in  
a d d it io n  to  the  d u ty  p re s c r ib e d  in  th e  t a r i f f .
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Many d i f f i c u l t i e s  co m p licated  th e  developm ent of t h is  
arrangem ent end i t  rem ained one of the  most p e r s is t e n t ly  
annoying q u e s tio n s  a t is s u e  between th e  B r i t is h  and C h in ese. 
B r i t is h  m erchants com plained of the f a i l u r e  of the  t r a n s i t  pass  
system , Chinese a u th o r i t ie s  of i t s  abuse -  both w ith  some 
ju s t ic e .  The Chinese p r o v in c ia l  o f f i c i a l s  wore s tro n g ly  opposed 
to  the  imliole scheme a t f i r s t . Th ere  was no arrangem ent f o r  
s h a rin g  the money c o lle c te d  from  the  ta x  among th e  p ro v in c e s  
th roug h  # i lc h  th e  goods would pass on t h e i r  way t o  t h e i r  
d e s t in a t io n .  Thus by t h is  scheme many p ro v in c e s  would lo se  th e  
la rg e  revenue which th e y  d e riv e d  from  th e  ta x a t io n  of goods in  
t r a n s i t .  The r e s u lt  was th a t  many o f f i c i a l s  would not re s p e c t  
th e  t r a n s i t  pass c e r t i f i c a t e s  and fo r e ig n  m erchants , knowing  
th a t  th e y  m ight have to  pay the  t r a n s i t  dues as w a ll  as th e  ta x  
in  com m utation of them , o f te n  d id  n o t c o n s id e r i t  w o rth w h ile  to  
pay th e  com m utation ta x .
G ra d u a lly  however th e  system won w id er acceptance in  
most p a r ts  of Chine a lth o u g h  in  th e  south i t  d id  no t b e g in  to  
be re co g n ize d  u n t i l  th e  very  end o f th e  19 th  c e n tu ry . Where 
th e  t r a n s i t  pass c e r t i f i c a t e s  were honoured, the  fo r e ig n  
m erchants had an advantage over th e  Chinese in  th a t  th e y  could  
c a lc u la te  ahead of tim e th e  exac t amoimt which th e y  would have  
to  pay in  d u t ie s .  The Chinese however were a ls o  ab le  to  b e n e f it  
by th e  system f o r  i t  became th e  p r a c t ic e  f o r  Chinese t r a d e rs  to  
convey fo r e ig n  goods vihich th e y  had im po rted  in to  th e  i n t e r io r  
under a t r a n s i t  pass which th e y  p a id  a fo r e ig n e r  to  ta k e  out 
f o r  them in  h is  name. C hinese o f f i c i a l s  com plained b i t t e r l y
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at f i r s t  th a t  th e  p r iv i l e g e  had o n ly  been in ten d ed  f o r  fo r e ig n  
goods in  fo r e ig n  hands. I t s  e x te n s io n  to  fo r e ig n  goods 
b e lo n g in g  t o  Chinese t r a d e rs  was however g ra d u a lly  accepted  
and was confirm ed in  the Ohefoo C onvention o f 1876.
The d is o rd e rs  a t th e  tim e  of th e  T a ip in g  r e b e l l io n  had 
been th e  occasion  of' an o th er v e ry  im p o rta n t developm ent 
re g a rd in g  the c o l le c t io n  of customs d u t ie s .  In  th e  T r e a ty  of 
Nanking th e  B r i t i s i i  had agreed th a t  t h e i r  Consuls should be 
re s p o n s ib le  f o r  seeing  th a t  th e  d u t ie s  due to  th e  Chinese
Government from  B r i t is h  m erchants ware p a id . O th ar governm ents
however d id  not e s su me t h i s  o b lig a t io n  and t h is  tended to
pu t th e  B r i t is h  t r a d e r  a t a d isad van tag e  in  c o m p e tit io n . At
the  same tim e  th e  C o n su ls ’ e f f o r t s  to  h e lp  p ro te c t  th e  Chines©  
revenue were hampered by th e  encouragement which Chinese  
o f f i c i a l s  gave to  th e  m erchants to  evade th e  f u l l  payment o f 
customs d u tie s . These c o n s id e ra tio n s  led  to  th e  B r i t is h  
Governm ent’ s d e c is io n  in  1851 not to  t r e a t  th e  o b lig a t io n  
as a b in d in g  one any lo n g e r .
Two y e ars  l a t e r  however unprecedented d i f f i c u l t i e s  arose
in  th e  c o l le c t io n  of customs d u t ie s  at S hanghai. The
d e v a s ta t in g  advance of th e  T a ip in g s  down th e  Y angtze  led
to  an extrem e shortage of money a t Shanghai # i ic h  hampered
t r a d e .  In  p a r t ic u la r ,  i t  made i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the  m erchants
UciA
to  pay customs d u t ie s  f o r  th e s a ^ to  be p a id  in  cash. The 
s i t u a t io n  became even mors co m p lica ted  in  September 1353  
when an independent group o f re b e ls  cap tu red  Shanghai i t s e l f
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and lo o te d  th e  Customs House. The B r i t i s h ,  F rench  and Am erican  
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  wanted to  keep th e  fo r e ig n  s e ttle m e n t c o m p le te ly  
n e u t r a l  and considered  th a t t h is  p re c lu d e d  th e  fu n c t io n in g  
v /ith in  i t  o f th e  Customs O f f ic e r  of th e  im p e r ia l  Government.
And s ince tha  re b e ls  occupied most of th e  Chinese c i t y ,  th e re  
was h a r i l y  anywhere where he could  e x e rc is e  h is  o f f ic e .
M erchants welcomed the p ro sp e c t of r e l i e f  from  the  
payment of d u t ie s  Th e .C o n su ls  on th a  o th e r hand, p a r t ic u la r ly  
R u th e rfo rd  A lcock th e  B r i t is h  c o n s u l, f e l t  th a t  the  t r e a t y  
o b lig a t io n  to  pay d u t ie s  could not be e n t i r e ly  ig n o re d . But 
none of th e  v a r io u s  arrangem ents in tro d u c e d  in  th a  n ex t n in e  
months by th e  C onsuls and by the Chinese a u th o r i t ie s  to  t r y  
to  ensure th e  payment of d u t ie s  solved th e  p rob lem . O fte n  
th e  p la n s  of one a ide  were not a c c e p ta b le  to  the  o th e r , w h ils t  
most o f th e  arrangem ents made by th e  Consuls were subsequently  
re p u d ia te d  in  whole or in  p a r t  by t h e i r  M in is te r  or Governm ent. 
M eanwhile th e  m erchants from  c o u n tr ie s  who had no t r e a t y  w ith  
C h in a , ana who were consequently  s u b je c t to  no c o n tr o l ,  
r e v e l le d  in  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  ca rry  on tra d e  w ith o u t p a y in g  
any d u t ie s  and th e  n e c e s s it ie s  of c o m p e tit io n  lad  more and 
more o f th a  B r i t is h  and Am erican m erchants to  ta k e  p a r t  in  
t h is  sm uggling. In  January 1854, fo l lo w in g  th e  example of 
th e  F rench  ana th e  A m ericans, S ir  George Bonham th e  B r i t is h  
S u p erin ten d e n t to ld  Aloock th a t  he should c le a r  ships vh lch  
had not p a id  d u ty . I t  was obvious however th a t  t h is  s o lu t io n  
could  o n ly  be a tem p orary  one and th a t  sooner or l a t e r  th e  
payment of d u t ie s  would have to  be resumed.
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E ven ts  had Im pressed upon th e  C onsuls th e  e x te n t to
which th e  working of the  t r e a t y  p ro v is io n s  re g a rd in g  the
c o l le c t io n  of d u t ie s  depenaed on th e  f a ls e  assum ption th a t  th e re
would be s u f f ic ie n t  "honesty , energy and c a p a c ity  in  [ th e  
ChineseJ Custom House o f f i c i a l s  . . .  to  ensure th e  
Chinese Government i t s  le g i t im a te  incom e, end the  
fo r e ig n  tra d e  a g a in s t gross abuse from  c o r ru p t io n  and
f r o n  n e g lig e n o e  combined" . !
And A lcock was confirm ed in  a c o n v ic t io n  wdiich he had form ed  
e a r l i e r  th a t  th e  in t r o d u c t io n  of fo r e ig n e r s  in to  th e  Customs 
a d m in is tr a t io n  was necessary  i f  i t  vms to  fu n c t io n  ju s t ly  
and e f f e c t i v e l y .  The French arhi Am erican Consuls agreed w ith  
him and, a t a m eeting  of th e  th re e  C onsuls and th e  T a o ta i on 
29 June 1354, r e g u la t io n s  were drawn up f o r  a new Customs 
p ro c e d u re , Under th e  new scheme th e re  were to  be th re e  fo r e ig n  
In s p e c to rs , each o f th e  consu ls  n o m in a tin g  one of h is  c o u n try ­
man f o r  appointm ent by th e  T a o ta i .
The new aarnlni s t r a t i  on s ta r te d  in  J u ly  and from  th e  
b e g in n in g  i t  was a g re a t success. Trade seemed to  f lo u r is h  
under I t  and th e re  were hopes th a t  th e  la rg e  revenues vh ich  
were c o lle c te d  would h e lp  to  re c o n c ile  th e  Chinese Government 
to  the  id e a  of fo r e ig n  t r a d e . The Chinese a u th o r i t ie s  however 
re p u ls e d  a l l  suggestions uhat th a  new system should be extended  
to  th e  o th e r  t r e a ty  p o r ts .  And. some B r i t is h  m erchants began to  
c o u p la in  th a t  o lisnglia i was b e in g  p e n a liz e d  by i t s  s in g u la r  
p o s i t io n .  C larendon became more and more concerned on t h is
1 . A lcock to  Bonliara, 10 A p r i l  1854^ quoted in  S .F . W rig h t,
H a rt and the  Chinese Customs, L l9 5 0 ] ,  102.
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p o in t  and a t th e  end of 1856 gave in s t r u c t io n s  th a t  th e  
Shanghai In s p e c to ra te  would have to  be stopped u n less  th e  same 
system was In tro d u c e d  in  th e  o th e r  p o r ts  at once. L u c k ily  
p re -o c c u p a tio n  w ith  th e  "Arrow" a f f a i r  p re v en te d  im m ediate  
a c t io n  on t h i s  in s t r u c t io n  and th e  T r e a ty  o f T ie n ts in  which  
ended th e  war between England and Chine p ro v id e d  f o r  th e  
e x te n s io n  of th a  system to  the  o th e r  t r e a t y  p o r ts .
Under th e  o r ig in a l  re g u la t io n s  th e  Consuls had had 
c o n s id e ra b le  powers of c o n tr o l  over th e  a d m in is tra t io n  o f the  
Customs. In  f a c t ,  th e  In s p e c to rs  took an in c r e a s in g ly  in d e ­
pendent l in e  of a c t io n . T h is  was c r i t i c i z e d  and co n tes ted  by  
th e  Consuls but i t  was welcomed by th e  B r l t i ^  Government who 
d id  no t want to  be re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  In s p e c to r s ’ a c t io n s  
and #10 p r e fe r r e d  th a t  th ey  should be considered  s e rv an ts  of 
th e  C hinese Governm ent. I t  was on th e s e  l in e s  th a t  th e  new 
Customs A d m in is tra t io n  developed a f t e r  th e  T re a ty  of T ie n t s in ,  
th e  appointm ent o f th e  In s p e c to rs  b e in g  l e f t  to  th e  Chinese  
Governm ent. At th e  same tim e  however th e  p re -em in en ce  of 
B r i t is h  in f lu e n c e  in  th e  A d m in is tra t io n  was f i r m ly  e s ta b lis h e d .  
They had had a le a d in g  p o s it io n  from  the  s ta r t  by v i r t u e  of 
th e  f a c t  th a t  Thomas Tad©, th e  o r ig in a l  B r i t is h  member o f th e  
In s p e c to r a te ,  was th e  o n ly  one of th e  f i r s t  In s p e c to rs  w ith  a 
knowledge of Chinese and co n seq u en tly  th e  a d m in is tra t io n  had  
been la r g e ly  in  h is  hands. When th e  Chinese dec id ed  a f t e r  th e  
war th a t  th e re  should be one person re s p o n s ib le  f o r  s u p e rv is in g  
th e  # io le  a d m in is tr a t io n , t h e i r  cho ice  was H enry Lay, Wade’ s
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successor on th e  Shanghai In s p e c to r a te . And B r i t is h  le a d e rs h ip
was p e rp e tu a te d  a f t e r  L a y ’ s d is m is s a l in  1863 by the appointm ent
of R obert H a r t  vho h e ld  th e  p o s it io n  of In sp e c to r-n e n e rs il
1
u n t i l  th e  b eg in n in g  of th e  20th  c e n tu ry .
The system as i t  d eve lo p ed , w ith  th e  independence o f th e  
Customs S e rv ic e  f i r m ly  e s ta b lis h e d  on th e  one hand but w ith  
th e  dominance o f B r i t is h  In f lu e n c e  in  i t  ensured on th e  o th e r ,  
was an a d m irab le  one from  th e  p o in t  o f v iew  of th e  B r i t is h  
Governm ent. They had no r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  th e  a d m in is tra t io n  
of th e  Customs and were f r e e  of a l l  th e  c o m p lic a tio n s  # i ic h  
would have a tten d ed  a system in  which fo r e ig n  governm ents had 
r ig h t s  of c o n t r o l .  But a t th e  same t in e  th e y  ware assured o f 
th e  p r o te c t io n  of t h e i r  com m ercial in t e r e s t s  -  t h e i r  v i t a l  
in t e r e s t s  in  Chin© -  by th e  p re -em in en ce  of B r i t ia h  in f lu e n c e  
i n  th e  a d m in is tra t io n  vAloh d e a lt  w ith  many of th e  q u es tio n s  
most c lo s e ly  to u ch in g  fo r e ig n  t r a d e .
The g re a t c ry  of th e  B r i t is h  in  China had alw ays been  
f o r  eq u a l t r a d in g  o p p o r tu n it ie s  f o r  ©11 -  a p o l ic y  c h r is te n e d  
a t th e  end of the  c e n tu ry  as th a t  of th e  "open d o o r* and 
enshrined  in  th e  t r e a t i e s  in  the  m o s t-f© v o u re d -n a tio n  c lau se  
which p ro v id ed  th a t  each c o u n try  m ight share any p r iv i le g e s  
g ra n te d  to  o th e rs . B r i t a in  perhaps gained le s s  from  t h i s  
c lau se  th a n  o th e rs  s ince i t  was she who took th e  lesd  in  opening  
Chine to  fo r e ig n  tra d e  and # io  was th e  f i r s t  to  g a in  many of
1. Cp. S .F . w r ig h t , H a rt and th e  C hinese Customs, [1 9 5 0 ] .
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of th e  p r iv i le g e s  of fo r e ig n  tr a d e rs  in  C h in a . N e v e rth e le s s  
i t  was to  t h is  s t ip u la t io n ,  a long w ith  t h e i r  in f lu e n c e  in  
th e  Customs A d m in is tra t io n  and a l l  th e  o th e r fe a tu r e s  of 
th e  t r e a t y  system, th a t  th e y  looked f o r  th e  p re s e rv a t io n  
of th a t  e q u a li ty  of o p p o rtu n ity  vÉiich was th e  fo u n d a tio n  
of B r i t is h  com m ercial supremacy in  C h in a .
CHAPTER
BRITISH POLICY. THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR.
AND THBJ INTERVENTION OF THE POWERS.
The immediate cause of the Sino-Japanese war of 
1894-95 lay in the situation in Corea. China had enjoyed 
suzerain rights over Corea for several centuries, but 
until recently the relationship had remained a very loose 
one even though C h i  n a had always attached more 
importance to Corea, on account of its position, than to 
most of her other vassal states. As long as the Coreans 
paid tribute regularly and sought the investiture of each 
king upon his accession by the Emperor of China, the 
Chinese had taken little interest in Corean affairs. How­
ever the historic Japanese interest in Corea had revived 
when Japan abandoned her policy of seclusion in the 
eighteen-sixties and embarked upon an active policy in 
the Pacific. In 1876 Japan negotiated the treaty which 
first opened Corea to foreign trade. The controversy 
raised in Corea by this new intercourse with the outer 
world was a fertile field for conflict between China and
and Japan. Both countries sent troops to Corea to keep 
order when a dispute arose there in 1882. In 1884 there 
was a much more serious incident in which the troops of 
the two countries clashed. Under the impact of the 
renewed Japanese interest in Corea, the Chinese began a 
concerted effort to assert their influence there.
The Government of the backward country of Corea was 
generally recognized as one of the most corrupt of Oriental 
governments. Official oppression had frequently led to 
popular risings, but these, poorly led and poorly equipped, 
had never been very successful. However a rebellion in 
1894 of the Tonghaks, a secret society with a large member­
ship, enjoyed unprecedented success. The Corean Government 
was unable to cope with the situation and the rebels advanced 
northwards and were soon threatening the capital, Seoul.
At the end of May, Yuan Shih-kai, the Chinese Resident 
in Corea, finally persuaded the King of Corea to appeal for 
Chinese assistance in suppressing the revolt.^ In response
to this request, about 2000 Chinese troops landed in Corea
2on 5 June. On 7 June the Japanese announced that they
1. f.G.Hillier, Narrative of events in Corea, enclosed 
in 0*Conor to Kimberley, No. 589»<5*017/1198.
2. ibid. '
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were sending troops to Seoul to protect Japanese interests 
there.^ The period from this time until the actual declar­
ation of war on 1 August 1894 was crowded with the many 
efforts which were made to find a means of settling the 
dispute peacefully. The Diplomatic Representatives of a 
number of the Powers, ©specially those of England and Russia, 
were actively engaged in the search for a solution. One 
particular source of confusion was the absence of any single 
authority acting for the Chinese Government in the matter. 
Both the Taungli Yamen, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Li Hung-chang, who had special responsibility for 
Corean affairs, took part in negotiations. But there was
no clear division of authority between them and both were
2
reluctant to take responsibility at any point.
The Chinese had said at first that their troops would 
be withdrawn as soon as order was restored.^ Shortly after 
the arrival of their troops, Corean soldiers dispersed the 
rebels. In the meantime however, the Japanese intervention
1. Paget to Kimberley, Tel.14, 7 June 1894, F046/440.
2. 0*Conor to Kimberley, No.191 Confidential, 13 July 
1894, FOl7/1195.
0’Conor to Kimberley, No.199» 18 July 1894,
F017/1195.
3. 0 ’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.22, 12 June 1894,
P017/1204.
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had greatly complicated the problem* It was no longer 
simply a question of the restoration of order and the 
withdrawal of troops* The Japanese refused to withdraw 
their troops until arrangements had been made for the 
introduction of reforms in the Gorean Government which 
would prevent disturbances in the future.^  They also 
refused to recognize Chinese suzerainty over Corea. The 
Chinese would admit no question of their suzerain rights 
in Corea, were strongly opposed to the question of reform 
being raised, and insisted in any case upon the withdrawal 
of the troops from Corea before any other matters were 
discussed.^ The problem was to find a basis for negotiat­
ions to which both the Chinese and the Japanese could be 
reconciled. Efforts in this direction were frustrated by 
the obstinacy of the Chinese and the ambition of the Japan­
ese: no sooner were the Chinese finally persuaded to make 
a concession than the Japanese would introduce a new 
condition. Meanwhile both countries had been sending more
Zl
troops to Corea and were making preparations for war. On
1. 0*Conor to Kimberley, Tel.27, 24 June 1894, PCI7/1204.
Paget to Kimberley, Tel.19, 25 June 1894, P046/440.
2. 0’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.28, 25 June 1894, P017/1204.
5* ibid, and 0*Conor to Kimberley, Tel.27* 24 June 1894, 
fÜI7/1204.
4. 0*Conor to Kimberley, Tel.55, 24 July 1894, P017/1204.
Hillier, Narrative of Events in Corea, enclosure in 0*Conor 
to Kimberley, No.389, P017/H98*
4î
25 July there was an engagement between Chinese and 
Japanese ships of war off Corea^ and on the same day 
occurred the Japanese sinking of the Kowshing, a transport 
belonging to a British firm which had been engaged to carry 
Chinese troops to Corea. Two days earlier the Japanese 
troops in Seoul had occupied the palace and gained control 
of the city, and had made the King their prisoner and 
appointed his father as Regent.^ On 1 August 1894 China
Zl
and Japan declared war on each other.
Anxiety as to the effect of a war between China and 
Japan on their trade was the first preoccupation of the 
British as war appeared increasingly inevitable. On 22 
July I8 9 4, a week before the outbreak of the war, Hannan, 
the British Consul at Shanghai, learnt that the Chinese 
were preparing to block the river leading to the city in 
order to protect it from attack by the Japanese. Shanghai 
was the great centre of foreign trade with China and, to 
avoid the complete disruption of that trade, Hannen suggested
1. Kimberley to 0’Conor, Tel.72, 28 July 1894, P017/1202.
2. 0 ’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.61, 28 July 1894, F017/1204.
3 . Hillier, Narrative of Events in Corea, enclosure in
0*Conor to Kimberley, No. 389, POl7/1198.
4. Paget to Kimberley, Tel.48, 1 August 1894, P046/440.
0*Conor to Kimberley, Tel.6 3 , 1 August 1894, POl7/1204.
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that the Japanese should be asked to refrain from attacking
it in the event of war.^ The British Government made the 
2
request at once and the next day the Japanese promised
that if war broke out ”no warlike operations shall be 
undertaken against Shanghai or its approaches".*
Thereupon the Chinese agreed not to block the river.^
A month later, however, the Japanese began to complain 
of the use the Chinese were making of the arsenal at Shanghai 
and of the extensive contraband trade they alleged was being 
carried on there.^ The British were determined to hold the 
Japanese to their promise.^ They pointed out that the Japan­
ese had known of the existence of the arsenal when they gave 
the pledge. Moreover British investigations did not show 
that increased use had been made of the arsenal since the 
outbreak of the war or that there was much foundation for
1. Hannen to Foreign Office, Telegram , 22 July 1894, 
P017/1207.
2. Kimberley to Paget, Tel.27 (P), 22 July 1894,POl7/1209.
3. Mutsu to Paget, 23 July 1894, enclosure No. 2 in Paget
to Kimberley, No. 28, 25 July 1894, P046/436.
4. 0’Conor to Kimberley, Tel. 58, 27 July 1894, POl7/1204.
5. Trench to Kimberley, Tel. 60, 21 August 1894, P046/440.
6. ibid.. minute by Kimberley.
43
the assertions of contraband trade.^ But the Japanese 
persisted in claiming that their promise was not binding 
unless the Chinese completely stopped using Shanghai as a
p
base for preparations for war. The British declared 
firmly that they considered the Japanese still bound by 
their promise and they steadily maintained that no conditions 
had been attached when it was originally made. Nevertheless 
the pressure of the Japanese led them to consider asking 
the Chinese for a promise not to use Shanghai as a base for 
offensive operations.^ They gave up the idea because 0’Conor 
did not think the Chinese would entertain the suggestion - 
indeed he thought they might block the river if pressed on 
the point.
The British were in a dilemma. Trade would be dis­
rupted if the river were closed; but a Japanese attack 
would probably cause risings in the provinces along the 
Yangtse and the ensuing chaos would have an equally bad 
effect on tradeFurthermore they were told that the
1. Kimberley to Trench, Tel.43, 2? August 1894, F046/439*
2. Trench to Kimberley, No.119» 12 September 1894,
F046/437.
3. Kimberley to Trench, Tel.49, 16 September 1894,
F046/439.
4. Private Kimberley Papers, Bertie to Kimberley, private, 
29 September 1894.
Chinese, having relied upon the British assurances, would 
hold them responsible if the Japanese were to attack Shanghai,^ 
When alarming reports were received at the end of September 
saying that the Japanese in their elation over other victories 
might well make such an attempt, the British warned Japan that 
the consequences would be serious. On 2 October Kimberley 
asked that Admiral Fremantle, the Commander-in-Chief on the 
China Station, should be instructed to resist any Japanese 
attempt to attack Shanghai.^ The Admiralty first had to 
find out if the Admiral had the necessary vessels for the 
operation.^ The Cabinet was consulted in the interval and 
confirmed Kimberley’s decision that Shanghai must be defended.^ 
Instructions in this sense were sent to the Admiral, giving 
him discretion to decide whether he had sufficient force to 
take action should the issue arise before reinforcements 
reached him.^
The other concern noticeably animating British policy
1. 0’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.76 (P), 5 September 1894,
FOl7/1204;
Bertie, Memorandum, 28 September 1894, FOl7/1213*
2. Kimberley to Trench, Tel.55, 29 September 1894,F046/439*
3. Kimberley to Foreign Office,Telegram,2 October 1894, 
F046/439.
4. Bertie, Memorandum, 3 October 1894, F017/1214.
5. Note by Rosebery attached to draft of Kimberley to 0*Conor, 
Tel.122,10 October, 1894, F017/1203*
6. Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief,China Station, No.56, 9 
October 1894, in FOl7/1214.
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in the quarrel between China and Japan was alarm at the 
advantage Russia might take of their difficulties. The 
theme that continually recurs in British advice to the 
Chinese and Jsponese to make every effort to settle the 
question peacefully is that only Russia would profit by a 
war between them.^ Indications that the Chinese were tend­
ing to count on Russian help to get them out of their 
difficulties always brought a quick reminder of the true 
nature of Russian ambitions in China.
In its first stages the Corean question occupied but 
a small part of Kimberley’s attention. It was the interest 
of Russia combined with the fact that a peaceful settlement 
seemed to be getting more and more remote that roused his 
concern. His efforts to bring the Chinese and Japanese 
into negotiation always redoubled upon receiving reports 
of the activity of the Russians for the event most likely 
to encourage a desperate appeal by the Chinese to Russia 
was the end of all hope of a negotiated settlement.
The British concentrated at first upon encouraging the 
Chinese and Japanese to come to an agreement between them­
selves, stressing the dangers inherent in foreign intervention
1. Kimberley to Paget, Tel.15, 28 June 1894, F046/439*
Kimberley to 0*Conor, Tel.44, 50 June 1894, POll/1202.
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and trying to lielp tnem to find terms on which they could 
agree to start negotiations. At the end of June the 
Russian Ambassador in Tokio, acting on the command of the 
Tsar, urged the Japanese to comply with the King of Gorea's 
request that they should withdraw their troops. The Japan­
ese refused. O'Conor thought the Russians would next invite 
the diplomatic co-operation of the other powers to whom the 
King of Corea had appealed and that the Chinese would then 
give all the credit for this assistance to the Russians.^ 
When Kimberley heard this on July he told Paget, the 
British Charge d'Affaires in Tokio, to press the Japanese
again to start negotiations on terms which the Chinese had
2
been persuaded to accept. "If this effort fails", he told
O'Conor, "we will at once communicate with Russia as to 
calling for joint action by the powers".*
F o u r days l a t e r ,  on 7 July, the British heard of Count
iL
Cassini*s suggestion to Li Hung-chang that the dispute 
should be settled by a conference of the three neighbouring
1. 0'Conor to Kimberley, Tel.>4 Confidential, ^ July ld^4,
P017/1204.
2. Kimberley to Paget, Tel.18, 3 July 1894, F046/439.
3. Kimberley to O'Conor, Tel.46, 3 July 1894, F017/1202.
4. Count Cassini was Russian Minister in China. He had 
left Peking to return to Russia on leave of absence, 
but then had remained at Tientsin to be in touch 
with Li Hung-chang.
powers - China, Japan, and Russia.^ At once Kimberley
expressed his vigorous disapproval of this idea, declaring
that "in the event of any arrangement between China and 
"Russia together or between those two powers and 
Japan to the exclusion of England, Her Majesty's 
Government must consider their own interests and 
will take such steps as may be necessary to secure
them".2
At the same time he began to sound out the attitude of the 
various powers to some sort of joint intervention.^ At this 
point the objection of the Japanese to the preliminary with­
drawal of their troops seemed to be the insuperable obstacle 
to negotiations. Kimberley suggested that the deadlock 
might be broken by their agreeing instead upon a joint 
occupation of Corea and he asked the Russian Government to
iL
join the British in recommending this proposal.
Subsequently he made a proposal to the governments of
Russia, Prance, Germany, and the United States for joint
15
intervention to secure a peaceful settlement.^ The replies
1. O'Conor to Kimberley, Tel. 36 Confidential, 6 July 1894, 
P017/1204.
2. Kimberley to O'Conor, Tel.30, 7 July 1894, P017/1202.
3 . Kimberley to 0»Conor, Tel.34, 11 July 1894, POl7/1202.
4. Kimberley to O'Conor, Tel.55» 14 July 1894, P017/1202.
" " Tel.60, 16 July 1894, POl7/1202.
3 . " " Tel.63, 20 July 1894, POl7/1202.
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seemed to leave it to England and Russia to take the lead.
The Russian response, though non-committal at first, seemed 
favourable and on 23 July the Russian Government informed 
the British that the Russian ministers at Peking and Tokio 
were being instructed to work with the British representatives 
there.^
But by the time that this partnership developed, hope
of a peaceful settlement had almost been given up. When
Cassini told his British colleague of his instructions,
0*Conor said that he thought "strong joint pressure" on
2
Japan was necessary. But, as Bertie commented and Kimberley
agreed, "stern language unless of a menacing character is 
not likely to deter the Japanese from making the most 
of their opportunity".*
He cited an article by the Berlin correspondent of the
Evening Standard as a correct description of the situation.
This article quoted from the National Zeitung which thought
that "the Japanese have no reason to fear that England will  ^
interfere in a war which spares her commercial interests".
The British had just obtained the Japanese promise not to
1. Kimberley to Lascelles, No.192, 23 July 1894, P063/1471.
2. O'Conor to Kimberley, Tel.37, 26 July 1894, P017/1204;
Comments & clipping attached.
3. ibid., minutes by Bertie & Kimberley.
4. ibid., attached clipping.
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attack Shanghai in the event of war and could now contemplate
what they seemed unable to prevent with less anxiety than
would otherwise have been the case. The article also
mentioned that the Japanese were probably aware that
"nothing is to be feared yet from a Russian army, 
whereas the appearance of a Russian sqadron from 
Vladivostock off Corea would soon bring the English 
into those waters".
Upon the declaration of war on 1 August 1894,
Kimberley suggested that Britain and Russia might take the
initiative in a remonstrance by the Powers against the
resort to war,^ but he gave up the idea when Giers replied
2
that he saw no advantage in it. Complaints from the 
Russian Government at the beginning of August that their 
Ministers at Peking and Tokio had not been informed of 
negotiations in which the British representatives had 
participated show that the partnership was strained at 
times. But they also serve to show the importance the 
British attached to co-operation with Russia. "Our desire" 
said Kimberley in his instructions to O'Conor when telling 
him of the Russian complaint "is to work with Russia and 
you should communicate freely with your Russian colleague".^ 
The Russian Government also valued the common stand taken
1. Kimberley to Lascelles, Tel.37, 1 August 1894, P065/1474.
2. Lascelles to Kimberley, Tel.37, 5 August 1894, P063/1474.
3. Kimberley to O'Conor, Tel.77, 2 August 1894, FOl7/1202.
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by the Powers, Glers wrote to de Staal that "1'accord 
établi entre les grandes puissances en vue d§ cette 
situation permet d'esperer que les difficultés 
présentes pourront être localisées",^
From the beginning the Russians had shown themselves to be
more concerned with localizing than with preventing war
between China and Japan, The British had never shown much
fear of such a war spreading. They were worried enough,
as it was, by the possible consequences of a war between
China and Japan alone. Although reassured on the whole as
far as their trade was concerned, they still feared the
advantage which Russia might take of the situation arising
from war and they co-operated with her partly as a means of
restraining her and keeping an eye upon her.
The war also brought with it the danger of an increase
in the anti-foreign riots which were a perennial problem
in British relations with China. It seemed unlikely that
the Chinese people would distinguish carefully between
Japanese and other foreigners and the British were afraid
that the war would aggravate feeling against all foreigners.
The passage through the country of soldiers on their way
to the front created some disorder, but parts of China were
quieter during the first part of the war because the rowdy
elements who played the leading part in most riots had
1. A. Meyendorff, Correspondance Diplomatique de M.de Staal 
[1929J, II, 249.
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joined the army and were away. It was the prospect of the 
disbanding of the army that caused most alarm. Chinese 
soldiers were hardly ever paid in full when they were 
disbanded and quite often they were not paid at all. In 
consequence they took to looting on their way home and if 
they were retreating after a defeat they were liable to be 
particularly violent.^
Speculation on the outcome of the war ran the whole 
gamut of possibilities at first. An overwhelming Japanese 
victory was not then generally accepted as a foregone 
conclusion. Japan had undergone no real trial of strength 
since her adoption of western methods and there was a 
disposition to doubt the depth of her reforms and to question 
her staying power. This line of thought was reinforced by 
the feeling that the Chinese would surely take radical 
measures to organize their defences when faced with the 
actual fact of war and by the conviction that China had 
immense latent power which would give her the advantage if 
only the war lasted long enough for it to come into play.
But from the beginning of the war there were gloomy 
forebodings of the consequences of the defeat of China. The
1. Circular to H.M. Consuls in China enclosed in O ’Conor 
to Kimberley, No.351, 2? September 1894, FOl7/1193;
0’Conor to Kimberley, Wo.378, 15 October 1894,
FOl7/1198; O’Conor to Kimberley, Wo.214, 7 June 
1895, F017/1235.
2. O’Conor to Kimberley, Wo.220, 26 July 1894, FOl7/1195*
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Manchu dynasty whose rule over China had been successfully 
established in the seventeenth century, had enjoyed a 
brilliant record through most of the eighteenth century 
but had fallen into a state of decline in the nineteenth.
There was strong feeling against the dynasty all over the 
country and there wore a large number of secret societies 
in existence. The fear was that the discontent engendered 
by defeat might set off a rebellion which would overturn 
the government.^ O’Conor had written in July that serious 
reverses for the Chinese on the field of battle might lead 
to the collapse of the government. This report reached 
London in September immediately after the overwhelming 
Japanese victory at Ping-yang. Kimberley telegraphed anxious-
p
ly to enquire about the effect of this in China. O’Conor 
replied that it was too early to tell with any certainty.^ 
Knowing as we do that revolution and collapse did not 
follow immediately, it is hard to gauge how seriously they 
were considered to be a possibility at the time. Reference 
to the breakup of China became a commonplace of British 
discussions of the situation in official quartei*s as well
1. Bristow to O’Conor, No.32 Confidential and Secret,
26 July 1894, enclosed in O’Conor to Kimberley, No.236
Confidential, POl7/1195; O ’Conor to Kimberley, No.378
15 October 1894, P017/1198;
2. Kimberley to O'Conor, Tel.101, 23 September 1894,FOl7/1202.
3* O ’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.85, 25 September 1894,POl7/1204.
as in the press and among the general public. Yet, there is 
no evidence that the British considered what course they 
would pursue in the event of such a collapse. Nevertheless 
there is no mistaking the fact that it would have been a most 
unwelcome development from the point of view of the British 
government. Rosebery, referring in a speech at Sheffield on 
26 October to the efforts which the Government had made earlier 
in the month to bring about peace negotiations, said:
"I at any rate cannot contemplate any such event as 
might happen in the sudden destruction of the central 
Government of China by a conquering force. A head­
less China, a China without a Government of any kind, 
means such a scene of chaos and horror as the world 
perhaps has never contemplated".I
"If the country collapses..." wrote Malet from Berlin 
at the end of September, "it will take the wind out of Africa
p
as a quarrelling ground for the powers". This was the aspect 
of the problem that made the idea particularly unwelcome to 
the British. Not only would there be the damage to British 
commercial interests and the danger to British residents in 
China which the disorder and disruption entailed by rebellion 
would cause, but there would be rivalry for the inheritance 
of power in China. 'The conversation of the French and German
1. The Times,27 October 1894.
2. Private Kimberley Papers, Malet to Kimberley, private, 
29 September 1894.
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ministers in China seemed upon occasion to suggest that they
welcomed the prospect of a partition of China.^ O ’Conor
always made it clear that Britain did not. She had no desire
for political influence and responsibility in China. There
was much talk at the time, particularly among naval and
military personnel in the Par East, of the ease with which
Britain could establish a protectorate in China and of the
great opportunity she was losing by not doing so. Captain
Cavendish, the British military attache in China, wrote a
personal letter in this vein to Kimberley. Kimberley in
reply completely denied the wisdom or value of such a course
from the British point of view. #hile his reply was obviously
designed to put a stop to the hope of such action in the
circles where it was commonly considered, it may also be
taken as an accurate statement of Kimberley’s own point of
view. His letter started: "I do not agree in the necessity 
for our embarking in some great scheme of influence 
over China.
We must extend and protect our trade but we want 
nothing more than that - Multiplication of posts which 
must be garrisoned and defended means increase of weak­
ness, not of strength".2
On the other hand, there was the faint tope that the 
war might at last induce the Chinese to introduce radical
1. O’Conor to Kimberley, No.225 Confidential, 2? July 1894, 
P017/1195.
2. private Kimberley Papers, Kimberley to Gapt.Cavendish, 
50 May 1895.
reforms in their system of government. The foreign represent­
atives in China were not very hopeful on this score and they 
became much less so when they saw how little the Chinese were 
doing to defend themselves even in wartime. They concluded 
that nothing short of a calamity would convince the Chinese 
of the need for change. They would have hoped for an astound­
ing Japanese victory and occupation as a means of rousing the 
Chinese had they not been fearful that this might have other 
consequences.^ When some of the European countries were 
putting projects for reform before the Chinese at the end of 
the war, they confessed their anxiety to get the projects 
launched at once - before the Chinese relapsed into their 
usual state of passive unconcern.
Whether or not the war eventually led to the regeneration 
of China, it was evident that she would be completely impotent 
for some time to come. In the eighties many people in England 
had thought that Chinese strength was at last reviving and 
that she was on the verge of becoming an effective Power. The 
friendship between the two countries had then been so close
2
that it was often referred to in common speech as an alliance. 
The war made it clear that for a while at least Chinese friend-
1. Private Kimberley Papers, O’Conor to Kimberley, Private, 
22 November 1894.
2. Cn.E.V.G. Kieraan, British Diplomacy in China, 1880-85,
11939 j , 300-02 & 303-05.
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ship would not he much of an asset. This affected the 
British because they had relied partly on the preservation 
of this friendship for the protection of their interests 
in Asia. In a number of British communications to the 
Chinese in the first months of 1894 the stress on the 
identity of British and Chinese interests is noticeable.
The natural desire to be on good terms with a country in 
which they had extensive commercial interests does not seem 
sufficient reason for this. A consideration of the British 
position in India helps to explain it.
The British establishment in India had involved them 
with Russia in Central Asia and with France in the Indo- 
Chinese peninsula. In both these places there were special 
questions at issue at this time. In central Asia, the 
negotiations between Britain and Russia to settle their 
frontier on the Pamirs were in their last stages. In the 
Indo-Chinese peninsula, the French and British were consider­
ing the establishment of a neutral buffer state on the upper 
Mekong as a means of giving effect to the desire they had 
both expressed to keep their possessions in the Indo-Chinese 
peninsula. In both these cases China was the fourth great 
Power in the area and was also in some measure involved in
athe question at issue. It was only natural that the
British should want in each case to be able to count on
the support of the Chinese, or at least to be sure that it
did not go to the other side. This became the more important
as France and Russia drew closer together. But just at this
time China became absorbed in the war which soon showed how
hopelessly weak and inert she was. "She will no longer be
any use to us as a bogey to France in Siam and to Russia in
Central Asia" wrote an official of the British Legation in
Peking.^ There was also the danger of a relaxation of Chinese
control over her extensive possessions in Central Asia which
might make it easier for Russia to encroach upon them. The
Government of India was considering what attitude they should
take to the rather shadowy Chinese claim to suzerainty over
Nepal. Kimberley’s opinion was that "It would be a very good
thing if this connection with China ceased. Some day Russia
if she gained paramount influence over China might use it for
2
her own purposes".
This situation was particularly serious for the British, 
coming as it did at a time when there was a general quickening
1. Henry Cockburn (Assistant to the Chinese Secretary in 
the British Legation at Peking) to Francis Gockburn^'^
Tiiis is in a small collection of Mr. Cockburn’s letters 
in the possession of his son.
2. O’Conor to Kimberley, No.164, 30 April 1895» FOl7/1267. 
Minute by Kimberley.
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of European interest in the Far East and when the Franco- 
Russian alliance had become a potential force.^ Russia and 
France had both increased theii* squadrons in the Far East and 
Japan was beginning to construct a first class fleet. Britain 
had also increased her squadron on the China Station but,though 
it was superior to either the French or the Russians alone, it 
was no longer stronger than a combination of the twc."^ All 
these circumstances encouraged the British to lean towards 
Japan - the new power in the Pacific. Whilst the Liberal 
Government was in office, the British desire to cultivate 
Japanese friendship is very noticeable. There was some back­
ground for this recognition of Japanese development. In July 
I894 long negotiations for treaty revision had' been concluded 
by the signature of a treaty providing for the ending of 
extraterritoriality in five years time,^
It was a mark in Japan’s favour, in the eyes of the 
British, that her activity was likely to increase the pre­
occupation of Russia with the Far East for this might lead 
to a relaxation of Russian interest elsewhere. If Russian
1. In November,1893, Dufferin wrote to Rosebery of the Franco- 
Russian understanding tnat ... it is certain that the
diplomacy of Europe is face to face with a new situation; 
that as far as we are concerned we shall now find the 
Representatives of France and Russia allied against us 
in respect of all the current controversies of the day 
in which the interests of one or other of these Powers 
are concerned; and that both are likely to prove more 
susceptible, more exacting and peremptory than formerly". 
Dufferin to Rosebery, No.450 Confidential, 3 November 
1893, from a copy in the Private Kimberley Papers.
LXXXV I, [1892-94] , 39-51.
0,- A3.
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interest were concentrated in Central Asia, the British
did not feel at ease in India,; if in the '^ear East the
chances of some minor dispute resulting in a European
conflict were increased. Therefore the development of
Russian interest in the Far ^ast must in some respects
have been a relief to the British. There, the paths of
Russian and Japanese ambition crossed each other;
"The real object of Japanese policy and of the war", 
commented Kimberley, "is to prepare for the dangers 
which they apprehend from the development of Hussian  ^
strength on the completion of the Siberian railway..."
Kimberley thought that the contingencies in which the Japan­
ese might menace British interests were distant and that in 
the meantime they would be too much concerned with combatting 
Russian ambition to seek other rivals. He considered the 
increased strength of Japan an advantage to the British as
a counterpoise to that of Russia. In short, "our policy
2
must be to make her our ally". As early as September,
I8 9 4, there is evidence that the British desire for Japanese 
friendship was entering into their consideration of other 
questions. Bertie, writing to Kimberley about the danger 
of the Japanese ignoring their promise not to attack Shanghai,
1. Minute by Kimberley, 12 April 1395, on a Report from 
the Intelligence Division of the War Office, 8 April 
1895, 1017/1252.
2. Private Kimberley Papers, Kimberley to Captain Cavenaish, 
Private, 30 May 1895•
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said "The active friendship of Japan would be very useful 
to us in a contest witii Russia in tne Far East but we , 
shall not gain it by any hesitation in our attitude..."
The question of a formal alliance was not raised. The British
aim was to develop such friendly relations with Japan that
they could count upon the Japanese being on their side in
the event of a crisis.
The successes of the Japanese forces in the war caused 
great elation in Japan and the strong feeling in the country 
in favour of pressing their advantage, advancing to Peking, 
and dictating a favourable peace treaty there made it 
difficult for the Japanese Government to enter into peace 
negotiations at an earlier stage. On the other side, the 
pride of the Chinese had not been lessened by their humiliat­
ing defeat. When it came to suing for peace they were very 
much on their dignity and resisted any procedure that seemed 
to them to be beneath it. A fresh attempt to launch negotiat­
ions, made by the American Ministers at Peking and Tokio at 
the turn of the year, came to grief at first over the reluct­
ance of the Chinese to give their delegates conventional full 
powers - an event which Kimberley considered "interesting" 
and Rosebery "superfluous" as an "illustration of Chinese
1. Private Kimberley Papers, Bertie to Kimberley, 29 
September 1894.
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obstinacy".1
Eventually negotiations between the Chinese and 
Jananese were started. The Chinese had been persuaded to 
give their delegates regular full powers. They also gave 
way to the Japanese insistence that their plenipotientiary 
should be some one of high rank and appointed Li Hung-chang. 
The Japanese then told them that negotiations would be useless 
if the Chinese delegates were unable to negotiate on the 
basis of the payment of an indemnity and the cession of
2
territory and the Chinese apparently conceded this point too. 
But they were still afraid that it might lead to complications 
with other Powers and they began to sound out the attitude 
of European Governments to the possibility of the cession 
of Chinese territory to Japan.^
The difficulties of the Tsungli Yamen were increased 
by the fact that they were dealing with two different problems, 
They had at the same time both to negotiate with the Japanese 
and to convince a large section of Chinese official opinion 
that negotiation was the policy to adopt. The existence of 
a strong party in China which still wanted to continue the
1. O’Conor to Kimberley, No.52, 15 February 1895, POl7/1253•
Minutes by Rosebery and Kimberley.
2. Kimberley to O’Conor, Tel.11, 25 February 1895,P01?/1242;
0’Conor to Kimberley, Eel.12, 2 March 1895, POl7/1245.
5. O’Conor to Kimberley, Te1.10, 25 February 1895,POl7/1245.
war no doubt partly accounted for the delay and the evasion 
of the Chinese in starting negotiations. The Ministers of 
the Tsungli Yamen pointed out to O’Conor that they incurred 
much unpopularity by opposing this group. Li Hung-chang was 
in a particularly awkward position. He had been considered 
responsible for the conduct of the war and his reputation had 
already suffered greatly on account of the Chinese defeat.
A Japanese attack on the province of Chihli in his absence 
would be taken as a sign that he was working in the interests 
of the Japanese. In that event or if the terms of the treaty 
were very harsh, Li might no longer have the authority to 
persuade the Chinese Government to ratify the treaty he had 
concluded.^
The British were not entirely wanting in appreciation 
of the difficulties of the Chinese position in starting 
negotiations. But they were far more sensible of the diffic­
ulties the Chinese would incur by not doing so. The manifest 
inability of the Chinese to continue the war without suffering 
disastrous defeat determined the British approach to the 
subject. There was a general belief that a resumption of 
hostilities would be followed almost immediately by a Japanese 
march on Peking and many observers thought that the capture of
1. O’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.8, 18 February 1895, FOl7/1243.
6z
the capital would lead to the fall of the dynasty. There­
fore the British urged the Chinese to start negotiations 
without delay, arguing that the Japanese terms would only 
become more severe with the passage of time and prolonged 
Chinese resistance. They also tried to impress the importance 
of opening negotiations on the Japanese. Kimberley pointed 
out how inimical to Japanese interests would be the general 
disruption which might follow a Japanese occupation of 
Peking - and how embarrassing it would be for the Japanese 
if there were no Chinese Government left with which they 
could negotiate a settlement.
The first anxiety of the Chinese in the negotiations 
was to arrange an armistice and Li Hung-chang requested one 
almost immediately after his arrival at Shinonoseki on 19 
karch. The Japanese offered an armistice for two months 
provided Shaniiaikwan, Tientsin, and Taku were handed over 
to them temporarily and the railway from Shanhaikwan to 
Tientsin placed under their control. They refused to dis­
close their conditions for peace until the Chinese accepted 
these terms.^ But acceptance would have put Peking at the 
mercy of the Japanese and made a farce of negotiations on 
unknown terms of peace. The Tsungli Yamen wanted to know
1. O’Conor to Kimberley, Te1.18 (P.), 22 March 1895, 
F017/1243.
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wiiat these were before replying to the proposal for an 
arnistice.^ Kimberley thought the request reasonable and 
asked if tJie Russian Government would .join the British in
p
telling the Japanese so. But the Chinese formally declined 
an armistice on the Japanese terns before the .British had 
taken any action.^ And before the consequences of the 
Chi .ne se refusal could be felt, came the attempted assassin­
ation of Li Hung-chang by a Japanese fanatic. Following 
the incident, negotiations were suspended although not 
abandoned by the Chinese. The Viceroy’s son was instructed 
to take his father’s place and to enquire what conditions 
the Jap suae G e had in mind for peace.^ To atone for the 
accident, the Japanese Government, at the command of the 
Mikado, offered an armistice without the conditions on which 
they had previously insisted.^ This was concluded on 1 April, 
to last for twenty days. It applied only to the three 
northern provinces of GiiMi, Jehol, and Shantung. Formosa
1. O’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.18 (P.) 22 March 1895,
F017/1243.
2. Kimberley to O’Conor, Tel.24, 23 March 1895, F017/1242.
3. Kimberley to Lascelles, Tel.32, 25 March 1895, P065/1493.
4. O’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.21, 27 March 1895, P017/1243.
5. Lowthej to Kimberley, Tel.30 Confidential, 29 March 1895,
P046/456.
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was excluded.^
On 4 April 1895 the Japanese announced their peace 
terms. They asked for the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula, 
Formosa, and the Pescadores; the payment by China of an 
indemnity of 300 m. taels (about £30 m.) and of the expenses 
of the temporary occupation of Shengking and Shantung; and 
the recognition by China of Corean independence. They wanted 
a new commercial convention to be concluded between the two 
countries. Their peace terms already included extensive 
commercial demands, including requests for most-favoured­
nation treatment for Japan in China, the right to establish 
warehouses in the interior, the right to import machinery, 
to manufacture goods in China, and to have those goods treated 
like imported goods with regard to taxation. They wanted 
foreign goods imported by Japanese merchants to be freed 
from further taxation by the payment of a commutation tax 
of 2% of their value, and Chinese goods transported in 
Japanese boats to be subject only to coast trade duties.
They also requested the removal of the Woosung bar, which 
restricted the approaches to Shanghai; the free navigation 
of the Woosung river from Shanghai to Soochow and Hangchow, 
of the West River from Canton to Wuchow, and of Lake Tung 
Tiig and the Liang-siang river up to Siang-tan; and the
1. Lowther to Kimberley, Tel.32, 1 April 1895, F046/436.
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opening of Chung king, Siangtan, Wuchow, Peking, Shashih, 
Suchow, 9jid Hangchow as Treaty Ports.^
However in the course of the next fortnight the Japan­
ese modified their terms considerably. They gave up their 
demand for the right to navigate the West River, the Liang- 
Slang river and Lake Tungting and for the opening of Wuchow, 
Siangtan, and Peking. They abandoned the proposal for a 
commutation tax and the request for the right to establish
p
warehouses in the interior. Some of the other conditions 
were altered; a smaller section of the Liaotung Peninsula 
was to be ceded, the indemnity was reduced to 200 m. taels 
(about £20 m.), and the request for the payment of occupation 
expenses waived.
The immediate Chinese reaction to the original terms 
had been unfavourable and the Tsungli Yamen had appealed at 
once to the British, Russian, French, and German Governments 
for their good offices in moderating the Japanese demands.^ 
They hoped too that more substantial support might be forth­
coming from some of these Powers. But, despite rumours of
1. O’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.23, 4 April 1895, FOl7/1243;
Kimberley to O’Conor, Tel.36, 8 April 1895, F017/1242;
Lowther to Kimberley, Tel.33, 4 April 1895, F046/ 456.
2. O’Conor to Kimberley, Tel.30,16 April 1895, FOl7/1243,
O’Conor to Kimberley,Tel.31,17 April 1895, F017/1243.
3. Kimberley to O’Conor, Tel.39,10 April 1895, F017/1242.
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of foreign intervention, the Chinese could secure no promise
of military assistance in the event of their rejecting the
Japanese demands# With such a promise they would gladly
have done so, out the Tsungli Yamen were too painfully aware
of the weajmess of Che Chinese position to do so without it.
As their despair of any foreign help grew, they became more
and more inclined to accept the Japanese terms.^ O'Conor
thought that if the Japanese modified their terms, they would
be accepted. The various modifications which the Japanese
introduced made the pill seem less bitter to the Chinese and,
there being no other alternative in sight, the Chinese agreed
to accept the revised terms. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was
o
signed on 17 April 1895* Ratification was to take place 
within three weeks.
Russia had obviously been the great hope of the Chinese 
who were said to be ready to make large concessions to her 
in Manchuria in return for her support in rejecting the 
Japanese demands.^  But, although there were rumours in 
China that Russia was going to intervene in conjunction with
1. O'Conor to Kimberley, Tel.28 Secret & Tel.29 Secret,
13 April 1395, F017/1243*
2. Lowther to Kimberley, Tel.37, 17 April 1895, F046/456; 
J.V.A.Mac Murray, Treaties ^ d  Agreements with and 
concerning China. “[1921 J” , 1, IB.
3. O'Conor to Kimberley, No. 129 very confidential, 10 April 
1895, P017/1234.
Trance and German?, the Chinese were apparently unable to 
secure anj' assurance of support and these powers had taken 
no action by the time the treaty was signed on 17 April.
This was not the result of indifference. On 3 April, 
the Russian Government suggested to the British that the 
muropean Powers should tell Japan that they thought permanent 
Japanese possession of the Liaotung Peninsula, particularly 
of Port Arthur, would be a menace to peace in the Far East.^ 
The British refusal to join in such action was evidently a 
blow to the Russians who did not immediately proceed with 
their plan. Lobanov repeatedly affirmed his belief that if 
all four powers joined in making the protest, Japan would 
comply. But despite the Russian hesitation, Lascelles, then 
British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, noted the "growing 
determination" of the Russians "to have the Japanese demands
p
withdrawn" and immediately after the signature of the treaty, 
the British were informed that the Russians, French, and 
Germans were going to make a protest on the lines suggested 
before. The persistent Russian efforts to persuade the 
British to join them were unsuccessful. On 23 April 1895
1. Kimberley to Lascelles, Tel.46 Secret, 8 April 1895, 
P065/1493.
2. Lascelles to Kimberley, No.89 Secret and Confidential,
10 April 1895, F065/1490.
the Russian, French, and Geriaan Ministers in Tokio made the 
protest to Japan,^ The Japanese Government was in an awkward 
position. The peace was not popular in Japan and the Govern­
ment was afraid that their withdrawal might lead to internal 
trouble. But they were also too exhausted by the war to 
engage in a fresh conflict and tne threatening tone of the 
communications from the three powers and also various moves 
of the Russians suggested that they would resort to force.^ 
Moreover the British warned Japan that they thought Russia 
was bent on winning her point and that Britain would not 
support Japan in resisting the demands of the Powers.^ In 
face of all these circumstances, on 5 May the Japanese gave 
way.5
The British decision not to intervene was the fruit 
of much consideration. The Japanese had announced their 
conditions for peace on 4 April 1395• A number of reports 
received in the next four days acquainted the British Govern­
ment with the Japanese proposals.^ They received their first
1. Lowther to Kimberley, Tel.42, 24 April 1895, P046/455.
2. Lowther to Kimberley, Tel.46, 27 April 1895, F046/456.
5. Lowther to Kimberley, Tel.51, 6 May 1895» ajid Tel.52
8 May 1895, F046/456.
4. Kimberley to Lowther, wo.57, 29 April 1895, hC46/449.
5. Lowther to Kimberley, Tel.51, 6 May 1895, F046/456.
6. O'Conor to Kimberley, Tel.25, 4 April 1895, FOl7/1243;
Lowther to Kimberley, Tel.35, 4 April 1895, F046/456.
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detailed news of the Japanese commercial demands from the
Japanese minister in London on 5 April, On 3 April the
Cabinet met, at Kimberley’s request, to consider whether
Bihtain shoula tame any action. They decided that "the
Japanese conditions do not aifford grounds for interfer­
ence on our pEirt".!
hhe Russians, French, and Germans were informed of this
decision on the sune lay. De Staal had coma to the Foreign
Office to communicate the Russian Government’s suggestion
of a protest when Kimberley tola him of the Cabined*s
decision.^
Tne British tnen waited anxiously to see wnether the 
Gliinese would accept the Jap one se terms and whether the other 
Rowers would protest against them. The Treaty of Shimonoseki 
was signed on ly April 1395 but the period of uncertainty 
was not over, for Russia, France and Germany tnen decided
definitely to make their protest. Kimberley asked Lowtner
%
wnat effect tnis was likely to nave on Japan.^ "unless 
warnings are to be followed by force tney will nave no
IL
effect..." was the reply. All three Governments pressed
tne British to join them. The question was raised again
1. Kimberley to O'Conor, Tel.57 Secret, 3 April 1895, 
F017/1242.
2. ibid.
3. Kifflberlev to Lowther, Tel.13 Secret, 20 April 1895, 
P046/455.
4. Lowther to Kimberley, Tel.40, 22 April 1395, F046/456.
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at the Cabinet meeting on 23 April but the original decision
not to intervene was reaffirmed.^ That evening the protest
of the three Powers was made in Tokio. In the meauritime the
Russians made a last effort to persuade the British to
support the action that was being taken. Lobanov suggested
that she should join the protest on the secret understanding
that she would not be obliged to join in using force if
2
that became necessary. Rosebery concurred in Kimberley’s 
opinion that this arrangement was unacceptable and the 
British Government maintained their decision to refrain 
from intervention.^
Professor Langer has commented that ”... we know 
almost nothing of the discussion or of the motives which
h
kept the British standing aside”. The Foreign Office 
recores for the period have since been opened. These and 
Kimberley’s Papers, considered in conjunction with the 
published material, shed much light on the British policy 
in this question.
At first the British had a great deal to gain from
1. Private Kimberley Papers, Memorandum of Decision of 
Cabinet, 23 April 1393*
2. Kimberley to Lascelles, No.USA, 24 April 1895, 
F065/1489.
3. ibid. and Kimberley to Lascelles, Tel.63, 25 April 1395, 
PÔGF/1493.
4. W.L.Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism. ^1933] ,1,185.
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not interfering. The Japanese peace terms included demands
for many new privileges for foreign trade which British
merchants had been wanting for a long time and were then
pressing their Government to obtain. The extraction of
commercial concessions from the Chinese was invariably an
arduous task but for once they seemed obtainable at the cost
of very little effort to the British since this time most
of the work of persuasion would fall to the Japanese. The
British Government were eager to make the most of such an
opportunity. When Kimberley informed 0’Conor of the Cabinet's
decision he explained that "Her Majesty's Government attach 
much importance to the commercial stipulations communic­
ated by the Japanese Minister".!
Such a compelling reason for abstaining must have been
particularly welcome to Kimberley and Rosebery because the
vehement disapproval of "meddling" expressed by Harcourt
promised vigorous opposition from within the Cabinet to any
proposal for intervention. "Is there no pie in the world 
out of which we can manage to keep our fingers?"
wrote Harcourt in reply to word from Kimberley that the
Japanese terms raised serious issues which would require
careful consideration by the British, " ...—  though I know 
we meddle everywhere, particularly where we have no 
concern".^
1. Kimberley to O'Conor, Tel.37 Secret, 8 April 1893,
PCI7/1242.
2. Private Kimberley Papers, Harcourt to Kimberley,Private,
3 April 1893" The first part of this quotation is in
A.G.Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt [1923] 11,338.
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Relations with Harcourt were exceptionally strained at this 
time. The vigorous exception he had taken to Grey’s declar­
ation on the Upper Nile, made in the House of Commons on 28
March, had led him to ask to "see all answers on important 
questions (and) to make, on behalf of the Cabinet, all 
important statements in debate on foreign affairs"
and an arrangement on these lines was made.^ In the mean­
time a proposal to examine the cost of a railway linking 
Uganda and the coast had led Harcourt to threaten resign­
ations "I can inform you at once without the aid of 
experts what your railway will cost.
It will be three Cabinet Ministers including the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer..
I am not at all disposed to be shoved down an 
inclined plane on this matter".2
Kimberley was evidently stirred by his difficulties with
Harcourt at this time to complain to Rosebery of the
difficulty of his position. Rosebery replied: ".... I agree 
with you that the position with regard to foreign affairs 
is almost intolerable. Had it not been that on the whole 
we have had our way, I should have thought it my duty to 
make way patriotically for a homogeneous government that 
could carry out an efficient foreign policy. That is 
my answer to what you say about our having no policy - so 
far our policy has prevailed and has been satisfactory 
and efficient.
—  But I do not disguise from myself that we are 
approaching the parting of the ways because I cannot 
compromise on these vital matters".2
1. A.G. Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, [1923] II, 
333-37.
2. A.G.Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt,[19231 ,11,334
3. Private Kimberley Papers, Rosebery to Kimberley, Private 
& Secret, 7 April 1893•
%Clearly Kimberley and Rosebery would have wanted to avoid 
courting fresh disagreement at such a time. As it was, the 
attraction of the Japanese commercial demands largely stifled 
other considerations and the initial decision of the British 
Government to abstain from intervention seems to have been 
reached fairly easily. There apparently was not much dispute 
about it in the Cabinet; there was little reference, in making 
the decision, to the probable action of the other Powers; and 
there is little trace of any wish immediately afterwards to 
have chosen otherwise.
Unfortunately for the British, however, the commercial 
demands were anathema to the Chinese, and the Japanese were 
ready to withdraw many of them in their attempt to induce the 
Chinese to conclude the treaty,^ The comparatively meagre 
commercial stipulations that remained formed a much less 
compelling invitation to abstain and other factors, consider­
ation of which had been to a large extent forestalled by the 
attraction of the original commercial demands, now loomed 
larger. Moreover in the meantime the plans of Russia, France, 
and Germany to intervene had taken more definite shape.
The strongest reason in favour of British participation 
in the intervention was the desire to continue acting with 
Russia and the other Powers. Rosebery had spoken during the
1. 0*Conor to Kimberley, No. 155» 25 April 1895, F017/1254.
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war of "the paramount importance of maintaining the
concert of Europe" in this question. ! Kimberley had
made co-operation with Russia a fundamental element of his 
policy in the matter and the two countries had acted together 
since just before the outbreak of the war.^ This partner­
ship had been accompanied by hopes of a general improvement 
in their relations and had even given rise to some talk of 
an understanding between them.^ The irritation of the 
Russians with the initial British decision not to intervene 
had given the British an unpleasant fore^t^^e of the bad
wWcA-k
effect/their abstention was likely to have on their relations 
with Russia. Consequently when they considered the question 
of intervention again, they were affected much more by reluct­
ance to separate from Russia.
However all the information the British received 
convinced them that force would have to be used or, at least, 
threatened if the intervention were to achieve its object.
Had they wanted to use force, they had sufficient strength 
in the Far East to do so. They had reinforced their squadron 
on the China Station in October 1894 when they decided to 
resist any Japanese attempt to attack Shanghai.^ What had
1. Lord Crewe, Lord Rosebery, [1931],11,554, quoting from 
Lord Rendel,The Personal Papers of Lord Rende1. [1931] , 
pp. 258-6 5 .
2. Vide supra. p. LS
3 . Lascelles to Kimberley, no.275 Confidential, 29 November 
1894, FO65/I4 7 3.
4. Vide supra. p.
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been considered enough for single-handed British resistance
to the Japanese in the full flush of their first victories
was presumably ample for joint action with other Powers
against a Japanese force now tired by the exertions of war.
Indeed the British seemed confident that they held the
decisive position. Sanderson commented on a memorandum
received from the Intelligence Division of the War Office
which showed the weakness of the Russian forces in their
Far Eastern territories: "It shows very clearly why the
Russians object so strongly to the cession to Japan 
of the Liaotung Peninsula, how little able they are 
to prevent it, and the reason therefore of their 
great vexation that we, who could prevent it, will 
not join them for the purpose".!
Nevertheless the British decided to adhere to their original
decision on the grounds that "it is not possible for us to 
embark on a policy of this kind without knowing the 
ulterior measures to which it is in contemplation to 
have recourse in the, in our opinion, almost certain 
event of Japan refusing to yield to the desire of the
Powers".2
Rosebery later wrote that his aim had been to "reserve
strength for this question, and possible occasions of 
a similar kind. •. I would have Great Britain hanging 
like a thundercloud over these filibusters: not dispersed 
in showers all over the Empire".^
1. Minute by Sanderson, 11 April 1895, Intelligence Division, 
War Office, Foreign Office, 3 April 1895, F017/1252.
2. private Kimberley Papers, Memorandum of Decision of Cabinet 
23 April 1895• This is the communication reproduced in A. 
Meyendorff, Correspondance Diplomatique de M.de Staal, II, 
258, ,where if Is 3es crlFed. as **sans aoute du commencement 
de février (sans date) et probablement pro memoria d'un 
entretien avec Lord Rosebery". Actually, Kimberley made 
this communication to de Staal on 23 April 1895,Kimberley 
to Lascelles,Tel.57,23 April 1895, F065/1493-
3. Lord Crewe, Lord Rosebery, [1931] ,11,554.
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Tne évident determination of the British not to use
force in tins question appears to nave been the consequence
of their desire to keep on good terms with Japan combined
witn the fact tnat the subject of the protest — the Japanese
acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsiife. — iid not directly touch
any special British interest* When Kimberley first heard of
the Japanese demand for the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula,
he had described it as the most serious of their t e r m s A n d
in a general sense the change in the balance of power which
such a disturbance of the status quo would entail would be
most unwelcome to the British. The position of the Liaotung
Peninsula, so near Peking,the capital of China, and commanding
the sea approaches to it, would enaole an) foreign power
established there to exercise great influence over the Chinese
Government. The fact remained however that British interests
were largely concentrated in the centre and south of China,
and the British aim was to confine action to areas where they
2
had specific interests at stake• "Le Cabinet de Londres", 
wrote de Staal, "continue a être domine par la crainte 
... d'etre entraîne au delà des limites qu’il a tracées a 
sa politique dans l’Extrême-Orient...".^
1. Private Kimberley Papers, Harcourt to Kimberley,5 Atril
1895
2. cp. Kimberley to ^ueen Victoria, 23 April 1395» Letters 
of tueen Victoria, II, 496.
5. A.Meyendorff, Correspondance Diplomatique de M.de Staal.
,1929, ,11, 269.
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Equally important was "the desire to keep Japan on our
side"^ which Rosebery cited later as one of the main aims of
his policy at the time of the intervention, Kimberley wrote
to the <siueen that he was "convinced that it would be a fatal 
mistake to deprive Japan of the fruit of her victories 
by compelling her to relinquish a portion of the advantages 
she has secured by her treaty with C h i n a " . 2
In the preceding months many British officials had voiced
similar opinions of the importance of according Japan the
recognition due to a rising power. Moreover the very strong
bias of public opinion in favour of Japan reinforced the
desire the Government had shown from the beginning of the
war to encourage Japanese friendship, a wish later sujnmed up
by Kimberley in the statement that "our policy must be to
make her our ally".^
Before the Japanese demands were definitely known de
Staal had thought that what the British feared most was that
the war would be followed by an alliance between China and
Japan in which Japan would guide the regeneration of China.^
Hatzfeldt had the same impression and considered that the
1. The Marquess of Crewe, Lord Rosebery, [1931] ,11,554.
2. Letters of yueen Victoria, II, 496.
5. Private Kimberley Papers, Kimberley to Captain Cavendish,
Private, 30 May 1895.
4. A. Meyendorff, Correspondance Diplomatique de M. de Staal, 
[1929] ,11, 263— 2SC----------------------------------
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British desire to avoid any iaisundei*standing with Japan 
represented an attempt to safeguard British interests in 
China from the injury they might otherwise suffer from such 
a combination,^ Fear of such a development was perhaps the 
underlying inspiration of the British insistence upon the 
importance of giving full recognition to the rising power 
in the Far East. Yet there is little in the British documents 
to show that this concern was weighing particularly heavily 
on the minds of the British at that time. In the uncertain 
atmosphere of the period before the conclusion of peace there 
was a general sense that anything was possible. But the 
instant inquiry as to the truth of a report in the Times 
that an offensive and defensive alliance between China and 
Japan was one of the terms of peace seems to reflect surprise 
at a development which was not expected (and which did not 
in fact materialize) as much as alarm at the event. Cert­
ainly this was not the immediate concern governing British 
policy in the sense of Dr. Joseph’s suggestion that the 
British inclination to intervene varied directly in proport­
ion with the indications of the extent of Japanese ambition 
in China.^ It is true that any sign that negotiations might
1.cp.P. Joseph, Foreign Diplomacy in China, [1929] ,106.
2. Kimberley to O'Conor, Tel.40, 16 April 1895, FOl7/1242.
3. P. Joseph, Foreign Diplomacy in China, [1929],p.117-18.
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break down and hostilities be resumed spurred them to urge 
the conclusion of peace with fresh vigour. But in this they 
were dominated by the fear that the renewal of the war might 
lead to the collapse of China : a prospect that appalled them 
in any event without specific reference to the advantage that 
the Japanese might take of it. It was recognized that an 
alliance between China and Japan might be dangerous for 
Britain but the danger was not considered an immediate one.
Three weeks after the treaty had been ratified Kimberley said;
"What would happen if China were to follow the example 
of Japan and civilize herself, and if Japan and China 
were to be allied is another affair, but this if is a 
contingency which need not trouble us now".!
Professor Langer has written that: "All we know, from 
^ueen Victoria's correspondence, is that Rosebery 
personally would have liked to work with Russia, that 
he had great difficulties with his colleagues, and that 
in the end he was unable to convince them".2
It is true that Rosebery would have liked to work with Russia
and greatly regretted the separation from her - regretted it
to the point of seeming to resent the decision that had been
made. Yet there is no evidence that Rosebery disagreed with
Kimberley, who would also have liked to work with Russia, in
feeling the greater weight of the arguments against taking
1. Private Kimberley Papers, Kimberley to Captain Cavendish, 
Private, 30 May 1895.
2. W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, [1935], 1,185.
in tne intervention. It was arguments in this sense which
Rosebery cited two and a half yesirs later as having been
the guiding motives of ais policy at the time ; the 'desire
to keep Japan on our side * and to 'reserve strength'.^ The
vueen too, who, a.s Professor Langer noued, deeply regretted
that &nglana could noc join the powers, at the same time
admitted "the impossibility of our doing so".^
Rosebery certainly appears to have felt himself hampered
by differences of opinion within the Cabinet when the question
of intervention was reconsidered after the signature of the
treaty • He told the queen that "the difficulties in the
Cabinet were great".Previously he nad touched on this
subject in a conversation with de Staal who reported that
",.Lord Rosebery se plaignit des difficultés qu'il rencontrait 
parfçis dans le maniement des affaires politiques. Le 
système des Conseils de Gabine'Ç lui paraissait peu fait 
pour discussion de questions délicates ou complexes. 
Convoques souvent avec precipitation* ces Conseils 
reunissaient,des personnes très compétentes pour les 
affaires intérieures du pays, mais souvent peu^aptes a 
saisir les combinaisons de la politique étrangers. Les 
decisions prises se ressentaient quelquefois de ces 
inconvénients 4
1. The Marquess of Crewe, Lord Rosebery, [1931., II, 554.
Vide Supra, p.29 &—
2. Letters of gueen Victoria, 'Third Series, II, 497.
3. ibid..
4. A• Meyendorff, Correspondance Diplomatique de M.de Staal,
;i929, , II, 2^ .
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But what trace is there of these difficulties in the 
action taken by Rosebery and Kimberley? In the circumstances, 
the various considerations which were important to them would 
not appear to have allowed much alternative to the policy they 
in fact pursued. They themselves were opposed to using force 
in this question and yet were convinced that force, or the 
threat of force, would be necessary if the intervention were 
to succeed. They were both unwilling to adopt the expedient, 
suggested by Russia, of joining in the protest but holding 
aloof if it came to using force - particularly since they 
were so sure that force would be necessary. And they were 
able to counteract the support for Japan implied by their 
refusal to intervene and to show sympathy for Russia by their 
warning to Japan that they would not help her to resist the 
Russian demands.
This is not to say that there was not difference of 
opinion within the Cabinet on the subject. Kimberley and 
Rosebery on the one hand and Harcourt on the other approached 
the question from sharply contrasting points of view. Harcourt 
vigorously decried the significance of the issues raised by 
the Japanese terms, Kimberley firmly refused to acquiesce 
in this denial of the gravity of the situation.^
1. Private Kimberley Papers,Harcourt to Kimberley 5 April 1895;
Kimberley to Harcourt 6 April 1895 
Harcourt to Kimberley 6 April 1895 
Kimberley to Harcourt 7 April 1895
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H a r c o u r t * s  i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  th e  im p o rta n ce
o f  w o rk in g  w i t h  R ussia  must have been a p a r t i c u l a r  source  
o f  i r r i t a t i o n  when the  q u e s t io n  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  was b e in g  
r e c o n s id e r e d  f o r  th e n  i t  was th e  consequences o f  s e p a r a t in g  
f ro m  R uss ia  w hich p a r t i c u l a r l y  w o r r ie d  R osebery  and K im b e r le y .  
I n  p o in t  o f  f a c t  c ircu m stan ces  l e f t  l i t t l e  room f o r  t h i s  
d iv e rg e n c e  to  have much p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  upon p o l i c y .  N ever­
t h e l e s s ,  the  m ounting s t r a i n  o f  th e  division w i t h i n  the  
C a b in e t  w i t h  r e g a rd  to  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s ,  no doubt e s p e c i a l l y  
t e l l i n g  on Rosebery a t  t h i s  t im e  when he was n o t  a t  a l l  w e l l ,  
combined w i th  h is  f e e l i n g  t h a t  m a tte rs  were coming to  a c r i s i s  
must have made Rosebery p e c u l i a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  to  e v e ry  d i f f e r ­
ence o f  o p in io n  w h a te v e r  i t s  a c t u a l  e f f e c t s .  T h is  a c u te  
awareness o f  u n d e r ly in g  d i f f e r e n c e s  would seem to  a cco u n t  
t o  a la r g e  e x t e n t  f o r  h is  s t r i c t u r e s  upon th e  C a b in e t  i n  
t h i s  q u e s t io n .
The d e s i r e  t o  c o n f in e  t h e i r  a c t io n  i n  th e  F a r  B as t  
w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  r e s t r i c t e d  l i m i t s  and th e  w ish  t o  a v o id  
a l i e n a t i n g  Japan seem t o  have been th e  c o n s id e ra t io n s  
im m e d ia te ly  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  B r i t i s h  d e c is io n  n o t  to  
j o i n  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  But t h e i r  d e c is io n  was r e in f o r c e d  
by two more g e n e r a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  w h ich , a l th o u g h  less 
d i r e c t  i n  t h e i r  o p e r a t io n ,  must t o  a la r g e  e x te n t  have  
fo rm ed  th e  fram ew ork  w i t h i n  w hich th e  B r i t i s h  ch o ice  was 
made. One was t h e i r  in c r e a s in g  im p a t ie n c e  f o r  a f i n a l
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settlement ; one gets the impression that the British were 
anxious that a settlement should be reached rather than 
that further time should be spent upon perfecting its terms• 
This arose directly from their concern with the protection 
of British trade in China and their consequent fear of the 
effects of a resumption of hostilities. The other consider­
ation was the "profound distrust of the professed disinter­
estedness of the European powers in the Par East"^ which 
the British felt. The very fact that this feeling was 
deep-seated adds to the difficulty of defining with precision 
its effect upon British policy. There is abundant evidence 
that the British were aware of the ambitions of the Powers 
in the Par East but very little reference is made to this 
in connection with their decision. Nevertheless the British 
appreciation of the fact that the intervention would be made 
a stepping stone for the advancement of these ambitions must 
have made it seem a futile proposition from their point of 
view.
1. Lillian M, Penson, "The New Course in British Foreign
Policy, 1892-1902", Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society. 4th Ser., XXV, 194-3, p.i^^.
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CHAPTER 4
BRITISH POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN 
INTEREST IN  CHINA. 1895-97
B r i t i s h  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  c o n c lu s io n  of peace was 
somewhat marred by th e  c ircum stances  in  %hlch i t  was f i n a l l y  
a c h ie v e d . The success o f the  in t e r v e n t io n  enormously in cre a s ed  
th e  in f lu e n c e  of th e  in te r v e n in g  Powers over th e  Chinese  
Government and p ro v id e d  them w ith  grounds f o r  c la im in g  sp ec ia l  
concessions from  th e  Chinese as a reward f o r  t h e i r  s e rv ic e s .  
When the Chinese heard  th a t  the  Japanese had g iv e n  way t o  th e  
demands of th e  Powers, th ey  p leaded  f o r  d e la y  i n  th e  r a t i f i c a ­
t i o n  of the t r e a t y  so th a t  i t  could be re v is e d  f i r s t .  But th e
Japanese were y i e l d i n g  n o th in g  to  China and in s is te d  upon the
1
t r e a t y  b e in g  r a t i f i e d  as i t  stood and re v is e d  at l e i s u r e .  The
r e v i s i o n  took  p la c e  a t  a very  l e i s u r e l y  p a c e . The Japanese
demands f o r  compensation were not fo r m a l ly  announced u n t i l  
2
19 J u ly  and the Supplementary T r e a ty  was n o t signed u n t i l  
3
8 November -  e x a c t ly  s ix  months a f t e r  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of the  
T r e a ty  of Shlmonoseki. The in c re a s e d  in f lu e n c e  of th e  th re e
1. Lowther t o  K im b e r le y ,  T e l . 53, 8 May 1895, F 0 4 6 /4 5 6 .
2 . Lowther t o  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 7 5 ,  most c o n f i d e n t i a l ,  19 Ju ly
1895, F 0 4 6 /4 5 6 .
3 .  J .V .A .  MacMurray ( E d i t o r ) ,  T r e a t ie s  and Agreements w ith  and
concern in g  C h in a , [ l 9 2 1 j ,  I , ë o l
Powers over th e  Chinese Government was pro longed hy t h i s  d e la y  
i n  s e t t l i n g  the  qu es tio n  end enhanced by the  Chinese dependence 
UDon th e  th r e e  Pow er's  agreement w ith  Japan f o r  the  r e t r o c e s s io n  
of the  L iao tu n g  P e n in s u la .  Moreover the  c o n d it io n s  of the  
r e t r o c e s s io n  were arranged through the  R ussian , F re n c h , and 
German Governments and not between China and Japan d i r e c t l y .
The dangerous e f f e c t s  of Chinese subservience  to  the  
Powers were sharp ly  Impressed upon th e  B r i t i s h  in  the two 
months a f t e r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by th e  c o n c lu s io n  of th e  Russo-Chinese  
lo an  agreement and the  Franco-C hinese  f r o n t i e r  and com m ercial  
c o n v e n tio n s . I n  consequence the  B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e  t o  the  
n e g o t ia t io n s  a rra n g in g  f o r  the  re tr o c e s s io n  was dominated by 
t h e i r  d e s i r e  t o  lessen  the  in f lu e n c e  of these  Powers over th e  
Chinese Government. On 7 June Low ther, a c t in g  on an id e a  of 
O 'C o n o r 's ,  suggested t h a t  the  Japanese might seek com m ercial 
concess ions , such as the opening of the  Fest R iv e r ,  as com­
p e n s a t io n  f o r  the  r e t r o c e s s io n  in s te a d  of the a d d i t io n a l
1
in d e m n ity  which they were g e n e r a l ly  ex p e c te d  to  demand. The 
B r i t i s h  Government endorsed t h i s  id e e ,  not on ly  because th ey  
were anxious f o r  the  opening of th e  West R iv e r ,  but a ls o  
because of t h e i r  b e l i e f  th a t  "any c o n s id e ra b le  in c re a s e  of the  
in d e m n itv  w i l l  throw  China in t o  a re a t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and a p o s i t io n
2 '
of subserv ience  t o  th e  Powers". The Japanese d id  not r e p u d ia te
1. Lowther to  K im b e r le y , T e l . 6 6 , 7 June 1895, F 0 4 6 /4 5 6 .
2 . K im berley  to  Low ther, T e l # 27, 7 June 1895, F 0 4 6 /4 5 5 .
thô id e s  -of asKing f o r  c0-^m9rcîal concessions as c ompanisati rn
biît th ey  made i t  c le a r  t h a t  th ey  were u n w i l l in g  to  fo re g o  an
a o c - i t io n s l  in d e m n ity .  S s l ia b ' iry  made an e f f o r t  to  h a s ten
th e  n e g o t ia t -o n s  s h o r t ly  a f t e r  he assumad o f f i c e  a t th e  end
of iiune. On oelng im  ormed thaü the  Japanese had not y e t
o e o i:  ed -«hat da^sncs they  were going to  make, he te le g ra p h e d
t o  nowtner: do not Know whether the Japanese Government
<f'iite rea lize  th a t  u n t i l  the  s rrsnrem ant f o r  the  
r e t r o c e s s io n  of th e  L iao tung  P e n in s u la  t o  China i s  
concluded, China i s  c om ple te ly  under th e  d o m in a t io n  cf 
th e  th re e  Powers and p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f Russia and France  
E u t, d e s p ite  Japanese p r o fe s s io n s  t h a t  they were
f u l l y  aware of the d isadvantages  c f the s i t u a t io n ,  t h i s  e f f o r t
had l i t t l e  e f f e c t  and the repeated  B r i t i s h  suggestions t h a t
d i r e c t  n e g c t ia t io n s  bet ween China and Jppan would be a much
b e t t e r  way of s e t t l i n g  the  ques t io n  were e q u a l ly  u n p ro d u c t iv e .
The s p e c ia l  In f lu e n c e  which France and Russia e x e rc is e d
over th e  Chinese Government owed much to  the  c lo se  and a c t iv e
c o -o p e r a t io n  of t h e i r  M in is te r s  a t P e k in g , M. G ira rd  and Count
2
C a s s in i  "The Siamese tw in s  of Peking D ip lom acy", "Nous é t io n s  
t o u t e f o i s  s i u n is ,  le  comte C a s s in i e t  m o i,"  wrote G e rard , "n o tre
a c t io n  é t a i t  s i é t ro i te m e n t  co ncertée  e t confondue,nos
3
c a ra c tè re s  e t  nos tempéraments se fo n d a ie n t  s i b i e n , . . . " .
T h e i r  c lo se  a lignm ent was d e l i b e r a t e l y  s tre s s e d . The purpose
1. S a l is b u ry  to  Low ther, T e l . 31 S e c re t ,  11 J u ly  1895, P 0 4 6 /4 5 5 .
2 . V a le n t in e  C h i r o l ,  The F a r  Sa s te rn  Q u e s t io n . [ l 8 9 6 ] ,  6 9 .
3 .  Mémoires d ’ Auguste G erard , [ 1 9 2 8 ] ,  266.
of an aisàienca ih ie h  th e  two m ini s ta rs  bed w ith  th e  Fmpsrcr
on 7 June 1895 was a lnp -lj to  p reean t l e t t e r s  announcing th e
accession of the new Tsar and President. They however concealed
t h i s  f a c t  aiwi arranged th e  lÉicie a f f a i r  " to  c r e a te  an
1
im p res s io n  of the In t l# g c y  o f the two c o u n t r ie s . "  They were
each s trengthened  in  t h e i r  d e a l in g s  w ith  th e  Chinese hy t h i s
p a r t n e r s h ip .  Cas s i n i ,  i n  n e g o t ie o in g  th e  agreement f o r  th e
f i r s t  in dem n ity  lo a n , was s tro n g ly  sup-ported hy Gérard., st^
0»Conor thought th a t  Gerard "probably  f e l t  f r e e r  th a n  C a s s in i
2
t o  h i n t  a t  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  d i  sp-le  a s in g  R u s s ia " .  S im i l a r l y  
C a s s in i  s - jp -p o rte d  G é ra rd  i n  h i s  ns .go t 1 s t  L a is  f o r  s f r o n t i e r  
and com m ercial co n v en tio n , ever, accogpanylng him t e  th e  i n t e r ­
v iew  w i th  th e  1 s - '-n ig li i  amen .at w h ic h  th e  Conventions were 
3
a ipned . S i r  Robert B e r t ,  In s p e c to r -G e n e r .s i o f th e  Chinese
Customs S e rv ic e ,  said  th a t  he was t r y i n g  " to  s t i f f e n  C h in e 's
back s b i t ,  end w itn  same success, but I  know ^ a ' l l  c o l la p s e
4
th e  '■‘I ' - u te  C as s in i shews h i s  te e th  o r  Gerard f r e i n s * .  Gerard
wrote l a t ^ r  that a t  th.? ?r.c of 1895: "Ls c o n s t e l l a t io n  qui
r é g n a i t  a F é l i n ,  Je veux, d i r e  1© c o n s t e l l a t io n  f r a n c o -  
ru s s e , a l l s i t  pendant quslgo, e temp s b r i l l e r  sans 
t r o u b le  au f irm am ent de l a  v i l l a  Jaune". 5
1. O’ Conor to  B e r t i e ,  P r iv a t e ,  5 June 1895, F017/1235#
2 . O'Conor to  X i '^ te r la y ,  no, 229 S e c re t ,  18 June 1395, F 017/125 6 .
5 . O'Concr to  k i^ b e r le y ,  T e l . 77 (P a ra p h ra s e ) ,  2€ June 1895,
F 0 1 7 /1 2 6 8 .
4 .  S .P . W r ig h t ,  H a r t  end the  Chinese Customs, [ 1 9 5 0 ] ,  65 9 . Mr.
■fright in tro d u c e s  t h i s  q u o ta t io n  ir . d ls c u s s in n  the  lo an  
n e g o t ia t io n :  in  fu n s , 1895. The re fe re n c e  which he g iv e s  
f o r  i t ,  however, i s  dated 19 A p r i l  1696.
5 . Mémoires d*Auguste .Gérard, [ 1928 j , 271-7  2 .
MI t  was the  marked a n ta g o n is t  which th e  French and
Russians showed to  e v e ry th in g  B r i t i s h  in  China which made t h i s
com bination  p a r t i c u l a r l y  dnny^rovg f o r  B r i t a i n .  0 * Conor said
t h a t  i t  ?/as p a r t  of the  ''avowed p o l ic y "  of Cerara  ana C a s s in i
t o  " lo s e  no opportunité? of seeking to  supplant B r i t i s h  s u b je c ts
1
i n  th e  v a r io u s  p o s i t io n s  which th ey  occupy throughout C h in a" .
And when Macdonald a r r iv e d  i n  China i n  A p r i l ,  1896 to  ta k e  up
h i s  p o s i t io n  as M in is t e r ,  he wrote t o  B e r t ie  th a t  "The Russian
and French h o s t i l i t y  to  a ny th in g  B r i t i s h  here  i s ,  from a l l
acco unts , q u ite  e x t r a o r d in a r y ,  to  anyone coming from  th e
2
o u ts id e  world q u i te  c h i l d is h " .
The B r i t i s h  f i r s t  f e l t  the  im pact of t h i s  new r i v a l r y  i n  
th e  in te n s e  c o m p e t it io n  which began im m e d ia te ly  a f t e r  th e  
c o n c lu s io n  of peace to  p ro v id e  China w ith  the lo an  vh lch  she 
req ijd red  i n  o rd er  t o  pay the in d em n ity  t o  Japan. One source 
of confusion  in  these  n e g o t ia t io n s  was t h a t  th e  Chinese d id  
not know e x a c t ly  how much th e y  needed or wanted to  borrow.
The in d e m n ity  p rov ided  f o r  i n  the  T r e a ty  of Shimonoseki was 
200 m. T a e ls ,  (c .  £20 m .) .  I t  was g e n e r a l ly  assumed th a t  th e re  
would be an a d d i t io n a l  in d e m n ity  f o r  the r e t r o c e s s io n  of the  
L ia o tu n g  P en in s u la  but the  amount of t h i s ,  30 m. T a e ls  ( c .£ 3  ran.) 
was not d e f i n i t e l y  s e t t l e d  u n t i l  O ctober. I t  was a lso  expected  
t h a t  th e  Chinese r a i ^ t  want to  borrow some money f o r  c u r re n t
1# O'Oonor to  S a l is b u r y ,  n o .356, 13 September 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 3 8 .
2 .  Macdonald to  B e r t i e ,  P r i v a t e ,  23 A p r i l  1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 7 .
iO
government expenses. I f  th ey  undertook the  r e - o r g a n iz a t io n  
of t h e i r  army and navy they  would d e f i n i t e l y  r e q u i r e  a con­
s id e r a b le  gum. But th e re  had been no d e c is io n  as to  how much 
th e y  ^ o u ld  arrange to  borrow. Moreover i t  was not c e r t a in  
at f i r s t  who[her the Chinese would r a is e  the  money th ey  
r e q u ir e d  by ono lo an  or by a s e r ie s  of lo a n s . E v e n tu a l ly  th e  
Chinese met t h e i r  re q u ire m e n ts  by th re e  f o r e ig n  loans -  th e  
F ra n c o -R u s s ia n  lo a n  of J u ly ,  1395, ana th e  two Angio-Garmgn 
lo an s  of March, 1896, and March, 1893.
The B r i t i s h  bank most in te r e s te d  i n  th e  m a tte r  was the  
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking C o rp o ra t io n  which f o r  th e  
p re v io u s  twenty y e ars  had enjoyed a v i r t u a l  monopoly o f th e
banking business of th e  Chinese Government and had p ro v id ed
1
most of i t s  lo an s . They were anxious to  m a in ta in  t h e i r
predom inant p o s i t io n  and consequently  were eager to  be able
t o  respond to  an o v e r tu re  from  B a r t  asking  i f  th e y  could p ro v id e
th e  £60 m. which he t h o u ^ t  China would r e f a i r e »  T h is  was a
very  la r g e  t r a n s a c t io n  f o r  a bank of t h i s  n a tu re  b u t ,  h a v in g
secured th e  c o -o p e ra t io n  of a German s y n d ic a te ,  th ey  f e l t  t h a t
th e y  would be ab le  to  manage i t .  Cameron, the  B ank's  Manager,
to ld  Sanderson on 7 May t h a t  " th is  bank w i l l  undertake  to  f in d
2
a l l  the  money r e q u ire d  by C h in a" . However they  were a f r a i d
1. Cameron to  K im b e r le y , 21 May 1395, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 2 ;  F .  Tamagna, 
Banking ana F inance i n  C hina, [ l 9 4 2 j ,  2 4 -2 5 .
2 . Cameron to  Sanderson, 7 May 1895, ™ 017/1252.
mt h a t  f o r e ig n  cogsp'etition might iç -set the  e r r s n - e r e c t s  they  
were aiaKing, There wer~ r e p o r ts  th e t  “ re n c h , R uss ian , sr^i 
German f i n a n c i a l  groups wanted t : make the  le a n ,  w ith o u t  
Sngliahi p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and on c o n d it io n  th a t  some form of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  was in tro d u ced  in  the Customs A d m in is tra ­
t i o n  ana th a t  the- Chinese ol&ced a la r n e  numbar of o rders  in
1
dermany and Ft sncs.
Ga’ieron had kept the  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  1 r f  or wed of th e
steps the  la n k  was ta k in g  and no* he seamed to  hope f o r  some
more open support from  the  Government. But, e l th o  :gh th e
F o re ig n  O f f ic e  hoped f o r  she "^nk’ s success, they  L'elt th a t
the  c o m p e t it io n  of o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  msde i t  im p o ss ib le  f o r  them
to  g iv e  any such supp ort. Sancarson proposed to  t e l l  Cameron
t n a t  " i f  uh3 Bank can manage the lo an  on the  l i n e s  th e y
w ish , we s h a l l  th in k  they have done e x tre m e ly  w e l l .
But . . .  the  Government would r a th e r  only h e a r  of i t
as an accompli shed f a c t . * 2
K im berley  ex p la in e d  to  O'Conor t h a t  "’F .M . Government do not  
wish t  G in te r v e n e  in  t h i s  n e g o t ia t io n .  Arrangement 
th roug h  S ng lish  banks alone though fa v o u ra b le  t o  B r i t i s h  
in t e r e s t s  woula e x c i te  g rea t I n t e r n a t i  on@1 je a lo u s y  and
H .M .G . could a c t  make them selves re s p o n s ib le  f o r  
e x c lu s io n  cf o th e r  c o u n t r ie s . "  3
However the  Government was alarmed by the  development of 
f o r e ig n  c o m p e t it io n  in  the fo l lo w in g  week vh ich  conv in ced  them
1. Sanderson, Memorandum, ? .cay 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 2 .
2. Sand arson, damorandum, 13 May 1395, F C 1 7 /1 252 .
3 .  p r i v a t e  K im berley  P apers , K im berley  to  O 'Gonor, T e legram ,
P r iv a t e  and S e c re t ,  15 la y  1395.
tnsli tb a  ong Kong ®.nî 3h&n.ghel h-snk would not succeed in  
s ecu rin g  t h *  c o n tra c t  f  or  the  loan  and tb s *  th e r e  was danger  
of Znzlend being excluded . Th*n r e r t ! c - 7 * r l y  fe a re d  a Russian
lo a n  m":ion th e y  wens ~ur-G w c.ilc  he a c c o r^ a n ls d  t y  a g u a ra n te e  
létîoh mi :ist hs?e s e r i  vus p o l i t i c a l  consequences. Then
a ls o  become mere snr more convinced of ohf im portance o f the  
Chinese r a is in g  a l l  *he money th e y  r e q u ire d  by ? s in g le
t r a n s a c t io n  and thcuqht t k s t  « s e r ie s  of lo ses  I n j u r e
1
Chinese c r e d i t  and ‘• f r i t t e r  ewey" h e r  s e c u r i ty .  These two
c o n s id é ra t io n s  made the news th a t  Chins wss l i k e l y  t o  accept
2
« lo an  o f £S m. from  Russie p a r t i c u l a r l y  unwelcome.
The new urgency of the quedkion changed the  Governasnt » s
a t t i t u d e  t o  In t e r v e n t io n  and they tu rned  to  th e  R o th s c h i ld s ,
explainlng afterwards to Cameron that *the pressure of other 
Governments on China had become so strong and that it 
was 30 clearly essential that the loan Aoiild be brou^t 
out as one trmnsECtiin, th&t we have been compelled 
to get the assistance of the PothschiIds in preventing 
anything, being done to preju&ica Briti^ interests*" 3
I t  i a  d i f f i c u l t  to  t r a c e  c le a r l y  th e  f i r s t  s teps  ta k e n  I n
t h i s  appea l to  th e  R o th s c h ild s .  Roseber%,: had a p p a re n t ly  bad
some c o n v e rs a t io n  with Lord Hctiischiid the week b e fo re  but a t
t h a t  t im e  I t  was still hoped th a t  the Hong Song and Siang
4
Bank s ig h t  be ab le  to  manage the lo a n .  Then on 19 May
1 .  K im berley  to- L a s c e l le s ,  T e l . 37 , 21 iay 1895 , ^065 /1493 ,
t-y : 1 -Conor, T e l . 82 S e c re t ,  13 isy 1595, F017 /12 42 .
3 . Sanderson, ieror&ndnm , 21 le y  1395, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 2 .
4 . Sanderson, Memorandum, 13 is y  1396, 7 0 17 /1 2 5 2 ;  Rosebery to
Sanderson, Te legram , 15 aisy 1 3 9 6, F017/ 1 2 5 2.
%Sanderson mentions that Rothschild celled on hi~* cupinq the
day and h i e  ao cc -n t of t h e i r  c c n Y e rs s t io a  suggests t h a t  th ey
1 '
hsd a ls o  been in  tC':3h on the p ra v io u s  day. I t  eeems o c s s ib le
t h a t  R o th s c h ild  c a l le d  cf h is  own accord i n  the  f i r s t  in s ta n c e
to  convey some Inh:crmet i  :n which he had re c e iv e d  about th e
grave s ta te  o f the loan  n e g o t ia t io n s  snd th a t  t h i s  in fo r m a t io n
le d  to  a d e c is io n  to  see% the  R o th s c h i ld s ' h e lp  In  th e  m a t te r .
# i 9D. Sanderson saw R o th s c h ild  on 19 May he " a u th o r iz e d "  him
t o  t e l l  the P a r is  R o th s c h ild  a th a t  "we t r u s te d  s in c e r e ly  th a t
no answer w i l l  be g ive n  tc  th e  Russian F inance M in is t e r  u n t i l
2
th e  r e s u l t  of our coam unication  to  P r in c e  lobanow i s  known".
The n ex t day R o th s c h ild  saw .""ir-berlay a t h i s  house i n  Lowndes
Square and made the  suggestion th a t  R o th s c h ild s  in  P a r is  end
London should ts asued by the Chinese Government t o  in v e s t ig a t e
the  best way of r a is in g  the  loan  and at the  ssms tim e  s a t i s -
3
f y in g  R u s s ia , F ra n c e , Germany, m û  R n t ls n d . K im berley  wrote  
t o  Sanderson: " . . .  I  th in k  the move would be a pood one . . . .
4
. . .  you had b e t t e r  coma here  an once, be should lo s e  no t im e " .  
N e v e r th e le s s  exam in a tion  the  s i t u a t io n ,  a l t h o u ^  u r g e n t ,
had proved re a s s u r in g  i n  some r e s p e c ts .  I t  æ peered th a t  no
1 . Sanderson, Meaorandua, 19 May 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 2 .
2. I b i d .  on 18 May L a s c e l le s  had been in s t r u c te d  to  make
Lobanow aware of the f a c t  th a t  the  B r i t i s h  knew of the  
Russian o f f e r  to  China end to  im press upon him the g re a t  
i n t e r e s t  of B r i t a i n  in th e  q u e s t io n . K im berley  to  L a s c e l le s  
T e l . 31 and T e l . 92 S e c re t ,  13 May 1895, '^065 /1493.
3 . K im berley to  O 'Conor, T e l . 64 , S e c re t ,  2C May 1395, F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 2 .
4 .  K im berley  to  Sanderson, 20 May 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 2 .
hla r g e  lo a n  could be r a is e d  w ith o u t reco u rse  to  th e  London 
1
money m arket. Moreover the  P a r is  R o th s c h ild s ,  ihom W it te
had approached about the  lo a n  he was o f f e r in g  to  th e  C h in ese ,
had prom ised t h a t  th ey  would not un dertake  any arrangem ent
which was not ac cep ta b le  to  the  B r i t i s l i .  And K im berley  wrote
2
"We are  a t  p re s e n t m asters of the s i t u a t io n " .
The B r i t i s h  adopted R o th s c h i ld 's  p ro p o s a l and p la c e d  i t
3
b e fo re  the  Chinese Government. But th e  Chinese tu rned  i t
dov/n. The T sung 11 Yamen e x p la in e d  to  O'Conor t h a t  th e y  had
a lre a d y  promised to  borrow £8 ra. from  Russia and t h a t ,  a ltho ugh
th e y  would n o rm a lly  have welcomed th e  B r i t i s i i  p ro p o s a l ,  th e y
f e l t  t h a t  the  lo a n  was perhaps the best means of re p a y in g  th e  
4
Powers. However the  B r i t i s l i  d id  not appear to  be much
moved by th e  Chinese r e f u s a l .  They were c o n c e n tra t in g  upon
secu rin g  the  agreement of the  o th er  th r e e  Governments to  t h e i r
p la n .  By 26 May Sanderson t h o u ^ t  th a t  "we have p r a c t i c a l l y
5
got th e  th re e  Governments in t o  an amenable c o n d it io n "  and 
n^en O'Conor t e l e g r ^ h a d  the  next day t h a t  he had c o n f i d e n t ia l  
in fo r m a t io n  th a t  the  acceptance of a £16 m. lo an  from  Russia  
had been sanctioned by Im p e r ia l  Decree Sanderson commented t h a t
1 . K im berley  to  Sanderson, 20 May 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 2 .
2. K im berley  to  O 'Conor, T e l . 64 S e c re t ,  80 May 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 2 .
P r iv a t e  i i im b e r le y  Papers , A l f r e d  de R o th s c h ild  to  K im b e r ley ,  
22 May 1895.
3 .  K im berley  to  O'Conor, T e l . 64 S e c re t ,  20 May 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 2 .
4 .  O'Conor to  K im b e r le y , T e l . 57 S e c re t ,  21 May 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 3 .
5 . Sanderson, Memorandum, 26 May 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 2 .
%" t h i s  i s  th e  move we have more or le s s  checked ."
T h is  confidence  proved to  be p o o r ly  founded. Ten days
l a t e r  they  le a r n t  th a t  th e  Russian Government was on the  p o in t
of conc lu d in g  an agreement w ith  P a r is  bankers f o r  a lo an  of 
2 3 
£16 m i l l io n s .  T h is  agreement was signed on 10 June.
Roth s t e in ,  the  Russian agent I n  these  n e g o t ia t io n s ,  c laim ed
t h a t  b e fo re  he l e f t  S t .  P e te ra b u re h  th e  Chinese S u « c ia l  Envoy
4
th e r e  had agreed to  th e  te rm s . But th e  agreement between th e
Chinese and the Russian Governments was not f i n e l i v  concluded  
5
u n t i l  6 J u ly .  I n  the  in t e r v a l  th e  B r i t i s l i  and German M in is te r s
6
p ro te s te d  s tro n g ly  a g a in s t  the  c o n c lu s io n  of the  lo a n ,  p a r ­
t i c u l a r l y  a g a in s t  the  Russian g u a ra n te e . They succeeded i n  
i n s t i l l i n g  a g re a t  f e a r  of th e  guarantee  i n t o  th e  Chinese and 
i n  the end i t  was in c lu d e d  in  th e  agreement between th e  French
Bankers and the Russian Government but not i n  th e  agreement
7
between the Chinese and the  Russian Governments. The B r i t i s h  
seem to  have hoped d u r in g  June t h a t  th e  Chinese might be 
persuaded n o t to  accept the  lo an  a lth o u g h  th e r e  does not r e a l l y  
appear to  have been much chance of t h i s .  The c h ie f  m istake of
1 . O’ Conor to  K im b e r le y , i e l . 6 1  S e c re t ,  27 May 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 3 .
fvilnute by Sanderson.
2 . K im berley  to  O’ Conor, T e l . 72  C o n f id e n t ia l ,  5 June 1895,
F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 2 .
3 .  K im berley  to  O’ Conor, T e l . 7 4 ,  11 June 1895, P 0 1 7 /1 2 4 2 .
4 .  G o s s e lin  to  o im b e r le y , ‘' 'e l .  17, 14 June 1895, F 0 6 4 /1 3 5 2 .
5 . J .V .A .  MacMurray, op. c i t . [ l 9 2 l ] .  I ,  3 5 -4 1 ,
6 .  O’ Conor to  K im b e r le y , T e l . 67 S e c re t ,  10 June 1895, F 0 17 /12 43 .
7 .  D u f f e r l n  to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 42 S e c re t ,  9 Ju ly  1895, F027 /3223 ,
%th e  B r i t i s h  a t  the  e a r l i e r  and c r n c ia l  stage of the  lo an  nego­
t i a t i o n s  seems t o  have been th a t  th ey  r e l i e d  to o  much itoon 
t h e i r  commanding p o s i t io n  i n  the  money market and p a id  to o  
l i t t l e  a t t e n t io n  to  the  Chinese end of the  n e g o t ia t io n s  or to  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of the  Chinese a c cep tin g  a s m a lle r  lo an  # i lc h  
could  be ra is e d  w ith o u t th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of R o th s c h ild s  or  
of th e  London money m arke t.
I n  May 0*Conor had ob ta ined  an assurance from  th e  T s ’-m g ll
Yamen t h a t  ”no a r r a i  gement would be made f o r  payment of
1
in dem n ity  to  the  exc lu  s i  of i îng land” . The B r i t i s h  reminded
th e  Chinese of t h i s  prom ise on a number of occasions* They
con s id ered  th a t  the  Russian e f f o r t s  ( i n  th e  m iddle of June) to
c o n c i l i a t e  Germany f o r  h e r  e x c lu s io n  from th e  f i r s t  lo a n  by
p ro m is in g  to  see th a t  Chinese n a v a l  and m ' l i t a r y  o rd e rs  were
p la c e d  i n  Germany re p re s e n te d  ” a d e f i n i t e  i n t e n t i o n  to  exclude
G re a t B r i t a i n "  and 0 * Conor was t o ld  to  make i t  c le a r  t o  th e
2
Chinese t h a t  "we have • • •  no in t e n t io n  of b e in g  e f f a c e d . "
S h o r t ly  b e fo re  th e  co n c lu s io n  of th e  lo an  agreement between
China and Russia on 6 J u ly ,  th e  Bong hong end Shanghai Bank and
th e  D e u ts c h -A s ia t is q u e  Bank came to  an agreement to  c o -o p e ra te
i n  o f f e r i n g  China a lo a n  of £16 m i l l io n s ,  vhich she would need
t o  pay the  r e s t  of th e  in d e m n ity .  The B r i t i s h  Government, i n
response to  the  German re q u e s t f o r  t h e i r  c o -o p e ra t io n  i n  the
1* P r iv a t e  K im berley  Papers , O'Conor to  K im b e r ley , Te legram ,  
P r iv a t e  and S e c re t ,  13 May 1395.
2 . P r iv a t e  K im berley  Papers, r i i b e r l e y  to  O'Conor, Te legram ,  
P r i v a t e ,  18 June 1895.
Vm a tte r .  In s t r u c t e d  O'Conor to  jo in  Schwenk, the  German
1
M in is t e r  in  P ek in g , i n  s u p p o rt in g  th e  p ro p o s a l .  However one 
c o n d i t io n  of the  Russian lo a n  was t h a t  China should not borrow  
any more money f o r  s ix  months. C onsequently  a c t iv e  n e g o t ia t io n s  
f o r  th e  second lo a n  d id  not beg in  u n t i l  November. Then th e r e
were d is t u r b in g  r e p o r ts  th a t  Schwenk was p re s s in g  f o r  a separate
2
German lo a n  of £8 mn. The B r i t is h ,  were a f r a i d  t h a t  i f  a 
s e p a ra te  German lo an  was made, Germany would c la im  th a t  more
Germans should be employed in  the Customs S erv ice  and t h a t
3
B r i t i s h  in f lu e n c e  th e r e  would s u f fe r  as a r e s u l t .  However
i t  tu rn e d  out th a t  th e  German b m k s ,  f e e l i n g  bound by t h e i r
agreement w ith  th e  Hong Kong an; Shanghai Banks, had re fu s e d
to  have a n y th in g  to  do w ith  Schwenk's scheme f o r  a separa te  
4
lo a n  and on 10 November the  T s u n g li  Yamen dec ided  to  borrow
5
£16 m i l l i o n s  from England and Germany c o n j o i n t l y .  When the
Chinese l a t e r  showed a d is p o s i t io n  to  re p u d ia te  a l l  o b l ig a t io n
t o  borrow from  England, th e  B r i t i s h  Government e m o h a t ic a l ly
6
m a in ta in e d  th a t  the  Chinese were bound by t h i s  d e c is io n .  
D i f f e r e n c e s  between th e  Chinese Government and the  Anglo-German
1. S a l is b u ry  to  O'Conor, T e l . 8 9 ,  6 Ju ly  1895, P 0 1 7 /1 2 4 2 .
2 . B eau c le rk  to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 145, 8 November 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 3 .
B e a u c le rk , th e  S e c re ta ry  of L e g a t io n  a t  P ek in g , was 
charge d ' a f f a i r e s  th e r e  from  5 November 1895 to  22 A p r i l
1896.
3 .  B e r t i e ,  Memorandum, 9 November 1895, P 0 1 7 /1 2 5 2 .
4 .  G o s s a i i n t o  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 42 , 10 November 1395, F 0 6 4 /1 3 5 2 .
5 . B eau c lerk  to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 149, 10 November 1895, P 0 1 7 /1 2 4 3 .
6 .  S a lis b u ry  t o  B ea u c le rk , T e l . 10, 24 January 1696, P 0 1 7 /1 2 7 9 .
" " " , T e l . 20, 19 February  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 9 .
synd ica t?  over the  term s of the  lo an  delayed th e  c o n c lu s io n
of an agreement u n t i l  March. B ut, d e s p ite  soma American and
1*ranch c o m p e t i t io n ,  th a  Syndicate  was f a i r l y  c o n f id e n t  th a t
they would o b ta in  the c o n tra c t  f o r  the  loan  i n  the  end.
They thought t h a t  the Chinese e n te r ta in e d  o th e r  o f f e r s  c h i e f l y
ir.! o rd e r  to  induce them to  lower t h e i r  te rm s. However at the
very  b eg in n in g  of March French c o m p e tit io n  assumed a much more
a la rm in g  a s p e c t .  The R ussians, who had h i t h e r t o  opposed
a n o th er  lo an  to  C hina, abandoned t h e i r  o b je c t io n s .  The Chinese
were said to  be s e r io u s ly  c o n s id e r in g  the  French o f f e r ,  one
c o n d i t io n  of which was reputed  to  be some French c o n t r o l  i n
2
the  Customs A d m in is t r a t io n .  At t h i s  p o in t  H a r t ,  who had been
awey , in te r v e n e d ,  a r r i v i n g  " ju s t  i n  th e  n ick  of t im e and
[s a y in g ]  the  very  t h in g  th a t  screwed up the  Yamen to  the  p o in t
3
of r e s i s t i n g  G e ra rd ."  The p r e l im in a r y  agreement between
th e  Chinese Government and the  Synd icate  was signed in f o r m a l ly  
4 5
on 7 March and th e  f i n a l  agreement was concluded, on 23 March.
Arrangements were made f o r  the i n s c r i p t i o n  of th e  lo an  a t  the
6
Bank of îngland.
1 . B eau c le rk  to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 14 , 31 January 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 8 0 .
2 . Cameron to  Sanderson, 5 March 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 8 7 .
B eau clerk  to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 25 , 7 March 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 8 0 .
3 . S .F .  A r ig h t ,  H a r t  end the  Chinese Customs, [ l 9 5 0 ] ,  662.
4 .  Beaucler'^' to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 26 , 7 March 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 8 0 .
5. J .V .A .  MscMurrpy, o p . c i t . , [ l 9 2 l ] .  I ,  55.
6 .  S a lis b u ry  to  B ea u c le rk , T e l . 29 , 26 March 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 9 .
Th ree  c o n s id e rc t ic n s  emerge from  th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r
th ese  two loans showing t h ? main reasons f o r  th e  concern of
th e  t^ r i t is h  Government in  the m a tte r .  There  was the  f e a r  th a t
o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  might make the  lo a n  an occ^^sion f o r  o b ta in in g
p o l i t i c a l  concessions from China and t h a t  a loan by France or
Russia  would f o s t e r  Chinese submission to  those powers -  a f e a r
amply . j u s t i f i e d  in  th e  B r i t i s h  v iew  by th e  Russian Governm ent's
g u aran tee  o f the  F ran c o -R u s s ia n  lo an  to  China of J u ly ,  1895.
Secondly th e r e  was the  apparent f e e l i n g  t h a t  i t  would be an
a f f r o n t  i f  B r i t i s h  banks were e n t i r e l y  excluded from th e  lo an s
or had on ly  a minor share in  th e  t r a n s a c t io n .  T h is  le d  them,
e a r ly  i n  the  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  th e  f i r s t  lo a n , to  seek some
assurance from  the  Chinese th a t  no arrangem ent would be made
1
f o r  the  in d em n ity  to  the  e x c lu s io n  of England, and d u r in g
th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  the  second loan  to  i n s i s t  upon th e
o b l ig a t io n  of the  Chinese to  borrow from  a B r i t i s h  bank.
F i n a l l y ,  th e y  were anxious to  avoid changes in  th e  Chinese  
Customs A d m in is t r a t io n  because th e y  regarded the  p r e s e r v a t io n  
of B r i t i s h  in f lu e n c e  th e re  as e s s e n t ia l  f o r  the  p r o t e c t io n  of  
th e  la r g e  B r i t i s h  t ra d e  w ith  C hina.
Th ere  were two «ays i n  which arrangem ents f o r  the  In d e m n ity
loans might a f f e c t  th e  Customs A d m in is t r a t io n .  The f i r s t  was
by th e  in t r o d u c t io n  of some form of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l .
T h is  was said  to  be a c o n d it io n  of the  suggested loan  by F ra n c e ,
1. P r iv a t e  -vimberley Papers , O'Gonnr t o  K im b e r ley ,
T e le g r a 's  P r iv a t e  & S e c re t ,  18 May 1895.
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R u ss ie , end Germany re p o rte d  in  May, 1895. The id e a  was very
unwelcome t o  the  B r i t i s h .  One of th e  le a d in g  f e a tu r e s  of the
Chinese Customs A d m in is t ra t io n  was i t s  freedom from  in t e r f e r e n c e
by f o r e ig n  governments. F o re ig n  c o n t r o l  would have been a
breach of t h i s  t r a d i t i o n ,  and the  B r i t i s h  fe a re d  t h a t  i t  would
im p a ir  th e  e f f i c i e n c y  of the  a d m in is t r a t io n .  K im berley
suggested th a t  d 'Conor should h i n t  to  the  T s u n g li  Yamen t h a t
a lo an  by th e  Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank would p ro b a b ly  not
1
in v o lv e  a l t e r a t i o n s  i n  th e  Customs A d m in is t r a t io n .  But even
th e  B r i t i s h  thougtit th a t  i t  might be im p o ss ib le  to  r a is e  the
lo a n  w ith o u t  a measure of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  and O'Conor
was asked to  suggest the  " le a s t  d i s t a s t e f u l  and em barrassing"
2
way i n  which the req u irem en t could be met. They were a lso
anxious to  make sure th a t  th e y  were consu lted  about any changes
which were made i n  th e  Customs a d m in is t r a t io n .  La see l i e s  was
in s t r u c te d  t o  make I t  c le a r  to  Lobanow t h a t  "on account of our 
immense commercial i n t e r e s t s  in  C h in a , BOt of th e  
f o r e ig n  t ra d e  b e in g  B r i t i s h ,  we are j u s t i f i e d  i n  
e x p e c t in g  th a t  no f i n a n c i a l  arrangem ents w i l l  be made 
a f f e c t i n g  the M a r it im e  Customs w ith o u t our be ing  
c o n s u l te d ."  3
S i m i l a r l y ,  th e  B r i t i s h  considered  t h a t  one of the most a la rm in g  
aspects  of th e  French c o m p e t it io n  f o r  the second in d e m n ity  lo an  
i n  March 1896 was the  French re q u e s t f o r  c o n t r o l  of th e  Customs. 
The French a p p a re n t ly  had i n  mind the  appointm ent of a French
1. P r iv a t e  K im berley  Papers , K im berley to  O'Conor, T e l .
P r iv a te  L S e c re t ,  8 May 1895.
2. " " " K im berley  to  O'Conor, T e l .
P r iv a t e  & S e c re t ,  13 May 1895.
5 .  K im berley  to  La s c e l le  3, T e l . 6 1 , 18 May 1895, F 0 6 5 /1 4 9 3 .
iQl
In s p e c to r  to  lo o /  a f t e r  tha  i n t e r e s t s  of th e  bondholders -
an Innovation «rich hamaror. con i id are C won Id bo the ^rnin" of
1
the Gar vice as it existed.
Tne British wera a lso  afrsid that ^rance, Germany and
R ussia might taka advantage of hav ing  lada a lo an  to  China to
c la i- ' i  th a t  n rre  of t h s l r  su b jec ts  should be e p lo g a d  In  -he
lervics. This was the possibility m:.ich ertia
s tressed  in  "ovember, 1895, whan the  German M i n i s t e r 's  e f f o r t s
to negotiate a separate German loan were being considered. He
nointed out that this would gradually lead uo i-h ^ oecline of
2
G r i t  13}: In f lu e n c e  i n  che Customs A d m in is t r a t io n .  "'er&rc, the
Trench minister, was rressing -'art to appoint more ^renchmen
and V*c0 : or hah written in Gepta ^ ber that the ^rench and Russim
Ministers In China "talk pretty openly of altering i n  the  
n ear f u t u r e  th e  arrangement and c o n s t i t u t io n  of the  
Customs lervica to their urofit and advantsgo." ^
I t  was a g a in s t  t h i s  background th a t  B e r t i e ,  on r e c e iv in g  a
long memorandum from che China A s s o c ia t io n  d e s c r ib in g  th e
establishment of the Customs S e rv ic e ,  suggested that s d e ^ a t c h
should be sent to  th e  new ^ r i t i  sh m in is te r  to  China embodying
the  substance of t h i s  memorandum and emphasising the " n e c e s s ity
4
of th e  In s p e c to r -G e n e r a l  being a B r i t i s h  s u b je c t" .  I f  t h i s
1. Cameron to  Sanderson, 4 jiRrch 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 8 7 .
2. B e r t i e ,  Memoranaum, 9 November 1395, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 6 .
5 .  O'Conor t o  S a l is b u ry ,  n o .356 , 13 September 1395, F 0 1 7 /1 2 3 8 .
4 .  B e r t i e ,  Memorandum, 17 November 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 6 .
102,
was assured th e n  they  could r e ly  upon th e  In s p e c t  o r -G e n e ra l  t o  
"p reserve  the  p re s en t p r o p o r t io n  of B r i t i s h  employes 
which, i s  c e r t a i n l y  not excess ive  as re g a rd s  our si:ere 
i n  th e  t r a d e  and consequent p ro d u c t io n  of re v e n u e s ."  ^
The Anglo-German synd ica te  in c lu d e d  a s t ip u la t io n  in
t h e i r  lo a n  c o n tra c t  w ith  the  Chinese Government of March,
1396, which gave some assurance in  t h i s  m a t te r .  I t  p ro v id ed
t h a t  th e  Cu'?toma A d m in is t r a t io n  should rem ain  as i t  was th a n
c o n s t i tu te d  d u r in g  th e  currency  of th e  lo a n  -  t h i r t y - s i x  
2
y e a r s .  I n  September, 1896 B e r t ie  re tu rn e d  to  th e  q u es tio n  of
o b ta in in g  a promise th a t  the  In s p e c to r -G e n e r a l  should always
be an Englishman and he suggested th à t  th e y  should make sure th a t
3
th e r e  was a s u i ta b le  B r i t i s h  successor to  H a r t  a v a i l a b le .
R ep orts  l a t e r  in  th e  y e a r  t h a t  H a r t  was ag ing  added to  th e  
urgency of the  q u e s t io n . L i t t l e  was done u n t i l  May, 1897
when Macdonald was asked i f  he could persuade H a r t  to  d isc u s s
4
th e  s u b jec t of h i s  successor. The names of s e v e ra l  members 
of the  C onsular S e rv ic e ,  one of whom might be t r a n s fe r r e d  to  
the  Customs S e rv ic e  i f  th e re  was no s u i ta b le  B r i t i s h  c a n d id a te  
a lre a d y  i n  the  Customs, were suggested. George Jamieson, whom 
Macdonald considered th e  best person a v a i l a b le ,  was approached.
He was ready to  ta k e  over th e  post f o r  a few  ye ars  i n  o rder
1. B e r t i e ,  memorandum, 17 kove^ber 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 6 .
2 . J .V .A .  MacMurrey, op . c i t . ,  1 ,  57.
5 . B e r t i e ,  Memorandum, 4 September 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 8 9 .
4 .  B e r t ie  to  Macdonald, P r iv a t e  T e legram , 6 May 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
t o  t r a i n  a. younger E n g lis h  successor. But TTart, when ^proached
on th e  s u b je c t ,  po in ted  out the  o b s ta c le s  to  the  appointment
of some one from th e  B r i t i s h  C onsu lar S e rv ic e ,  w hatever t h e i r  
2
a b i l i t y .  The p ro p o sa l would meet w i th  s trong o p p o s it io n  
from  the  Chinese Government erri from o th e r  f o r e ig n  governments  
in te re s te d , in  C hina. I f  i t  was complied, w i th ,  i t  would c r e a te  
d is c o n te n t  throughout the Customs S e r v ic e . However he promised  
h i s  s tro n g  support f o r  the c a n d id a tu re  of Robert Rredon whom 
he considered  the boat choice f o r  the  p o s i t io n .  Macdonald and 
th e  f o r e ig n  O f f ic e  concurred in  H a r t ' s  argument and l e f t  him  
t o  o b ta in  B redon 's  acpo ln tm ont. The F o re ig n  O f f ic e  had
3
e v id e n t ly  been th in k in g  in  term s of H a r t ' s  Immediate r e s ig n a t io n .
Macdonald thought t h i s  would be dangerous. He considered  t h a t
the  best p la n  was f o r  .Part to  go on le a v e  and f o r  Bred on
to  serve as a c t in g  In s o e o to r -G e n e re l  in  h i s  absence, thus
4
p av in g  the way f o r  a l a t e r  change. Bredon came to  th e  F o re ig n  
O f f ic e  a number of t im e s  to  d iscu ss  the  s u b je c t .  Having once 
been u n f a i r l y  t r e a te d  by H a r t ,  he was r a th e r  wary of t h i s  new 
v e n tu re .  However Macdonald assured him t h a t  he d id  not t h in k  
th e re  was a r i s k  of h i s  r e c e iv in g  such tre a tm e n t aga in  and 
e v e n tu a l ly  Bredon, a lthough s t i l l  s c e p t ic a l ,  dec ided to  go
1. B e r t i e ,  Memorandum, 11 May 1897, H 017 /1314 .
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 26, 28 May 1897, ^ 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
3 . On 10 May B e r t ie  had w r i t t e n  th a t  " th e  on ly  way I  can t h i n k
of to  get S i r  Robert H a r t  out and George Jamieson i n  would 
be t o  g iv e  the  fo rm er t o  understand th a t  i f  he can get 
the  l a t t e r  appointed by the Chinese Government, S i r  Robert  
H a r t ' s  p a t r i o t i c  s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  w i l l  m e r i t  a G .G .B ." 
B e r t ie ,  Memorandum, 10 May 1897, ^ 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
4 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  " r l v g t e  Te leg ram , 2" lay  1897
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Dut tD  China in  CDtsr-er* H a r t  had p r c-M sad th a t  h.3 m?'.:id
go an leave la March, tat he had alas said that it would h?
i "T:  : s e t t l e  t :  h?a: ever t o  Fred on i f  they h a d  only tee n
to g e th e r  f o r  t t?c- week 5. Moreover H a r t ' s  h e a l t h  s u ffe re d  i n
the winter and there was always the danger of his death,
Ic n s e g u e n t ly  Macdcnald thought i t  v e ry  io ç D r is n t  th a t  Fredcn
she;Id a r r i v e  in the sutuzn b efo re  the  r i v e r  to  -e k in g  c lo s e d .
The Governm ent's  cone err. to  p re s erv e  I r i t i s h
In f lu e n c e  in  the Chinese Custows A d m in is t ra t io n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t ,
but at the t i r e  t h i s  la  s not a we j  or q u e s t le n .  Between 1395
end 1897 "B rit ish  a t t e n t io n ,  so f a r  as China was concerned,
we 3 co n cen tra ted  to  s la rg e  e x te n t  up on the  long n e g o t ia t io n s
!>/ith the  Chine?" f c r  the 00e n ln r  of the ^est F iv e r  and tha
3
re ad ju s tm en t of the  f r o n t i e r  be:ween Burma and C h in a . These
n e g o t ia t io n s  arose from a Chinese breach o f the In g lo -C h in e se
?urmA f r o n t i e r  convention of 1 ‘^ grch 1394 by which Fritisb.
rights over the .small state of Kiang Hung were transferred to
China on th? express condition t h a t  i t  should never be ceded
4
to  an o th er  power w ith o u t B r i t i s h  consent. W everth e lass  a
1. -redon t o  B e r t ie ,  29 August 1397, F 0 I7 /1 5 3 0 .
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  Te legram  P r iv a te  -v C o n f id e n t ia l ,
22 August 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
3 .  On the  g e n e ra l  q u e s t io n  of B r i t i s h  and French p o l ic y  in
Southern China cp. P . Joseph, F o re ig n  Diplom acy in  C h ina.  
[ l 9 2 9 j ,  1 4 7 -1 5 1 , 1 81 -183 ; '^.L. la n g e r .  The Diplom acy of 
l a i p e r i a l i  sm, [ 1 9 5 5 ] ,  I ,  3 9 0 -3 9 5 .
4 .  J .V .A .  MaCüUrrey, o p . c i t . .  I ,  4 .
sect ici: of isng Hiuig wss csced to Franc s by "h- ■ rnnco- 
Cbl:.9S9 f r o n t i e r  Convention of 20 June 1595. The c : n c lu s i :n
of tb? r rench convention alth China was snethrP striking
illustration of" the Influence which “rsnce and. Russia hac
acuuir-uo Over tne Chinese Government. Gerard had pressed
c u r in g  the war f c r  e r e c t i f i c a t i o n  of the  Tcngklng f r o n t i e r
but with little result. The participation of Trance in the
intervention, however, gave Cérai*c * g renewed rressure for a
C onvention  greater chances of success. Gérard conducted
his negotiations with great secreCT but O'Conor was snare t h a t
1
something was in  the r in d .  Ihen he l e r r n t  In *-he m iddle
of June th< t the French demands included the cession of
certain districts in Xiang Rung, he reminded the Chinese of
2
their treaty obliratlcng on this point. A repetition of
this warnin0 a few days later only brought an announcement
from the Chinese that they had virtually concluded an
Bgree^^nt with the French and that no infrinrement of Britain's
3
treaty rights was involved. O'Conor went to the T s n n g ll
Yemen on th e  next day, 20 June 1896 to  p r o te s t  again  and to  
demand that the final conclusion of the agreement should be 
postponed until the  British o b je c t io n s  had been co n s id ered .
But while he sat in one room of the Yamen urging delay, the 
French and Russian Ministers were in another Dressing f o r  
the Immediate conclusion of the convention. Tha despairing
1. C'Concr to iim'CBrlcy, no. 179 Confidential, 15 lay 1895,
F 0 1 7 /1 2 6 7 .
2. O'Conor to  K im b e r le y ,  Tel.71, 14 June 1895, ^ 9 1 7 /1 2 4 3 .
3. O'Conor to Kimberley, Tel.75, 19 June 1895, ^017/1243.
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3 atn@n m in is te r s  went f r a n t i c a l l y  frcui one to  the o th e r  try ln ? *  
to  keep them at bay w ith  evas ive  r e p l i e s .  But e v e n tu a l ly  
the  Chinese gave way b e fo re  the th r e a ts  of the  French m in is t e r  
and signed the  C onvention , I t  was on ly  a f t e r  two more hours  
of f u t i l e  c o n v e rs a t io n  th a t  O'Conor gathered from a casual 
h i n t  by one of th e  Chinese m in is te r s  th a t  th e  s ig n a tu re  had 
a c t u a l l y  ta k e n  p la c e .
The French had a c t u a l ly  concluded two Conventions w ith  
th e  Chinese -  one s e t t l i n g  the  f r o n t i e r  between China and 
Tongking and one d e a l in g  w ith  com m ercia l m a t te rs .  The d e s i r e  
to  tap th e  Chinese market had been one of the  m ainsprings  of 
th e  development of th e  French Empire in  In d o -C h in a  and wss
3
the  c h ie f  m otive f o r  t h e i r  a c q u is i t io n  of Tongking in  1885. 
C onsequently  th e y  were e a g e r,  once th e y  had e s ta b lis h e d  them­
s e lve s  t h e r e ,  to  ta k e  up th e  ta s k  of opening Southern China  
to  t h e i r  t r a d e .  T h is  was the  o b je c t of the  Fran co-C hina se 
com m ercial C onvention of 20 June 1895.
The breach of th e  1894 Convention was the s p e c i f ic  
reason  f o r  B r i t i s h  o b je c t io n s  to  the conclusion  of the F ra n c o -  
Chinese C onventions but th e re  were deeper reasons u n d e r ly in g  
t h e i r  concern . B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t  in  southw estern  China had 
th r e e  main a s p ects . I n  the  f i r s t  p la c e ,  B r i t i s h  and Chinese
1. O'Conor to  K im b e r le y , a o .2 3 7 , 21 June 1895, ^ 0 1 7 /1 2 6 8 .
2 . J .V .A ,  Mac Murray, o p . c i t . ,  I ,  2 6 -3 0 .
3 .  P ie r r e  Renouvin, La Q uestion  d 'E x t r ê m e -O r ie n t , [ 1 9 4 6 ] ,  121,
op, a ls o  W.L. Lans'er, The Diplomacy of Im p e r ia l is m  [ 1 9 3 5 ] ,  
I ,  390.
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■possessions were c c -ts rm in o u s  t h e r e .  T h is  common f r o n t i e r
had beer, c o n s id e ra b ly  lengthened by the B r i t i s h  annexation  of
upper Burma in  1336 and s e v e ra l  problems a r is in g  out of t h e i r
new r e la t io n s h ip  re  rained to  be s e t t l e d .  The a n n e xa tio n  was
the  r e s u l t  of f e c r  on the p a r t  of the  B r i t i s i i  t h a t  the  success
of F rench  a c t i v i t y  i n  'pper Eurms was endangering t h e i r
p o s i t io n  in  I n d i a .  A lthough on the  one hand the B r i t i s h  were
d eterm ined  to  p r o te c t  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  in  I n d i a ,  they  were on
th e  o th e r  hand v e ry  anxious to  avoid unneoessary f r i c t i o n
w ith  Prance in  these re g io n s .  I f  B r i t a i n  and Prance had a
common f r o n t i e r  th e r e ,  a la rg e  e x p e n d itu re  upon f o r t i f i c a t i o n s
wouId be necessary and th e re  would be a c o n t in u a l  o p p o r tu n ity
f o r  some sm all in c id e n t  to  b r in v  to  th e  surface  "The ground
1
s w e ll  of i l l - w i l l "  which c h a r a c te r iz e d  A nglo-French r e l a t i o n s .  
I n  consequence the  d e s ire  to  m a in ta in  the  s e p a ra t io n  of B r i t i s h  
and French possess ions in  the In d o -C h in es e  p e n in s u la  was one 
of th e  g u id in g  c o n s id e ra t io n s  of B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  i n  t h i s  a re a .  
F i n a l l y ,  th e re  was a widespread b e l i e f  th a t  southwestern  
China was a reg l on of immense p o t e n t i a l  w ea lth  and i n  the  
n i n e t ie s  hopes f o r  the expansion of t ra d e  w ith  China tu rn e d ,  
t o  a la r g e  e x te n t ,  upon the  opening of t h i s  er^a  to  f o r e ig n  
t r a d e .  The French a ttem pt to  draw the  t ra d e  of southern China  
o f f  through Tohgkin^ spurred the B r i t i s h  to  t r y  to  open t h i s  
p a r t  of China to  f o r e ig n  t ra d e  on terms wl'ich would g iv e  them 
th e  advantage.
1. G rey, T w e n ty - f iv e  Y e a rs .  [ 1 9 2 5 ] ,  I ,  11.
Ths British to'k strong excertlcn t : = cc'"olu?i"n of
the ^rercT-Bhlngs9 Bcr-gntfcnm. C':o-:r vsrnet th^ "hire se
:.hot he z o " l i  nri ar.sw^ r fcr the o in s e r ;  ssces cf t h * l r
1
violation of the treotg with Britain end he -retested «gainst
the retifitetion ot the "* t i o" wl t'^  ^r ence h = *gre the
2
-citer h 6: beer iiscuesei -^ ith the British. The Toverrrent
r e s l - r . e l  ju s t  as " i e t e r l e y  was shout to  eôôrses the  ^Tench
Government f crms ily reserving Britain's ri oh:e, hvt he toll
5
the F r e n c h  Aatasaedcr verbsliy of hie irtentlo-. Salisbury,
on assuming office, aprrevet ttCor.or' s act 1er «nd instructed
hi- to remind th? Chinese that the provisions of the 1354
Convertir/ were interdependent eni that Britain wonId therefore
he releesei from her rhliratlins nnder it, if "hin« lorored 
4
hers, ^ut, es^ed Conor, had the Frit 1 sh any "insuperable
British protests had diet nr bed ":h= :Ch!nese but he was 
Increasingly convinced that th e y  wo'lld r a t i f y  their C onvention  
with France a rvvao . re  thon dot *:h«t t h -  best co'-rse f o r  G reat
t a l would be to consent to cession in return ^or covuen-
5
sat 1 on. There were IndicsU rr.s that the Chinese would
1 . : ' Conor tc  . . - in te r ls n ,  i s l . v o  (P a ra p h ra s e ) ,  2C June 1396,
FDlV'lcGa.
2. O'Conor lo  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 6 1 ,  1 Ju ly  15 95, FD 17 /1243 .
3 . K im berley to  D u f f e r i n ,  d r a f t  of despatch , 24 June 1396,
} ...17/  j.'ZCz •
ia * i  SO' ISCn, T :1 7 /1 2 4 2 .
'Conor ic  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 54 Cc. C l . ,  4 J ly  1B55, FC17/1243  
« * " T e l . 37 , 10 Ju ly  1395, - " 1 ^ /1 2 4 3 .
welcome such an arrangem ent. The Government moved r a th e r
sxcwly uo/arCiS the adoption of this idea. Ihay evidently
f e l t  hampered by not knowing tha exact term s of the  F ran co -
Chinese Conventions ann by their uni amiliarity with tha area
concerned and wanted to  .-.sit u n t i l  Scott reached London from
1
Bangkok b e fo re  th e y  came to  a d e c is io n .  however on 8 August
1395 S a lis b u ry  in form ed the Chinese M in is t e r  th a t  G reat B r i t a i n
w 01 ! Id  consent to  the cession of d i s t r i c t s  in  Ml eng hung to
F ran ce  in  r e tu r n  f o r  t e r r i t o r i a l  compensation on th e  f r o n t i e r
2
near the  'p p e r  Ir ra w a d d y .
I h i s  vas much le s s  than O’ Conor thought the B r i t i s h  were
s i - t i t l e c  cc c la im . I n  the  co -rse of the next two months,
how ever, the B r i t i s h  en larged  t h e i r  c la im s i  or com pensation.
On? of t h e i r  a d d i t io n a l  p ro p o sa is  was to  t e l l  th e  Chinese th a t
th e  L a c e n n ia l  T r ib u te  M iss io n  from Burma to  China "must f o r
3
th e  f u t u r e  be a l to g e th e r  d is c o n t in u e d ."  There were r e p o r ts
th a t  r ra n e e  haa acqu ired  mining r ig h t s  i n  Yunnan, v a r io u s
com m ercial o r l v i l e g a s ,  and the r ig h t  to  extend r a i lw a y s  in
4 '
Tongking i n t t  Chinese t e r r i t o r y .  ih e  f i r s t  i n t e n t io n  of the
B r i t i s h  Government was to  in fo rm  the Chinese th a t  Great B r i t a i n
5
would, 8 5 G m a tte r  of course, expect t o  share any such r i g h t s .
1 . S a l is b u ry  tc  O’ Conor, T e l . 91 , 10 J u ly  1395, F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 2 .
2 . S a l is b u ry  to  O’ Conor, T e l . 100 (P a ra p h ra s e ) ,  10 aueust 1895,
F 0 1 7 /1 2 6 9 .
3 . S a l is b u ry  to  In d ia  O f f i c e ,  16 August 1895, ^ 0 1 7 /1 2 7 0 .
4 .  O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 9 9 ,  13 J u ly  1895, ^ 0 1 7 /1 2 4 3 .
5 . S a l is b u ry  to  In d ia  O f f i c e ,  16 Ausust 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 0 .
/ lo
Then th e y  decided th a t  i t  would be best to  esk the Chinese
1
f o r  a s p e c i f ic  assurance on t h i s  p o in t .  O’ Conor’ s rem inder
t h a t  the Chinese never considered the  m o s t - fa v o u re d -n a t io n
c lau se  a p p l ic a b le  to  t r e a t i e s  w ith  n e is h b o u r in s  s ts te s
2 ^
confirm ed them in  t h l s  o p in io n .
The req u es t f o r  the opening of the  F est R iv e r  # i ic h
became the  most im p o rta n t  qu estio n  in  the whole n e g o t ia t io n s ,
was not in tro d u ce d  u n t i l  O ctober, a month a f t e r  th e  nego-
3
t i a t  ions had s t a r t e d .  The B r i t is h ,  had been anxious to  hrve  
the  'best R iv e r  opened to  f o r e ig n  t ra d e  f o r  some t im e .  They  
had regarded the Japanese request f o r  i t s  opening as one of 
the  most a t t r a c t i v e  of t h n i r  o r i g i n a l  peace term s and had g r e a t ly  
r e g r e t te d  the subsequent w ith d ra w a l of t h i s  demand. The 
B r i t i s h  Government warmly welcomed T o w ther’ s suggestion  t h a t  
the  Japanese should ask f o r  the  opening of the l e st R iv e r  as 
compensation f o r  the  r e t r e o e s s l  n of the  L iao tu n g  P e n in s u la  
and a p p a re n t ly  th e y  r e a l l y  hoped t h a t  the opening of the  
l e s t  R iv e r  might be obtained in  t h i s  way. I t  was when t h e  
Japanese made i t  c le a r  th a t  th ey  were not going to  r a is e  th e  
qu estio n  th a t  the B r i t i  ah decided to  In tro d u c e  i t  in t o  t h e i r  
own n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  C h ina. No doubt the  strong o b je c t io n s  
which the  Chinese had expressed to  the  e x te n t  of the B r i t i s h
1 . S a l is b u ry  to  O’ Conor, T e l ,  104 (P a ra p h ra s e ) , 2L August 1895,
P C 17/1271 .
2 . O’ Conor t o  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 99 , 22 August 1895 , F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 3 .
3 . S a l is b u ry  t o  O’ Conor, T e l . 135 C o n f id e n t ia l ,  23 October 1895,
P 0 1 7 /1 2 9 3 .
/Il
t e r r i t o r i a l  demands encouraged the  B r i t i s h  t o  hope th a t  th e
p ro s p e c t of a m o d if ic a t io n  i n  these  demands would secure
th e  opening of the West R iv e r .
IT n t l l  th e  Chinese agreed in  p r i n c i p l e  t o  th e  opening
of th e  West R iv e r ,  th e  B r i t i s h  re fu s e d  to  say vdiat m o d i f ic a t io n s
1
they w o 'Id  make in  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r i a l  demands. They h e ld
to  t h i s  r e fu s a l  i n  s p i te  of s e v e ra l  Chinese a ttem p ts  to  f i n d
out f i r s t  what th e  re v is e d  t e r r i t o r i a l  demand s would he.
Meanwhile a number of even ts  in c re a s ed  the  urgency of a
s e tt le m e n t  from  the  B r i t i s h  p o in t  of v ie w , E a r ly  i n  November
a sm all French fo r c e  occupied the  d i s t r i c t s  i n  K iang Hung
which were th e  source of a l l  th e  d is p u te .  However th e  Chinese
to o k  prompt and e f f e c t i v e  a c t io n  f o r  once and w i th in  two
2
weeks the  French had l e f t .  At the  end of the  month the
B r i t i s h  f i n a l l y  re c e iv e d  the  t e x t  of the F ra n o o -C h in e se
C onvention  and e xam in a tio n  of t h i s  re v e a le d  f u r t h e r  i n f r i n g e -
3
m ent3 of B r i t a i n ’ s t e r r i t o r i a l  r i g h t s .  And at th e  same tim e
th e r e  were rumours t h a t  China was about to  r a t i f y  th e  
4
C onventio n . A l l  these  developments conspired to  aggravate  
the  i r r i t a t i o n  of the  B r i t i s h  w ith  the  f a i l u r e  to  conclude a 
s e tt le m e n t  and led them t o  warn the  Chinese th a t  B r i t a i n  would
1 . S a l is b u r y  to  O’ Conor, T e l . 135 C o n f id e n t ia l ,  23 October 1895,
F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 3 .
2 .  S a l is b u ry  t o  B e a u c le rk , T e l . 145 (P a ra p h ra s e ) ,  5 November
1395, P0 1 7 /1 27 1 ;  S a l is b u ry  t o  B e a u c le rk , T e l .  155,
16 November 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 2 .
3 .  S a l is b u ry  to  B e a u c le rk , T e l . 171, 21 December 1 8 9 5 ,F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 2 .
4 .  S a l is b u ry  to  B e a u c le rk , T e l . 169, 15 December 1 8 9 5 ,F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 2 .
I i z
bo compelled t o  t r e a t  the  p r o v is io n s  of th e  1394 Convention
as no lo n g e r  v a l id  and to  take  steps to  recompense h e r s e l f
i f  an agreement was not reached soon.
At th e  very end of December however th e  T s u n g l i  Yemen
2
f i n a l l y  agreed to  th e  opening, of the best R iv e r .  The B r i t i s h
in s is te d  upon h av in g  a w r i t t e n  u n d e rta k in g  on t h i s  p o in t
b e fo re  they would say what m o d i f ic a t io n s  th ey  were go ing to
3
make i n  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r i a l  demands. A p p a re n tly  they had
not decided  what those m o d i f ic a t io n s  would be f o r ,  now t h a t
i t  was known th a t  th e  Chinese would agree to  the opening of
the  best R iv e r ,  c o n s u l ta t io n  on t h i s  su b jec t ensued between
4
the  In d ia  O f f ic e  and th e  F o re ig n  O f f i c e .
But l i t t l e  p ro g re s s  was made when th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  were
resumed i n  F e b ru a ry .  From the  very b e g in n in g , th e  conduct of
these  n e g o t ia t io n s  had been o b stru c ted  by the  Chinese M in is t e r
i n  London. I n  October he had f  gi led to  r e p o r t  S a l is b u r y ’ s
o f f e r  to  th e  Chinese Government, from  November t o  F e b ru a ry
he was p reven ted  from  coming to  the  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  by an
i l l n e s s  viliich B e r t ie  suspected might be due to  an " u n w il l in g n e s s
5
to  d isc u s s  unp leasant s u b je c ts " ,  and when the n e g o t ia t io n s
1 . S a l is b u ry  to  B e a u c le rk , T e l . 169, 15 December 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 2 .
2 . B eau c lerk  to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l .  172, 29 December 1895, P 0 1 7 /1 2 7 2 .
3 . I b i d . M inute by B e r t i e .
4 .  In d i a  O f f ic e  to  F o re ig n  O f f i c e ,  4 January 1896, P 0 1 7 /1 2 9 3 .
5 . B e r t i e ,  Memorandum, 27 November 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 2 .
tis
were resumed i n  F eb ru ary  he aga in  f a i l e d  to  r e p o r t  to  h i s
Government, A lthough the  B r i t i s h  re c e iv e d  no r e p ly  to  th e
r e v is e d  t e r r i t o r i a l  demands which they p u t fo rw a rd  i n
F e b ru a ry ,  they gathered  th a t  Chinese o b je c t io n s  would c e n tre
round the  req u es t f o r  th e  r e t e n t i o n  of Kokang which, by th e
1
1894 C onvention , was to  have been t r a n s fe r r e d  t o  C h in a .
E a r ly  i n  A p r i l  the  Chinese M in is t e r  o f fe r e d  t o  t r y  to  get
th e /C h in e s e  Government’ s consent to  th e  B r i t i s h  p ro p o s a ls  i f
th e y  would abandon th e  demands f o r  Kokang. Th ere  was some
d is p o s i t io n  among B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  to  seek an agreement on
t h i s  b a s is  but S a l is b u ry  thought i t  worth w h ile  to  make a
2
f u r t h e r  e f f o r t  to  r e t a i n  Kokang. The B r i t i s h  had, however,
c o m p le te ly  lo s t  p a t ie n c e  by t h i s  t im e  w ith  the  a ttem pt to
3
conduct th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  i n  London. At th e  end of A p r i l
th e y  were t r a n s fe r r e d  to  P ek ing  but Macdonald was in s t r u c te d
to  ta ke  no a c t io n  and to  w a it  f o r  th e  Chinese to  make th e  
4
f i r s t  move. A p p a re n tly  n o th in g  happened. By th e  m iddle  of 
June th e  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  had come to  the  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  th ey  
would never o b ta in  t h e i r  compensation by n e g o t ia t io n .  
S a l is b u r y  proposed in fo rm in g  the  Chinese th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  no
lo n g e r  considered  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  s t ip u la t io n s  of th e  1894
5
C onvention  v a l i d .  The Government of In d ia  however was not
1. Sanderson t o  B e r t i e ,  4 March 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 4 .
2 . Sanderson, Memorandum, 8 A p r i l  1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 4 .  M inute
by S a l is b u r y .
5 .  B e r t i e ,  Memorandum, 15 A p r i l  1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 4 .
4 .  S a l is b u ry  t o  Macdonald, T e l . 34 , A p r i l  1896, F 0 1 7 /
5 . F o re ig n  O f f ic e  to  In d ia  O f f i c e ,  16 June 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 5 .
' N
in  fa v o u r  of t h i s  id e a .  Although anxious to  regain. Kokang,
th e y  were u n w i l l in g  to  resume r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  the  r e s t  of
th e  t e r r i t o r y  which, under the  1894 C onvention , was to  be
1
t r a n s fe r r e d  to  C hina. Consequently at th e  end of August
Macdonald was in s t r u c te d  to  begin n e g o t ia t io n s .  He was t o
t a l l  th e  Chinese th a t  B r i t a i n  would be compelled t o  d e c la r e
t h a t  the  1894 Convention had lapsed i f  an agreement was no t  
2
reached soon. E v id e n t ly  the  Chinese a ttac h ed  c o n s id e ra b le
im portance  to  th e  p r o v is io n s  o f the  1894 C onvention: Macdonald
had re p o r te d  th a t  he thought the T s u n g li  Yamen would concede
3
a good d e a l r a th e r  than  r i s k  i t ?  a b ro g a t io n .  T h is  enabled
th e  B r i t i s h  to  bank f a i r l y  h e a v i l y ,  In  th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  t h a t
f o l lo w e d ,  upon t h r e a ts  of a b ro g a t io n .
Macdonald submitted the  B r i t i s h  p ro o o s a ls  t o  th e  T s u n g li
4
Yamen i n  th e  m iddle  of September. T h e i r  f i r s t  r e p ly  on
5
9 October r e je c te d  most of the  B r i t is h ,  demands but w i t h in
two weeks Macdonald, a f t e r  much d is c u s s io n ,  had secured t h e i r
agreement to  term s which he thought were the  best the  B r i t i s h  
6 ■ 7
could e x p e c t .  S a l is b u ry  wanted to  accept these te rm s . The
1 . In d ia  O f f ic e  to  F o re ig n  O f f i c e ,  29 J u ly  1 8 9 6 ,  F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 5 .
2 . S a l is b u r y  to  Macdonald, T e l . 7 0 ,  31 August 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 5 .
3 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 8 4 ,  20 August 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 5 .
4 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 8 7 ,  12 September 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 5 .
5 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  n o .211, 14 October 1896, P 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
6 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 92 , 25 October 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
7 .  I b i d .  M inute by S a l is b u r y .
//s
f i r s t  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  the  way of d o in g  so wss th a t  the Chinese
had re fu sed  to  accept the  s t i p u l a t i o n  th a t  B r i t a i n  should
en jo y  th e  same p r iv i l e g e s  as ^rance  in  th e  m a tte r  of t r a d e ,
mines and ra i  Iw ays. B e r t ie  thought i t  would be conceding
1
"an im p o rta n t  p r i n c i p l e "  to  g iv e  way on t h i s  p o in t *  Accord- 
i^ëLy i t  was decided to  press  aga in  f o r  th e  in c lu s io n  of t h i s  
s t i p u l a t i o n  but t o  w ithdraw  the  demand i f  the  Chinese main­
ta in e d  t h e i r  o b je c t io n s ,  s t a t in g  c l e a r l y  t h a t  th e y  were on ly  
d o in g  so to  avoid c r e a t in g  embarrassment f o r  th e  Chinese and 
t h a t  the  B r i t i s h  Government re s e rv e d  th e  r i ^ t  t o  c la im  i n  th e
2
f u t u r e  any such p r i v i l e g e s  granted  by China to  any o th e r  Power. 
Then th e  In d ia  O f f ic e  questioned  th e  p r o v is io n s  re g a rd in g  
Kokang. Macdonald had agreed th a t  th e  Chinese should have  
th e  o u t ly in g  d i s t r i c t s  o f  Kokang b e l i e v in g  th a t  t h i s  a rra n g e ­
ment was in  accord w ith  a memorandum from th e  Government of
3
I n d ia  which he had been u s in g . E v id e n t ly  i t  was th e  ou t­
ly in g  d i s t r i c t s  of some o th e r  s ta te  ^hose c ess io n  the  Government
of In d ia  had been w i l l i n g  to  a c c e p t.  They wanted the  whole of  
4
Kokang. S a l is b u ry  had l i t t l e  sympathy f o r  them, rem ark ing
t h a t  th e y  had "no r i g h t  to  be p a r t i c u l a r  f o r  they  a llow ed th e
5
whole of Kokang to  s l ip  through t h e i r  f i n g e r s " .  However t h i s
1. Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 92 , 23 October 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
M inute  by B e r t ie .
2 .  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  to  I n d i a  O f f i c e ,  28 October 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
3 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 94 , 31 October 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
4 .  Lee Warner ( In d ia  O f f i c e )  t o  B e r t i e ,  29 October IB 9 6 ,F 017/1296.
5 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 94, 31 October 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
M inute by S a l is b u r y .
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mi sunders tand ing  was e xp la in e d  to  Macdonald and, w ith  the
p r o v is o  th a t  h is  term s were r e a l l y  i n  accord w ith  th e  memorandum,
1
he was a u th o r iz e d  to  accept the  Chinese te rm s . But d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  then  arose over the  arrangem ents f o r  th e  opening of th e
lA-est R iv e r .  The on ly  p o r t  which the  T s u n g li  Yamen were w i l l i n g
2
to  open was 'Vuchou. The B r i t i s h  wanted two or th re e  p o r ts  on
th e  r i v e r  to  be opened and th e y  were p a r t i c u l a r l y  anxious f o r
th e  opening of N an n in g -fu  Woich had " s p e c ia l  im portance . . .
3
i n  v iew  of French d e s ig n s " .  But the  T s u n g li  Yamen m a in ta in ed
t h a t  Fanning was not on the. West R iv e r  p ro p er  but on anoth er
branch of the  r i v e r  -  end Macdonald was e v e n tu a l ly  convinced
4
t h a t  th e re  was t r u t h  i n  t h i s  c o n te n t io n .  On 6 December
however, when the T s u n g li  Yamen agreed t o  the  opening of
Wuchou, Samshui and fo u r  or f i v e  c a l l i n g  s ta t io n s ,  they  a ls o
consented to  the opening of Nanning l a t e r  on i f  the t ra d e
appeared to  j u s t i f y  i t .  Moreover th e y  said th e y  would g iv e
a w r i t t e n  u n d e rta k in g  to  open Nanning im m edia te ly  i f  the  French
5
e v e r  prolonged the Lunchu r a i lw a y  to  Posé. The F o re ig n  O f f ic e
6
a u th o r iz e d  Macdonald to  conclude th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  on t h i s  b a s is
1 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 7 8 ,  3 November 1396, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
2 . Macdonald t o  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 95 , 9 November 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
3 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 7 9 ,  11 November 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
4 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 101, 5 December 1896, P 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
5. Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 102, 7 December 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
6 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 8 8 ,  8 December 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 6 .
i n
and a f t e r  f u r t h e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and d e la y s  i n  the arrangement  
of d e t a i l s ,  the  agreement was f i n a l l y  concluded on 3 F e b ru a ry
1897.
I n  these  long n e g o t ia t io n s ,  as d u r in g  th e  lo a n  nego­
t i a t i o n s ,  B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  i s  ev idence of a re a d in e s s  to  ta k e  
a c t io n  when i t  was f e l t  th a t  f o r e ig n  a c t i v i t y  was to u c h in g  
B r i t i s h  in t e r e s t s  d i r e c t l y .  I n  o th e r  r e s p e c ts ,  however, 
th e  B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e  to  the  am b it io n s  of o th e r  Pokers  i a  
marked by a c e r t a in  r e s ig n a t io n .  T h is  i s  conspicuous i n  the  
case of th e  w ell-know n Russian d e s ir e  f o r  an i c e - f r e e  p o r t .
O’ Conor wrote in  May, 1895, t h a t  B r i t a i n  would be f o o l i s h  to
2
t r y  to  p re v e n t  Russia  a c q u ir in g  an open p o r t .  W i th in  n ine  
months t h i s  d ictum  had become an axiom of B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  i n  
C h in a . S a l is b u r y ,  w r i t i n g  to  Satow e a r ly  i n  O ctober, 1895, 
said  t h a t  Japan might be u s e fu l  " in  h in d e r in g  Russia from  
g e t t in g  an i c e - f r e e  p o r t "  but t h i s  re fe re n c e  would not seem 
t o  w arran t th e  in fe r e n c e  th a t  S a l is b u ry  was in te n d in g  to  
stand i n  R u s s ia ’ s way i n  t h i s  m a t te r .  F o r  one t h i n g ,  t h i s  was 
not the  sub jec t which S a l is b u ry  was d is c u s s in g  i n  t h i s  l e t t e r .  
He had in tro d u c e d  i t  in  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of h i s  main s u b jec t which  
was B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t  in  Japan and on th a t  s u b jec t h i s  o p in io n  
was t h a t  "our s t r a t e g ic  and m i l i t a r y  i n t e r e s t s  i n  Japan can 
e a s i l y  be o v e r -e s t im a te d ."  Moreover he doubted both the
1 . J .V .A .  MacMurray, o p . c i t . ,  I ,  94.
2 . O’ Conor to  B e r t i e ,  P r iv a t e ,  13 rli*^
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a b i l i t y  and the  I n c l i n a t i o n  of the  Japanese to  p re ven t  
Russia t a k in g  a p a r t .  Three weeks l a t e r ,  imhen the  Times  
p u b lish e d  a r e p o r t  th a t  Russia and China had concluded a 
C onvention which gave Russia the  r i g h t  to  run uhe T ra n s -  
S ib e r ia n  R a i lro a d  through M anchuria , to  connect i t  w ith  P o rt  
A rth u r ,  and to  have an anchorage a t  t h a t  p o r t ,  S a l is b u ry  t o l d  
H a t z f e l d t ,  the  German Ambassador in  London, th a t  he was no t  
averse to  Russia becoming more absorbed in  China s ince th e  
r e s u l t  would be a weakening of h e r  in t e r e s t  i n  th e  Near E a s t .
He sa id  t h a t  B r i t a i n  would on ly  o b je c t  i f  Russia asked f o r
2
e x c lu s iv e  r i g h t s  f o r  h e r  ships at P o rt  A r th u r .  On 16 November, 
he had an in t e r v ie w  w ith  a d e p u ta t io n  from th e  China A ssocia ­
t i o n .  T h e i r  d i s p o s i t io n  to  adopt a s im i la r  a t t i t u d e  t o  th e  
Russian a c q u is i t io n  of an i c e - f r e e  p o r t  must have been v e ry  
welcome t o  S a l is b u r y .  Keswick, th e  chairm an of the  A s s o c ia t io n ,  
suggested th a t  " i t  might . . .  be wise to  acquiesce in  [R u s s ia ’ s]
a m b it io n s  f o r  an open p o r t "  a lthough th e  " f o r t i f i c a t i o n  of P o r t
3
A rth u r  could not be regarded w ith o u t ap p re h e n s io n ."  S a l is b u ry  
was q u ick  to  a s c e r ta in  t h a t  th ey  would not have th e  same 
o b je c t io n s  to  a commercial p o r t .  # ie n  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a 
r e p e t i t i o n  of even ts  a t  Batoum i n  1886 was m entioned, S a l is b u ry
r e p l i e d  t h a t  "We can get a t P o r t  A r th u r .  We c o u ld n ’ t  get
4
a t Batoum."
1 . Satow Papers , S a l is b u ry  to  Satow, P r iv a t e  and S e c re t ,
3 October 1995, P .R .O . ,  3 0 / 3 3 / 5 / 2 .
2 CoviLai- YotVxe, Qe.rmo.rL Forevc^  Q(jpiu.^  7.5 Oct>b&r
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3 . Nathan A. P e lc o v i t a ,  Old China Hands and th e  ^ o re lg n  O f f i c e ,
[ 1 9 4 9 ] ,  186.
4 .  Nathan A. P e lc o v i t s ,  o p . c i t . , 187.
Thus acceptance of the  a c q u is i t io n  by Russia of an 
l e a - f r e e  p o r t  became er. e s ta b lis h e d  p a r t  of B r i t i s h  p o l i c y .
B e r t ie  began s memorandum on 28 January 1896 w ith  th e  s ta te -
1
meiît th a t  " th e  Russians must have a w in te r  ^ a rb o u r" ,  and
B a l fo u r  o roo ls im ed i n  s speech a t  B r i s t o l  on 3 F e b ru a ry  th a t
**30 f a r  . . .  from  re g a rc in g  w ith  f e a r  and jep.lousy s commercial
o u t le t  f o r  Russia whlc'" should not be icebound h a l f  the  y e a r ,
i  s h o u il  welcome such s r e s u l t  as s d i s t i n c t  advance in  t h i s
2
f a r  d is t a n t  re g io n  . . .  " R e s ig n a t io n  i s  a lso  the  keynote  of 
the  r e a c t io n  of the F o re ig n  d f l i c e  t o  r e p o r ts  in  June, 1S96 
t h a t  L i  Fung-chaag, th en  in  " t . P e t e r s b u r g ,  was about to  
conclude a C onvention w ith  Russia p r o v id in g  f o r  the  c o n s tru c ­
t i o n  cf s r a i lw a y  across Manchuria to  a te rm in u s  near F o r t
A rth u r  and f o r  a. lo a n , ra is e d  in  P e r is  end guaranteed by th e
5
R ussian  Government, f o r  t h i s  ouroose. Macdonald suggested
4
t h a t  the  Bank of England might be arproached t c  o f f e r  a loan
but t h i s  id e a  was net considered f e a s i b l e .  S a l is b u ry  took
no e x c e p t io n  tc  B e r t i e ' s  comment t h a t :  " I f  China i s  bent on
p la c in g  h e r s e l f  in  the  embrace of Russia we cannot w e l l  
do mors than warn th e  T s u n g li  Yamen of the p ro b ab le
consequences of so f o o l is h  a p r o c e e d in g ...............  I n  v iew
of R u s s ia ’ s p o l i t i c a l  «nd commercial in t e r e s t  in  the  
p r o je c te d  r a i lw a y  she would ou tb id  any o f f e r  foimded on 
s o le ly  commercial c a lc u la t io n s " .  5
1. B e r t i e ,  Memorandum, 28 January 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 8 7 .
2. The T im es , 4 February  1896.
3 . S a lisbury  to  . .^acd one I d , T e l . 40 s e c r e t ,  7 June 1896, F017/1279L
4 .  Lscdonalc to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 5 2 ,  3 June 1896, FC 17 /1380 .
5 . I b i c .  M inute by B e r t i e ,  9 June 1896,
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The Germans a ls o  had am bitio ns  i n  C h ina. They wanted
a c o a l in g  s ta t io n  and had t h i s  i n  mind as the reward isliich
they  r’ ig h t  c la im  f o r  t h e i r  h e lp  in  securing  the  r e t r o c e s s io n
of th e  L iao tu n g  P e n in s u la .  The sosrcri f o r  a s u i ta b le  c o a l in g
s t a t io n  was the  c h ie f  p ré -o c c u p a t io n  of t h s i r  p o l ic y  in  China
from  1895 to  1897. i n  the autumn of 1395 they  approached
th a  Chinese Government on the subject but the  Chinese re fu sed
to  e n t e r t a i n  t h e i r  request on th e  grounds th a t  i t  ’would lead
to  s im i la r  demands by o th e r  Powers. The Germans continued
survey ing  p o s s ib le  o laces  and at the  end of 1896 th e  German
M in is t e r  began to  . r e s s  the  T s u n g li  Yamen again  to  l e t
Germany have a c o a l in g  s t a t io n .
The B r i t i s i i  were aware of the German d e s i r e .  â ^ o rè ly
a&tvT th e—cenolu-gion -of- pe-groe in  1895 O'Conor had 'w r i t te n
t h a t  the  German m in is te r  thought t h a t  "a l e e t l a  is la n d  would 
1
be B rood id e a "  and at the end of th e  y e a r  th ey  re c e iv e d  many
r e p o r ts  from  China of th e  v a r io u s  survey ing  a c t i v i t i e s  of 
2
th e  Germans, A r e p o r t  in  November t h a t  th e  Germans
had been surveying in  the  Chusan Is la n d s  and were ask ing  f o r  
a c o a l in g  s ta t io n  th s r e  prompted th e^  to  remind the  Chinese  
Government th a t  B r i t a i n  had evacuated Chusan i n  1846 on the
1 . Private K im btrley  ^ 0*Cohcr fe  I / im b e r ie y u 7  Uouiixo^ry
2 . B eau c lerk  to  S a l is b u r y ,  n o .435 C o n f id e n t ia l  and n o .479
S ecre t c f 5 November end 29 November, 1395, F 0 1 7 /1 2 4 0 .
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c o n d i t io n ,  embodied in  © T re a ty  concluded in  th a t  y e a r ,  t h e t  
i t  should never be cedea to  any o th e r  Power* I t  was f u r t h e r  
dec ided  to  p res s  th e  Chinese f o r  a w r i t t e n  assurance t h a t , i n  
accordance w ith  t h i s  t r e a t y  s t ip u la t io n ,  th ey  would not g ive  
any concession f o r  a c o a l in g  s ta t io n  i n  the Chusan Is la n d s  -  
but S a lis b u ry  added th a t  E e a u c le rk *s  "tone should be th a t
2
we should in s i s t  upon t h e i r  r e f u s a l  as a m a tte r  of r i g h t . "
A l l  the  r e p o r ts  and. rumours of German and Russian  
a c t i v i t y  le d  B e r t ie  to  p o in t  out th a t  the  A d m ira lty  would have  
t o  d ec ide  whether B r i t a i n  would need a s ta t io n  n o r th  of Hong­
kong i f  R ussia  or Germany acquired  © p o r t  or c o a l in g  s t a t io n  
i n  China* B r i t a i n  would have to  tak e  or d e s tro y  such bases 
i n  the  event of a war w ith  e i t h e r  co u n try *  T h is  c o n s id e ra t io n  
made i t  p r e f e r a b le  from  the  B r i t i s h  p o in t  of v iew  th a t  Russia
should have a p o rt  separated from h e r  own t e r r i t o r y  s ince
3
B r i t a i n  would then  be a b le  to  cut h e r  communications. The
f a c t  t h a t  the  Rupsian f l e e t  was w in te r in g  at K iao -chan  had
a p p a re n t ly  in s p ir e d  the  hope th a t  Russia might ta k e  t h i s  p o r t
in s te a d  of one f u r t h e r  n o r th .  However the  B r i t i s h  Government
does not appear to  have g iven  the  m a tte r  much f u r t h e r  a t t e n t io n
u n t i l  th e  very end of 1896 when Macdonald re p o r te d  th a t  the
T s u n g li  Yamen were l i k e l y  to  y i e l d  to  the  renewed pre ssu re  of
the German M in is te r  f o r  a c o a l in g  s t a t io n .  He thought th a t  a
i *  S a l is b u ry  to  B e a u c le rk , T e l .  161, 29 November 1895, P017/124 3,
2* M inute  by S a l is b u r y ,  B eau c lerk  to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 161 S e c re t ,  
2 December 1895, P 0 1 7 /1 2 4 3 .
3 . B e r t i e ,  Memorandum, 28 January 1396, F 0 1 7 /1 2 8 7 .
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s ta tem ent t h a t  such & concession to  Germany would he fo l lo w e d  
by s im i la r  demands from B r i t a i n  might succeed in  th w a r t in g  
the  German e f f o r t s  but h is  own f e e l i n g  wag th a t  a German 
c o a l in g  s t a t io n  in  China would net in ju r e  G reat B r i t a i n  whereas  
th e  f a i l u r e  of th e  German attem pt on account of B r i t i s h
1
o p p o s it io n  would be the  source of a g re a t  d e a l  of i l l - f e e l i n g .
B e r t ie  c o n su lted  th e  A d m ira lty  im m ed ia te ly  and was in form ed
th a t  i t  would be d e s i r a b le  f o r  B r i t a i n  to  have a h a rb o u r in
th e  Chusan is la n d s  i f  Germany acq u ire d  a c o a l in g  s t a t io n  near
2
Swatow or Amoy . Consequently  Macdonald was in s t r u c te d
5
not to  express any o p in io n  of the  German re q u e s t .
An a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r  B r i t a i n  was to  s tre n g th e n  h e r  p o s i t io n  
by o b ta in in g  an e x ten s io n  of th e  boundaries  of Hongkong. The 
C o lo n ia l  O f f i c e ,  l a t e r  jo in e d  by th e  war O f f ic e  and by th e  
A d m ira lty ,  hed been u rg in g  th e  n e c e s s i ty  of an e x te n s io n  f o r  
two y e a r s .  The F o re ig n  O f f ic e  had re fu sed  to  ta k e  up th e  
q u e s t io n  because th e y  were engaged i n  o th e r  n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  
th e  C hinese . But S a lis b u ry  had scant sympathy f o r  the  p r o je c t
anyway. H is  f i r s t  ccement upon i t  was: " I  sm ell f o r t i f i c a -
4
t i o n a . "  A y e a r  l a t e r ,  a lth o u g h  assured t h a t  expensive  
f o r t i f i e r i o n s  would not be necessary , he was s t i l l  opposed 
t o  the  p la n  because he thought t h a t  the  e x te n s io n  could on ly
1 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . I l l  C o n f id e n t ia l ,
23 December 1896.
2 . I b i d .  Minute by B e r t i e .
3 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, TaLlOO C o n f id e n t ia l ,  29 December IB96.
4 .  C o lo n ia l  O f f ic e  to  F o re ig n  O f f ic e ,  S e c re t ,  27 November 1895,
F 017 /1256  ^
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1
he o b ta in e d  by fo r c e .  When B e r t ie  suggested th a t  he might 
wsnt to  c o n s id e r  the  q u es tio n  of an e x te n s io n  of the  bo undaries  
of Hong Fong i n  connection  w ith  th e  German re q u e s t f o r  a
2
c o a l in g  s ta t io n ,  S a lis b u ry  sa id : " I  p r e f e r  the  Chusan id e a . "  
Compensation r a t h e r  than p re v e n t io n  was the  keynote of B r i t i s h  
p o l ic y :  they would not stop Germany from a c q u ir in g  a c o a l in g
s t a t i o n  nor Russia an i c e - f r e e  p o r t  -  r a t h e r  th ey  would ask 
f o r  a correspond ing  concession them selves . And i t  i s  n o t ic e a b le  
t h a t  Chusan, th e  p la c e  to  which t h e i r  t h o u ^ t s  tu rn e d  most, 
was s i tu a te d  near the  mouth of th e  Yangtze  -  i n  o th e r  words, 
at th e  gate to  the  re g io n  where t h e i r  com m ercial i n t e r e s t s  
we re  c one s n t  r  o t  ed ,
1. S a l is b u r y ,  Memorandum, 30 December 1396, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 0 .
2 . m inute by S a l is b u ry  on Memorandum by B e r t i e ,  29 December
1996, F 0 1 7 /1 2 9 0 .
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CHAPTER 5
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH POLI (TV,
NOVEvÆBER 1897 TO MARCH 1898
The German occupation  of Kiaochau on 14 November 1897 
was an im p o rta n t  landm ark, in  a sense a tu rn in g  p o in t ,  in  the  
development of fo r e ig n  a c t i v i t y  in  C h in a . I t  was n o t t h a t  
Germany was the f i r s t  country  to  d is p la y  am bitio ns  th e r e .
There had been abundant evidence of French and Russian  
a m b it io n s  in  China in  the p re v io u s  two and a h a l f  y e a r s .  But 
the o u t r ig h t  occupation of a p o r t  was a new d e p a r tu re ,  a l l  the  
more p o in te d  on account of the abruptness of the  a c t io n .
T h is  event brought F a r  E as te rn  A f f a i r s  in t o  the l i m e l i g h t  in  
Europe and in au g u ra ted  a p e r io d  of In te n s e  fo r e ig n  a c t i v i t y  
in  C hina.
For th re e  ye ars  the a c q u is i t io n  of a c o a l in g  s ta t io n  
had been the Germans’ f i r s t  wish in  China but f o r  some tim e  
they had been unable to  dec ide  which p la c e  would be most 
s u i t a b l e .  A f t e r  much in v e s t ig a t io n  however Kiaochau had 
been decided on at a m eeting of the Emperor m d h is  m in is te r s  
on 29 November 1896. In  the summer of 1897 the  choice was 
approved by an e x p e rt  sent out to  examine the p lace  in  d e t a i l .  
And a f t e r  the s u b jec t had been ra is e d  a t  the c o n v e rs a t io n s
i l s
between the  :mperor ana the Tssr in  Anpu a t ,  the O e rm ^ s  f e l t
t h a t  they had R u le ian  consent to  t h e i r  p la n . In  the b eg in n in g
of --ove^ter two German C a th o l ic  m is s io n a r ie s  in  the p ro v in ce
of Shantnno were murdered, Th® Gmperor was dater"^lnsd to
Seize t r i e  op o r t u r i t y  to  f u l f i l  the ’^ «^ r' a^n am bition  and
almost im m ediate ly  ordered the ” or F as te rn  Squadron of the
F l e e t  to  K iaochau. The subsequent Russian o b je c t 'o n s  to  t h i s
a c t io n  alarmed the Germans but in the meantime ttie German
.AGmiral hao occupied h iaochau, N e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  a s e t t le m e n t
between German\ and China began a week l a t e r  when von Heyking,
the German m in is te r  in  P ek ing , presented  th e  German demands
to  the T s u n g li  Yamen. These I n i t i a l  demands were c h i e f l y
concerned w ith  p ro v id in g  compensation and punishment f o r  the
murder of the m is s io n a r ie s  but they a lso  in c lu d e d  a re q u e s t
th a t  Germans should have p re fe re n c e  in  the c o n s tru c t io n  of
r a i lw a y s  and working of mines in  Shantung. The reques t f o r
th e  le a s e  of Kiaochau was in tro d u c e d  a f t e r  the  n e g o t ia t io n s
had s t a r t e d .  On 4 January 1898 th e  Chinese f i n a l l y  y ie ld e d
to  the German demanas and these were embodieo in  a Convention
1
which was signed on 6 March 1898.
The f i r s t  r e a c t io n  of the B r i t i s h  to  the  German occupa­
t i o n  of Kiaochau was to  i n s t r u c t  Macdonald to  in t im a te  to  the  
Chinese Government t h a t ,  i f  Germany was g ran ted  a p o r t  or  
coal^n^ s t a t i o n .  G reat B r i t a i n  would expect a c o u n te r v a i l in g
1 . Cp. T .L .  hanger. The Diplomacy of Im p e r ia l is m ,  [ l 9 3 5 j ,  I I ,  
4 4 8 -6 9 ,  4 7 6 -7 3 ;  P. Joseph, F o re ig n  Diplomacy in .C h in a , 
L 1 9 2 9 j,  c h .9; A. & P . , (1 8 9 8 ) ,  CV. L c .8 8 1 4 j .  paasinü
t u
1
©dvfintare* Fut Mscdoaslc thought t h a t  I t  would he best to
do n o th in g  u n t i l  a f t e r  had ob ta ined  a p la c e  since
such an in t im a t io n  m.Unt lead the Chinese to re fu s e  the  (^erman
re quest a no the ^er^^ns w o 'ld  be sure to  le a r n  tk ^ t  the
2
rei use j was the result of rritisin action. Eortie was afraid
th a t  B r i t a i n  would p r e ju d ic e  her c la im  to  compensation i f  she
d id  n o t  g ive  the Chinese p r io r  werninc of h e r  in t e n t io n  but
S a lis b u ry  thought i t  "h a rd ly  w o rth w h ile"  to  do so, adding
3
th a t  i t  might "cause t r o u b le  w ith  GermanyL A cc o rd in g ly
hacdonalû was in s t r u c te d  to  suspend a c t io n  on the  o r i g i n a l
4
In s t r u c t i o n .  T h is  d e s ir e  to  avoid a n ta g o n iz in g  Germany 
continued  to  he one of th e  f i r s t  c o n s id e ra t io n s  of the  B r i t i s h  
d u r in r  the  n e g o t ia t io n s  between the Germans and the  Chinese.
Ghan the  T s u n g li  Yamen t r i e d  in  the  m iddle of December to  
f in d  cut whet the B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e  would be i f  Geu’^ any was 
gran ted  e c o a l in g  s t a t io n ,  Macdonald was in s t r u c te d  " to  avo id  
sayiïu->  ^ an y th in g  wb 1 ch would enable th e  Chinese to  contend
5
th a t  t h e i r  o p p o s it io n  i s  based upon the r e f u s a l  of t h i s  country ."
Most of the  German demands seemed reason ab le  to  th e  
B r i t i s h .  I t  was, os one o f f i c i a l  in  the  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  put i t ,
1 . S a l is b u rv  to  Macdonald, T e l . 59 C o n f . ,  17 November 1897,
P 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 63 C o n f . ,  19 November 1397 ,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
3 . I b i d . M inutes by B e r t ie  and S a l is b u r y .
4 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 60 , 21 November 1897, P 0 1 7 /1 31 4 .
5 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 7 0 , 15 December 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
I t ]
" d e s i r a b le ,  in  [ t h e ]  g e n e ra l  i n t e r e s t ,  to  b r in #  [ t h e ]  conse-
1
qwenoes of m urdering m is s io n a r ie s  home to  th e  C h in es e ."
However they o b jec ted  s tro n g ly  to  the  German re q u e s t f o r
p r e f e r e n t i a l  advantages in  Shantung. B r i t i s h  o p p o s it io n  to  t h i s
p ro p o s a l ,  which was d escribed  as "a dangerous p re ced en t . . .
2
at v a r ia n c e  w ith  the  m o s t- fn v o u re d -n a t io n  c la u s e " ,  was
3
e n u n c ia te d  th re e  t im es  in  in s t r u c t io n s  to  Macdonald and the
Chinese were warned t h a t  B r i t a i n  would r e q j i r e  "compensation
. . .  on p o in ts  in  re s p e c t  of which the  r ig h t s  secured by
4
T re a ty  have been d is r e g a r d e d ."
Although the  B r i t i s h  decided f o r  the  tim e be in g  to  say 
n o th in g  to  the Chinese of t h e i r  in t e n t io n  to  ask f o r  a s im i la r  
concession i f  Germany was granted  a c o a lin g  s t a t io n ,  they  d id  
not abandon the  i n t e n t i o n .  And i t  i s  e v id e n t  th a t  B e r t ie  
at le a s t  was sure from  the  tim e o f the occupation  th a t  
Germany would i n s i s t  upon hav ing  a c o s l ln g  s t a t io n .  He 
commented on 20 November th a t  "The Germans have gone to o  f a r  
to  recede a l to g e th e r  . . .  they would not have done what they
5
have done f o r  the sake of t h e i r  murdered m is s io n a r ie s  o n ly ,"
1 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 69 , 22 November 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
M inute by F .A .  Cam pbell, S en io r C le rk  in  the  American  
and A s ia t ic  D epartm ent.
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 69 , 22 November 1897, P 0 17 /1 314 .
T h is  te leg ram  i s  p u b lish e d  in  A.& P . ,  [ l 8 9 S ] ,  CV, [ C .8 8 1 4 ] ,  
65 but in  the  pu b lish ed  v e rs io n  the  p reced en t i s  d es crib ed  
83 ’n o v e l*  in s te a d  of ’ dangerous ’ .
3 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, 23 November, 8 December and 15 Dec­
ember 1897, A.& P . .  [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,  CV, [ c . 8 8 1 4 j ,  6 5 , 69 and 7 0 .
4 .  S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, B December 1897 , A.& P . .  [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,
CV, LG.8 8 1 4 ] ,  6 9 .
5 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 68 , 19 November 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
M inute by B e r t i e .
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Thera  was a p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  Germany would ta k e  scis c la c s
f u r t h e r  south in s te a d  of K iaochau. Macdonald was asko" to
a s c e r ta in  whether, in  e i t h e r  e v e n t .  Adm iral D u l l e r ,  the
Commander- i n - C h i e f  on th e  China s t a t io n ,  thought t h a t  B r i t a i n
1
should ac q u ire  another s ta t io n  n o rth  of Kong Kong. The
A d m ir a l 's  op in ion  was th a t  a s ta t io n  in  the n o rth  would be
u s e iu i  i f  i t  was f o r t i f i e d .  "That means a charge of some
2
£4 ,(;00  a vmar" was S a l i  sbury ' s c om-ient. D urinn  the next
month the  B r i t i s h  a p p a re n t ly  d id  not g iv e  the  su b jec t much
a t t e n t i o n ,  no doubt because the  n e g o t ia t io n s  between. Germany
and China had not y a t  come to  any c o n c lu s io n . However at
the  v e ry  end of the  y e a r  i t  was ra is e d  a g a in . On 29 December
both  Curzon and Cham berlain wrote to  S a lis b u ry  about the
3
g r a v i t y  of the s i t u a t io n  and the  n e c e s s i ty  f o r  a c t io n .
S a l is b u ry  had a lre a d y  on the p re v io u s  day enquired whether
th e r e  was "any sm all p o r t  on th e  G u lf  of P e c h i l l  s u i ta b le
4
as a makeweight f o r  [ t h e ]  German occupation?" Put he h im s e lf  
e v id e n t ly  d i s l i k e d  th e  id e a  of ta k in g  a p o r t  so f a r  n o r th  
f o r  he wrote in  r e p ly  to  Cham berlain: " . . .  I  agree w ith  y oui 
th a t  ’ th e  p u b l i c ’ w i l l  r e q u ir e  some t e r r i t o r i a l  or c a r to g ra p h ic  
c o n s o la t io n  in  China; i t  w i l l  not be u s e fu l  and w i l l  be
1 . B e r t ie  to  Macdonald, Te legram , P r iv a te  & C o n f id e n t ia l ,
19 November 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
2 . iuscdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  Te legram , P r iv a t e ,  23 November 1897,
F 0 1 7 /1 5 1 4 .
5 . Ronald shay. L i f e  of Lord Cur z on, [1 9 2 B ] ,  I ,  2 7 7 -2 7 9 .
J .L .  G a rv in ,  L i f e  of Joseph C ham berla in . [ 1 9 3 4 ] ,  I I I ,  
2 4 8 -4 9 .
4 .  S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 75 S e c re t ,  28 December 1897,  
F 0 1 7 /1 5 1 4 .
/ I f
ex p e n s iv e ; but es e m a tte r  of oure sentim ent we s h a l l  hsne
1
to  do i t .  I  thir.K i t  *111  be Chusan.® On the fcllowlnr: day
ne r e - a f f i rm é e  the E r i t l  sh in t  entier , in  an im p o rta n t  te le g ra m
tc  ipcdonelQ which endec w ith  the sta tem ent th a t  " i f  t e r r i t o r y
i s  ceded t o  Germany, we s h s l l  r e q u ir e  some ccrresoond inn  
2
c ’^ n c e s s i on. "
The g e n e ra l excits-^ent pro c cncern over ^ a r  Eastern  
a f f a i r s  roused by the Germen occuoation  o f '^iaochati was g r e a t ly  
i n t e n s i f i e d  in  the  -‘la d le  of December by the  anr cun cement 
th a t  the  Russian F a r  E as te rn  Squadron was going tc  w in te r  at 
P o rt  A r th u r .  T h is  stec was w ide ly  regarded as being *^erely  
th e  p re lu d e  to  the  a c q u is i t io n  by Russie o f the  I c e - f r e e  p o r t  
which she had so long d e s ir e d .  There  was much s p e c u la t io n  as 
to  th e  exact o b je c t  of her  8 " ib lt io n  but f o r  some t im e  th e re  
was l i t t l e  f u r t h e r  in d ic a t iv e  of th e  Russian in t e n t io n s .
The sub jec t which was r e a l l y  engross ing  the a t t e n t io n  
of the  F o re ig n  C f f ic =  a t t h i s  tim e was the n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  
the  t h i r d  indeTsaity lo a n .  Just b e fo re  Christm as these  had 
taken  a s e r io u s  tu rn  which lad  the  B r i t i s h  Government to  
d e p a r t  from  i t s  customary p r a c t ic e  and to  c o n s id er g u ara n te e in g  
the  lo an  or even making i t  them selves . T e n ta t iv e  d is c u s s io n s  
of th e  r a i s i n g  of the  t h i r d  in denm ity  loan had s ta r te d  as f a r  
back as F e b ru a ry , 1817. Then the  Chinese had approached both
1. J .L .  G a rv in ,  o p .c i t . , I I I ,  249.
2. S a l is b u ry  to  fa c d o n a Id , T e l . 76 S e c re t ,  21 December 1897,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
l î o
th e  E n g lis h  and the German s. The Hong Kong end Shanghai
Rank and the  Beutsch A s ia t is c h e  Bank, who were s t i l l  working
1
to g e th e r ,  took up the  m a tte r .
Th ere  was some debate between them about i n v i t i n g  French
and Russian c o -o p e ra t io n ,  the E ng lish  bsnk be ing  opposed to
the  id ea  on the whole w h ile  the Germans in c l in e d  a t  t im e s  to  
2
fa v o u r  i t .  However the  c r u c ia l  q u es tio n  throughout the  
n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  the  t h i r d  indem nity  loan was the  
s e c u r i ty  to  be demanded f o r  i t .  I t  was no t known p r e c is e ly  
how much of the M a r i t im e  Customs Revenue would be a v a i la b le  
f o r  t h i s  lo an  but i t  was c e r t a in  th a t  i t  would n o t be enough 
and th a t  some a d d i t io n a l  s e c u r i ty  would be n e c e s s a ry . The 
d i f f i c u l t y  was th a t  European banks would not accept o th e r  
Chinese revenues as s e c u r i ty  u n less  p ro v is io n  was made f o r  
t h e i r  be ing  brought under fo r e ig n  c o n tro l  in  the  event of  
d e f a u l t  i f  no t f o r  immediate fo r e ig n  s u p e rv is io n . But th e  
Chinese shrank from the suggestion of fo r e ig n  c o n tro l  and 
i n  the  a ttem p t to  secure the  loan on e a s ie r  terms L i Hung-chang
3
made an a b o r t iv e  appeal to  Russia in  June and l a t e r  opened 
n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  another B r i t i s h  group, known as th e  Jameson- 
Hooley synd ica te  w ith  whom he concluded a p r e l im in a r y  agreement
1 . Cameron to  B e r t i e ,  9 February  and 20 F e b ru a ry  1897,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 2 8 .
2 . Cameron to  B e r t i e ,  5 ia rc h  1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 2 8 .
3. Cameron to  B e r t i e ,  21 June 1897, P 017 /1S 29 .
I l l
1
I n  September. However the  Syndicate  proved unable  to
f u l f i l l  i t s  o b l ig a t io n s  and in  the  m iddle of October the
2
Chinese resumed n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  th e  Anglo-German s y n d ic a te .
But then  the Germans were a p p a re n t ly  in  no h u rry  to
3
conclude the  bu s in ess . Moreover th e y  In s is te d  upon immediate
fo r e ig n  c o n t r o l  of the revenues which were o f fe r e d  as s e c u r i t y .
In s te a d  of p ro v is io n  f o r  such o cm tro l in  th e  event of the
Chinese d e f a u l t i n g ,  wiiich was the  most the  Chinese would g ran t
end, wiiich the  Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank was w i l l i n g  to  
4
a c c e p t .  D u r in g  October and November French in t e r e s t  in  the
lo a n  was not regarded v e ry  s e r io u s ly  f o r  a p p a re n t ly  th e
Russians were u n w i l l in g  to  guarantee  anoth er French loan to
China at th a t  tim e and the  Chinese were s t ro n g ly  opposed to
5
borrow ing  any more money from  the  F rench . But at the end
of November when the  French expressed a d e s i r e  to  jo in  th e
E n g l is h  and German banks in  p r o v id in g  the  lo a n , th e  Germans
were read y  to  in c lu d e  them and a lso  wanted t o  secure Russian  
Ô
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank would
7
i n f i n i t e l y  have p r e fe r r e d  not to  In c lu d e  th e  French or the Russians.
1 . Cameron to  B e r t i e ,  28 September 1897, .F017/1350.
2 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 49 , 16 October 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
3. B ru sse l to  Cameron, 18 October 1897, i n  F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 0 . Mr.
B ru ss e l was the  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  of th e  Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank i n  Hamburg.
4 . Cameron to  B e r t i e ,  22 November 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 0 .
5 . Cameron to  B e r t i e ,  29 October 1897 , F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 0 .
7 .  i b i d .
mThe Germans ss id  t h e t  th e y  would s t i l l  he w i l l l n T  to  set
v i t  I! the  E n g lis h  ©lone but th a t  .In th a t  cess they would have
to  Xr-.sj. st upon the imnedl ©te appointment of fc reXnn in  s noctors ,
which th e y  were a p p a re n t ly  w i l l i n y to  fo rg o  i f  a l l  fo u r
c o u n t r ie s  Joined in  .making the  lo a n . I t  ,7ss v ery  d o u b t fu l
i f  the Chinese coula  be persuaded to  agree tc  t h i s ,  and t h i s
f a c t  fo rced  the Hong Kong end Shanghai Bank t o  c o n s id er
consentin g  to  French and Pussi en p a r t i  cip a t io n  f o r  f e a r  o f
lo s in g  th e  loan e n t i r e l y .
The v a r ie t y  of in t e r e s t s  in vo lv e d  made the arrangement
of a loan by bsriics of the  fo u r  c o u n tr ie s  a v e ry  com plicated
m a t te r .  An added o b s ta c le  was th e  r e lu c ta n c e  o f the  Chinese
to  accept the  term s which the  banks considered  n ec e s s a ry .
Moreover the  u n c e r ta in ty  c rea te d  by p o l i t i c a l  developments
in  the Fiar Seat was lo w e r in g  Chinese c r e d i t  In  Europe and
t h i s  made the  r a is in g  of the loan  a l l  the  more d i f f i c u l t .  By
the  m iddle of December even Cameron was convinced th a t
Imm ediate c o n t r o l  of the  revenues o f fe re d  as s e c u r i ty  would 
1
be n e c e ss ary . " I f  on ly  th e  B r i t i s h  Government could be got
to  Ruarantee the loan" wrote B ru sse l from Hamburg, " th e re
2
would bo an end to  a l l  these  i n t r i g u e s . "  S h o r t ly  a f te rw a rd s ,  
on 21 December, the Chinese asked i f  th e  Anglo-German Synd icate  
would make th e  lo an  on th e  term s they had suggested in  June.
1 . Cameron to  B e r t ie ,  13 December 1897, F 017/ I 330.
2 . B ru sse l to  Cameron, lb  December 1897, a n c io s e a  In  Cameron
t o  B e r t i e ,  20 December 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 0 .
I f  n o t ,  tha  C h ine38 sa id  th a t  they  would accept an o f f e r  
which Russia had made to  p ro v id e  the  lo an  on ver^y easy te rm s.  
A ccording to  Macdonald the c o n d it io n s  a ttach ed  to  the  Russian  
o f f e r  were th a t  Russia  shouM have an open p o r t ,  and the  
f in a n c in g ,  c o n s tru c t io n ,  and c o n tro l  of a l l  r a i lw a y s  in  Man­
c h u r ia  and N orthern  China, and t h a t  the  n ex t In s p e c to r -G e n e ra l
1
of the  Customs A d m in is tra t io n  should be a R uss ian . The
term s suggested by th e  Anglo-German Synd icate  Bank i n  June
had not in c lu d ed  any p r o v is io n  f o r  f o r e ig n  c o n t r o l .  Cameron
said th a t  a lo an  on these terms was no lo n g e r  p o s s ib le ;
indeed " in  the p resen t s ta te  of u n c e r ta in ty  i t  i s  im p o ss ib le
to  f l o a t  a Chinese lo an  on any s e c u r i ty  short of a guarantee
2
by one of the  European Powers." B e r t ie  to ld  Cameron th a t
he saw no p rospect of a B r i t i s i i  guarantee and th a t  he could
not see .uhat the B r i t l s n  Government would g a in  by g iv in g  a
g u aran tee  -  " c e r t a in ly  no t Chinese g r a t i t u d e ,  f o r  such a th in g
5
does no t e x i s t " .  S a l is b u ry  considered th a t  i t  was "Q u ite  out
4
of the  q u es tio n . The House of Commons would n o t lo o k  a t i t . "
1 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 9 5 , 22 December 1897, P 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
P ro fe s s o r  Langer has p o in te d  out th a t  Macdonald’ s r e p o r t  of 
th e  Russian term s was in c o r r e c t  i n  some re s p e c ts .  Apparent­
ly  th e  Russians d id  n e t ,  as Macdonald r e p o r te d ,  ask th a t  
S i r  Robert H a r t ’ s successor should be a R ussian . I n  con­
s id e r in g  B r i t i s h  p o l ic y ,  however, the  im p o rta n t  t h in g  to  
remember i s  th e t  the  B r i t i s h  Government were under the  
im p ress io n  th a t  the  Russians had made such a re q u e s t .
Cp. W.L. Langer, o p . c i t . ,  I I ,  4 6 2 -4 63  and fo o tn o te  n o .37 .
2 . Cameron to  B e r t ie ,  23 December 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 0 .
3 . I b i d . , minute by B e r t ie .
4 .  I b i d . ,  minute by S a l is b u r y .
Ilf.
S a l is b u r y ’ s a t t i t u d e  was not I n f l e x i b l e .  On the  next day
Cameron wrote an o f f i c i a l  l e t t e r  to  S a ils b u ry  fo r m a l ly  u rg in g
th e  b r i t i s b  Government to  c o n s id er  g u ara n te e in g  th e  lo a n . In
t h i s  l e t t e r  Cameron drew an a la rm ing  p ic tu r e  of the p ro b ab le
consequences of a loan  on the  Russian te rm s. The s e c u r i ty  f o r
e Russian loan was to  be the land ta x  and in  th e  even t of
Chinese d e f a u l t  Russia would have the  r i g h t  to  c o l l e c t  t h i s
ta x  - I n  which case China would become " l i t t l e  b e t t e r  than  a
Russian p r o v in c e ."  But even i f  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  d id  not
m a t e r i a l i z e ,  Cameron thought th a t  th e  lo a n  would g ive  R u ss ia ,
and a ls o  France and Germany, a la r g e r  share in  the  c o n t r o l  o f
the  Cuatoms A d m in is tra t io n  which th ey  would be a b le  t o  use to
i n j u r e  B r i t i s b  t r a d e .  "Wo o th e r  concessions e x to r te d  from
C h in a ,"  he wrote "cou ld  coraoensate En#land f o r  the  lo s s  of h e r
1
c o n t r o l  over the  Customs S e r v ic e ."  The p rospec t of f o r e ig n  
c o n t r o l  o f th e  Customs A d m in is tra t io n  and of the  d e c l in e  
of B r i t i s h  in f lu e n c e  th e re  in v a r ia b ly  s t i r r e d  th e  B r i t i s h  
Government. A lread y , on h e a r in g  th a t  one c o n d it io n  of the  
Russian o f f e r  was t h a t  a Russian should be made In s p e c to r -  
G enera l when the  post became v a ca n t,  th e y  had in s t r u c te d  
Macdonald to  in fo rm  th e  T s u n g li  Yamen t h a t  " In  view of the  
g re a t  preponderance of B r i t i s h  t ra d e  w ith  China over t h a t  of 
a l l  f o r e ig n  c o u n tr ie s  combined, HMG w i l l  i n s i s t  upon a 
B r i t i s h  successor to  S i r  Robert H a r t  in  th e  event o f vacancy ."
1. Hong Kong and Shanphai Bank to  S a l is b u r y ,  24 December 1897,
F017 /1330 ,
2 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 7 2 ,  23 December 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
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no?; Salisbury ilr9 c19 0 that tsmeron's letter should ba
sont at once to Hicks-Bs&ch, the Ghpncallor of the Exchequer,
c0 luentin^ that "1 co net know what according to cur
t r a d i t i o n s  csn be done: but T s r  in c l in e d  to agree
that i f  we car. do nothin:;, the fiscal cdmin * st rat Ion 
w i l l  f a l l  in t o  fo r e ig n  hands to  the s erio u s  d e tr im e n t  
of our trade." 1 “^he British d id  net conn it themselves
at cnc3 but fro'^  this time it is fairl^ clear that they were
p rep ared  tc take some a c t io n .
nhon it was first suggested that the 'r1t1sh Government
should guarantee the loan, it h-d been stressed t' at they
cculc claim Isrre con ce s si on s from China I*' retur" for doing 
2
sc and the main cfuestiou before them now was to decide on
their demani s. Sell sbury ’ s first approach to trie question
reflects the fear of foreirn encroachment uoon the Chinese
fiscal administration which prompted the hrttish action. He
told Mpcdor-ald that : "C o n d it io n s  giving us control of the
revenue at the  p o r ts  and on th e  r i v e r s  seem p r e f e r a b le  
at t h i s  juncture to an island or « port: because In
case of war we could always se ize  these  l a s t :  whereas
B grasp of th e  revenue machinery could only be obta ined  
by consent of the  Chinese a t  a c r i s i s  l i k e  t h i s .  "
Two of the  demands which the  B r i t i s h  made were concerned w ith
th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  of the Chinese revenu es . They asked th a t
an Englishman should be head o f the  Customs u n t i l  th e  debt  
4
was p a id  and th a t  any " r ig h t  or power of s u r v e i l la n c e  over or
1. M inute by S e llsb u ry  on Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to
S a l is b u r y ,  24 recember IB Y ,  F 017 /133C .
2 . Cameron t o  B e r t ie ,  20 December 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 0 ;  Hong Kong
and Shanghai Banking C o rp o ra t io n  to  .S a lisbury , 24 December 
1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 0 .
3 . S a l is b u ry  to  iviacdonald, T e l . 7 5 S e c re t ,  28 December 1897,
P 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
4# S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 76 S e c re t ,  31 December 1897,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
b - . s u r  £, tier, cf s,ny I.-iperi. si Revsr.ues ccscrdec tc ar.y cthsr
1
r.stAcn" shculc be s r t e n ù e ù  t c  B r l t s i n .  T h e  R r i t i s h  bac & 
f u r t h e r  <^r c r t u n i ty  tc  s trengthen t h e i r  ho le  on the Chinese  
revenues In  « r rp n c ln :  th? t t r u -  cf the lcF.n. Xcst cf th e
Iqrlt'-a Ct :z% ;'t€ ReTenue %e ? r let get tc the service cf ether 
Irsr, 3 3T.C thersfcre ether revenues, such as the 11 kin 
snd s a l t  taxes and the native oustrns, would hgv* tc for- 
th e  security for this l e a n .  Hut these were a l l  under purely 
Chinese z&nsgè’^ent s.nc -:**s prevision f o r  f  :reigr. s'u-ervl alon 
■ n r a s  nacsEsary t o  r  = he ^he^ accepts :le s c  sccurlt y . ^he 
iriti s i  "  c Torn rent s u r _3 st e  ' "  h  :  t  the likin, salt, s n  •' native 
cost :  3 revenues, vhl ?'■ they w e  re re:r =■ at ino a s s e c u r i t y  f o r  
t h e  loan, she*;: I f  h e  end ■'.. t  » -  h y  a n  Hr. o i l  s h  ran and, in the
e v e n t  c :  o - e f s ^ i t ,  p . s c e :  v n c e r  • r o i l  s o .  c c :  t r : . .  ‘ s c o - ^ n s i a
- sox' it :f the oe revenues wa? an 'i"«possible*
rep : r t e c  th a t  r e r t  thought in s is te n c e  upon
4
o t i c n s .  - c o o r f i n g  t o  ' i e v d  o n e  I d ,
t  n e i r e  C v ^ t - c v s  r e v e n u e  v a s  cn lv  a u d i t e d  b y  H a rt  e n d
q n l  a  s t a f f  t h r e  ? t i u e a  t h e  s i .  ?  e  " ' j c u ^ o  h e  r e  g o  i r i
5
’ a u d i t '  the  r e v e n u e  s now i n  yj e c t l  en.  h e r e  hgc  been
1. SellsWrv tc ïeedcn&ld, T e l .3 S e c re t ,  ? January 1853,
F 0 1 7 /1 2 3 3 .
2. Sailshrary to  Escdcnald, 3 January 1393, A.H ?.. 11393],
3 " , . " ' .1 3 1 4 , ,  '’ St
3. iecdon«‘ld to bertle, Telstra-, Private, 11 January 1396,
F 0 1 7 /1 5 4 0 .
4. 7acdoneld to  Sellsbury, T e l .15, 11 Jsnuary 1333, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
5. Macdonald to Salisbury, Tel.13, 1: January 1833, F0 1 7 /1 5 4 0 .
/E7
misunderstanding over the exact meaning of the word ’audit'.
The Britisb Government had not Intended anything on such a
large scale when they made tha request. Sslishury explainad
that all they wanted was to have 'some 8:ngli shman 3 0  placed
that he may he able to warn us if any flsca] measures were
be in# taken oh would injure the revenue v/hich is our
, ,1
security. This requirement was eventually met hy an
agreement that the Chinese Government should annc'nt two
Inspectors who would examine the accounts and make renorts
2
Tip on the 11 kin and salt tax. At the same time the i'simgli
Yemen agreed that in the event of default the British should
assume control of the revenues pledged as security. These
were to be the likin end salt taxes, the native customs and
the balance of the Maritime Customs revenue. "t one point an
error in the transmission of a telegram led tha Pritisb to
believe thet the Chinese would pledge only one third of the
salt revenues. Their reaction to this Idea illustrates their
anxiety to have undi sput^d rights over whatever revenues might
come under their control. Tf it was necessary to be content
with only part of the salt revenues, they insisted that the
division should he by provinces "... so that we may have a hold
over our portion ahd not be osed to illicit Interference
3
from other Powers.
1. Salisbury to Macdonald, Tel.6 Secret, 12 January 1908,
F017/1338.
2. Macdonald to Salisbury, 18 January 1908, A.& P.. [189B],
CV, [C.8814J, 84.
3. Salisbury to .«scdonald, Tel. 14 Private, 2C January 1898,
F017/1358.
/3g
ihe oi the Hzit,i sL. position i n  relation to
biis su «mini St ratio... ci nne- Chinese revenues las o:iij one coject
O Î  t h e  e t a c t y  a e s & a c - s  w n l o n  t h e  S T i t i s i n  # s i e  i n  r e t u m  f o r
making the loan. several of their other requests were hesigned
to extsiic. the facilities for foreign trace with Chins* They
esïcec. ior the opetil-n». of :_ritema.i navigation in China; the
ireeGor of forelgn goo: s irow 11 kin in the Treat? Ports; and
the cosninn of i&lienwan, ianninn, anc a port 1:. .Tunan as 
1
Treaty Forts* Another cf tneir heaancs mas for the right
to construct a railway 1ro# the luraese frontier tc the 
2
Yangtze vaixsy. 1 he Brltisl'i hsa been trying for seme time 
to get daiiiicts per ml salon for the extension of a railway 
Iroa ^urrêB into I'unn&n anc, nc uoufct, mexccmaG tnis export unity 
to press the point. Eut it is possible tast this request 
was also partly inspirée cy a desire to straagtaan the British 
position in the lan.gtf:s v&llay. dome of the other aeasads 
mhicn they tnought of waking Indicate tnat the British wanted 
to establish a right tc spécial ccnsidération in that region. 
They as&ed the Chinese to cromise that territory in the
3
Yangtze valley should never be ceded to any other Power and 
Salisbury haa suggestec, although this was not included in the 
aemsnds eventually presented to the Chinese , that they
1* S a lis b u ry  to  uacdoneld, T e l , 76 S e c re t ,  31 December 1897,  
F O l T / l s i l ;  -i&cdcrald i :  S a l is b u ry ,  IF  Js:iuary 1893,
A.a P . .  [13S 3J , C¥, i e . 8 S 1 4 j ,  80 .
2 ,  S a lisb u ry  to  Is c d o r .s id , T e l . 76 S e c re t ,  31 December 1897, 
F 0 1 7 /1 5 1 4 .
5 . I b i d .
should ask foi* th e  f i r s t  r e f u s a l  of concessions in  the  
1
Yangtze  v a l l e y .
Throughout the  n e g o t ia t io n s  the  B r i t i s h  a n x ie ty  f o r
t h e i r  success i s  m a n ife s t and t h i s  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  t h e i r
re a d in e s s  to  modify t h e i r  p rop osals *  S a l is b u ry  acquiesced in
M acdonald 's  op in io n  th a t  i t  would be b e t t e r  not to  ask f o r
2
th e  f i r s t  r e fu s a l  of concessions in  th e  Yangtze  v a l l e y .
The proposed req u es t f o r  the  opening of Chinese p o r ts  to
f o r e ig n  s a l t ,  in troQ uced  a f t e r  the n e g o t ia t io n s  had s t a r t e d ,
was dropped im m ed ia te ly  when Macdonald complained th a t  i t  was
o
an " im p o s s ib le  c o n d i t io n " .  On 15 January Macdonald had a
lone; d is c u s s io n  of th e  B r i t i s h  demands w ith  the  T s u n g li  Yamen
4
i n  which " the  main f i g h t  was over T a l ie n w a n " . P r e v io u s ly
th e  Chinese had seemed to  welcome th e  id e a  of opening t h i s
p o r t  and th ey  s t i l l  acknowledged the advantages of do ing  so.
But tha Russian charge d ' a f f a i r e s  had warned t h a t  th e y  would
in c u r  R ussian h o s t i l i t y  i f  th e y  conceded t h i s  o o ln t ,  and
Macdonald thought t h a t  the  Chinese were l i k e l y  to  " l e t  [ t h e ]
5
lo a n  go r a th e r  th an  run  [ t h e ]  r i s k  o f Russian r e p r i s a l s " .
1 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 75 S e c re t ,  28 December 1897,
F 0 1 7 / l d i 4 .  P a r t  of t h i s  te legram  i s  oubl^shed in  A •He P. * 
[ 1 8 9 8 ] ,  CV, [C .8 8 1 4 ] ,  7 2 .
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 14, 11 January 1897, P 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
3 . MacdonaM to  B e r t ie ,  T e legram , P r iv a t e ,  11 January 1898,
^ 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 :  S a lis b u ry  t c  Macdonald, T e l . 6 S e c re t ,  12 Janu­
a ry  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
4 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 19, 16 January 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 40 .
Most of t h i s  te le g ra m  i s  u r in te d  in  A.6c P . ,  [ l 0 9 3 ] ,
CV, LC .8814J, SO.
5 . I b i d .
l a wan im-roi?itely authorized to vlthdrsw the demand if he
thought it "1 ‘practicable" to  irsfot uoon it, slthrurh Gsl; s-
1
bur:y ad^ed th?t "we shoqilc give it up /,1th ^ogret." Another
much cootoste; peint s the  omount o^  the lo a n . The Chinese
want3.1 tc borrow F i r  r. whereas fhs 7 r 5ti sh only nT-nted to land
F12 m. , the ©‘’’ount c f the  in re m rd ty  rem a in in g  to  be p a id .
The British Government's difficulty was that th * y  had to
de si on tl'eir p r e p 's a ls  tc  oless? 'Barlia^int ?s v e i l  as the
Chinese. "hen 'ccdcnsld urged "‘hem to mate the lo r n  £16 m.,
Go]1shurp ^xplninsd that: "There will be the greatest p a r l i a ­
mentary d i f f i c u l t y  in  advancing more than the  in d em n ity  
r e n ^ ' I r e s  u n l e s s  s o m e  o b j e c t  c a n  b e  s h o w n  v h l c b  c o m m a n d s  
i t s e l f  to P a r l ia m e n t ."  -  A lthough he mentioned th a t  p ay in g
o f f  an e a r l i e r  Chinese lo an  might s a t i s f y  t h e i r  re q u ire m e n ts ,
he was c le a r l y  s t i l l  r e lu c t a n t  to  e n la rg e  the lo a n . Tw elve days
l a t e r  he re p e ated  t h a t  "he siiould g r e a t ly  p r e f e r  to  co n fin a
5 '  '
th e  lo an  to  £ 1 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 " .  T h is  t im e however he was p repared  
to  in c re a s e  i t  -  on c o n d it io n  th a t  the  e x t ra  amount was used 
e i t h e r  to  pay o f f  an e a r l i e r  loan or to  buy ships and guns
in  Eng land. S a lis b u ry  d es c rib e d  the  second a l t e r n a t i v e  as
4
"the  one we l i k e  l e a s t " .  The B r i t i s h  had s tro n g ly  d isapproved  
of a s im i la r  German prop osal in  1395 and i t  i s  a measure of
1. S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, 17 ’'anuary 1893, A. b ? . ,  L1S9.3],
CV, LG.8 9 1 4 j ,  3 3 .
2 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 7 S e c re t ,  12 January 1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 3 .
3 .  S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 17, 24 January 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
Fart of this te legram  i s  p r in te d  in  A.dc P . , [ l 8 9 8 ] ,  CV, 
[ C .8 9 1 4 j ,  87 .
4 . I b i d .
t h e i r  eagerness to  o b ta in  the agreement f o r  the  loan  th a t  th e y  
were now w i l l i n g  to  cons id er such a scheme. T h is  p ro p o s a l  
had one advantage however in  th a t  i t  enabled th e  B r i t i s h  to  
appeal to  the  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  of Chinese o f f i c i a l s  to  any 
scheme which o f fe r e d  them some immediate p e rs o n a l g a in .
S a l is b u ry  te le g ra p h e d  to  Macdonald th a t  " I t  may serve your
purposes to  remember th a t  in  making tha  c o n tra c t  f o r  
spending th e  £4 mn. in  England th e  le g i t im a t e  
commissions w i l l  f ©11 t c  members of the Chinese  
Governm ent." 1
The g re a t  o b s ta c le  to  the  success of the  B r i t i s h  n e g o t ia ­
t io n s  was Russian o p p o s it io n .  T h is  was foreshadowed to  a 
c e r t a i n  e x te n t  i n  t h e i r  o b je c t io n s  to  the  opening of T a lie n w a n .  
At th e  same tim e th e re  was a re p o r t  that, n e g o t ia t io n s  were 
going on f o r  a F ran co -R u ss ian  lo an  and t h i s  prompted the
F o re ig n  O f f ic e  to  urge Macdonald to  p re s s  on w ith  h is  n e g o t ia -
2
t io n s .  U n t i l  t h i s  t im e the  B r i t i s h  had e v id e n t ly  managed
to  keep t h e i r  a c t io n  f a i r l y  s e cre t  f o r ,  when The Times
p u b lis h e d  an account of the  B r i t i s h  p ro p o s a ls  on 17 January ,
S a l is b u ry  te le g ra p h e d  to  Macdonald;
" I  am a f r a id  th a t  the  uinlucky d is c o v e ry  o f our 
n e g o t ia t io n s  by the Times t h i s  morning w i l l  expose 
you t o  much h in d ran ce  from  the  o th e r  d ip lo m a t is ts ." ^
N e v e r th e le s s  Macdonald ob ta ined  the  T s u n g li  Yemen’ s assent to
p ro p o s a ls  re g a rd in g  the s e c u r i ty  f o r  the  lo an  on 18 January
end i n  th e  next few  days a number of the  o th e r  p ro p o s a ls  ware
1. S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, l e l e g r a i ' .  P r iv a te  and S e c re t ,
25 January 1898, P 0 1 7 /1 33 8 .
2 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 10 S e c re t ,  17 January 1898,
? 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
3 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 11 S e c re t ,  17 January 1 8 9 . ,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 3 .
c l a r i f i e d  and accepted. Then, ■when he was almost w i th in
re ac h  of an agreement, the  Russian o p p o s it io n  to  th e  loan
became pronounced. On 24 January the  T s u n g li  Yemen to ld
Macdonald t h a t  Russia had p ro te s te d  s tro n g ly  e # a in s t  th e
c o n c lu s io n  of the lo an  "on the  ground t l  a t i t  would d is t u r b
the  ba lance of in f lu e n c e  i n  C h in a ."  Macdonald was c l e a r l y
a f r a i d  t h a t ,  w i th  th e  Chinese cowering b e fo re  th e  Russian
t h r e a t s ,  the n e g o t ia t io n s  might f a i l  and he was at p a in s  to
im press upon the B r i t i s h  Government t h e t  i t  was " s tro n #  f e a r
2
of R ussia" which made the  Chinese h e s i t a t e .  He r e fe r r e d  to
a despatch  which he had w r i t t e n  on 1 December 1397 e x p res s in g
h i s  concern over how B r i t a i n  was to  d e a l  w ith  a Russian p o l ic y
i n  China which he thought would in c r e a s in g ly  be one of
" v io le n t  and perem ptory  demands." Re had w r i t t e n :  "We have  
throughout th e  long term of our r e l a t i o n s  w ith  China  
t r e a t e d  h e r  w ith  so much fo rb ea ran ce  th a t  she i s  tempted  
to  b e l ie v e  th a t  whatever p ro v o c a t io n  she may g iv e ,  we 
w i l l  n o t  show o u rse lves  im p lac ab le  or r e j e c t  a p e a c e fu l  
s e tt le m e n t  of th e  q u a r r e l ,  and th e r e fo r e  when exposed 
to  p ressu re  from two q u a r te rs  she choose the  l i n e  
of le a s t  r e s is ta n c e ,  th a t  #3 io h  b r in g s  h e r  in t o  c o n f l i c t  
w ith  England, fe e l in g ^ s u r s  th a t  she runs no r i s k  of 
a c tu a l  h o s t i l i t i e s . " ^
i © had concluded by s tre s s in g  th e  im portance of making th e  
Chin©se f e e l  th a t  th ey  had as much to  f e a r  from B r i t a i n  as from
1. Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 24, 25 January 1838. P 0 1 7 /1 338 ;
most of t h i s  te le g ra m  i s  p u b lish ed  i n  A.& P . .  [ l 8 9 8 j ,
CV, [ c . 8 8 1 4 ] ,  8 6 -8 7 .
2. Macdonald to  F o re ig n  O f f ic e ,  P r iv a t e  Te legram , 26 January
1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
3 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  n o .162, 1 December 1897, P 0 1 7 /1 3 1 3 .
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R u s s ia . Nov» he r e i t e r a t e d  the same theme, saying:
"There i s  no le v e ra g e ,  where th e  Chinese are  concerned,  
l i k e  f e a r ,  and we, hovvever u n w i l l in g ,  must meat 
t h r e a t  w ith  t h r e a t . "  1
I n a b i l i t y  as much as re lu c ta n c e  l im i t e d  the  e x te n t  to  
which B r i t a i n  could adopt such a p o l ic y .  I t  was soon e v id e n t  
t h a t  she could do l i t t l e  to  he lp  the  Chinese w ith s ta n d  th e  
Russian p r o t e s t s .  The T s u n g li  Yamen t o l d  Macdonald th a t  on ly  
a prom ise of p r o te c t io n  ag a in s t Russia would h e lp  them and 
M acdonald 's  in fo r m a t io n  was th a t  Pavlow, th e  Russian charge
2
d ' a f f a i r e s ,  had th re a te n e d  a m i l i t a r y  move over the  f r o n t i e r .
S a l is b u r y 's  answer to  t h i s  was: "vve can g ive  no promise of
p r o t e c t io n  a g a in s t  Russia because she th r e a te n s  a 
m i l i t a r y  move over th e  f r o n t i e r  a g a in s t  which we are  
n e c e s s a r i ly  p o w e rle ss ."  S
However S a lisb u ry  was not I n d i f f e r e n t  to  the  new tu r n  of  
e v e n ts .  He had a lre a d y  s ta ted  f i r m ly  what s teps B r i t a i n  would 
take  in  Iho event of h e r  o f f e r  being re fu s e d .  P a v lo w 's  argu­
ment to  the  T s u n g li  Yamen had been th a t  the  proposed B r i t i s h
4
loan wovild ’’d is t u r b  the  balance of in f lu e n c e  i n  C h in a" . " I f  
a lo an  from  us vho nave 4 /5  of the  t r a d e  would d is t u r b  th e  
balance " r e to r t e d  S a l is b u r y ,  " a f o r t i o r i  th a t  e f f e c t  would 
bs produced by a lo an  from R u s s ia ."  In  o rder to  re d re s s  the
1. Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 27 S e c re t ,  28 January 1898,
r Ü 17 /1540 .
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 33, 31 January 1893, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
P a r t  of t h i s  te le g ra m  i s  p u b lish ed  in  A.& .P . , [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,
CV, LC .8814J, 94 .
3 . S a l is b u ry  to  Tacdonald, T e l . 25, 1 F e b ru a ry  1898, F017 /133B .
4 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  25 January 1898, A.& P . . [ l 8 9 8 j ,
CV, [ 0 . 3 3 1 4 ] ,  8 6 .
b a la n c e , B r i t a i n  would then demand: "freedom of in la n d
n a v ig a t io n :  the  t e r r i t o r y  necessary f o r  e r r  Burmese r a i lw a y :
and i t h e j  occvpgtion of Chusan.® And he corcl'x3ed "These th in o a
Chine must grant i f  she accepts e lo an  fro-» R ussia : end i f
1
she re fu s e s  we s h s l l  ta ke  them ."
Gut what, asked the  Chinese, would happen i f  they  re fu s ed
th e  B r i t i s h  lo an  end ye t d id  not borrow f r o ^  9 si a? S a l is b u ry
m ain ta ined  th a t  90^9 concessions would s t i l l  be necessary  to
compensate f o r  : he " a f f ro n t®  i n f l i c t e d  on Great ’ r i t s i n  by th e
r e f u s a l  of h e r  o f f e r  " in  de ference  t o  Russian t h r e a t s " ,  saw
c l e s r l y  however th a t  In  t h i s  event B r i t a i n  would have to  modify
h e r  daman: 3 f o r  "o th erw ise  we d e s tro y  any m otive f o r  t h e i r
2
r e fu s in g  to  borrow fro-» Russia" and he said th a t  " ^ r i ts in  
would th e n  be content w ith the opening of i n t e r n a l  n a v ig a t io n  
t c  B r i t i s h  steamers and a w r i t t e n  assurance th a t  < i r  Robert 
H a r t ' s  successor would be a B r i t i s h  s u b je c t .
The T s u n g li  Yamen hed in t im a te d  to  Tacdonsld on 30
January th a t  they thought the  only course open to  them was to
3
borrow from  n e i t h e r  Tnslsnd nor R ussia . On 3 ’February P r in c e
.Kuns in form ed him th a t  the  Chinese Government had taken  a
4
d e f i n i t e  d e c is io n  to  t h i s  e f f e c t .  On the  same day Macdonald
1. C a lisburg  to  ^^cdonald, T e l . 23, 28 January 1333, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
2 .  S a lis b u ry  to  Macdo; a i d , T e l . 26, 1 February  135-3, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
3 . i iacd o ra ld  to  S a l is b u ry ,  21 January 13 53, T P . .  [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,
GV, [C .8 3 1 4 J ,  94 .
4 .  Macdonald to  S e l l  sbury, T e l . 34 (P.), 5 February  1893,
F C 17 /134 3 . Most of t h i s  te le g ra m  i s  sub 11 shed in  A. & P . ,
[1 8 9 3 J , CV, iC .3 8 1 4 ] ,  95 .
wrote to  the  T s u n g li  Yamen asking f o r  2 w r i t t e n  u n d e rta k in g
t h a t  the  In s p e c to r -G e n e ra l  of the  Customs Admini s tr^^tior
1
should always be a B r i t i s h  s u b je c t .  A c tu a l ly ,  t h i s
re q u e s t was made in d e p en d en tly  of th e  demands f o r  compensation
f o r  th e  r e f u s a l  of the  B r i t i s h  lo a n . Macdonald had asked
f o r  such an assurance d u r in g  th e  loan nogot1 a t i  ons in  Januory,
not 2 2 9 c o n d it io n  of the loan  but 3 s a p o in t  up on which G reat
2
E r l t a i n  world i n s i s t  in  any even t. On 2 February  th e  T s u n a l i
3
Yamen rep eated  th e  " p o s i t iv e  assurances" which they had g iven  
him at t h a t  t im e  and i t  only remained to  o b ta in  the»  in  
w r i t i n g .  At the  same tim e Macdonald was p re s s in g  the  T s u n g li  
Yamen to  make some o th er  concessions to  Great B r i t a i n  t o  com­
pensate  f o r  t h e i r  r e f u s a l  of the  E r i t l s h  lo a n . On 5 F e b ru a ry  
th e y  agreed , n e t  only to  open the i n t e r n a l  n a v ig a t io n  of 
China to  B r i t i s h  steamers but a lso  to  open a p o r t  i n  Hunan 
and to  prom ise , i f  Macdonald requested  i t  in  w r i t i n g ,  not to
4
alienate t e r r i t o r y  i n  the Yangtze re g io n  to  any o th e r  Power.
On 11 F e b ru a ry  the  T s u n g li  Yamen gave Macdonald the  promised
assurance th a t  they  would "never a l ie n a t e  any t e r r i t o r y  in  the
5
p ro v in c e s  a d jo in in g  the  Yangtze to  any o th e r  Power". Three
1. Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 3 4 ( P . ) ,  3 February  1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 3 .  Most of t h i s  te le g ra m  i s  p u b lish ed  i n  A,& P . .  
[1 3 9 8 J , GV, lC .8 8 1 4 j ,  95.
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 2 1 ( P . ) ,  21 January 1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 3 .  Most of t h i s  te le g ra m  i s  p u b lish ed  i n  A.& P . . 
[ 1 8 9 5 ] ,  CV, [C .8G 14J, 6G.
3 . I b i d .
4 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u ry ,  T e l . 37 C o n f id e n t ia l ,  6 F e b ru a ry  1898,
F 017/13401
5 . Gooch and Tem perley , I ,  11 , Ed. n o te .
Z4.6
Qays leter, when he received a despatch from the Ts'ungli
Yemen a g ree in g  th a t  th e  In s p e c to r -G e n e ra l  o f th e  Customs
A d m in is t r a t io n  should be a B r i t i s h  sub jec t as long as B r i t i s h
t r a d e  w ith  China was g r e a te r  than th a t  of any o th e r  c o u n try ,
he in form ed S a lis b u ry  th a t  a l l  the  concessions which he had
1
reported earlier were now confirmed. Salisbury considered
th e  concessions "very  v a lu a b le "  and c o n g ra tu la te d  Macdonald
on h is  achievem ent. " I t  i s  however very  em barrassing" he
2
com plained " to  have to  keep the  secre t  f o r  a month". Fo r
th e  C h inese , f e a r f u l  of demands by o th e r  Powers, had expressed
the wish that for the time being any public announcement should
be co n fin ed  to  the statement th a t  China was not going to  borrow
from  England or Russia but was c o n s id e r in g  what s teps  she
could  ta k e  to  Improve h e r  revenue. A month or s ix  weeks l a t e r
they  would n o t mind th e  opening of i n t e r n a l  n a v ig a t io n  and the
e v e n tu a l  opening of a p o r t  in  Eunan being  announced. T h e i r
consent was obtained, however, to the immediate announcement
of these  concessions on the c o n d it io n  th a t  they  were not
connected with the refusal of th e  loan or described as special 
/  3
0once salons to Great Britain.
Meanwhile th e  Chinese were s t i l l  w ith o u t a lo a n .  As
soon as I t  was known th a t  the  B r i t i s h  Government's o f f e r  had
1. Macdonald t o  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 39, 14 February  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
Most of t h i s  te le g ra m  I s  pub lished  in  A.& P • « [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,  GV, 
[ C .8 8 1 4 ] ,  10 1 -1 0 2 .
2. S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 35 , 14 F eb ru ary  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
Most of t h i s  te le g ra m  i s  p u b lish ed  i n  A . &  P . , [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,  CV, 
C .8 8 1 4 ] ,  102.
3 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u ry ,  T e l . 43 , 18 F eb ru ary  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
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been re fu s e d ,  the Hong hong and Shan^lial Bank took  up th e
q u e s t io n  a g a in . They wanted to  o f f e r  China a lo a n  but thought
t h a t  such an o f f e r  would only be f e a s i b l e  I f  the  Government
prom ised to  ta k e  th e  unsubscribed p o r t io n  of th e  lo a n . "T h is
seems [ t h e ]  only chance of g e t t in g  [ t h e j  lo a n  f o r  Eng land”
1
te le g ra p h e d  Macdonald. But t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  sug e s t io n  was
im p r a c t ic a b le  because the  Government lacked  th e  power to
2
subscribe  to  a p u b l ic  lo an . There was some c o n s id e r a t io n  of
o th e r  ways in  which th e  Government might h e lp  th e  Bank, the
c h ie f  p o s s i b i l i t y  being an u n d e rta k in g  ”to  do whet we could
3
t o  lo o k  a f t e r  the in t e r e s t s  of our b o ndho lders” . "'he conc lu ­
s ion  however was th a t  n o th in g  ecuId be done. The C h a n c e llo r  
of the  Exchequer thought th a t  the  Bank should make th e  lo an  on 
t h e i r  own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i f  th ey  were going to  un dertake  i t  
end he was s tro n g ly  of the  o p in io n  th a t  he should ta ke  no
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  the m a tte r  un less  th e re  was to  be some
4
quid p ro  quo. The concessions which the  B r i t i s h  re c e iv e dh^mmmrn, Aii — wTi i
from  th e  Chinese s h o r t ly  a f te rw a rd s  on ly  confirm ed H icks  Beach 
i n  h i s  d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  to  have a n y th in g  to  do w ith  th e  lo a n .
On 10 F e b ru a ry  Cameron wrote to  B e r t ie  ag a in  t e l l i n g  him th a t  
th e  Chinese Government had decided t o  p la c e  under the  immediate
1 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 35 Very S e c re t ,  3 F e b ru a ry  1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
2 . S a l is b u r y  to  Macdonald, T e l . 31, 5 F e b ru ary  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
3 . S i r  E. H a m ilto n , (A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry ,  the  T r e a s u r y ) ,  to
B e r t i e ,  4 F e b ru a ry  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 6 .
4 .  H a m ilto n  to  B e r t i e ,  5 F e b ru a ry  1898, F0 1 7 /1 5 5 6 .
c o n t r o l  of th e  Customs A d m in is tra t io n  enough of zha s a l t  and 
I x k i n  revenues to  form  the  s e c u r i ty  f o r  a losn  of £16 m, and 
H a r t  wanted to  know i f  th e  Dank could make th e  lo an * Cameron 
cons id ered  th e  occasion 'a grand o p p o r tu n ity  of re ^ s in in - i  lo s t
1
ground” but he f a i t  th a t  some Government support was n e c e s s a ry . 
S a lis b u ry  had th e  l e t t e r  sent to  th e  C h a n c e llo r  o f the  
Exchequer at once* H ic k s  Beach's r e p ly  was a v igo ro us  r e f u s a l  
to  have an y th in g  to  do w ith  the lo a n . " I t  i s  one t h i n g , ” he 
said " to  make a lo an  to  the  Chinese Government o r s e lv e s  i n  
c o n s id e ra t io n  of im p o rta n t  commercial concessions. I t  i s  q u ite  
an o th er  th in g  to  'g e t  up behind' a p r iv a t e  bank in  the v e ry  
i n d e f i n i t e  manner suggested, i  have navor been disposed to
2
t h i s  course end th in k  i t  would be a v ery  dangerous p re c e d e n t ."
Moreover the  o b s ta c le  which had o r i g i n a l l y  p rev en ted  th e  Banl<
from  ra is in ? ;  a lo a n  w ith o u t a guarantee  seamed to  him to  be
removed now th a t  the  Chinese were w i l l i n g  t o  p la c e  th e  revenues
which ?;ere to  form  th e  s e c u r i ty  f o r  the  lo an  under the  immediate
c o n t r o l  of the Customs A d m in is t r a t io n .  "And i f  the  lo a n  i s
m ere ly  a q u es tio n  between r i v a l  f i n a n c i e r s  of d i f f e r e n t
n o t io n s ,"  he concluded, " I  care v ery  l i t t l e  who %8ts i t ,  hav ing
3
regard  to  the  prom ises we have from  the Yemen." Cameron 
e x p la in e d  to  B e r t ie  th a t  the  Bank wished, not th a t  th e  Government
1. Cameron to  B e r t ie ,  10 February  1898, FC 17 /1356 .
2 .  Minute by H ic k s  Leach, Cameron to  B e r t i e ,  10 February 1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 6 .
3 . I b i d .
should guarantee the lo a n , but t h a t  the  Bank of England
should j o i n  them in  is s u in g  i t *  I n  the  course of the  next
day Cameron happened to  w r i te  B e r t ie  th re e  t im es  ®nd H icks
Beacii, Oil r e c e iv in g  these  l e t t e r s ,  exclaimed " * * *  cannot you
1
stop t h i s  man from p e s te r in g  us w ith  h i s  prop osals?"  T h is
o u tb u rs t  was not s im ply the r e s u l t  of h is  o p p o s it io n  to
Cameron's p ro p o sa ls *  Something e ls e  was on h is  mind!
" . . .  how i s  i t  p o s s ib le  f o r  u s ,"  he asked, " c o n s is te n t ly  
w ith  good f a i t h ,  to  do an y th in g  of the  k ind  which he 
d e s ir e s  w h ile  we are n e g o t ia t in g  a t  S t .  P e te rs b u rg ? ” 2
Fo r the  B r i t i s h  were then engaged i n  n e g o t ia t io n s ,  which had
indeed s ta r te d  almost fo u r  weeks b e fo r e ,  f o r  an u n d ers tan d in g
w ith  R ussia .
I t  was the  s i t u a t io n  in  China, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y
d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered in  the  loan  n e g o t ia t io n s ,  wiiich
prompted the B r i t i s h  o v e r tu re  to  R uss ia . \%hen the  B r i t i s h  were
f i r s t  proposing  to  make the lo a n , S a lis b u ry  had t o ld  Macdonald
t h a t  " i f  VJ9 can get Russia to  go w ith  us ta k in g  h a l f  th e
r i s k  and analagous advantages in  th e  N o rth , we should p r e f e r  
5
to  do 30 . "  T h is  id e a ,  however, was a p p a re n t ly  not pursued  
and the  B r i t i s h  continued t h e i r  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  the  lo an
1* M inuta by B ic k s  Beach, Cameron to  B e r t ie ,  11 i eb ru ary  1898, 
F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 6 .
2 . I b i d *
3 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 76 S e c re t ,  31 December 1897,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 . The C h a n c e llo r  of th e  exchequer, acco rd ing  to  
h i s  b io g ra p h e r ,  was anxious to  c o -o p e ra te  w ith  R ussia  i n  
the  m a tte r  of the  lo a n . Cp. Lady V i c t o r i a  l ic k s  Beach, 
L i f e  of S i r M ich ae l H icks  Beach, [ 1 9 3 2 ] ,  I I ,  58.
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in d e p e n d e n t ly .  I n  a lnn~ d isc n e s in n  of the c c n a it ie n s  of
the  lo sn  w ith  the  T s n n r i i  Yemen on 16 J a n u rry , Lscdcnald
d isco vered  th a t  ^hy Russian chsrgé d ’ a f f a i r e s  brd warns" th e
Chinese th a t  th e y  would in c u r  Russ' sn r .o s t i i  l t y  i f  they agreed
t c  open Ta.lienwan. Consequently th ey  were very r e lu c t a n t  to
concede t h i s  cemrnd. T h is  in s p ire d  iacd on a Id to  r e f e r  to
S a l is b u r y 's  e a r l i e r  suggestion of working v i th  Russie and to
express h i s  own o p in io n  t h a t :  "The t:me has come when i f
p o s s ib le  we should come to  en unders tand ing  w ith  Russia as
to  our g e n e ra l p o l ic y  out h e re .  I t  world he - r e f e r a b l e  i f
2
re  could work to g e th e r  and I  th in k  t n i s  i s  f e a s i b le  . . . "
T h is  te le g ra m  was rece ived  at the  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  on the  morning
of 17 January . That a fte rn o o n  S a lis b u ry  sent the  In s t r u c t io n s
to  O'Conor, now M in is te r  at 3 t . Pe tersbu rg h , " to  ask Monsieur
V ' i t te  whether i t  i  s p o s s ib le  th a t  England end Russia should
3
work  to g e th e r  in  China. . . . "  O'Conor took up t h i s  p ro p o s é
e a g e r ly .  On 19 January he saw, net W i t te ,  th e  f in a n c e  M in is t e r ,
but M c u r s v ie f f ,  the  F o re ig n  M in is te r .  Moreover he suggested
to  him th a t  an u n ders tand ing  between the  two c o u n tr ie s  should
not be confined  to  the  F a r  East but should "extend to  the
4
g e n e ra l  area of our r e s p e c t iv e  i n t e r e s t s . "
1 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  16 January 1898, A. & P . ,  [ l 8 9 8 j ,
[c .8 8 1 4 ] ,  8 0 .
2 . Macdonald to  B e r t ie ,  Te legram , P r iv a t e ,  16 January 1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 5 4 0 .
3 . S a l is b u ry  to  O'Conor, 17 January 1898, Gooch and Tem p erley ,
I ,  5.
4 .  I b i d .^  6 .  O'Conor to  S a l is b u ry ,  20 January 1898.
i i iO nravieff wantaa uhe B r i t i s h  Government to  fo rm u la te
t n e i r  v iew s. A cco ro inz ly  on 2b January Salisbury  e ls b o re te c
the i - r i t i s i :  p ro p o s a l ,  accepting  C 'C o nor 's  e x te n s io n  of the
area  or th e  n e g o t ia t io n s .  The B r i t i s h  approach to  qu estio ns
concern ing  China seems to  be pervaded by a d e s ire  th a t  the
p r o t e c t io n  of L r i t i s h  commercial in t e r e s t s  th e re  should no t
e n t a i l  f r i c t i o n  w ith  uuropean Powers. T h is  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n
S a l is b u r y 's  e x p la n a t io n  of the d r i t i s l i  reason f o r  hoping f o r
an agree%^nt w ith  n u s s ia . "The two Empires of China and Turkey
are so weak," be s a id , " th a t  i r  a l l  im po rtan t m a tte rs  they
are c o n s ta n t ly  guided by the  advice of F o re ig n  Powers. I n
g iv in g  t h i s  adv ice  England and rvn g s i a are c o n s ta n t ly  opposed,
n e u t r a l i z i n g  each e t h e r 's  e f f o r t s  much - >^ore f r e q u e n t ly  than
the  r e a l  antagonism of t h e i r  in t e r e s t s  world j u s t i f y ;  and
t h i s  c o n d it io n  of th in g s  i s  not l i k e l y  to  d im in is h ,  but to
in c r e a s e .  I t  i s  to  remove or lessen  t h i s  e v i l  th a t  we have
thought th a t  an u n ders tand ing  w ith  Russia might b e n e f i t  both  
1
n a t io n s ."  S a lis b u ry  p o in ted  out th a t  th e re  were p a r t s  of 
C hins, as of T u rkey , in  which Russia was p a r t i c u l a r l y  in t e r e s t e d ,  
o th e r  p a r t s  in  which B r i t a i n  had the  g r e a te s t  i n t e r e s t .  "Would 
i t  be p o s s ib le ,"  he asked, " to  arrange th a t  where, in  regard  
to  these  t e r r i t o r i e s  our counsels d i f f e r ,  the Power le a s t  
in te r e s te d  should g ive  way to  and a s s is t  the  o th er? "  He 
in s is te d  th a t  th e re  should be no in fr in g e m e n t  of e x is t in g  t r e a t y  
r i g h t s  and no i n j u r y  to  th e  i n t e g r i t y  of e i t h e r  China or
1. S a l is b u ry  to  O'Conor, 25 January 1898, Gooch and T em p e rley .
I, a.
mT u rk e y . "A'e aim at no p a r t i t i o n  of t e r r i t o r y ,  but only a 
p a r t i t i o n  of p repon derance ."
I t  i s  n e v e r th e le s s  very  n o t ic e a b le  th a t  the  sub jec t  
which most a c t iv e ly  concerned the  B r i t i s h  was s t i l l  th e  lo a n .
At the same time th a t  O'Conor was in s t r u c te d  t c  sound out 
b i t t a  about the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of England and Russia working  
to g e th e r  in  China, Macdonald was t o l d  to  ''press on" w ith  h i s  
lo an  n e g o t ia t io n s  because r e p o r ts  had been re c e iv e d  th a t  nego­
t i a t i o n s  were ta k in g  p la c e  f o r  e F ranco-R usa ian  lo a n .  The 
d e c is io n  reached on the  same day, to  drop th e  demand f o r  th e  
im m ediate opening of Ta llenw an was c l e a r l y  made i n  o rd er  to  
f a c i l i t a t e  the  success of the  loan n e g o t ia t io n s .  A lthough th e
in s t r u c t io n s  sent th re e  or fo u r  days l a t e r  f o r  the  w ith d ra w a l
2
of the B r i t i s h  th ip s  which had s a i le d  to  Port A r th u r  o b v io u s ly  
re p re s e n te d  an a ttem pt to  c o n c i l i a t e  the Russians, t h i s  may 
w e l l  have been in s p ir e d  as much by & d e s ir e  to  d isarm  Russian
1. S a l is b u r y  to  O'Conor, 25 January 1898, Gooch and T e m p e rley .
I ,  8 .
2 . vihen Macdonald complained th a t  B r i t i s h  p r e s t ig e  i n  China
had been in ju r e d  by th e  r e p o r t  th a t  the  B r i t i s h  m en-of-w ar  
had been withdrawn because of Bussi an r e p r e s e n ta t io n s ,  
S a l is b u ry  m ain ta in ed  th a t  the "s ta tem ent th a t  [ t h e ]
A dm ira l has been d i r e c te d  to  w ithdraw  ships from P o rt  
A rth u r  i s  a pure in v e n t io n " .  R a th er ,  the  A dm ira l had 
m erely  been to ld  th a t  he might move the  ships whenever i t  
was convenient to  do so. I t  i s  c le a r  however th a t  S a l i s ­
bury h im s e lf  considered th a t  t h i s  in s t r u c t io n  c o n s t i tu te d  
an o rd e r  f o r  the  w ith d raw a l of the ships f o r  he te leg ra p h e d  
to  O'Conor: "Or ci e rs  a lre a d y  sent f o r  w ith d ra w a l o f B r i t i s h  
ships from  P o rt  A r th u r ."  S a l is b u ry  to  O'Conor, T e l . 13,
21 January 1898, 8 0 6 5 /1 5 5 7 ;  cp. a ls o  L e t t e r s  of Queen 
V i c t o r i a ,  i l l ,  227.
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o p p o s it io n  to  the  lo an  as by any w ish to  smooth th e  way f o r
n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  an Anglo-Russian u n d e rs ta n d in g . And w h i ls t
O'Conor was p u rsu ing  the  q u es tio n  of an u n ders tand ing  a t  S t .
P e te rs b u rg h , the  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  was engaged in  o b ta in in g  a
f i n a l  s e t t le m e n t  of the arrangem ents f o r  the  lo an  and,
subsequen tly , i n  c o n s id e r in g  what a c t io n  B r i t a i n  should ta k e
i f  the  Chinese re fu sed  the  lo a n .
At a Court B a l l  i n  S t . P e te rs b u rg  on 1 F e b ru a ry  the
Emperor spoke to  O'Conor i n  very  encouraging term s about th e
p o s s i b i l i t y  of an agreement between the two c o u n t r ie s .  The
E m peror's  message was re c e iv e d  in  London ju s t  a f t e r  the
announcement th a t  th e  Chinese had re fu sed  th e  B r i t i s h  lo an
on account of Russian t h r e a t s .  Consequently " i t  w i l l  be
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  us" S a lis b u ry  sa id  " to  p u t on paper an e f fu s iv e
r e c o g n i t io n  of the  Em peror's  k ind ness" . However he t o ld
O'Conor to  thank th e  Emperor v e r b a l ly  f o r  the  g o o d w ill  shown
in  h is  message and, more Im p o rta n t ,  in s t r u c te d  him to  d isc u s s
th e  c o n d it io n s  of the  B r i t i s h  loan  w ith  the  Russians and f in d
1
out the ir  o b je c t io n s .
Thus th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a B r i t i s h  Government lo an  to  
China was once aga in  re v iv e d .  The B r i t i s h  had a p p a re n t ly  
cons id ered  a t f i r s t  th a t  the  Chinese r e f u s a l  of t h e i r  loan  
ended th e  m a tte r .  O'Conor however had t o l d  L am sdorff , the  
R ussian  A s s is ta n t  U nder-S ecre t any f o r  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s ,  th a t
1 . S a lis b u ry  t o  O'Conor, B F ebruary  1898, Gooch and 
T em p erley , I ,  11.
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he thought the B r i t i s h  Government hgd gone to o  f a r  % ith t h e i r
lo an  n e g o t ia t io n s  to  g ive  them ud ana Lam sdorff hsd said
t h a t  the  Russians d id  not o b je c t  so much to  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of
an A ng lo -G hinese lo an  as to  some of th? c o n d it io n s  which bad 
1
been proposed. When i t  was decided thfet n o th in g  couM be
done to  a s s is t  th e  Hong Song and Shanghai Bank in  r a is in g
th e  lo a n ,  B e r t ie  p o in te d  out th a t  then  one of th e  o th e r  Powers
would p ro b a b ly  make th e  loan end th e re b y  a c q u ire  " reasonab le
ground f o r  c la im in g  to  in tro d u c e  in t o  the  Customs S e rv ic e ,
nominees of t h e i r  own. *ve s h a l l  then  f in d  the  c o n t r o l
2
s l ip p in g  out of our hand s."  At h is  sugg estio n , t h e r e f o r e ,
th e  B r i t i s h  took advantage of the  f a c t  th a t  û»Conor had kept
th e  way open f o r  d is c u s s io n  of the  lo a n . The in t r o d u c t io n
of t h i s  q u es tio n  In t o  the  n e g o t ia t io n s  gave a much more
p r a c t i c a l  p o in t  to  the  c o n ve rsa tio n s  w ith  Russia from  the
Governm ent's  o r ,  a t l e a s t ,  from S a l is b u r y 's  p o in t  of v iew .
R u s s ia 's  demands in  r e tu r n  f o r  l e t t i n g  B r i t a i n  make the
lo an  to  China were, Lam sdorff t o ld  O'Conor on 18 F e b ru a ry ,
" v e ry  s im p le , m erely a le as e  f o r ,  say, tw e n ty  ye ars  of
T a llen w an  and P o rt  A r th u r ,  or some o th er  p o r t  in  the  North
which may u l t im a t e ly  be considered more d e s ir a b le  as a te rm in a l
3
r a i lw a y  s t a t i o n . "  T h is  was n o t  on e n t i r e l y  unforeseen ev en t.
1 . O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 24 S e c re t ,  7 F ebruary  1898,
F 0 6 5 /1 5 5 9 .
2 . B e r t ie ,  Memorandum, 3 February  1893, F 0 1 7 /1 3 56 .
3 . O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  19 Fe b ru a ry  1898, Gooch and Tem perley .
I ,  14.
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From th.9 tim e of the announcement th a t  th e  Russian F a r  Eastern
Squadron was going t c  w in te r  at F o r t  A rth u r ,  i t  had been
expected th a t  nu ssi a would ash f o r  s r e n t ,  The c h ie f  concern
of th e  B r i t i a i i  Government, amidst a l l  the exc item ent w^iich
t h i s  p rospect aroused, had been to  ensure th « t  any o o r t  acquired
by Russia would be open on equal term s to  B r i t i s h  t r a d e .  On
27 January de S ta a l ,  the  Russian Ambassador in  London, had t o ld
S a lis b u ry  of a message which he had re ce iv e d  fr^m  M o n ra v ie f f  in
which the  F o re ig n  :4 in is te r  r e fe r r e d  to  the  f a c t  th a t  E n g lis h
statesmen bad p u b l i c l y  acknowledged th a t  i t  was on ly  n a t u r a l
th a t  Russia should d e s ir e  a commercial o u t le t  in  th e  P a c i f i c ,
"Any such p o r t"  the  message continued "would be open to  the
ships of a l l  the  Great ^owers, l i k e  o ther  p o r ts  on the  Chinese
m ain lan d . I t  would be open to  the  commerce of a l l  the world
and England, idiose t ra d e  in t e r e s t s  were so im p o rta n t  in  these
1
r e g io n s ,  would share the  advantage ."  T h is  assurance  
a p p a re n t ly  d id  much to  a l l a y  any uneasiness caused by the  
R ussian  o b je c t io n s  to  th e  B r i t i s h  demand f o r  the  opening of 
T a lle n w a n . C e r t a in ly ,  S a l is b u ry  l a id  g rea t emphasis on i t  in  
th e  debate i n  the  House of Lords on 8 F ebruary  when P a r l ia m e n t  
reassem bled . T ra c in g  the  s to ry  of the  B r i t i s h  demand f o r  the  
opening of T a lle n w a n , he e xp la in e d  th a t  i t  had been withdrawn  
but t h a t  the  Chinese had agreed th a t  i t  should be opened i f  
e v er  a r a i lw a y  was brought down the  L iao tung  P e n in s u la . He
1. S a lis b u ry  to  O'Conor, 2 February  1818, A > à P . .  [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,  
CV, [ C .8 8 1 4 ] ,  52.
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added, however, th a t  th e  p o in t  h e ld  l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  f o r  him
any more " fo r  • • •  we have re c e iv e d  spontaneously from  the
R ussian Government an assurance th a t  any p o r t  which th e y  m i ^ t
o b ta in  Isave  to  employ f o r  the  o u t le t  of t h e i r  co'^merce would
he 8 f r e e  p o r t ,  f r e e  to  the  commerce of th i  a c o u n try .  Now a
f r e e  p o r t " ,  he concluded, " is  much b e t t e r  thmn a ^ r e a t y  P o r t .
So h a v in g  s s c e r ta in s d  th a t  Ts lieriw an was to  be a f r e e  p o r t  i t
In t e r e s t e d  us v ery  l i t t l e  to  know whether i t  was to  be s T r e a ty  
1
p o r t  or n o t . "  A lthough de S ta a l  e x p la in ed  th e  next cay
th a t  he had a c t u a l ly  mrant th a t  "the p o r t  to  0=' used by Russia
A ? p CO u ie r c ia l  o u t le t "  would he a T r e a ty  p o r t  and not a f r  ■ e
p o r t ,  S a lis b u ry  s t i l l  seemed f a i r l y  s a t i s f i e d .  /  T r e a ty  p o r t ,
he s a id ,  was "not much i n f e r i o r  in  va lue  to  r. f r e e  p o r t "  and
moreover i t  v/rs p r e fe r a b le  from the  R r i t i s h  p o in t  of v iew
th a t  th e  p o r t  sh'O Jlc thus  he brought mi t h i n  th e  framework of 
2
th e  T r e a t i e s .  l%hen Lamsdorff announced th a t  Russia wanted
P o r t  A rth u r  as w e l l  as Tel.ienwan, O'Conor p ro te s te d  t h a t  "the
possession  of such a m i l i t a r y  p o s i t io n  . . .  wo Id  r a d i c a l l y
3
a l t e r  the  c o n d it io n  of th in g s "  and ha to ld  S a lis b u ry  th a t  th e
Russians c le a r l y  wanted Port A rth u r  as a n a v a l dockyard f o r
4
t h e i r  e x c lu s iv e  use. S a l is b u ry  however took  no apparent n o t ic e
1. R e n s a rû 's  P a r l ia m e n ta ry  D eb a te s , 4 th  C eriss , L l I I ,
(1 3 9 7 -9 8 ) ,  4 0 :4 1 .
2 . S a l is b u ry  t o  O'Conor, 9 Fe b ru a ry  1898, A. & P . .  [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,
CV [ C .8 8 1 4 ] ,  9 y -S 7 •
3 .  O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  19 February  1898, Gooch end Tem p erley .
I ,  14.
4 .  O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l ,3 c  S e c re t ,  27 February  1898,
F 0 6 3 /1 5 5 9 . P a r t  of t h i s  te legram  is  p r in te d  in  Gooch and 
T e m p e r le y , I ,  15.
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of t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  and simply in s is te d  aga in  th a t  R ussia ,
i f  she ac q u ired  these p la c e s ,  must t r e a t  them as commercial
p o r t s .  He t o l d  O’ Conor to  f in d  out i f  the  Russians were f u l l y
awara th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  would " s t ic k  f a s t "  to  the  p r o v is io n s  of
1
th e  T r e a ty  of T ie n t s in  sc f a r  as T a lle n w a n  and P o r t  Arthur/weve
CcpnccmtJl.
And f i v e  days l a t e r  he s ta ted  w ith  emphasis th a t  th e  B r i t i s h
would have no o b je c t io n  to  a Russian lea se  of those p o r ts  -
2
" fo r  p u re ly  commercial pu rp oses ."
The p r o je c te d  understanding between th e  two c o u n tr ie s  
thus  became a v e ry  p r a c t i c a l  p r o p o s it io n :  Russian o b je c t io n s
to  a B r i t i s h  loan to  China were to  be waived i n  r e tu r n  f o r  
B r i t i s h  assent to  a Russian lease  of T a lle n w a n  and P o rt  A r th u r .  
Other developments a t the same tim e however led  S a l is b u ry  to  
doubt in c r e a s in g ly  whether B r i t a i n  had a n y th in g  to  g a in  by 
such an agreement. From th e  B r l t is la  Government’ s p o in t  o f  
v iew  th e  a t t r a c t i o n  of making the lo a n  la y  not i n  the  t r a n s ­
a c t io n  I t s e l f ,  from  which they were r a t h e r  a v ers e , but in  the  
c o n d it io n s  a ttac h ed  to  i t .  A f t e r  th e  B r i t i s h  ra is e d  th e  
q u e s t io n  of the  loan  i n  t h e i r  c o n v e rs a t io n s  w ith  th e  R ussians,  
the  C h inese , to  compensate f o r  t h e i r  r e f u s a l  of the  lo an  
o f fe r e d  by th e  B r i t i s h  Government, conceded a number of the
demands mhloh the  B r i t i s h  had o r i g i n a l l y  made as a c o n d it io n  
3
of th e  lo a n . The two most im p o rta n t  p o in ts  which these  Chinese
1. S a lis b u ry  to  O'Conor, T e l . 52 S e c re t ,  20 F e b ru a ry  1898,
F 06 5 /1 5 5 7 .
2. S a l is b u ry  to  O’ Conor, T e l . 56, 25 February  1893, F 0 6 5 /1 5 5 7 .
3 . Vide supra p.
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concessions d id  n o t cover were the  opening of Nanning and 
th e  e x te n s io n  of a B r i t i s h  r a i lw a y  from  Burma in t o  the  Yangtze  
V a l l e y .  The French were opposed to  both these demands and 
Lam edorff had made i t  c le a r  th a t  on t h i s  account Russia would 
be u n ab le  to  he lp  the  B r i t i s h  i n  p re s s in g  th e  Chinese t o  g ra n t  
th ese  re q u e s ts .  C onsequently , as S a l is b u ry  p o in te d  o u t,
"any acquiescence i n  the  occupation  of P o rt A rth u r  and 
T a lie n w a n  would be almost g r a t u i t o u s ."  I n  f a c t ,  " i f  we accepted  
th e  b a rg a in  h in te d  a t by Russia we should r e a l l y  ga in  n o th in g
except l i b e r t y  to  advance £16 m. I s  th a t  i n  i t s e l f  of any
2
g re a t  va lue?"
T h is  was the question  which S a l is b u ry  put to  O'Conor
and t o  Macdonald end which he in ten d ed  to  b r in g  b e fo re  th e
3
C ab in e t when i t  met on 23 F e b ru a ry . He h im s e lf  was c l e a r l y
s c e p t ic a l  of the  va lue  of the b a rg a in .  O'Conor on the  o th e r
hand thought th a t  i t  was w e l l  worth # i i l e  f o r  the  B r i t i s h  to
consent to  the Russian a c q u is i t io n  of P o rt  A rth u r  and T a lle n w a n
i f  t h i s  would enable  Russia and G reat B r i t a i n  to  come to  a
g e n e ra l  u n d e rs ta n d in g , p a r t i c u l a r l y  s ince t h e i r  r e f u s a l  was
u n l i k e l y  to  d e te r  th e  Russians and y e t  c e r t a in  to  c re a te  much
4
sore f e e l i n g  between the  two c o u n t r ie s .  From the  beg inn ing
1. O'Conor to  S a l i s b u r y , T e l . 31 S e c re t ,  18 F e b ru a ry  1898,
F 0 6 5 /1 5 5 9 .
2 . S a l is b u ry  to  O'Conor, T e l . 52 S e c re t ,  20 Fe b ru ary  1898,
P 06 5 /1 5 5 7 .
3 . I b i d .
4 .  O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 33 S e c re t ,  22 F e b ru a ry  1898,
F 0 8 5 /1 5 5 9 . P a r t  of t h i s  te le g ram  i s  p u b lish ed  in  Gooch 
and Tem p erley . I ,  15 .
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i t  wss from  O'Conor th a t  much of the impetus f o r  s g e n e ra l
under SI snding had come* I t  was he who f i r s t  suggested th a t
th e  p ro p o s a l should in c lu d e  the  Fear as w e l l  as th e  F a r  East
and he commented now th a t  he had always regarded the  loan as
"merely an in c id e n t  in  our n e g o t ia t io n s " .  T h is  remark shows
th e  c o n tra s t  between O'Conor*s end S a l is b u r y 's  approach to  the
proposed agreement f o r  i t  I s  s t r i k in g  to  observe how c lo s e ly
th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  an unders tand ing  had become a l l i e d  in
S a l is b u r y 's  mind w ith  the  question  of the  lo a n . Indeed th e
Hong r ong and Shanghai B ank's  conc lu s ion  of an agreement to
p ro v id e  the  lo an  removed the  one rem ain ing  a t t r a c t i o n  of
th e  b a rg a in  in  h is  eyes and confirm ed him in  th e  c o n v ic t io n
th a t  B r i t a i n  had n o th in g  to  g a in  from an agreement w ith
R uss ia . There i s  no a v a i la b le  record of the  C a b in e t 's  d e c is io n
in  t h i s  m a tte r  but i t  i s  apparent from  whet fo l lo w e d  t h a t
S a l is b u r y 's  v iew  p r e v a i le d .  On 25 F eb ru ary  he e x p la in ed  to
O'Conor th a t  the  B r i t i s h  Government d id  not o b je c t  to  a
R ussian lea se  of Ta lienw an and p o rt  A rth u r  but th a t  she could
not " fo r m a l ly  assent to  i t  un less  Russia o f f e r s  something in  
r e t u r n .  But she has n o th in g  to  o f f e r  us because France  
p re v e n ts  h e r  f r o ^  supp orting  Hanning on t h e  Burmese 
r a i lw a y  and the loan and o th e r  th in g s  have been done 
w ith o u t h e r  h e lp .  I t  seems an iv r e s s e . " 2
T h is  seems t o  be the  p o in t  at  which the  B r i t i s h  lo s t
i n t e r e s t  i n  the  n e g o t ia t io n s ,  a lthough th ey  were hot f o r m a l ly
1 . O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  T a l .S o  S e c re t ,  22 T e b ru s ry  1898,
F 0 6 5 /1 5 5 9 .  P a r t  of t h i s  te le g ra m  i s  pu b lish ed  i n  
Gooch and Tem p erley , I ,  16.
2 . S a lisb u ry  to  O'Conor, T e l . 66, 25 F eb ru ary  1898, F 0 6 5 /1 5 5 7 .
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abandoned. S a l is b u ry  indeed had never been v e ry  h o p e fu l .
On 11 F e b ru a ry  -  th e  same day on which H ic k s  Beach p ro te s te d
t h a t  i t  was im p o s s ib le , in  good f a i t h ,  to  e n t e r t a i n  Cameron's
p ro p o s a ls  w h ile  n e g o t ia t in g  w ith  uhe Russians -  he had said
in  f\ te le g ra m  in fo rm in g  Macdonald of the  n e g o t ia t io n s :  "We
have had some in te rc h a n g e  of f r i e n d l y  language at S t .
P e te rs b u rg  but th e y  are in s in c e re  and t h e i r  language i s  
1
am biguous." And y e t i t  was a p p a re n t ly  S a l is b u ry  who took
the  i n i t i a l  step in  the o v e r tu re .  When M acdonald 's  te le g ra m
u rg in g  that- B r i t a i n  and Hussis should come to  an agreement
to  work to g e th e r  in  China was re c e iv e d  at the  F o re ig n  O f f i c e ,
B e r t i e ' s  comment was: " Im poss ib le  I  f e a r .  Russia i s  too
2
c lo s e ly  bound to  F ra n c e ."  But i t  was on the same a f te rn o o n  
t h a t  S a l is b u ry  in s t r u c te d  O'Conor t o  approach W i t t e .  I t  may 
however be r e le v a n t  to  p o in t  out th a t  t h i s  was but one of 
s e v e ra l  in s t r u c t io n s  touch ing  a f f a i r s  in  China sent on the  
same d a y . I t  i s  a ls o  im p o rta n t  to  remember th a t  S a l is b u r y 's  
o r i g i n a l  in s t r u c t io n  was to  approach W it te  " i f  p r a c t ic a b le "  
and to  d iscu ss  w ith  him the p o s s i b i l i t y  of A nglo-R ussian  
c o -o p e r a t io n  in  C hina. O'Conor en la rged  S a l is b u r y 's  p ro p o s a l .  
He a ls o  broached i t  to  M o u ra v ie ff  as w e l l  as to  w it  t e . O'Conor 
would not however seem to  have been alone in  h i s  enthusiasm
1. S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, 11 F e b ru a ry , Gooch and Tem perley .
1 , 1 1 .
2 . Macdonald to  B e r t i e ,  Te legram , P r iv a t e ,  16 January 1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 . M inute by B e r t ie .
*  4/
f  or e g e n e ra l im d e rs ts rd in g  v i t h  Russia* P ro fe s s o r  Lsnger
has s'ugs;,estec th a t  i t  was B a l fo u r ,  Cham berlain and ^ ic k s
1
Beach Wbo were anxious f o r  such an snrsament. There i s  
l i t t l e  s c 'e c if ic  evidence on t h i s  t a i n t .  But th e re  are
in c L ic s t i jn s  th a t  in  the  case o f ' 'H ick s  Beach at le a s t  th .is
vTss 30Î h is  own re fe r e n c e ,  in  con n ectio n  w ith  p ro p o sa ls  f o r
^  ^ tke 2
th e  lo s n ,  to  fee n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  Russia and h is  b io g r a p h e r 's
statem ent th a t  he wished f o r  a c o r d ia l  un ders tand ing  between
3
Snglanc and Russia both bear out the c o n te n t io n .  I t  re c e iv e s
g e n e ra l  c o n f irm a t io n  moreover from M acdonald 's re fe re n c e  to
8 l e t t e r  from  B e r t ie  w r i t t e n  on 7 Januery in  which th e  l a t t e r
had mentioned t h a t  th e re  was "an i n c l i n a t i o n  among some of
4
th e  Powers th a t  be to  run With Russia . . . "
On b a lan ce , however. P ro fe s s o r  L a n g e r*s d e s c r ip t io n  of
5
t h i s  o v e r tu re  as " h a l f -h e a r te d "  seems j u s t i f i e d .  I n  any
event the  id e a  of a g e n e ra l un ders tand ing  between England and
Russia  was soon lo s t  i n  the ra p id  pace of o th e r  developm ents.
The f i n a l  agreement f o r  the Anglo-German Syndicate's lo an  to
6
China was signed on 1 March. On 5 March the  agreement between
1. ?/.L. Langer, o p .c i t . , I I ,  467 .
2 . V id e  supra , p .
3 . Lady V i c t o r i a  H ic k s  Peach, L i f e  of S i r  M ich ae l H ic ks Beach,
[ 1 9 3 2 ] ,  I I ,  59.
4 .  Macdonald to  L e r t l e ,  P r iv a t e ,  28 February 1893, F 0 1 7 /1 3 33 .
5 . W.L. Langer, o p .c i t . , 470.
6 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  1 March 1893, Gooch and Tem perley .
I ,  15.
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1
.rer^’sn:.: and Lnina re g a ra ln g  Liaochs": **as f i n a l l y  o -n c lu o ed .
Anc on c .ugrcn the Russians cemsndeo. f r o n  'h e  Chinese a
lea s e  cf F o rt  A rtn u r  and of ia l ie n & e n  and the r i g h t  to
c o n s tru c t  a r a i lw a y  f r o u  Fetuns on the T r e n s -S ib e r is n  l i n e
2
^n -iar..cnuria t  c- Port A rth u r . The Chinese conceded these
3
re q u e s ts  cn 24 la r c h .
"hisn dacdonslo re p o rte d  cn 25 Fehnoarn th a t  the  Chinese
would ce glad to  o f f e r  B r i t a i n  a lease  of " e i -h a i  T e i ,  the
re p ly  had beer, t h a t  "the p resen t p o l ic y  of F . . . 1 .  . . 2 . . .  i s  
to  d iscourage a l i e n a t i o n  of Chinese t e r r i t o r y .  I t  i s  
th e r e fo r e  prem ature to  d iscuss  the  Is a -e  of " 'e i -h a i  
?ei un less  the  a c t io n .o f  o ther Powers m a t e r ia l l y  
a l t e r s  the p o s i t i o n . ” I t  was e x a c t ly  a month l a t e r
t h a t  . see onaId was t o ld  t h a t  the  "S urrend er by Yemen of 
P o rt  A rth u r  t o  Russia m a t e r ia l l y  a l t e r s  balance o f  
power in  G u lf  c f  P s c h i l i .  I t  i s  th e r e fo r e  necessary  
tc  o b ta in  in  tns  manner you th in k  most e f f ic a c io u s  and 
speedy the  r e f u s a l  of Y e i -h a i  'fe i when Japanese have  
l e f t  i t . . . . "5 The tu rn in g  p o in t  between these  two
pronouncem ent3 was th e  p r e s e n ta t io n  of the  Russian demands
on 6 uiarch.
• On the day on wiiich th e  news of the  nussian demands 
was re c e iv e d  i n  London, B a l fo u r  te le g ra p h e d  to  Macdonald:
1. Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  8 March 1898, A.& P . ,  [ l 8 9 S ] ,
CV, LG.8 8 1 4 ] ,  104.
2. The 11.1:3 c, 7 March 1:2 38, p .7 .^
3 . -«acQonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  24 March, A«& P * . [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,  CV,
[ 0 .2 3 1 4 ] ,  l i e .
4 .  S a l is b u ry  to  &9cdonalc , 25 Feb ru ary  1938, Gooch and
Tem perley , I ,  IS .
5 . S a lis b u ry  to  wacdonald, 25 March 1898, i b i d . . 25.
;=s
Eussiens are to hev® leas-s : f  ?rro:
Art bur aaz. u« lienvsn or. obe sar? ter#s es :.b e ler e^n 
ieaz '*  o f riEOcbEU, tbe In f lu e n c e  : f  those Fevers  
over phe Governgent cf Fsklnu irill to sc increesed 
t o  t h e  f e t r f ^ e r t  o" t f s o  o f  E o r  Ee J 9 s t  y ’ s 3 e T  = rn T & e : : t ,  
tnet it SOS35 desirable for us to reke so-e coomter- 
' ' t O T e . . . * , -  T h i s  i r ^ o d i s t e  r e a c t i o n  of tbs  B r i t l s f e
the re v  s of tb  ? Yu s si sn no t ion  b : sr - wltns s = to  tbs strong  
i  '/oo.t. mt:L oh i t  rede .00 on them. Th? sen se of trrgency lA i eh 
one Br: : i  en e v id e n t l y  f e l t  «* f i r s t  ves no d c-ubt 1 te to th e  
r e p o r t  on at tbe  Rois siens nef i n s i s t  ni ur on the Chi ne 5 9  r e p l y ­
ing wi t i - 1 r. f i v e  _ey s sni n -c  :h r * & t = n e :  ? n i  l i t e r  y rc-r » i n t o
isnoburio i ‘" : '.te In  in  9 ss f i d  not corn- I'o v i  of. th e  ?n: s s l  sn 
■2
r e :  US st s. -lb en it oeotoe ev ident  th e :  th e  Eussô&ns we re
not proc^nclng quite so h « st i i y eft er ell, the British were 
eels t : o::.n;;i:er a: 5 gore leisurely reoe -axsotlp wbst their 
policy shc’oli he. .nos they 10 sd dec:' fed -h et action they 
she •■'If tele, the British intention we .5 to Et: pro sen the Russians 
end i'ofCT" tns • cf the c::diti n 3 npcn which Britain wctlf 
ec :p:ie see in the yrenting of the Bus si an densad s.
• : f isn B a l f o u r  t  e l e g r s o h e :  to . i a c d  one I d  c r  t  P e r c h ,  h e  
eus,Jested th a t  tn^ best : 1st. : c.r f r i t  a i t  ^fpht be t c  i n s i s t
1. “a if our t'v f eC'dct 5,Id, fsl,. d-5- 0 ecret, 7 March 13 FS, F017/153S.
T i l l s  t e l e n r e n  i  3 p r i n n o f  i n  A. B P u , [ I S  ?'9 ^,  C T ,  [ C . S S 1 4 ; ,  
1 0 4 , hut the  p r in te d  Ters.i cn ssys "*the in f lu e n c e  of  
R us s ia *  in s te a d  of "the in f lu e n c e  of these powers* .
Salisbury nras ill at this ’lire sad Ircm 7 March, if aot
e a r l i e r , " h a l f our tncl h i s  p i ece  at the F o re ig n  o f f i c e .
5* 11 en try  did net nowever leave Snnlend f o r  0 rsnce before 
2B M.erch.,
2. calf c u r  to l'Oonor, B March 1313, A . &  ? . ,  L IB3'@ j,  CV,
[C»c.^ 14 j, , X04- i. ÛC.
n re? s.t k ü . f the le? s» of Tei-baii lei when the F at sne se 
1
. ef t , "t. e rr i tl mt ver# c tiu? i r?ef i r. t h si? : ^ si t = t : heu»
5 : me n t l :  OT#r “e i - h a i  ""si : er? = n'T h sd
i  : b ? p la c e .  ci.zht : : cet tnene f i r s t . vas
i'
c e r t i  e  s c o . - m m # 3 i ' i t  t y  t h e  m l é i l #  M & m n  i t  * % #  é v i d e n t
t h a t  t h e  B : r i t l  s h  w e r e  d e t  # r w i r e d  a t  1 = 5  s t  t h a t  n o  c t h e r  F e w e r ,  
w ith  the  p a s s ib le  ex: et t i e n  t f  1st sn, h t t t l :  hsT? t e t - h & l
l ï ç l -  T h e y  w e r e  r e t  h : - e T  =  r  e  ' % i  '  ' s  t  :  i n c u r  t  n e  e . s z  e m s e
ü f  s c t n n l l y  - o c r ’ r t r y l n n  l e i - h s i  « n t  - r e f e r r e d  t h e  i d e s
3 . f  n t t  5 1  ni : ' . i  f  r  l e d g e  î  r  o - w  t h e  3 h  i  r .  e  s e  ,  e u  c h  s  s  h  = i  b e e n  
z i  T  e  n  i i  t h e  :  s  s e  -  i  T h u s . s n  t h . m  t  l ' e . - h ç i .  “* ' « i  ? c -  l i  n  e t
3
a  » c  e h  t  :■ ç r y  r t h e r  "  o w e  r  ,
î ' i t  w h e n  " a û l  s b n j r p  s s i i  u n  1 2  « i s . r o h  t h e t  '  v #  h f v e  r n
4
w i  : s m  i  e r  s ç e c i s l  r i g h t s  ? t  T e l - h a  i  ^ ' ' # i  n n r  s e l T s s *  h #  w s h e  
h i  5 s t s t e  n r c r t  n  e - . e n à  e n t  r t  e n  - r i  t  n i  n  r e r  e i  v i n  n  s s i i  s f  a r t  c r y  
ïï s  s U v T T s  n  ■: e  s-  t . h ? h  c n n s s i s  ? n n i i  n e t  i n f r i n g e  T r e a t y  r i  g h t  s. 
h e  f t s a n  s m e n t ' s i  c n - m e r ®  n f  t h e  - r i t  i  e t  s  t  :  e n e ’ i E r e  t h a t  
ï r e s t y  r i g h t s  v n n l n  ' s  o b s e r v e d  . n  s  1 . 1  t h e  p i s t e  e  ' s f f e c t e d  h y  
t h e  g T s r t i n n  n i  t h e  B u s e i s n  c  e r s  a h  e  s. n e  t h .  s  t  h e t h  T s l i m n w a n  
#nii F o r t  i r t h n r  scnln  h» open t n  f  o r e ig n  t r s h e .  f h e  pnesd -  
h l l i t y  o n '  o s t m t e n . s . n :  i n g  s n y  o t h e r  E r r s n n e w e n t  i  n t h i  s  r e $ ç - ? e t  
# % s  n u i ,  g i u ï ï i î - t e l  i n  a n y  o h  t h e  s l i - e m s t i v e  l i n e e  t f  p - o l i c y
y . s l . f  t n r  t c  M m c d t n s l i ,  ?  M s r o h  1 3 - S ,  A > 1  F . ,  . . 1 3 9 3 ? ,  € T ,
s j*  ^ - * j '-' f
2 ,  i s g a r o n  t o  i e n t i e ,  1 1  i s r : !  1 5  1 ,  ^ : 1 ~  l : f " ,  h ?
B e r t  i s ,
Ô .  u s . i s h M r y  :  :  : a i  i S ,  i ^  ü n n t n  I B  i l .  ? T 1 T / 1 & 2 3 .
n
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which th e  B r i t i s h  considered adop ting . Yet th e re  was amole
reason to  doubt whether i t  was in  accord ciith th e  r e a l
in t e n t io n s  of the Russians to  g ive  such assurances as the
P r i t l s b  d e s ir e d .
The qu es tio n  hsd a lre a d y  a r is e n  in  January as a r e s u l t
o f th e  B r i t i s h  request f o r  the openin^ of “ a lienw sn and de
S te a l  had assured S a lisb ury  th a t  any o o r t  acqu ired  by Russia
1
would be open to  fo r e ig n  t r a d e .  T h is  however was b e fo re
th e  Russians in d ic a te d  th a t  they  wanted P o rt  A rth u r  as w e l l
a 3 T a lien w an  and since then th e re  had been no r e p e t i t i o n  of
t h i s  assurance w ith  s p e c i f ic  re fe re n c e  to  P o rt A r th u r .
O'Conor f e l t  th a t  th e  Russians ob v ious ly  wanted P o rt A rth u r
2
as a n a v a l base f o r  t h e i r  own use. And M o u r a v ie f f ,  speaking
tc  O'Conor on 9 March about the Russian demands f o r  Port
A rth u r  and v^xienwan, sa id  th a t  T a lien w an  would be open to  
3
f o r e ig n  t r a d e .  The F o re ig n  O f f ic e  n o tic ed  th e  e v id e n t
d i s t i n c t i o n  between T a lienw an  and P o rt A rth u r  end t o ld  O'Conor
to  seel- assurance th a t  the  s t ip u la t io n s  of th e  T r e a t ie s
4
would p r e v a i l  in  both p la c e s .  O'Conor took up the  qj e s t io n  
w ith  M o u ra v ie f f  who cla im ed th a t  he had never g iven  any
1. Vide sur-rs, p
2 . O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 33 S e c re t ,  22 February  1898,
F 0 6 5 /1 5 5 9 .
3 . O'Conor to  S a l is b u ry ,  9 tt.erch 1893, A.& P #, [ 1 3 9 8 ] ,  CV,
[ 0 . 8 8 1 4 ] ,  105.
4 .  I b i d . , 105, S a lis b u ry  to  O'Conor, 11 larch 1698.
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assurance t h a t  P o rt  A rth u r  would he open to  t r a c e .  T h is  was
l i t e r a l l y  t r u e .  He was however v e ry  d is c o rc e r te o  upon
r e a l i z i n g  th a t  de S te a l  had said th a t  any p o r t  accp Ira d  by
Rusal a v/ould be open to  fo r e ig n  t r a d e .  R eccveriny  h i n s e l f ,
he said th a t  th e  Emperor* 3 o rders  were th a t  T a lie n w a n  should
be open, to  t ra d e  cut th a t  P o rt  A r t h w  should be a s t r i c t l y
m i l i t a r y  p o r t ,  and th e r e fo re  M o u ra v ie f f  could not g iv e  the
assurance which he re q u ire d  w ith o u t c o n s u lt in g  th e  Emperor 
1
a g a in .  Three days l a t e r  he t o ld  O'Conor th a t  he might
in fo rm  the B r i t i s h  Government th a t  f o r e ig n  t r a c e  would have
" f r e e  access” to  P o r t  A rth ur and T a l ie n w a n , i f  acqu ired  by
2
R ussia  " s i m i la r ly  to  o th e r  p o r ts  in  th e  Chinese E m p ire .”
On 19 March B a lfo u r  to ld  Macdonald t h a t  " I t  seems 
probab le  t h a t  vm may have to  choose between two p o l i c i e s ,  
th e  one a llow ing, Russia to  le a s e  P o rt A r th u r  sub jec t  
to  engagements to  p reserve  e x is t in g  t r e a t y  r i g h t s  end 
p o s s ib ly  though t h i s  is  d o u b t fu l  to  r e f r a i n  from  f o r t i ­
f y in g  Port A rth ur -  we ta k in g  ss a makeweight a lea se  
of W e i-h a i Wei.
"The o th e r  r e q u i r in g  the Russians t c  a b s ta in  from  
le a s in g  Port A r th u r ,  we engaging to  ta k e  no p o r t  i n  3
th e  G u lf  of P e c h i l i  and not to  in te rv e n e  in M a n c h u r ia . . . "
4
The C ab inet had met on 18 March and B a l f o u r 's  o u t l in e  of the  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  fa c in g  B r i t a i n  would appear to  be a statem ent of 
the  d i f f e r e n t  op in ions  sdvsncec a t th a t  m eeting . The f i r s t
1. O'Conor to  S a l is b u ry ,  13 March 1898, (R .18  M arch ), Gooch
and T e m p erley . I ,  19.
2 .  O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  16 March 1899, A.& P . ,  [ l 3 9 S ] ,  GV,
[ C .8 8 1 4 ] ,  10 3 -1 0 9 .
3 .  B a l fo u r  to  Macdonald, 19 March 1898, Gooch and T em p erley .
I ,  2 1 -2 2 .
4 .  The Tim es, 19 March 1898, p . 11.
p ro p o s a l sums up the  conclus ions reached in  the course of
F o re ig n  O f f ic e  c o n s id e ra t io n  of vhat B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  should be.
The second suggestion on the o th e r  hand hears l i t t l e  r e l a t i o n
to  th e  th in k in g  of the F o re ig n  O f f ic e  on the s u b je c t .
Korxaldshay says th a t  many members of the  Government were
opposed, to  C urzon 's  c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  the best p o l ic y  was to
1
occupy W e i-h a i Wei and i t  i s  p robab le  th a t  the  second
a l t e r n a t i v e ,  i n  which Y e i -h a i  Wei had no p la c e ,  o r ig in a te d  in
th e  C a b in e t .  There  was another C ab inet mooting on 22 March
a p p a re n t ly  f o r  th e  purpose of d e c id in g  what l in e  B r i t a i n  
2
should ta k e .  The d e c is io n  reached i  s an i n t e r e s t i n g
com bin ation  of the  two a l t e r n a t iv e  propounded by B a l fo u r .
O'Conor was told, to  in fo rm  M o u ra v ie ff  t h a t  the  B r i t i s h
Government was g lad to  ta k e  note of R ussian assurances th a t
th e y  had no in t e n t io n  of in f r i n g i n g  t r e a t y  r ig h t s  and to  t e l l
him th a t  B r i t a i n  d id  not o b je c t  t o  Russia  h a v in g  an i c e - f r e e
commercial p o r t  nor to  a r a i lw a y  connecting  th a t  p o r t  w ith
th e  T r a n s -S ib e r ia n  l i n e .  On the o th er  hand, the  message
c o n tin u e d , "The c o n t r o l  by Russia of a m i l i t a r y  p o r t  in  the  
immediate neighbourhood of Pek in  opens q u es tio n s  of an 
e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r .  The occupation  of P o rt  
A rth u r  which i s  use less  f o r  co 'm ercia l  purposes and 
whose vhole Im portance i s  d e r iv e d  s o le ly  from i t s  m i l i t ­
a ry  s tren g th  and s t r a te g ic  p o s i t io n ,  ?.ould In e v i t a b l y  
be considered in  the East as a s tand ing  menace t o  Peking  
and a commencement of the  P a r t i t i o n  of C h in a .” 3
1 . Ronaldshsy, The L i f e  of Lord Cur2on, [1 9 2 8 ] ,  I ,  285.
2 . L e t t e r s  of Queen V i c t o r i a , i i i ,  2 3 7 -8 .
3 .  S a l is b u ry  to  O'Conor, 22 March 1898, Gooch and T em p e rle y .
I ,  23.
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The B r i t i s h  Government had grsvg o b je a t i  ans te  th e  e c l l e y  
: "elicit ir. such act lie »r.h wo •'•Id r remise not- to occtt any 
p o rt  II.. the t'uli of P e c h i l i  them selves ae iono as other 
r -w e rs  r e f r s ic e d  f r c ^  c o i r r  so. f t  the  ss^e t im e  Ysodrm s#
WPS in s t r u c te d  t o  t« X l  the  Chinese th a t  the  B r i t i s h  hove^nment
th c u z h t  th a t  the  best course would be no-t to  le a s e  P ort A rthur
t o  n.\i="sîa and th a t  they wo " là  net t o  occ^toy ^ ^ i - h a l
i f  t h i s  cours? was fo l lo w e d ,  “ e wss a lso  t o ld  however
to  In f  or"' the  t  g un ""11 Ys-en th a t  the B r i t i s h  Government would
i n  r e tu r n  in s i  st up on s oledge th a t  ' . e i - h a i  Yet would not be
2
" a l ie n a te d  or ceded to- any e th e r  European power. "
Thus on the one band the B r i t i s h  kept the  way open f o r  
th e  occupation  of E e i-h & l Eel «houId  th a t  prove necessary  
w h i ls t  on the  e th e r  hand they  expressed t h e i r  o b je c t io n s  to  
th e  Bus s i an occupation  of ^ r r t  A rthur which would make i t  
n e c e ss ary . I t  i s  n o t ic e a b le  th a t  the  B r i t i s h  d id  no t p r o te s t  
d i r e c t l y  a g a in s t  th e  le a se  c f  P o rt  A rthur to  Russia and in  t h i s  
th ey  f o l lo w  c c lo s e ly  s minute which B a lis b u ry  had w r i t t e n  
t h a t  day saying th a t  "The only th in g  tc  be done i s  to  o b je c t  
to  the  m i l i t a r y  o c o u c a t ic r  of P o rt  A rth u r  in  language
3
s u f f i c i e n t l y  measured to  a l lo w  Russia to  f in d  a way o u t” .
1 . Gooch and T em p erle y , I ,  25.
2 .  B a l fo u r  to  Macdonald, T e l . 99 , 22 March 1898, P 01 7 /1 3 3 8 .
c p • a lso  L e t te r s  of pueen V i c t o r i a , i i - *  uo3.
3 . .J n u te  by S a l is b u ry ,  22 March 1328, Gooch an Tem perley ,
I ,  2 2 -2 3 .  T h is  minute i s  from  the Sanderson MSS.
B a l fo u r  hsd said of the  second a l t e r n a t i v e  th a t  i t  could
"o n ly  be c a r r ie d  through at the r i s k  of g e n e ra l war . . . "
S a l is b u r y 's  d e te rm in a t io n  to  avoid t h i s  r i s k  i s  e v id e n t .  The
reason f o r  I t  was made c le a r  a few  days l a t e r  when the  Russians,
paying no a t t e n t io n  to  the B r i t i s h  r e p r e s e n ta t io n ,  ob ta ined
the  consent of th e  Chinese t o  a l l  t h e i r  demands. Lady
Gwendolen C e c i l  has described  how some of S a l is b u r y 's
c o lle a g u e s  came to  see him a t  h is  house in  A r l in g to n  S t r e e t ,
on th e  morning a f t e r  t h i s  news had been re c e iv e d  in  London,
" in  a s ta te  of in d ig n a t io n  almost as g re a t  as th a t  Mthich
a g i ta te d  the  o u ts id e  p u b l ic  and anxious to  urge a s trong
2
course of a c t io n  on t h e i r  c h i e f . "  S a l is b u ry  was unab le  to
r e c e iv e  any v i s i t o r s  but h is  daughter took up to  him the
message which h is  co lle ag u e s  wished to  send to  th e  Russians.
S a l is b u r y 's  comment was t h a t  the  message would p ro b a b ly  mean
war and he e x p la in ed  th a t  " In  s ix  months' t im e  we s h a l l  be
on th e  verge of war w ith  F rance; I  c a n ' t  a f fo rd  to  q u a r r e l
3
w ith  Russia now".
I t  was on 24 March th a t  Macdonald re p o rte d  t h a t  the  
Russian Government had In form ed th e  Chinese th a t  P o rt  A rth u r  
and T a lie n w a n  could not be t r e a t e d  as separate q u es tio n s  and 
t h a t  Russia  would ta k e  " h o s t i l e  measures" i f  she was not g ran ted
1. Gooch and Temperley. I, 22, Balfour to Macdonald,
19 March 1898.
2 . Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Biographical Studies of Robert
Third Marqui s of S a l isbury, L1 9 4 8 5 8 .
3 . Ibid.
a iaass cf both plsse# cj a? march. Jbixese loTerngtxs
are trarafor#,* tha lsuE.gli Ym#@n told Mecic&slz.Tizrcea,
s.aius: îagir %: giv# w a y .*"  The h&y the C abinet
S9« tc c:zsiaer^*cat Britsi u should dc in light cf this nsv
s^ snts. -25 result *as the Instruction tc Mac-
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tenait to sSi for the lease cf Bsi-h&l Tsi.
V;^ rEcn, scccrding tc nc-n.slcshay, %ss slrcst entirely 
responsible for the conversion o: e reluctant CoTsmment to 
the idea of tamlcg w@i-hai Wei. it first "alfour, Chamberlain,
'j'CsCi.en, tne U^ifoe cf n e v c n a n lre , n ic k s  le a c h , and iansccvne
Tffore @11 cpccsed to I t .  Then Curtcn won Balfour's snpoort
4
sno was invited to port his csss before the Cabinet. nmfortu- 
nctely there is little other direct evidence :-n this orint 
i«ith Wnich one can c cvp are nonsldshay's account. It i? t o  
0-e not iced n<'0#e ver tnat ss esriy ss ? March Balfour augza st sd 
that the best plan vould be to ash for the refusal of the 
lease of i'ei-hsi ^ei. I f  his ad on 11 : n of this ides was the 
result cf Currents nerstaslcn, it Is the o^re interesting 
to observe hew little  trace there Is in the Foreign Office 
documents cf any préviens cçp celt ion to the idea on Balf oacr ? s 
part. Indeed a reading o f  these documents alone gives the 
impression that h f the middle of &#rch those at the Foreign
fFlsLOdwTMauLafc h59' i ’.aJLi'vl*uj^ T6 0-%
1. A. * p . „S-
2. letters cf Queen Victoria, iii, tg;
3. Gcoch and femperlej, Z, if.
4 .  Ronald shay, Ih s  L i f e  of Lord Gursc- n , I ,  25 3 -2 9 5 .
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r - n r l r t i r e  wi s  ?-:% =: r j  l i e  l ^ l t z  i s c e a s t - ^ s T t l e t t  s e c  
s3 e ; id. éc i ' j  i l r  - 11 1 ;f D e B-ae l e  t .
r e s o lu t io n  C urzrc  hst aiTiTwed 'ThA: tn *
Indspsndenes : f  T k l ns srs t s t t  er ? : i  i c :  r-n = •* s ' l i r i s n d » 1 n 
tn  ) jc v a ra ^ e n t . « , a n : ~n*: tin ? y p,r :?,' " < i t->':* f. : ' - *
nh  ^ 2 *'f*-c: :* nn i t s ie s  : : 0'.:t  to l l 'C "  ?tTl n ' I ■: :
1
c o u n t r y .” Yh ls  r -  s 'c lu tl on d ' - f T e u  mf « " ' t -  -%!: t .■':*■■? r*
V,TT Y T' .r;v 1%»*' "§S ifcw^ ^ ^ ^  ^ O; a-  ^ » V «. -i J*  ^^  ^  ^  ^ V *  m . ^
u r l  1 . 1  s . ' i  i n t  e n t i e r ,  t  "  f  ? /  '  o r  .% s . i  . I  •• r  c  c r . c  e s s  •'. -  i f  e t h e r
cn?eT9 esrs g ran t ec i : e : \ r n s  in  : h i s .  J"" the ~Th#r h?.n' ^
\m t i  1 another ® : v * r  d?f *. ::i 1 ?1; ' ' I t  «:. net ?'-c’;- ■• ccncassi on,
the B-riolaii Ttcid no ^o?e : c ol^ o a c c.nu: eo-c ou.c^i $si cn,
in short, the Prit: m were prepared t r se: * pood ex«'"iele
but if i t  was not followed, they would, f o l l o w  the e%&-nle
of others. The aeintsngnca of Chinese Independence and
i n t e g r i t y  was the ~ ’ c  st do s lr a b la  co. d i t i e n  o f  a f f a i r s  f r o n
the Pritish point of ri ew but they could not no to .any groat
lengths for its preservation. ”... The seirure of Chiu.ese
territory, the & d o n atio n  of Chinese territory, the usurpation
of Chinese s o v e r e ig n ty ,” said C urso r, ”1 a not p r i n a r l l ^  any
2
p a r t  of B r i t i s h  p o l i c y ” . Nor, it i s  c le a r ,  wms the .active  
d efence of Chinese independence and i n t e g r i t y .
1 , H ansard*s  P a r l ia m e n ta ry  D eb ates , 4 th  S e r ie s ,  L IV ,  33 1 -3 3 2 .
2,  I b i d . , 332.
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CHAPTER 6
1
"THE BATTLE OF CONCESSIONS"
"Speaking g e n e r a l ly , "  wrote B a l fo u r  i n  s despatch to  
O'Conor on 28 March s e t t in g  f o r t h  th e  B r i t i s h  Governm ent's  
v iew  of th e  concessions i^ lc h  Russia had ob ta ined  from  C hina,
" i t  may be said  th a t  the  p o l ic y  of t h i s  country  i s  
e f f e c t i v e l y  to  open China to  the  commerce of th e  
w o rld , and th a t  our e s t im a te  of the  a c t io n  of o th e r  
Powers in  the  F a r  East depends on th e  degree to  W ilch  
i t  promotes or h in d e rs  the  a t t& n m e n t  o f t h i s  o b je c t .  
. . . . .  The c o n s tru c t io n  of r a i lw a y s ,  so long as th e  
n a t u r a l  f lo w  of t ra d e  along them i s  n o t o b s tru c te d  or  
d iv e r te d  by f i s c a l  or a d m in is t r a t iv e  r e g u la t io n s ,  
must always be one of the  most p o w e rfu l means by which 
the  ends des ired  by Her M a je s ty 's  Government may be 
a t t a i n e d . "  2
Thus d id  the B r i t i s h  Government approach a sub jec t which was 
soon to  become t h e i r  main p reo cc u p a tio n  in  C hine. Fo r e x c i t e ­
ment over Chinese a f f a i r s  d id  not subside a f t e r  th e  even ts  
of March, and in  the  months th a t  fo l lo w e d  i t  was more and more 
upon th e  c o m p e tit io n  f o r  r a i lw a y  concessions th a t  f o r e ig n  
i n t e r e s t  and a c t i v i t y  in  China was c o n c e n tra te d .
1. " I t  does not seem th a t  the b a t t l e  of concessions i s
going w e l l  f o r  us . . . . "  S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald,
13 July 1898, A.& P . .  I l 8 0 9 ] ,  C IX , [ C . 9 1 3 l ] ,  435.
2. S a lis b u ry  to  O'Conor, 28 March 1893, Gooch and Tem p erley .
I ,  27.
nThe b u i ld in g  of r a i lw a y s  was no t an e n t i r e l y  ne w
developm ent i n  China but very  l i t t l e  had been done in  t h i s
1
d i r e c t i o n  b e fo re  th e  S ino-Japanese war. The f i r s t  a ttem p ts  
made by f o r e ig n e r s  to  in tro d u c e  r a i lw a y s  i n  China were almost 
co m p le te ly  u n su cce ss fu l owing to  the  o p p o s it io n  of Chinese  
o f f i c i a l s .  A re q u e s t  f o r  p e rm is s io n  to  b u i ld  a r a i l r o a d  
from  Shangiial to  d o o c r o n ,  made by a group of Shanghai merchants  
i n  J u ly  1863, was r e fu s e d .  A more comprehensive p la n  
p re s e n te d  i n  the same y e a r  by S i r  MacDonald Stephenson, who 
had ta k e n  a le a d in g  p a r t  i n  th e  developm ent of r a i lw a y s  in  
I n d i a ,  was a ls o  tu rn e d  down. T h i r t e e n  y e a rs  l a t e r  a l i n e  
was a c t u a l l y  b u i l t  from  Shanghai t o  Woosung and, when opened 
i n  Ju ly  1676, showed every s ign  of becoming e g re a t  success.
The lo c a l  p o p u la t io n  was not i n  the  le a s t  h o s t i l e .  But th e  
o f f i c i a l s  were opposed to  i t  and when a Chinese was run  over  
and k i l l e d ,  i t  was re q u ire d  i n  s e t t le m e n t  o f the  episode  
th a t  th e  i*ai I ro a d  should be handed over to  th e  Chinese  
Government. %hen i t  wes ta k e n  over i n  1877 t r a f f i c  was stopped 
and soon a f te rw a rd s  th e  l i n e  ues d e s tro y e d .
I n  the  y e a rs  t h a t  fo l lo w e d  however a few  Chinese o f f i c i a l s  
to o k  i:p th e  qu estio n  of r a i lw a y s  and, d e s p i te  th e  s tro ng  
o p p o s it io n  of a la r g e  s e c t io n  of Chinese o f f ic ia ld o m ,  achieved  
some r e s u l t s .  Between 1889 and 1893 s ix ty  m ile s  of r a i lw a y
1 . On the  developm ents i n  t h i s  e a r ly  p e r io d  op. P .H . K ant,  
R ailw ay  E n te r p r is e  i n  C h in a , [ 1 9 0 7 ] ,  1 -4 2 ;  B .B . Morse,
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e la t io n s  of the  Chinese E m pire . 
[ 1 9 1 0 -1 9 1 8 ] ,  I I I ,  7 2 -8 1 .
n s
had been b u i l t  in  Formosa. More im p o r ta n t ,  by 1894 th e re  
was a r a i lw a y  l i n e  a l l  the way from T ie n t s i n ,  at th e  mouth 
of th e  P e i-h o ,  along the coast to  Shanhaikwan, ju s t  w ith in  
th e  G reat 'V a il ,  -  a d is ta n c e  of some 160 m ile s .  T h is  l i n e  
owed much to  the  in t e r e s t  and support of L i Hung-chang, the  
V ic e ro y  of C h i h l i .  L i hrd a lso  conceived the  id ea  of e x te n d in g  
the  r a i lw a y  n o rtheas tw ards  from Shanhaikwen across the  southern  
p ro v in c e s  of M anchuria . I t  was news of t h i s  in t e n t io n  # i io h  
led  the  Russians to  undertake the c o n s tru c t io n  of the  T ra n s -  
S ib e r ia n  r a i lw a y  i n  1891. They a lso  t r i e d  to  h in d e r  the  
f u l f i l m e n t  of L i  Rung-chsng'a p lan  but in  1893 he re c e iv e d  
p e rm is s io n  to  c o n s tru c t  the  r a i lw a y  and 40 m ile s  of i t  had 
been b u i l t  when the Sino-Japanese war s ta r te d .
A s p e c ia l  bureau, the Im p é r ia l  R ailw ays of North C hina,
was e s ta b l is h e d  to  manage t h i s  l i n e  which was a Government
u n d e r ta k in g .  G.W. K in d er , a B r it is l ')  eng ineer vho had p lay ed
0 le a d in g  p a r t  i n  the  c o n s tru c t io n  of the  T i e n t s i n  Shanhaikwen
r a i lw a y  from i t s  e a r l i e s t  stages, was appo inted  3 n g in e e r - in -
C h ie f  t o  the  new a d m in is t r a t io n .  I n  th e  sp rin g  of 1895
however th e re  were d is tu r b in g  r e p o r ts  th a t  some of the  o th e r
B r i t i s h  eng ineers  employed by the Im p e r ia l  R a ilw ays  were being
d ism issed w h ils t  Gustav D e t r in g ,  an am bitio us  and e n e rg e t ic
German and a p ro tégé  of L i  H ung-chang 's , had been appointed a 
1
D i r e c t o r .  At t h i s  t im e  the  Chinese wanted t o  mortgage the
1. 0 ’ Conor to  K im cerley , n o .73 C o n f id e n t ia l ,  C .larch 1895,
F 0 1 7 /1 2 3 3 .
N o rth e rn  l i n e  to- a fo r e ig n  oonp^ny in  the hope of p r o te c t in g  
i t  from  Japanese a t ta c k  and th ey  aprrosched both the F r i t i s h  
and ernan banks on oh a s u b je c t .  The op in ion  of the F o re ig n  
O i :.!.0 0 ,'ïss t h s t  such an arr^nnenen t, made hy one of the
1
be i l l  g a ren t 3 a f t e r  the war ha: begun, $ould not be v a l i d ,  
D e t r in g ,  however, was said to  be r la n n in ?  the  fo rm a t io n  of 
a sy n d ica te  to  ta k e  over the l i n e ,  on th e  c o n c it io r .  th a t  he 
was g iven  the concession f o r  the r a i lw a y  f r c - ’i " l e n t  s in  to  
Hankow. And O'Conor, a lthough he r e a l i z e d  th ^ t  i t  was 
p ro b ab ly  im po ss ib le  f o r  the F r i t i s h  to  a f fo rd  any p r o te c t io n  
to  th e  n o rth e rn  l i n e  d u r i n i  the  war, f e l t  k e e n ly  " the  danger
of . . .  p la c in g  the  r a i lw a y  a d m in is tr a t io n  under Herman
2
in f lu e n c e  from  the s t a r t . "
I t  uas w id e ly  expected th a t  when the v&r  was over t^ o re
would be a g re a t  development of r a i lw a y s  in C h ina. Im m e d ia te ly
a f t e r  the  conc lu s ion  of peace, when the B r i t i s h  Government
was p reoccup ied  w ith  the  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  the  in d e m n ity  loan
and w orried  about the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of B r i t a i n  being excluded
from  the  lo an . O'Conor te le g ra p h e d : " I  more a f r a id  of
our lo s in g  Im p o rta n t  r a i lw a y  concessions f o r  want of s u i ta b le  
3
a p p l ic a n t s ,"  In  p o in t  of f a c t  the  war was not fo l lo w e d  by
1 . O'Conor to  K im berley , T e l . 9 C o n f id e n t ia l ,  19 February  1895,
7 0 1 7 /1 2 4 2 ,  minutes by 1 . S . Davidson, Lygal advisor to  the  
F o re ig n  O f f i c e ,  and K im b erley .
2 . O'Conor to  K im berley , n o .73 C o n f id e n t ia l ,  6 March 1095,
F 0 1 7 /1 2 3 3 .
3 . P r iv a t e  K im berley  Papers, O'Conor to  K im b erley , T e le g ra n ,
P r iv a t e ,  11 May 1395. O'Conor sent t h i s  te le g ram  as n o .53 
C o n f id e n t ia l  in  the  O f f i c i a l  S e r ie s  but was subsequently  
in s t r u c te d  to  make i t  a p r iv a t e  te le g ra m .
n i
a sudden spate of a c t i v i t y  in  t h i s  f i e l d .  Indeed i t  was 
about two and h a l f  y e a rs  b e fo re  tho c o m p e t it io n  f o r  r a i lw a y  
ccneess iens  became in te n s e .
The slow pace of development was la r g e ly  th e  r e s u l t  of 
the  s tro n g  o p p o s it io n  m i  oh s t i l l  e x is te d  among Chinese  
o f f i c i a l s  to  the  in t r o d u c t io n  of r a i lw a y s .  A c tu a l ly  t h e i r  
o b je c t io n  was not so much to  the  rad ?l way a them selves  as to  
th e  use of f o r e ig n e r s  in  the c o n s tru c t io n  of them. I n  con­
v e r s a t io n s  on th e  s u b jec t of r a i lw a y s .  M in is te r s  of the
T s u n g li  Yamer s tressed  t h e i r  d e s ir e  to  keep the  c o n s tru c t io n
1
of r a i lw a y s  I n  Chinese hands. There  was e s im i la r  f e e l i n g
w ith  re g a rd  to  m in e ra l  developm ent. Macdonald wrote th a t
th e r e  was a " f e a r  on [ t h e ]  p a r t  of o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  to  a l lo w
any f o r e ig n  c o n t r o l  o f mines would m?an the  g ra d u a l pass ing
2
of th e  c o u n try  in t o  f o r e ig n  hands". Eut Chinese o f f i c i a l s  
w ith  any u n d e rs ta n d in g  of the  problem  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  d ev e lo p ­
ment wes im p o s s ib le  w ith o u t f o r e ig n  a s s is ta n c e . Poth the  
c a p i t a l  and th e  t e c h n ic a l  exp e rien c e  of fo r e ig n e r s  was 
r e q u i r e d .  Moreover to  f l o a t  a Chinese r a i lw a y  lo an  in  Europe 
some measure of c o n t r o l  o f the r a i lw a y  was necessary  as 
s e c u r i t y .  Sheng T s o t e l  Who had a p p a re n t ly  u n d ertaken  to  
arrang e  f o r  th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f the  Feking-Hankow r a i lw a y
1 . O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  n o .406 , 24 October 1895, P 01 7 /1 2 3 9 ;
B ea u c le rk  to  S a l is b u r y ,  n o .33, 22 January 1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 5 ;  
E e a u c le rk  to  S a l is b u r y ,  n o .135 C o n f id e n t ia l ,  21 A p r i l  
1896, F 0 1 7 /1 2 7 7 .
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  n o .35 , 11 March 1897, P 0 1 7 /1 3 1 1 .
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w i t h o u t  any f o r e i g n  i n t e r f e r e n c e ,  . . .  p r a c t i c a l l y  a c r i t t e d  
t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  oi  t h i s . ”
e e v e r t h e l e s s  t n e r e  v.as a - e n e r a l  sense o f  im p e n d in g  
d e v e l o p m e n t .  The s u b j e c t  was fceing d i s c u s s e d  ’c r r e  anc " lo re  
ans t y  1 8 9 7  a nu'-’b s r  of s y n d i c  pt 2 s had been f  o r i ' s i  f o r  t h e  
p u r p o s e  of a s e u in ^  re  i  1 , e j  end o i n i u o  c o n c e s s i o n s .  The 
h o n g  Kong a no. S h angh a i  hank and t h e  1 e r  man L e u t s c h  A s i  a t  i  sche 
b a n k ,  who c o - o p e r a t e o  i n  i s s u i n g  twc cf the i n d e m n i t y  l o s r s ,
had agreea i n  July 1095 to  sr pi-e any r a ' l v o y  c o n c e s s i o n s
2
w h ic h  e i t h e r  m ig h t  o b t a i n  i n  C h in a .  i n  t h e  cu tumn o f  t h e
1895 t h e  E a s t e r n  C o n t r a c t  Company, a r r i t i s b ;  c o n c e r n ,  a p p l i e d
f o r  a c o n c e s s i o n  f o r  a r a i l w a y  t h r o u g h  t h a  P r o v i n c e  o f  
5
Y u n n a n ;  l a t e  i n  1096 P r i t c h u r d  Morgan ,  an  M .p .  w i t h  some
e x p e r i e n c e  I n  m in i n g  whc had come t o  an ag ree m en t  w i t h  I I
l l u n g - c h a n g  t h a t  summer r a g e r o i n ^  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  m in e s  i n
C h i n a ,  w e n t  c u t  t o  C h in a  t c  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ;
euG i n  th e  s u imer  o f  1897 t h a  P e k in g  d y n d l c a t e ,  an A n g lo -
i c s i i g n  g r o u p ,  was f o r m e o  t o  o b t a i n  m i n i n g  and r a i l w a y  
4
c orice ssl on s.
A c o n s i d e r a b l e  s t i r  was caused i n  May 1R97 by t h e  sudden
1. wacdonalo to  S a l is b u ry ,  n o .15 C o n f id e n t ia l ,  13 F eb ru ary
1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 11 .
2 . Sanderson t  o Cameron, 31 J u ly  1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 5 4 .
3 . O'Conor to  S a l is b u ry ,  n o .406, 24 October 1895, F 0 1 7 /1 2 3 9 .
4 .  S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonalo, T e l . 33, 7 June 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
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news th a t  Sheng T a o ta i  was on the verge of conc lu d in g  an
agreement w ith  & Belgian Syndicate f o r  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  of
the  l i n e  from Peking to  Hankow which the Chinese had f o r  some
tim e wanted to  have b u i l t .  The proposed arrangement w ith  the
B e lg ia n  Syndicate  was said to  p ro v id e  t h a t  a l l  f o r e ig n  p e rso n n e l
on the r a i lw a y  should be B e lg ia n  and th a t  a l l  tho m a te r ia l
should be bought in  Belgium. I t  was a lso  suspected th a t  under
the  cover of the B e lg ian  Syndicate th e  French were a c t i v e l y
In t e r e s t e d  in  the  proposed r a i lw a y .  I t  was d iscovered  moreover
t h a t  the  agreement in c luded  se ve ra l l i n e s  bes ides  the  one
from  Pekin? to  Hankow -  " p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  [ th o ]  Im p o rtan t l i n e s
2
i n  China" te le g ra p h ed  ...lacdonald. And a te le g ra m  from  the  
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank at T i e n t s i n  r e fe r r e d  to  th e  "B e lg ia n  
o f f e r s  a p p a re n tly  supported by France and Russia :In o rd e r to
3
exclude Tng lan i and Germany from  a l l  pay ing  t ru n k  r a i lw a y s " .
The B r i t i s h  and German L eg a tio n s  a t Peking made an im mediate
4
p r o te s t  a g a in s t  the  secre t conclusion, of such an agreement 
and s h o r t ly  a f te rw a rd s  the  American M in is te r  took s im i la r  a c t io n .  
An agreement w ith  the B e lg ia n  Syndicate  was ap p aren tly  si.gned 
a few  days l a t e r  b u t ,  as a r e s u l t  of these p r o te s ts ,  i n  a modi-
1. Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  Telegram  (no number), 13 May 1897,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 . Macdonald was i n  T ie n t s in  at t h i s  t im e .
Hence the  absence of numbers on h i s  te le g ra m s .
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u ry ,  Telegram (no number), 15 May 1897,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 4 .
3 . Enclosure i n  Cameron to  B e r t ie ,  13 May 18^7, r o i7 / l3 2 9 .
4. Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  Telegram  (no number), 13 May 1897,
F 0 17 /1 31 4 .
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f i o d  form  which d e a l t  only w ith  the Peking-Rankow l i n e .  "The
a i r  i s  th ic k  w ith  ra i lw a y  in t r ig u e s " ,  Macdonald wrote on 20
I'iay, "and th e re  i s  some good heavy ly in g  going on a l l  round.
I t  i s  very  d i f f i c u l t  to  a c t u a l ly  prove a n y th in g  i n  
t h i s  C i t y  of I n t r i g u e  but e v e ry th in g  p o in ts  to  the  
f a c t  th a t  the strong p r o te s ts  of the  German and American  
M in is te r s  couolad w ith  my own have stopped the  French  
and Russians p la y in g  a very  b ig  card and g e t t in g  the  
whole r a i lw a y  system of China from Moukden to  Canton  
in t o  t h e i r  hands". ^
I t  i s  I n t e r e s t in g  to  n o t ic e  the  in c lu s io n  of r e q ie s t s  
f o r  r a i lw a y  concessions or f o r  p r e f e r e n t i a l  r ig h t s  in  the  
working of mines or th e  c o n s tru c t io n  of r a i l r o a d s  in  demands 
made on China by o th e r  Powers and to  observe the  a s s o c ia t io n  
of such re q u e s ts  w ith  attem pts  by these Powers to  c re a te  spheres  
of in f lu e n c e  f o r  them selves . In  the  F ra n c c -C h in e se C onvention  
of 20 June 1895 th e re  was a c lause p ro v id in g  th a t  r a i lw a y s  in  
Annam m ld o t , upon arrangem ent, be extended in t o  Chinese  
t e r r i t o r y  and th a t  China in  d eve lo p in g  mines in  Yunnan, Kwangsi
and Kwangtung might i n  the f i r s t  in s ta n c e  c a l l  upon French
2
e n g in e e rs  and m anufac turers . I t  was on the b a s is  of t h i s  
c lau se  th a t  Gerard asked s h o r t ly  a f te rw a rd s  f o r  the  concession
to  a French company of the  r ig h t  to  extend th e  Hanoi-Lungson
3
r a i lw a y  to  Lungchow. The German demands in  November 1397 
in c lu d ed  a request th a t  German eng ineers  should have p re fe re n c e
1. Macdonald to  B e r t ie ,  P r iv a t e ,  20 May 1697, F 0 1 7 /1 3 1 1 .
2 . J .y .A .  Macmurray, o p . c l t . , I ,  2 9 -3 0 .
3 .  P .P . ,  Chine 1 3 94 -1898 , [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,  2 1 -2 4 .
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i n  the c o n s tru c t io n  of any r a i lw a y  which th e  Chinese might
1
de c id e  to  have b u i l t  in  Shantung* And when th e  Russians asked 
f o r  th e  le a s e  of P o rt A rthur and T a lie n w a n , th ey  a ls o  requested  
p e rm is s io n  to  connect P o rt  A rth u r  and th e  T r a n s -S ib e r ia n  l i n e .  
More s ig n i f i c a n t  I n  t h i s  connect ion  however were th e  o b je c t io n s  
r e p e a te d ly  raised, by P a v lo f f ,  the Russian charge d ' a f f a i r e s  
at P ek in g , to  the  employment of K ind er, th e  B r i t i s h  e n g in e e r ,  
to  superin tend  the  c o n s tru c t io n  of the  n o rth e rn  e x ten s io n  of 
th e  T i e n t s i n  — Shanhaikwan r a i lw a y .  I n  a d is c u s s io n  of t h i s  
s u b je c t  he to ld  Macdonald th a t  "the Russian Government in tended  
t h a t  the  p ro v in ce s  of China bo rd er in g  on the  Russian f r o n t i e r
2
must not come under the  in f lu e n c e  of any n a t io n  except R u s s ia " .
The B r i t i s h  had re p e a te d ly  expressed t h e i r  o b je c t io n s  
to  any Power hav ing  s p e c ia l  p r i v i l e g e s  in  C hina. The im p l i ­
c a t io n ,  i n  the  p r o v is io n s  of th e  Franco-Chineso C onvention ,  
t h a t  I 'rsnce  was to  have c e r t a in  p r e f e r e n t i a l  r ig h t s  in  the  
southern p ro v in c e s  of China led them to  remind the Chinese  
t h a t  th e y  would expect equal t re a tm e n t in  the  m a tte r  of
com m ercial and i n d u s t r i a l  concessions i n  t h i s  area as elsewhere
3
i n  C h ina. They a ls o  sought to  ensure e q u a l i t y  of t re a tm e n t  
by the  p r o v is io n  i n  the S a l i sbury-G ourcel agreement, concluded  
between England and France in  January 1896, th a t  " a l l  commercial
1• Vids supra p .  *15
2. Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  19 October 1807, A>A ? », [ 1 3 9 8 ] ,
[ C .8 8 1 4 ] ,  68 .
3 . Vide supra p . *15
i n
ana ouhar p r iv i l e g e s  and advantages" wiiich e i t h e r  country
a c q u ired  i n  th e  p rov in ces  of Yunnan and Szechuen shoiAo. be
"extended and rendered co.imon to  both ^owers and to  t h e i r
1
n a t io n a ls  and d e p e n d e n ts . . . " .  S im i l a r l y ,  the  B r i t i s h  had
o b je c te d  to  the German request f o r  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t re a tm e n t  i n  
2
Shantung and had p ro te s te d  to  the Russian Government about th e
3
a tte m p ts  to  secure K in d e r 's  removal from the N o rth e rn  L in e .
In  January 1836, moreover, th e re  were emphatic p u b l ic
a s s e r t io n s  of the  Government's d e te rm in a t io n  to  m a in ta in
B r i t a i n ' s  T re a ty  r ig h t s  in  C hins. Speaking of the B r i t i s h
d e s ir e  to  open China to  fo r e ig n  t r a d e .  S ir  M ichae l H ic k s  Beach
said at Swansea on 17 January: "Ye look  upon i t  as the  most 
h o p e fu l  p la c e  of the  fu tu r e  f o r  the commerce of our 
country  and the commerce cf the  world at la r g e ,  and 
th e  Government were a b s o lu te ly  de te rm in e d , a t w hatever  
c o s t ,  even - and he A isl^ed to  speak p l a i n l y  -  i f  
necessary , at the  cost of war, th a t  th a t  door should  
not be s h u t ."  And B a lfo u r  i n  a speech the week
b e fo r :  hed ta lk e d  of " th a t  e q u a l i ty  of o p p o r tu n ity  which i s  
a l l  th a t  we c la im  but which we do c la im "  and had said  
" i f  we ask f o r  freedom to  t r a d e ,  we do not mean freedom  
to  t ra d e  . . .  f o r  B r i t a i n  a lone; we mean freedom cf 
t ra d e  f o r  a l l  the  world a l i k e " . ' -
1 . B .F .S .P . .  [1 8 9 5 -1 8 9 6 ] ,  L X X X V II I ,  [ 1 9 0 0 ] ,  15.
2 . V ide supra p . 11.1
3 . G-oschen to  S a l is b u ry ,  28 December 1897 (R. 3 January 1 8 9 8 ) ,
A. & P . ,  [ 1 8 9 3 ] ,  CV, [C .3 8 1 4 ] ,  75; O'Conor to  S a l is b u r y ,  
T e l .  11, 20 January 1898, F 0 6 5 /1 5 57 ; S a lis b u ry  to  O'Conor, 
T e l . 7 5 ,  17 March 1898, FOS5/1557 w ith  a memorandum by 
B e r t ie  -  the te legrem  i s  p u b lish ed  i n  A.& ^ . ,  [ l 8 9 S ] ,
CV, LC .8S 14], 109.
4 .  The T im es , 18 January 1898, p . 6 .
5 . I b i d . ,  11 January 1893, p . 3 .
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The p r a c t i c a l  re in fo rc e m e n t of the  safeguards p r o te c t in g
B r i t i s h  commercial In t e r e s t s  in  China seems to  have been the
B r i t i s h  Government's aim in  t h e i r  p rop osa l to  make a loan to
China in  January 1893 # i i l s t  t h e i r  subsequent d e c is io n  to
t a i '0 K e l -h a l  Kei represented  an attem pt to  c o u n te ra c t the
in c re a s ed  in f lu e n c e  over the Chinese Government which, i n
appearance at l e a s t ,  th e  a c q u is i t ic n  of P o rt  A rth ur gave Russia,
Y e t an o th er strand i n  B r i t ig i i  p o l ic y  was t h e i r  move towards
the more d e f i n i t e  a s s e r t io n  of a c la im  to  s p e c ia l c o n s id e ra t io n
i n  the re g io n  of the  Yangtze , s tendency which became much
more pronounced from  March onwards.
The adoption  of a p o l ic y  of spheres of in f lu e n c e  had
been consciously  considered in  the F o re ig n  O f f ic e  as e a r ly  as
1
December. O'Conor favoured t h i s  course . E e r t ie  on the  o th er
hand argued t h a t :  " I f  we begin by d e f in in g  a sphere of
in f lu e n c e  as suggested i t  amounts to  an i n v i t a t i o n  
to  a u s e la ,  France and Germany to  go and do as th e y  
would w ith th e  undefined a reas . Our paramount in t e r e s t  
i n  Chine i s  u n r e s t r ic te d  t rad e  everywhere and th e r e fo r e  
we should d iscourage spheres as lone.-; as p o s s i b l e . . . "  2
3
And on the  vh. o le  S a lisb u ry  seemed to  concur i n  t h i s  o p in io n .  
N e v e r th e le s s  ha was e v id e n t ly  not disposed t o  ta ke  ex cep tio n  
to  Russian c la im s  to  a somewhat s p e c ia l  p o s i t io n  in  n o rth e rn  
C h in e . I t  i s  t r u e  th a t  when de S te a l  m ainta ined  t h a t  the
1. Sanderson, Memorandum on a c o n v e rs a t io n  w ith  O’ Conor,
23 December 1897, F 0 1 7 /1 3 30 .
2 . B e r t i e ,  Memorandum, 23 December 1897, P 0 1 7 /1 3 3 0 .
3 . I b i d . ,  minute by S a l is b u ry .
B r i t i s h  would be "encroaching on the Russian sphere of*
in f lu e n c e "  i f  they  in s is te d  upon Ta lienw an  becoming a T r e a ty
P o r t ,  S a l is b u ry  re fu sed  to  e d ^ lt  th a t  Russia could have anv
1
l e g i t im a t e  ground f o r  o b je c t io n s .  But at the seme tim e he
d id  ne t ta k e  ex ce p tio n  to  de S t a a l ’ s use of the  phrase "sphere
of in f lu e n c e " .  I t  was Macdonald who, on r e c e iv in g  an account
of th e  c o n v e rs a t io n ,  te le g ra p h e d : "Am I  to  re co g n ize  a Russian
sphere of In f lu e n c e ?  Up to  now I  have always re fu sed  to  do
30, m a in ta in in g  th a t  China being en independent co u n try ,
2
spheres of in f lu e n c e  do not e x i s t . . . "  To which S a lis b u ry
r e p l i e d :  "îî.M .G . have never recogn ized  th a t  any n a t io n  has
as of r ig h t  a sphere of in f lu e n c e  i n  China and th e r e fo r e  
you should not do so.
"As a m a tte r  of courtesy  n a t io n s  g e n e r a l ly  conceive  
t h a t  as reg ard s  re g io n s  a d ja c en t to  t h e i r  own 
possessions  th e y  have a s p e c ia l  c la im  to  th e  c o n s id e ra ­
t i o n  of t h e i r  w ish es ."  3
Meanwhile th e r e  were in d ic a t io n s  th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  them­
se lves  were anxious f o r  some r e c o g n it io n  of t h e i r  s p e c ia l  
i n t e r e s t  i n  the  re g io n  of the  Y angtze . S a l is b u ry  had suggested 
i n  December th a t  th e y  should ask f o r  the  f i r s t  r e f u s a l  of 
concessions i n  the Yangtze v a l l e y .  T h is  id ea  was not adopted 
but th e  B r i t i s h  d id  request and r e c e iv e  an assurance th a t  
t e r r i t o r y  i n  the  Yangtze  should not be a l ie n a te d  to  any o th e r
1. S a l is b u ry  to  O'Conop, 19 January 1638, A.& P . . [1 8 3 8 ] ,  CV,
[C .8 8 1 4 J ,  8 4 .
2 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u ry ,  T e l . 30 S e c re t ,  29 January 1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
3 . S a l is b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 24, 29 January 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
1
power. And then on 7 March came the  news of th e  Russian  
demands on the  Chinese. Two days l a t e r  th e re  was an anxious  
e n q u iry  iro m  th e  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  to  Macdonald asking  i f  the  
Chinese i n t e r p r e t e r  t h i s  assurance in  the same way as the  
B r i t i s l i  d id  -  namely, as meaning th a t  t e r r i t o r y  i n  the  Yangtze
2
v a l l e y  should not be ceded to  any Power o th e r  than  G reat B r i t a i n .
More in t e r e s t i n g  in  t h i s  connection , however, i s  B a l f o u r 's
s ta te m e n t,  on the day on which he le a r n t  of th e  Russian demands,
t h a t  i f  th a  Chinese complied w ith  the  Russian request f o r
p e rm is s io n  to  connect th e  T r a n s -S ib e r ia n  l i n e  by r a i l  w i th  P o rt
A r th u r ,  B r i t a i n  would " re q u ire  as a coun terpo ise  th e  p ro lo n g a -
3
t i o n  of th e  Burmese r a i lw a y  in t o  C hina".
T h is  p a r t i c u l a r  id e a  was a p p a re n t ly  dropped but i t  was
soon e v id e n t  th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  in tended to  i n s i s t  upon the
concession  of some m ajor r a i lw a y  l in e  i n  th e  Yangtze v a l le y
as one c o n d it io n  of t h e i r  acquiescence in  th e  g r a n t in g  of the
Russian demands. T h e i r  next suggestion was to  in fo rm  the
Russians th a t  "we presume . . .  th a t  they w i l l  throw  no
o b s ta c le  I n  the way of a commercial r a i lw a y  by [a n ]  Anglo-Chinese
4
Company be ing  construc ted  from Hankow to  P e k in " .  iVhen
1 . Vide supra
2. S a lisb u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 61 C o n f id e n t ia l ,  9 March 1898,
P 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
3 . B a l fo u r  to  Macdonald, T e l . 56 S e c re t ,  7 March 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
T h is  te l :g r a m  was aeon by Lord S a l is b u ry .
4 .  B a l fo u r  to  Macdonald, T e l . 67 very  C o n f id e n t ia l ,  11 March 1898,
P 0 1 7 /1 33 8 .
Macdonald expressed some doubts as to  the  f e a s i b i l i t y  of
t h i s  l i n e ,  i t  was exp la in ed  th a t  "what we contem plate  i s
Chinese Government f o r  L th e j  promise  
of L aj main tru n k  l i n e  to  be co n s tru c ted  by [a n ]  
Anglo-Chineae company under B r l t ia k i  c o n t r o l .  D i r e c t i o n
mlglit be determ ined h e r e a f t e r    our demand
would have to  be made in  such term s as n o t to  committ 
us to  c a r ry  th e  th in g  th r o u g h ."1 Macdonald thought
t h a t  th e  beat l i n e  would be one from Hankow to  Canton or
K in k is n g  and on 25 March, the  day on which i t  was decided t o
ta k a  W e i-h a i Wei, B a l fo u r  in s t r u c te d  him to  u re s s  f o r  such a
2
concession i f  he thought the t im e  was s u i t a b le .  Macdonald
thought th a t  i t  was, i f  th e re  was a B r i t i s h  sy n d ica te  ready
to  taKe up the concession. B a lfo u r  however r e p l ie d  t h a t
"You should o b ta in  [ t h e ]  promise of such a r a i lw a y
concession to  any com bination  h e r e a f t e r  recommended
by H .M .G ."  3
I t  i s  unusual to  f i n d  the B r i t i s h  Government g re a s in g  f o r  th e  
prom ise of a concession to  an u n s p e c if ie d  a p p l ic a n t .  I n  t h i s  
case however they  were c le a r ly  legs  in te r e s te d  in  the  a c tu a l  
c o n s tru c t io n  of th e  r a i lw a y  than  in  s ta k in g  s c la im  to  the  
concession as an in s trum ent f o r  the  p o s i t iv e  a s s e r t io n  of 
t h e i r  s p e c ia l  in t e r e s t  in  the  Yangtze re g io n .
Meanwhile the  growing co m p e tit io n  f o r  o th e r  r a i lw a y  
concessions was th r e a te n in g  to  become a source of f r i c t i o n  
between England and Germany. I n  the  m iddle of F e b ru a ry  th e
1. B a l fo u r  t c  Macdonald, T e l . 72 S e c re t ,  15 March 1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 5 3 8 .
2. B a l fo u r  tc  Macdonald, T e l . 110, 26 %arch 1898, P0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
3 . B a l fo u r  t o  Macdonald, T e l .  118, 30 March 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 8 .
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B r i t i s h  l e a r n t  o f th e  German o b je c t io n s  to  the  Chinese p la n  t o  
b u i ld  a r a i lw a y ,  p e r t l y  w ith  E n g lis h  c a p i t a l ,  from  T i e n t s i n  
to  C h in k ie n g . A s e c t io n  c f th e  r a i lw a y  would pass through  
Shantung and th e  Germans cla im ed t h a t  no r a i lw a y  could be
1
b u i l t  in  t h a t  p ro v in c e  except by arrangement w ith  Germany.
The B r i t i s h  took e x c e p tio n  to  t h i s  p r e te n s io n .  B a l fo u r  t e l e ­
graphed t o  Macdonald on 1 March th a t  " . . .  we cannot admit t h a t  
r a i lw a y  concessions to  B r i t i s h  s u b je c ts  can be b a rre d  
by such an a s s e r t io n  of p r e f e r e n t i a l  r i g h t s  on the  
p a r t  of Germany . . .  s im ply because a p o r t io n  of the  
proposed l i n e  passed through the  p r o v in c e .  2
"You shouj.d oppose any adm ission  of such a c la im " .
The d e s i r e  to  avo id  a n ta g o n iz in g  Germany, # i ic h  had 
been such a n o t ic e a b le  f e a t u r e  of the  B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e  t o  th e  
German demands i n  November and December, was at f i r s t  conspicu­
ous by i t s  absence from  the  B r i t i s h  c o n s id e ra t io n  of th e  ta k in g  
of W e i-h a i  Wei, i n  s p i te  of tha  f a c t  th a t  Macdonald had
emphasized more th a n  once th a t  B r i t a i n  would in c u r  German
3
h o s t i l i t y  by t h i s  s te p . T h is  c o n s id e ra t io n  however was
d o u b t le s s  one elem ent i n  B a l f o u r 's  re a d in e s s  to  accept an
i n v i t a t i o n  to  lunch p r i v a t e l y  w ith  H a t z f e l d t ,  th e  German
ambassador i n  London. " I t  was a t  th e  moment when th in g s  were 
approaching  t h e i r  h o t t e s t  in  c onn ectio n  w ith  P o rt  
A r th u r " ,  B a l fo u r  explained t o  S a l is b u r y  a f te r w a r d s ,  "and 
as I  thought t h a t  some good end no harm could come of 
i t ,  I  a c c e p te d " . The luncheon a c t u a l ly  took  p la c e  on
th e  v e ry  day on which i t  was dec ided  to  ta k e  W e i-h a i  Wei.
1 . Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 4 4 , 18 F e b ru a ry  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
2 .  B a l fo u r  tc  Macdonald, T e l . 52 , 1 March 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
3 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 7 1 ,  10 March 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 ;
Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 90 (P ) ,  21 March 1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 3 .
The m eeting  had been arranged by s sm all group of persons who
hoped f o r  an Anglo-German a l l i a n c e .  I n  f a c t ,  very  l i t t l e  came
of i t .  "There was an i n f i n i t y  of t a l k " ,  B a l fo u r  t o l d  S a l is b u r y ,
"out of the  nebulous f r i e n d l i n e s s  o f which I  r e a l l y  
g a th e re d  v e ry  l i t t l e  except t h a t  th e  Germans d id  not  
a t  e l l  l i k e  J o e 's  methods of p rocedure  i n  A f r ic a ,  and 1 
f e l t  a g g rieved  a t  our p r o te s t  about Shantung R a i lw a y s " .
B a l fo u r  was s c e p t ic a l  about th e  chances of an a l l i a n c e
between England and Germany. I t  was Cham berlain  who pursued
t h i s  id e a  w i th  enthusiasm . But th e  s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  of the
s p e c i f ic  sugg estio ns  which he made tc  H a t z f e l d t  w ith  re g a rd
to  Chinese a f f a i r s  i s  how out of ke ep in g  th e y  were w ith  th e
g e n e ra l  v iew  of B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  i n  China h e ld  by th e  F o re ig n
O f f i c e .  C ham berla in  said th a t  he thought England and Germany
" m i ^ t  say to  Russia  -  'You have got a l l  you say you 
want. We are re ad y  to  re c o g n iz e  yo u r p o s i t io n ,  but 
you must not go f u r t h e r .  The r e s t  cf China i s  under  
our j o i n t  p r o t e c t i o n ' .  Germany m i ^ t  extend t h a t  
p r o t e c t io n  over Shantiong and th e  p ro v in c e s  i n  th e  
H in t e r la n d ,  and, by agreement w ith  C h in a , Germany m i^ i t  
e s t a b l is h  t h e r e ,  i n  th e  name o f and on b e h a lf  o f C h in a ,  
such c o n t r o l  over th e  f i n a n c i a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  as would 
secure s u f f i c i e n t  funds t o  p ro v id e  an army under German 
o f f i c e r s .  At th e  same t im e  England t n i ^ t  ac t s i m i l a r l y  
in  th e  c e n t r a l  and southern  p ro v in c e s ,  and th e n ,  i f  in  
th e  f u t u r e  R uss ia  a ttem pted  f u r t h e r  a g re s s io n , she 
would have to  c o n fro n t  not o n ly  a war w ith  two g re a t  
European Powers but a ls o  the  d e fe n s iv e  fo r c e s  of 
China o rg an ized  and le d  by European o f f i c e r s " .  %
Schemes on such a la r g e  s ca le  ware not w i th in  th e  c o n te m p la t io n
of S a l is b u r y  and the F o re ig n  O f f i c e .
1 . Blanche S .C . D ugda le , A r th u r  James B a l fo u r ,  [ 1 9 3 6 ] ,  I ,
2 5 8 -2 5 9 .
2 . J .L .  G a rv in ,  o p .c i t . . I l l ,  266.
On the o th e r  hand serious  c o n s id e ra t io n  was be ing
g iv e n  to  the  id es  of coming to  an agreement w ith  Germany
r e g s rc ln g  r a i lw a y s  i n  China. The Germans re se n te d  th e  p r o te s t
which Macdonald had maoe ag a in s t t h e i r  c la im s i n  Shantung and
hoped t h a t  i t  might be withdrawn. The q u es tio n  gave the
B r i t i s h  the o p p o rtu n ity  which they d e s ire d  to  c o n c i l i a t e  th e
Germans. " I t  might p o s s ib ly  be of use in  a l la y in g  t h e i r  
o b je c t io n s  to  our o b ta in in g  W e i-h a i Wei", B a l fo u r  
te le g ra p h e d  to  Macdonald on 25 March, " i f ,  w ith o u t  
w aiv ing  our T re a ty  r i ^ t s , we gave them an assurance  
t h a t  we would net support a ttem p ts  to  o b ta in  r a i lw a y  
concessions in  or through [ t h e ]  P rov ince  of Shantung 
w ith o u t p re v io u s  c o n s u l ta t io n  #^1 th  Germany". ^
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the D e u ts c h -A s ia t is c h e
Bank, who in  July  1895 had come to  an agreement whereby each
had th e  o p tio n  of sharing any r a i lw a y  concessions ob ta ined  by
the  o th e r  in  China, were on the verge of s e p a ra t in g .  The F o re ig n
O f f ic e  advised the  B r i t i s h  bank " to  ho ld  on to  the Germans
2
as long  as they  are in  any way reason ab le"  but th e re  seemed 
to  be l i t t l e  chance of averting; the  s e p a ra t io n . The B r i t i s h  
were d o u b t le s s  f o r t i f i e d  in  t h e i r  d e s ir e  f o r  some arrangement 
with Germany by the prospect o f the  f r i c t i o n  between England  
end Germany which would in e v i t a b ly  r e s u l t  from c o m p e t i t io n  
between the two banks f o r  concessions a l l  over C hina.
On 2 A p r i l  tho B r i t i s h  in form ed the  German Government 
t h a t  th^y  were going to  take  liVei-hei Mel and they o f fe r e d  to
1. Le I f  our to  ^iBcdonalG, T e l . 114 Conl id e n t  i  a i ,  23 March 1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
2 . M inute on Cameron to  B e r t ie ,  28 March 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 8 .
n o
g iv e  an u n d e rta k in g  not to  connect the  p la c e  hy r s i l  w ith  the
i n t e r i o r  of the p ro v in c e .  B a l fo u r  f e l t  however th a t  the
p ro p o s a l f o r  a g e n e ra l r a i lw a y  agreement re q u ire d  more c a r e f u l
2
c o n s id e ra t io n  b e fo re  the  subject was broached t o  th e  Germans.
M acdonald 's  comment upon B a l fo u r 's  suggestion had bean th a t
i t  "imp l i e s  the  r e c o g n it io n  of Shantung as I th e ]  German sphere
f o r  r a i lw a y  c o n s tru c t io n " .  He was not n e c e s s a r i ly  opposed
t o  t h i s  but thought th a t  " i f  we are  to  g ive  such r e c o g n i t io n  . . .  
i t  would be b e t t e r  to  do so openly and o b ta in  s im i la r  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  r ig h t s  i n  the  lower Y an g tze .
Our l in e  would be to  i n s i s t  on our f r e e  tra d e  
throughout China but to  accept L th e j p r i n c i p l e  of 
spheres f o r  ra i lw a y  and mining concessions. "Ve should  
g a in  more by such a p o l ic y  than  by o b je c t in g  i n  th e o ry  
but p r a c t i c a l l y  admitting; the c la im  of o th e r  Powers". ^
I t  was upon such l in e s  th a t  B a lfo u r  approached th e  subject i n
© memorandum which he wrote on i t  on 14 A p r i l .  And on the
same day ho wrote to  Gurzon th a t  " i t  seems very d e s i r a b le  to
mark out soheres in  which we should net i n t e r f e r e  w ith  each
4
o th e rs  concessions".
The a c tu a l  fo rm u la t io n  of a p ro p o sa l r a is e d  many
prob lem s. B a lfo u r  f e l t  hampered to  begin w ith  by th e  "vagueness  
of our knowledge both about the German r a i lw a y  c la im s  
end, even more," about the  r a i lw a y  c la im s  whloh w^ 
should l i k e  to  see c a r r ie d  th ro u g h " . 5 The Germans
a p p a re n t ly  wanted the  B r i t i s h  to  support n e i t h e r  concessions
1. B a l fo u r  to  D e s c e lle s ,  2 A p r i l  1893, Gooch end le m p e r le y .  I ,
31.
2 . Mlnutn by P e lfo u r  or memorandum by B e r t ie ,  1 A p r i l  1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 8 .
3 . M a c d o n a ld  to  B a l fo u r ,  T e l . 109, 30 March 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0 .
4 .  B a l fo u r  to  Gurzon, 14 A p r i l  1898, B .8 .C .  Dugdale, pp. c i t . ,
I ,  256.
5 . M inute by B a l fo u r ,  14 A p r i l  1893, F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 8 .
i V
f o r  l i n e s  I n  Shantung no r concessions f o r  l i n e s  which would
compete w ith  those  i n  Shantung. T h is  ra is e d  such q u es tio n s  as
th e  best means of en s u r in g  th e  p r o t e c t io n  of through t r a f f i c  on
l i n e s  pa using through Shantung and th e  exact d e f i n i t i o n  of
1
what c o n s t i tu te d  a c o m p e t i t iv e  l i n e .  Eut th e  g r e a te s t
d i f f i c u l t y  of a l l  was to  mark out spheres " w ith o u t  e i t h e r  g iv in g
2
them to o  b ig  a sphere or o u rs e lv e s  to o  sm all a one". F o r  th e
Germans would p ro b a b ly  only agree to  re c o g n ize  s p e c ia l  B r i t i s h
r i g h t s  over an a re a  of roug h ly  the  same s ize  as Shantung and
i f  B r i t a i n  was t o  "accept any such r e s t r i c t e d  sphere, i t  would 
be d i f f i c u l t  so t o  word our agreement as not to  im p ly  
t h a t  we have no s p e c ia l  r i g h t s  o u ts id e  i t  and t h i s  we 
are  by no means p repared  to  d o ."  ^ B a l fo u r  sent
h i s  memorandum to  B e r t i e ,  Sanderson, and Gurzon f o r  t h e i r
comments. The g e n e ra l  r e a c t io n  was t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  should
c o n c e n tra te  upon e n su rin g  th a t  some a c c e p ta b le  p r o v is io n  was
made f o r  a th rough rs l Iway from  T i e n t s i n  to  th e  Yangtze  but
t h a t  th e y  should no t b ind them selves  by s p e c i f ic  arrangem ents
re g a rd in g  o th e r  p a r t s  of C h in a . Gurzon f e l t  r a t h e r  s t ro n g ly
t h a t  th ey  ware i n  danger of "a c q u ie s c in g  a l i t t l e  to o  h a s t i l y  . . .
4
i n  the  German p r e te n s io n s  over a l l  Shantung". B e r t ie  however  
was convinced t h a t  "we must r e c o n c i le  o u rs e lv e s  to  th e  e v id e n t
1 . M inute  by B a l fo u r ,  14 A p r i l  1833, 7 0 1 7 /1 3 5 8 .
2 . B a l fo u r  to  Gurzon, 14 A p r i l  1898, D ugdale , o p .c i t . .  I ,  256.
3 .  M inute  by B a l fo u r ,  14 A p r i l  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 8 .
4 .  Gurzon, Memorandum, 17 A p r i l  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 8 .
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f a c t  th a t  i f  th e  Germans have squeezed out o f th e  
Chinese engagements g ra n tin g  e x c lu s iv e  or p r e f e r e n t ia l  
r ig h t s  in  Shantung we s h e ll  not get a n y th in g  in  th a t  
p ro v in c e  except w ith  German concurrence however much 
we may th in k  and contend th a t  our T ie n ts in  T re a ty
r ig h t s  have been th e re b y  in fr in g e d  1
In  the  meantime d is p u te  had a ls o  a r is e n  over th e
S hanghai-N anklng  r a i lw a y . The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank
had become in te r e s te d  In  t h is  concession  since t h e i r  s e p a ra tio n
from  th e  German bank but th ey  wanted more tim e  to  co n s id er th e
m a tte r  th a n  the  Chinese would a llo w  and th e y  were a f r a id  th a t
in  consequence th e  Germans would get th e  concession . " I  need 
not p o in t o u t" , Cameron wrote to  B e r t ie ,  " # ia t  a 
s e rio u s  blow i t  would be to  B r i t is h  p r e s t ig e  i f  th e  
r a i lw a y  system in  the  r ic h  p ro v in c e s  of K iangsu and 
Chekiang w e re /to  pass londer th e  c o n tr o l of any o th e r  
Power . . . . "  T h is  l in e  was of s p e c ia l im portance
to  th e  B r i t is h  since i t  would pass through  th e  h e a r t  of th e
re g io n  where t h e i r  in te r e s ts  were c o n c e n tra te d . Macdonald
was in s tru c te d  to  persuade th e  Chinese to  g ran t th e  d e la y
which th e  Dank re q u ire d . He was to ld  moreover th a t  he could
p o in t  out th a t  " th is  concession  i s  one of th e  c o n d it io n s  vhich
H.xvî.G. c o n s id e rs  them selves e n t i t l e d  to  p ress  in  view  o f the
3
p r iv i le g e s  a lre a d y  conceded to  o th e r Pow ers."
Ten days l a t e r  H a t z f e ld t ,  th e  German Ambassador in  
London, came to  the  fo r e ig n  O ff ic e  to  com plain o f M acdonald 's
I .  B e r t ie ,  Memorandum, 15 A p r i l  1898, P 0 1 7 /1 3 5 8 .
2 . Hong Kong and S h a n ^ a i Bank to  B e r t ie ,  22 A p r i l  1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 8 .
3 . S a lis b u ry  to  M acdonald, T e l . 156, 23 A p r i l  1898, P 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
T h is  was in c lu d e d  in  th e  demands which Macdonald made upon 
th e  Chinese in  consequence of the g ra n tin g  of th e  French  
demands. Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , 25 A p r i l  1898, A. dc P . .  
l l S 9 9 j ,  C IX , [ 0 .9 1 3 1 ] ,  305; V id e  in f r a  p .IS S .
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o p p o s it io n  to  the  concession f o r  th e  r a i lw a y  b e in g  g ran ted
to  the D e u ts c h -A s ia tis c h e  Bank. He expressed the  hope th a t
th e  B r i t i s h  would w ithdraw  t h e i r  demand f o r  the  concession .
1
T h is  the  B r i t is h  were not disposed to  do . They were however
anxious " to  avoid  f r i c t i o n  w ith  German^ and to  t h is  end S a lis b u ry
suggested to  H a tz fe ld t  on the next day c e r ta in  term s upon which
an agreement might be reached w ith  re g a rd  both to  the  s p e c if ic
case of the S hang hai-Nanking r a ilw a y  and to  th e  g e n e ra l q u es tio n
of r a ilw a y  concessions. S a lis b u r y 's  p ro p o s a l was th a t  th e
E n g lis ii and German banks should share e q u a lly  a l l  th e  p r o f i t s
of th e  concession f o r  th e  Shanghai-NanKing r a ilw a y  but th a t
th e  company f o r  i t s  c o n s tru c tio n  should be r e g is te re d  as an
E n g lis h  one and should be under E n g lis h  management i f  i t  was
not under Chinese c o n tr o l .  H is  g e n e ra l p ro p o s a l was th a t  th e
p r o f i t s  of a l l  concessions o b ta in ed  by e i t h e r  bank in  th e
re g io n  of th e  Y angtze  and th e  p ro v in c e  of Shantung should be
d iv id e d  e q u a lly  between them but th a t  companies f o r  concessions
in  the Yangtze should be r e g is te re d  as E n g lis h  and be under
E nfflish  management w h ils t  in  ths case of concessions in
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Shantung th e  management ^ o u ld  be German. The Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank was a p p a re n tly  anxious to  resume c o -o p e ra t io n  
w ith  th e  German bank. Indeed S a lis b u r y 's  p ro p o sal was 
v i r t u a l l y  id e n t ic a l  w ith  a memorandum by Cameron o u t l in in g  th e
1 . B e r t ie ,  Memorandum, 3 May 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 9 .
2 . S a lis b u ry  to  Yecdonald, T e l . 169, 7 May 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
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c o n d it io n s  upon W iloh th e  Bank would be w i l l i n g  to  jo in  hands 
w ith  th e  Germans a g a in , and consequently  he was assured o f
th e  arrangem ent b e in g  approved by th e  Pank i f  i t  was accepted  
by th e  Germans.
The German response however was d is c o u ra g in g . S a lis b u ry  
urged th a t  an arrangem ent should a t le a s t  be made about th e
Shanghai-N anking  ra ilw a y  even i f  a g e n e ra l agreement was out
‘  2
o f th e  q u e s tio n . But both suggestions were tu rn e d  down.
H a t z f e ld t  m a in ta in ed  moreover th a t  th e  F r i t i s h  p o s i t io n  in  th e
Y angtze  and th e  German p o s it io n  in  Shantung were not com parable.
He argued th a t  th e  o ccu p atio n  of E iaochau gave Germany a
s p e c ia l p o s i t io n  in  Ghantung which in  consequence was "not
u n re s e rv e d ly  open to  B r i t is h  e n te r p r is e ,  whereas England not
h a v in g  occupied an y th in g  in  tha Y angtze  re g io n , th a t  re g io n
3
i s  s t i l l  u n re s e rv e d ly  open to  German e n t e r p r i s e . . . " .  S a lis b u ry
re fu s e d  to  accept t h is  argument and he te le g ra p h e d  to
Macdonald th a t :
" In  these c ircum stances you w i l l  of course  
co n tin u e  to  oppose [ th e ]  g ra n t of the  Shanghai- 
Hanklng rs l Iway to  th e  German Bank".4
The B r i t is h  were s t i l l  p reoccup ied  a t t h is  tim e  w ith
1 . R o th s c h ild  to  B e r t ie ,  e n c lo s in g  a memorandum by Cameron, 
4 May 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 6 9 .
2. B e r t ie ,  Memorandum, 6 May 1398, F 0 1 7 /1 3 5 9 .
3 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 176, 11 May 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
4 . I b id .
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a rra n g in g  n o t o n ly  th e  leas e  of W e i-h a i Wei but a ls o  an
e x te n s io n  of t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y  a t Hong jiong. The F o re ig n  O ff ic e
had f o r  th re e  years  tu rned  a deaf ear to  th e  p re s su re  of the
C o lo n ia l O f f ic e ,  th e  A d m ira lty  and th e  War O f f ic e  f o r  such an
e x te n s io n . In  March however th e  ^ranch had asked th e  Chinese
f o r  th e  le a s e  of Kwangchow Wan, a p o r t  on the  sou th ern  coadb
of C hina about 150 m ile s  from  Hong Kong. The B r i t is h  r e p ly
to  the  concession of th e  French demands in  A p r i l  was to  ask
f o r  " a l l  the  land re q u ire d  f o r  th e  m i l i t a r y  de fences  of Hong 
1
Kong". The Chino se had a lre a d y  in t im a te d  t h e i r  w ill in g n e s s
to  l e t  B r i t a in  have the e x tra  t e r r i t o r y  which she needed on
2
Kowloon, p ro v id e d  th a t  Kowloon C ity  was not in c lu d e d . T h is  
was th e  main d i f f i c u l t y  in  th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  th e  B r i t is h  
co n s id ered  th a t  Kowloon C ity  was n ec ess ary , E v e n tu a lly  an 
agreement was reached whereby Kowloon C ity  was in c lu d e d  in
1 . B a lfo u r  to  Macdonald, 13 A p r i l  1898, A.& P . . [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[C .9 1 3 1 ] ,  293 . The French a ls o  asked f o r  the  concession  
f o r  a r a i lw a y  from  th e  Tongking f r o n t i e r  to  Y un nan-fu ; 
f o r  th e  c o n s id e ra t io n  of a Frenchman as D ir e c to r  of Posts  
should th e  Chinese make such an appo intm ent; and f o r  a 
prom ise of the  n o n -a lie n a t io n  of th e  p ro v in c e s  of Kuang- 
tu n g , Kuangsi and Yunnan. Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry  
(B a l fo u r ) ,  12 A p r i l  1898, A. & P . ,  [1 3 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[ 0 .9 1 3 1 ] ,  286.
The B r i t is h  in  r e p ly  asked f o r  a s im ila r  u n d e rta k in g  
re g a rd in g  th e  P ro v in c e s  of Kuangtung and Yunnan. T h e ir  
o th e r ccuntor-dem anda were f o r  th e  opening o f Nanning, 
th e  concession  f o r  the Shanghai-N anking r a i lw a y , and an 
assurance th a t China had not g iv e n  France any e x c lu s iv e  
p r iv i le g e s  in  co n n ectio n  w ith  rd . Iways and m ines. B a lfo u r  
to  Macdonald, 13 A p r i l  1398, A. & P . , [ 1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[ C .9 1 3 1 ], 2 9 3 ;, Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , 25 A p r i l  1898,
A . tu P . , [ l 8 9 9 j ,  C IX , [ C .9131]^  305.
2 . Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry  ( B a l fo u r ) ,  12 A p r i l  1898, A.& P . ,
L1899],  C IX , [ c .9 1 3 1 ] ,  286.
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th e  a rea  leased  to  B r i t a in  su b jec t to  th e  c o n t in u a t io n  of
C hinese c i v i l  ju r is d ic t io n  th e re  s ide by s ide  w ith  th e
B r i t is h  a d m in is tra t io n . The C onvention f o r  th e  e x te n s io n  of
1
Hong Hong was signed on 9 June.
The B r i t is h  took over W e i-h a i Wei on 24 K&j when th e  
2
Japanese evacuated i t .  I t  was an o th er month however b e fo re  
th e  arrangem ent of the  d e t a i ls  of t h e i r  le a s e  was com pleted .
The Chinese were very  anxious th a t  t h e i r  m an -o f-w ar should  
s t i l l  be a llo w ed  to  use th e  p o r t  and th a t  th e re  should be
3
f a c i l i t i e s  th e re  f o r  th e  t r a in in g  of Chinese n a v a l o f f ic e r s .
W h ils t th e re  was some re lu c ta n c e  on th e  p a r t  of th e  B r i t is h
to  commit them selves to  g iv in g  th e  Chinese d e f in i t e  p r iv i le g e s
a t W e i-h s i W ei, t h e i r  in t e r e s t  in  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f a s s is t in g
China in  th e  re o rg a n iz a t io n  of h e r  f l e e t  made them disposed
to  be accommodating. " I f  we wish to  use W e i-h a i Wei as a
base from  vh ich  to  c o n s tru c t an e f f i c i e n t  Chinese
navy and army under B r i t is h  o f f ic a rs  we must not 
lé s in e r  about sm all th in g s "  sa id  S a lis b u r y .4
And 8 s t ip u la t io n  %as in s e r te d  in  th e  C onvention p ro v id in g
5
th a t  C hinese w arsh ips re ta in e d  the  r ig h t  to  use th e  p o r t .
T .  B .P .8 .P . .  (1 8 9 8 -1 8 9 9 ) , XC, 1 7 -1 8 .
2 . Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , 24 May 1898, A»& P . , [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[C .9 1 3 1 ] ,  369.
3 . Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , 24 May 1898, A.& P » . [ l 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[G .9 1 3 1 ] , 376; Macdonald t o  S a lis b u ry , 3 A p r i l  1898,
Gooch and T em p erley . I ,  30 .
4 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 189, 25 May 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 ,
m inute on d r a f t  by S a lis b u ry . The te le g ra m  i s  p u b lish ed  in
A.& P . . [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX , [ 0 .9 1 3 1 ] ,  3 7 0 -3 7 1 .
5 . B .F .S .P . .  (1 8 9 8 -1 8 9 9 ) , XC, 1 6 -1 7 .
mD u rin g  these n e g o t ia t io n s  th e  B r i t is h  fo rb o re  to  a 
c e r t a in  e x te n t to  p re s s  o th e r m a tte rs  on the C h in ese , In  th e  
meantime however th e  c o m p e titio n  f o r  r a ilw a y  concessions was 
becoming s source of growing concern . I t  became known a t th e  
end of may th a t  th e  B e lg ia n  S ynd icate  was re c e iv in g  open 
French and R ussian support in  i t s  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  th e  P e k in g -
Hankow concession end th a t  th e  l in e  m igjit be fin a n c e d  by th e
1
RusDO-Chinese Bank. "A concession of t h i s  n a tu re " , p ro te s te d  
th e  B r i t is h  two weeks l a t e r ,  " is  no lo n g e r a com m ercial 
or in d u s t r ia l  e n te r p r is e , and becomes a p o l i t i c a l  
movement a g a in s t B r it is ü i in t e r e s t s  in  the re g io n  of 
th e  Y a n g tze " . 2 A lso in d ic a t iv e  of the  B r i t is h  v iew  of
t h i s  developm ent was t h e i r  im m ediate in s t r u c t io n  to  Macdonald
3
to  p re s s  f o r  the Hankow-Canton r a ilw a y :  th e  one which th e y
had f i r s t  req u ested  in  March when th e y  d e s ire d  th e  concession  
f o r  3omo l in e  in  th e  Yangtze v a l le y  as a co u n te rp o is e  to  
th e  p ro lo n g a tio n  of the  T ra n s -S ib e r ia n  l in e  to  P o rt A rth u r .
The Government was f e e l in g  th e  p re s su re  uuon th e^  to  
ta k e  more v ig o ro u s  measures. "Macdonald sends us next
1 . S a lis b u ry  to  M acdonald, 24 May 1398, A. & ? . . [1 9 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[C .9 1 3 1 ] ,  370; Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , T e l . 184, 26 May 
1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 0  (most o f t h is  te le g ra m  is  p u b lish ed  in  
A. & P . . [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX , [C .9 1 3 1 ] ,  3 7 0 ) .
The B e lg ia n  S yn d icate  had o b ta in ed  th e  concession f o r  
t h is  l in e  in  May 1897 ( v id e  s w r a  p . ) but since then  
i t  had been re p o rte d  th a t  the  S ynd icate  was unable to  
c a rry  out i t s  agreement and was on th e  verge of c o lla p s e  
(c p . W.C. C a r tw r ig h t , memorandum, 30 June 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 6 0 )
2 . S a lis b u ry  to  M acdonald, 9 June 1898, A.& P . . [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[c .9 1 3 1 ] ,  391.
3 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, 26 May 1898, A. & P . ,  [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[C .9 1 3 1 ] ,  37 2 .
m" to  no in fo rm a tio n  about a l l  these  r a ilw a y  schemes", 
com plained Curzon on 15 th  June. "The Times end 
o th e r  newspapers have dal ly  a r t i c le s  denouncing us
f o r  supineness. I  have no m a te r ia l  f o r  answ ering  
p ro p e r ly  P a r lia m e n ta ry  q u e s t io n s " .1 Once th e
success of t h e i r  Hong Kong and W e i-h a i Wei n e g o t ia t io n s  was
assu red , th e  B r i t is h  f e l t  f r e e  to  devote  them selves to  the
o th e r m a tte rs  c a l l in g  f o r  t h e i r  a t t e n t io n .  "Now th a t  Kowloon 
and W e i-h a i Wei are a rra n g ed ", S a lis b u ry  te le g ra p h e d  
to  Macdonald on 23 June, " i t  i s  d e s ir a b le  . . .  th a t  
we should s e t t le  th e  o rd er in  which o th e r p r o je c ts  
should be pressed on th e  Yemen". 2
The r e a l  o b je c t io n  of the  B r i t is h  to  the  Russian
in t e r e s t  in  th e  Peking-Hankow l in e  was th a t  "w h ile  p r e f e r e n t ia l  
advantages are conceded to  R ussia in  M anchuria and to  
Germany in  Shantung, these  or o th e r  fo r e ig n  Powers 
should a lso  be o ffe re d  s p e c ia l openings or p r iv i le g e s  
in  th e  re g io n  of th e  Y a n g tze " .3  The B r i t is h  sense o f
g r ie v a n c e  was aggravated  by th e  news re c e iv e d  a few  days l a t e r
th a t  th e  R ussian  charge d 'a f f a i r e s  had o b je c te d  to  th e  Chinese
u s in g  a lo an  from  th e  Hong Kong and S h a n ^ a i Bank f o r  th e
e x te n s io n  of th e  N o rth e rn  l in e  to  Newchwsng.^ In  h is  te le g ra m
on 23 June S a lis b u ry  t o ld  Macdonald th a t  " N e g a tiv e ly  you have  
to  r e s is t  a l l  German ra ilw a y s  so long as th e y  r e s is t  
ours and to  oppose a l l  R ussian a ttem p ts  to  c a p tu re  
ra ilw a y s  in  th e  Yan g tze  d i s t r i c t 8 " . & __________________________
1 . M in u te  by Gurzon on d r a f t  of T e l . 206, S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald,
16 June 1898, P 0 1 7 /1 3 3 9 . (Most o f th e  te le g ra m  i s  p u b lis h e d
In  A.& p . , [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX , [ C . 9 l 3 l ] ,  4 0 3 ) .
2 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, 23 June 1333, A .a  F . , [1 8 9 9 ] ,  G IX ,
[C .9 1 3 1 ] ,  40 9 .
3 . S a lis b u ry  to  M acdonald, 9 June 1898, A.&. P . . [ 1 8 9 9 ]. C IX ,
[C .9 1 3 1 ] ,  391.
4 . Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , T e l . 201, 14 June 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 1 .
6 . S a lis b u ry  to  M acdonald, T e l . 211, 23 June 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 9 .
P a r t  of t h is  te le g ra m  i s  p u b lis h e d  in  A .& P . , [1 8 9 9 ] ,
CIX, [ c . 9 1 3 1 ] ,  409.
The B r i t is h  were c le a r ly  in te n t  i^pon a s s e r t in g  them­
s e lv e s  more v ig o ro u s ly  in  th e  c o m p e titio n  f o r  concessions#
But how th ey  could  best do so was a d i f f i c u l t  q u e s tio n . A 
p o lic y  of o b s tru c t io n , such as th a t  in d ic a te d  in  S a lis b u r y 's  
in s t r u c t io n  to  Macdonald, was not r e a l l y  welcome to  them -
le a s t  o f a l l  to  S a lis b u ry  who was ever ready t o  adopt th e
1
r e f r a in  o f "th e  mere ra ilw a y s  the b e t t e r " .  In  r e p ly in g  to
Gurzon»s o u tc ry  on f i r s t  h e a r in g  of th e  R ussian  in t e r e s t  in
th e  Peking-Hankow  l i n e ,  S a lis b u ry  had e x p la in ed  h is  fe e l in g s
on t h i s  s u b jec t a t some le n g th . " I  understand you to  propose  
th a t  we should r e s is t  and p re v e n t th e  c o n s tru c tio n  
of any Chinese ra ilw a y  to  whose expenses any R ussian  
bank has su b scrib ed . I s  t h i s  p r a c t ic a l? "  he asked,
c o n tin u in g  th a t  " i f  you do not accept t h is  g e n e ra l p r in c ip le  
I  do not see how th e  p a r t ic u la r  o ffe n c e  of f in a n c in g  
th e  Hankow r a i lw a y  can be d e te c te d  and p u n ish ed . I  
do not see my way, i f  R ussian c a p i t a l i s t s  11 throw  
t h e i r  money ab o u t, to  p re v e n tin g  th e  Chinese from  
p ic k in g  i t  up. We must f in d  some e q u a lly  p a t r i o t i c  
C a p i t a l is t s  on our s id e ; o th e rw ise  we must say 
s o r ro w fu lly  of th e  R ussian c o in  -  'R o u b le t ' , "  2
D e te rm in a tio n  to  b o ls te r  up th e  B r i t is h  p o s it io n  had
since  a p p a re n tly  made S a lis b u ry  le s s  r e lu c ta n t  to  c o n s id e r the
1. S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, 25 May 1898, A.& P . , [ l 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[C .9 1 5 1 J , 371 . T h is  p a r t ic u la r  comment was made upon 
h e a r in g  a re p o r t  th a t  Prance had ob ta ined  a concession  
f o r  a ra ilw a y  from  Pakhoi to  N anning. "The more ra ilw a y s  
th e  b e t t e r ,  from  e com m ercial p o in t  of v ie w " , te le g ra p h e d  
S a lis b u ry , "but th e re  i s  g re a t d is t r u s t  h e re  of French  
methods [a n d ! d i f f e r e n t i a l  r a te s  a g a in s t B r i t is h  tra d e  are  
f e a r e d . . . "  S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 130, 25 May 1898, 
F 017 /1Ô 38 . âüst of th e  te le g ra m  is  p u b lish ed  in  & &  P . . 
[ lB 9 9 ] ,  C IX , [C .9 1 3 1 ] ,  371 .
2 . Ronald shay, L i f e  o f lo rd  G urzon, I ,  [1 9 2 8 ] ,  287.
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b lo c k in g  of o th e r concessions and th e  R ussian o b je c tio n s  to
the  f in a n c in g  of the  n o rth e rn  l in e  by the Hong Tong and
Shangliai Bank had d o u b tle s s  h e lp e a  to  make him f e e l  th a t  such
2
a p o lic y  was more j u s t i f i a b l e .  N e v e rth e le s s  S a lis b u ry
r e ta in e d  h is  d is l ik e  of a p u re ly  o b s tru c t iv e  p o l ic y .  I t  was
c h a r a c t e r is t ic ,  and a ls o  in  accord w ith  th e  view s which he
had expressed in  h is  l e t t e r  to  Gurzon, th a t he was anxious to
d isc u s s  th e  su b jec t w ith  some " p r a c t ic a l"  p e rs o n . Lord
R o th s c h ild , to  vhom B e r t ie  mentioned t h is  on 6 J u ly , was
d o u b tfu l whether B r i t a in  could "w ith o u t r e s o r t in g  to  fo rc e
e x tra c t  concessions from  the  Chinese u n less  we work w ith  an 
3 4
a l l y .  Nor a p p a re n tly  d id  Mr. K esw ick, whom R o th s c h ild
brought to  d isc u ss  th e  q u es tio n  w ith  S a lis b u ry  a week l a t e r ,
1. Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , T e l . 201, 14 June 1393, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 1 ,
2 . S a lis b u ry  remained unconvinced however of the  " p o l i t i c a l
im p o rtan ce" of th e  Peking-Hankow l in e  b e in g  under 
French or Russian management. He commented upon a m inute  
in  t h is  sense by an o f f i c i a l  of th e  fo r e ig n  O f f ic e :  " I
th in k  tho 'p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e ' th e re o f  i s  la r g e ly  an 
im a g in a tio n . I  know no in s ta n c e  on \^ ic h  i t  can be 
based. The W estern R a ilw ay  of F rance was made by 
Englishm en and conducted by Englishm en f o r  some t im e .  
I t  n ever gave us the  s l ig h te s t  in f lu e n c e  in  F ra n c e .
The H irs c h  ra ilw a y s  n ever in cre a s ed  by an io t a  th e  
in f lu e n c e  of A u s tr ia  in  th e  B alkan  p e n in s u la . The 
German Emperor got concessions because he backed th e  
S u lta n  and d r i l l e d  h is  army: but th e re  i s  no ground
f o r  b e lie v in g  th a t  th e  A sia  M inor ra ilw a y s  have  
in c re a s e d  h is  in f lu e n c e . G erta l n ly  th e  Sm yrna-A id ln  
r a i lw a y  has g iven  no in f lu e n c e  to  G reat B r i t a in " .
M inute by S a lis b u ry  on Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry ,
T e l .2 3 d ,  23 J u ly  1898 , F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 1 .
3 . B e r t ie ,  memorandum, 6 Ju ly  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 5 6 0 .
4 . W illia m  Keswick o f J a rd in e  Matheson Company and th e  China
A s s o c ia t io n .
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in s p ir a  © more h o p e fu l mood. "The b a t t la  o f concessions  
does no t seem to  be go ing  w e ll  f o r  us"; S a lis b u ry  
te le g ra p h e d  to  Macdonald a fte rw a rd s , "and we must 
fa c e  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  th e  mass of Chinese ra ilw a y s  
i f  th e y  come in to  e x is te n c e  w i l l  be in  fo r e ig n  h a n d s " .1
Faced w ith  such a p o s s ib i l i t y ,  the  f i r s t  concern o f
th e  B r i t is h  was as a lw ays th e  p r o te c t io n  of t h e i r  t r a d e .  The
concessions f o r  r a ilw a y s  m i ^ t  go to  o th e rs . And as a r e s u l t
th e  o rd ers  f o r  ra i lw a y  m a te r ia ls  would go e lse w h ere . T h is
S a lis b u ry  was w i l l i n g  to  accept as an u n avo id ab le  e v i l .  But
th e  o th e r d an g er, th e  danger of p r e f e r e n t ia l  r a te s  on these
ra ilw a y s  which would s tra n g le  B r i t is h  t r a d e ,  he thought th ey
could  p re v e n t by p re s s in g  f o r  the  in c lu s io n  in  a l l  r a i lw a y
concessions of s t ip u la t io n s  p ro v id in g  f o r  eq u a l t re a tm e n t.
Such an a ttem p t would r e q u ire  a c o n s id e ra b le  amount o f
d e ta i le d  work, and to  a s s is t  Macdonald in  t h is  S a lis b u ry
2
proposed sending out an e x p e rt from  th e  Board o f T ra d e .
Macdonald f e l t  th a t  th e re  would not be much use in  h a v in g
such a p e rs o n , but sa id  th a t  a C h in es e -sp e ak in g  com m ercial
a tta c h e  would be v e ry  u s e fu l .  "O b ta in  le a v e  from  th e  T re a su ry "
d ire c te d  S a lis b u ry , " I t  ought not to  be re fu s e d  v i i i le  t h i s
' 3
i n i t i a l  p e r io d  c o n tin u e s " .
1 . S a lis b u ry  to  M acdonald, T e l . 223, 13 J u ly  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 9 .
P a r t  o f t h is  te le g ra m  is  p u b lis h e d  in  A. & P . . [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C]X. 
[G .9 1 3 1 J , 4 3 8 .
2 . I b i d .
3 . Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , T e l . 235, 23 J u ly  1898, P 0 1 7 /1 3 4 1 .
M inute by S a lis b u ry .
2.02.
But d e s p ite  the  note o f r e s ig n a t io n  sounded by S a lis b u ry
in  h is  te le g ra m  to  M acdonald, th e  B r i t is h  were n o t abandoning
th e  b a t t le  f o r  concessions. On th e  c o n tra ry  th e re  I s  an
e v id e n t a n x ie ty  to  ensure th a t  c e r ta in  concessions a t le a s t
went to  B r i t is h  s y n d ic a te s . The q u e s tio n  was b r o u ^ t  b e fo re
1
th e  C ab in e t when i t  met on 16 J u ly  and in  a te legram  to
Macdonald th a t  a fte rn o o n , presum ably a f t e r  th e  C ab in e t m eetin g ,
S a lis b u ry  sa id  th a t  "much a n x ie ty  p r e v a i ls  h e re  about th re e
r a ilw a y s " .  These th re e  were the  Peking-Hankow , th e  Shanghai-
N anklng , and th e  P ek ing  ( T ie n t s in )-C h in k ia n g  l in e s .  The la s t
was consid ered  " a p p a re n tly  th e  most im p o rta n t" . Of th e
S hanghai-N anking  r a ilw a y  S a lis b u ry  sa id  "%e hope we s h e ll  a t
2
le a s t  be ab le  to  p re v e n t th e  Germans g e t t in g  i t " .  And th e  
Peking-Hankow l in e  th ey  hoped th ey  m ight be a b le  to  a c q u ire  
in  exchange f o r  t h e i r  r ig h ts  over th e  N o rth e rn  l i n e .  A no te  
from  B e r t ie  to  Cameron on 22 J u ly , ask in g  i f  th e  B ank's  
s y n d ic a te  had g iven  up n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  th e  T ie n t  s in -C h in k ia n g  
and Canton-Hankow l in e s  and i f  so w hether he m i ^ t  in fo rm  
an o th er s yn d ica te  th a t  th ese  were a v a i la b le ,  i s  an o th er
1 . K esw ick, Memorandum, 14 J u ly  1898, FÔ 17/1361; Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank to  B e r t ie ,  14 Ju ly  1898 , P 0 1 7 /1 3 6 1 . 
Both these  papers  are  marked " P r in t  f o r  th e  C ab in e t -  
By J u ly  16 " .
2 . S a lis b u ry  to  M acdonald, T e l . 227, 5 .4 0  p .m . 16 J u ly  1 8 9 8 ,
P 0 1 7 /1 3 3 9 . Most of t h is  te le g ra m  i s  p u b lish ed  in  
A. & P . . [1 3 9 9 ] ,  C IX , [ c . 9 1 3 1 ] ,  438.
lô s
of th e  Governm ent's d e s ire  to  see th a t  as many concessions
1
as p o s s ib le  should be in  B r i t is h  hands.
The main aim of the  B r i t is h  Government in  th e  steps  
miilch they were ta k in g  seems t  o have been to  in s p ir e  in  
B r i t is t i  c o m p etito rs  f o r  concessions a sense of the  Govern­
m en t's  sympathy end support f o r  t h e i r  a c t i v i t y .  In  t h i s  th e y  
were p ro ceed in g  on l in e s  very  c lo se  to  those la id  down by 
Keswick in  s memorandum which he sent to  S a lis b u ry  a f t e r  t h e i r
in te r v ie w . " I t  may be assumed th a t  th e  f ln s n c l a l and
com m ercial p u b lic  w i l l  tak e  care  of them selves  and 
be ready to  compete w ith  a l l  com ers", Keswick had 
w r it t e n ,  "but to  g ive  them co n fid en ce  th e y  must f e e l  
sure of the  f i e l d  b e in g  kept open f o r  them and of 
v ig o ro u s  and su sta in ed  support i f  th e  Chinese are  
induced to  recede from  t h e i r  agreem ents . . . "  S
T h is  th e  Government was w i l l i n g  to  do. Indeed i t  was on ly
te n  deys l a t e r ,  a f t e r  re p o r ts  had been re c e iv e d  th a t  th e
Russian charge d 'a f f a i r e s  had ag a in  s tro n g ly  p ro te s te d  a g a in s t
th e  f  in a n c in g  of the  Shanhaikwan-Newchwang l in e  by th e  Hong
Kong and 3hanim ai Bank and even th a t  he had th re a te n e d  a
Russian s e izu re  of th e  p ro v in c e  of i l l  or K u ld ja  i f  th e  Chinese
p e r s is te d  in  th e  arrangem ent, th a t  Macdonald was to ld  th a t
he could " in fo rm  [ t h e ]  Yamen th a t H er M a je s ty 's  Government
1 . B e r t ie  to  Cameron, P r iv a te ,  22 Ju ly  1898, P 0 1 7 /1 3 6 1 .
2 . K esw ick, Memorandum on R ailw ays  in  C h in a , 14 Ju ly  1898,
F 0 1 7 /1 3 6 1 .
" w i l l  s ip p o rt them a g a in s t any Power which commits 
an act o f agg ress io n  on China because China has  
g ran ted  to  a B r i t is h  su b jec t p e rm is s io n  t o  make or 
support any r a ilw a y  or s im ila r  p u b lic  w o r k " .l
On th e  o th e r hand th e  Government was not d isposed to  
g iv e  p r a c t ic a l  a s s is ta n c e  In  the f in a n c in g  and c o n s tru c tio n  
of r a i lw a y s . The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank were ho p ing  
in  th e  n ld d le  o f J u ly  to  get th e  concession f o r  th e  T ie n t  s in -  
C h in k ian g  r a i lw a y  but wanted a Government subsid y . "They are  
not l i k e l y  to  get t h is " ,  S a lis b u ry  to ld  M acdonald. N ever­
th e le s s  he urged him  to  p re s s  f o r  th e  c o n ces s io n , saying
th a t  " i f  th e  chance of h a v in g  th e  concession i s  pu t a c tu a l ly  
w ith in  t h e i r  re a c h , I  do not t h in k  th e y  w i l l  in s is t  
on t h is  c o n d i t i o n " . 2 a few  days l a t e r  th e re  was
some q u e s tio n  of th e  Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank a c q u ir in g
th e  concession f o r  th e  Canton-Hankow l in e  from  th e  Am erican
S yn d ica te  which h e ld  i t .  A p p a re n tly  however th e y  f e l t  th a t
some Government a s s is ta n c e  would be necessary  to  r a is e  a lo an
f o r  t h is  r a i lw a y . B e r t ie  asked S a lis b u ry  i f  he had any
d ir e c t io n s  to  g iv e . S a l is b u r y 's  r e p ly  r e f l e c t s  v e ry
a c c u ra te ly  th e  # io le  te n o u r o f th e  G overnm ent's  a c t i v i t y  in
1 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, 22 J u ly  1898, Gooch and T em p erley .
I ,  3 6 . T h is  te le g ra m  is  a ls o  p u b lish e d  in  A.& P . . L1899j.  
C IX , [c .9 1 3 1 ] ,  44 3 . I t  i s  in t e r e s t in g  th a t  i t  was in c lu d e d  
in  t h is  Blue Book ( Correspondence re s p e c tin g  th e  A f f a i r s  
of C h in a ) r a th e r  th a n  in  A. & PT} [ l 3 9 9 j ,  C IX , [C .9 3 2 9 ]
( Correspondence between H er M a je s ty 's  Government and th e  
R ussian  Government w ith  re g a rd  to  t h e i r  re s p e c t iv e  R a ilw ay  
In t e r e s t s  in  C h in a) vfoich c o n ta in s  a l l  th e  o th e r p u b lis h ed  
m a te r ia l  re g a rd in g  th e  Shanhaikwan-Newchwang r a i lw a y .
2 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, 16 Ju ly  1898, A. & P > » [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
. [ c .9 1 3 1 ] ,  438.
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t h i s  q u e s tio n ; "Be v e ry  sym p ath etic"  he to ld  B e r t ie
"Prom ise a l l  th e  a s s is ta n c e  which we can g iv e  -  
but th e y  must not expect a f a r t h in g  fro m  th e  
T re a s u ry " *1
But a l t h o u ^  th e  Government was anxious n o t to  be 
drawn in t o  p r a c t ic a l  commitments of t h i s  k in d , th ey  were on 
th e  o th e r  hand ready to  go to  c o n s id e ra b le  le n g th s  to  support 
t h e i r  demands f o r  concessions. T h is  was amply i l l u s t r a t e d  in  
August when is s u e s  between th e  Chinese end th e  B r i t is h  re g a rd ­
in g  ra ilw a y s  came to  a head. The source o f the d is p u te  was 
once more th e  Peking-Hankow l i n e .  On 12 August th e  Tsung11 
Yamen r a t i f i e d  t h e i r  agreement w ith  th e  B e lg ia n  S ynd icate  
f o r  t h is  l i n e ,  d e s p ite  th e  assurance which th e y  had g iven  
Macdonald th a t  th e y  would not do so i f  i t  was found to  c o n ta in  
p ro v is io n s  f o r  th e  f in a n c in g  of the  l in e  by th e  Kusso-Chine se 
Bank and in  fa c e  of th e  rep eated  p r o te s ts  which he had made 
when he h eard  th a t  r a t i f i c a t i o n  was n e v e rth e le s s  b e in g  rushed
th ro u g h * " I f  heavy payment is  not exacted from  the  Chinese  
f o r  t h e i r  bad f a i t h " ,  te le g ra p h e d  M acdonald, "L i 
[H ung-chang] w i l l  persuade h is  c o lle a g u e s  th a t  i t  i s  
s a fe r  to  s l l # i t  England than  any o th e r  P ow er".^
B a lfo u r , who was aga in  ta k in g  S a lis b u r y 's  p la c e  a t th e
F o re ig n  O f f ic e ,  took  up th e  qi-iestlon w ith  eq u a l warmth. He
in s t r u c te d  Macdonald to  In s is t  upon a w r i t t e n  assurance th a t
a number o f th e  ra ilw a y  concessions f o r  vhioh th e  B r i t is h
1 . Cameron to  B e r t ie ,  21 J u ly  1893, P 0 1 7 /1 3 6 1 , m inute by
S a l i  sbury.
2 . Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , 13 August 1898, A .& P . . [1 8 9 9 ] ,
G IX , [ c .9 1 3 1 ] ,  4 6 3 -4 6 4 .
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were th e n  n e g o t ia t in g  would be g ra n ted  at once and on th e
same term s as those o f th e  Peking-Hankow concess ion .
Macdonald was to ld  moreover th a t  he could in fo rm  th e  Chinese
th a t  i f  th e y  d id  not comply im m e d ia te ly , B r i t a in  would "reg ard  
t h e i r  breach of f a i t h  co n cern in g  th e  Peking-Hankow  
r a i lw a y  as an ac t of d e l ib e r a te  h o s t i l i t y  a g a in s t  
t h i s  c o u n try , and s h a ll  act a c c o r d in g ly " . !  The th r e a t
was n o t an empty one. The B r i t is h  were p rep ared  to  use fo rc e
i f  n ece ssa ry , t h e i r  in te n t io n  in  such an event a p p a re n tly
2
b e in g  to  se ize  th e  f o r t s  a t the  mouth of th e  Y a n g tze . "Our 
o b je c t" ,  B a lfo u r  e x p la in e d  to  Macdonald, " is  to  pun ish  
Chinese p e r f id y ,  and to  make th e  punishm ent s w i f t " . 3
Macdonald p re s en ted  th e  B r i t is h  demands to  th e  T s u n g li Yamen
on 20 August, no t m en tio n in g  th e  measures iMiich B r i t a in  in te n d e d
to  ta k e  i f  th ey  were not g ra f te d  but s tre s s in g  th e  seriousness
4
o f th e  s i tu a t io n .  B a lfo u r , anxious f o r  a qu ick  s e tt le m e n t,
to ld  Macdonald th a t  i f  he thought i t  would h a s te n  m a tte rs  he
cou ld  in fo rm  th e  Chinese th a t  a d d it io n a l demands would be made
5
i f  th ey  d e la y e d . In  th e  event however a s e ttle m e n t was 
reached w ith o u t e i t h e r  r e s o r t in g  to  fo rc e  o r making a d d it io n a l
1 . B a lfo u r  to  Macdonald, 17 August 1898, A.& P . .  [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[ C .9 1 o l ] ,  4 66 .
2 . B a lfo u r  to  Macdonald, T e l . 246 ( re p e a t in g  In s t r u c t io n s  to
A d m ira l D u l l e r ) ,  17 August 1898 , P 0 1 7 /1 3 3 9 ; B e r t ie ,  
Memorandum, 17 August 1808, F G 17 /1362 .
3.  B a lfo u r  to  Macdonald, T e l . 250, 20 August 1898, P 0 1 7 /1 3 3 9 .
4 .  Macdonald to  B a lfo u r , T e l . 263, 21 August 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 1 .
Most of t h is  te le g ra m  is  p u b lish ed  In  A. dc P . , [1 8 9 9 ] ,
GIX, [ c . 9 1 3 1 ] ,  467.
5 . B a lfo u r  to  Macdonald, 24 August 1898, A.& P . ,  [1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[ c . 9 1 3 1 ] ,  482.
demand 8. On 14 3eptamber Macdonald re c e iv e d  from  th e
T s u n g li Yamen a despatch  a p o lo g iz in g  f o r  t h e i r  conduct and
co n se n tin g  to  th e  c o n s tru c t io n , by B r i t is h  s y n d ic a te s  and
on term s "not in f e r io r "  to  those of th e  concession  f o r  th e
Peking-Hankow  l i n e ,  of the rs5. iro s d s  which Macdonald had 
1
demanded.
A lthough the  B r i t is h  had not h e s ita te d  to  c o n s id e r
u s in g  fo rc e  a g a in s t th e  Chinese in  t h i s  m a tte r , th e y  had been
a t p a in s  to  exclude from  t h e i r  u ltim atu m  any demands which
m i ^ t  b r in g  them in to  c o n f l ic t  w ith  o th e r  Powers b e s id es
C h in a . They were p a r t i c u la r ly  anxious th a t  R ussia  should not
become in v o lv e d  in  th e  s e ttle m e n t of B r i t is h  d i f fe r e n c e s  w ith
C hina and B a lfo u r  in s is te d  upon th e  Shanhaikwan-Newchwang
r a iIw a y  b e in g  t r e a te d  as a c o m p le te ly  se p a ra te  m a tte r .
N e v e rth e le s s  in  t h is  q u es tio n  to o , which had a ls o  come
to  a heed a t t h is  t im e , he to o k  an e q u a lly  f i r m  l i n e .  The
R ussians had s u s ta in ed  t h e i r  o p p o s it io n  to  th e  In t e r e s t  of
th e  Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in  th e  Shanhaikwan-*Newchwang
l i n e .  They were now co n ten d in g  th a t  th e y  co u ld  not countenance
th e  m ortgage of th e  l in e  or any p ro v is io n  f o r  i t s  c o n tr o l
by Europeans -  a r e s t r i c t i o n  which th e  Bank said  would make a
2
com m ercial lo an  im p o s s ib le . S a lis b u ry  to ld  th e  Chinese
1. Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , 14 September 1898, A. & P . .
C IX , [ c . 9 1 3 1 ] ,  515.
2 . S a lis b u ry  to  M acdonald, 24 J u ly  1898, A.ic P . . [1 3 9 9 ] ,  G IX ,
[C .9 3 2 9 ] ,  655; Macdonald to  S a lis b u r y , T e l . 247 , 6 August 
1898, P 0 1 7 /1 3 4 1 .
M in is te r  on 8 August th a t  R ussia  had no r ig h t  to  make such 
1
o b je c tio n s #  Pour days l a t e r  B a lfo u r  rem o n s tra te d  w ith
L e s s a r, of th e  R ussian  Embassy, p o in t in g  out th a t  P a v lo f f 's
a c t io n  was " in  m a n ife s t c o n tr a d ic t io n  to  the  T re a ty  of 
T ie n ts in  . . .  and th a t  th e  a c t iv e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  of 
th e  R ussian Government in  t h is  v io la t io n  o f our 2 
r ig h t s  must lead  to  consequences o f g re a t g r a v i t y . "
The n e x t day Macdonald was to ld  th a t  he c o u ld , as he had
suggested, in fo rm  th e  Chinese th a t  t h e i r  assent in  th e  Russian
In te r fe r e n c e  was co n s id ered  a "mark of extrem e u n fr ie n d lin e s s  
to  G reat B r i t a i n . . . " . 3  And B a lfo u r  c a u tio n ed  him
s p e c ia l ly  to  "say n o th in g  to  suggest th a t  any com pensation  
which th e y  could  g ive  ua e lsew here would condone 
t h e i r  o ffe n c e " ,^  He gave a s t i l l  more e x p l i c i t  and
fo rm a l e x p res s io n  of th e  B r i t is h  o b je c t io n s  f i v e  days l a t e r
when he in s tr u c te d  S c o tt ,  the  B r i t is h  Ambassador at S t ,
P e te rs b u rg ,to  t e l l  M o u ra v ie ff  th a t  " i t  i s  im p o s s ib le  f o r  H er  
M a je s ty 's  Government to  acqu iesce in  an arrangem ent 
which w h ile  e x c lu d in g  England in  h e r  share o f th e  
r a i lw a y  e n te r p r is e s  of M anchuria le a v e s  a l l  China  
open to  th e  r a ilw a y  e n te rp r is e  of Russia# Such a 
p re te n s io n  i f  p e rs is te d  i n  must in e v i ta b ly  produce  
th e  most s e rio u s  In t e r n a t io n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I t  has  
a lre a d y  aroused in  t h is  co u n try  a f e e l in g  o f g re a t
e x a s p e r a t io n " .3
1. M in u te  by S a lis b u ry , 8 August 1898, Gooch and T e m p e rle y . I ,
3 7 .
2 . B a lfo u r  to  S c o tt , (d e s p a tc h ), 12 August 1898, A. & P . .
[1 8 9 9 ] ,  GIX, [ C .9329 ] ,  658.
3 . Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , 10 August 1898, A. & P# . [1 8 9 9 ] ,
CIX, [ c . 9 3 2 9 ] ,  658.
4 . B a lfo u r  to  M acdonald, T e l . 241 , 13 August 1898 , F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 9 .
P a r t  of t h i s  te le g ra m  is  p u b lish ed  in  A. & P . , [1 8 9 9 ] ,
CIX, [ c . 9 3 2 9 ] ,  659.
5 . B a lfo u r  to  S c o tt , 17 August 1898 , Gooch and T em p erley . 1 ,3 7
îA'hat, th e n , were th e  B r i t l f ih  to  do? M acdonald, -.vho was 
v e ry  an x icu a  th a t  th e  Bank should not lo se  th e  co n cess io n , 
thou ght th a t  t h is  migjbt he p rev en ted  i f  the  Bank would accept 
some o th e r  s e c u r ity  th a t  d id  not in f r in g e  th e  T s u n g li Yemen's 
agreem ent w ith th e  R ussian charge d 'a f f a i r e s ,  B r i t a in
1
Insisting a t th e  same tim e  on com pensation e ls e w h e re . T h is
B a lfo u r  d e s c rib e d  as "acqu iescence" «hioh he ru le d  out «s
2
b e in g  "on every  ground in a d m is s ib le " . On th e  o th e r hand i t
seemed to  him h a r d ly  w o rth w h ile  to  r is k  war over t h is  q u e s tio n :
J2Ë should be f ig h t in g  because we want M anchuria
and. the  Y angtze  to  be a common f i e l d  f o r  E n g lis h  and
R ussian c o n c e s s io n a ire s . They would be f ig h t in g
because th e y  p r e fe r r e d  d iv id in g  the  f i e l d  In to  two 
p o r t io n s  . . .  A sm all m a tte r  about which to  set th e  
w orld  on f i r e " . 3
And y e t h e re  B a lfo u r  was not q u ite  a c cu ra te  in  h is
sta tem ent of th e  p o in t  of d i f fe r e n c e  between England and
R u s s ia . The o b je c tio n a b le  fe a tu r e  of th e  R ussian  c la im s  from
th e  B r i t i s h  p o in t  of v ie w , as B a lfo u r  h im s e lf  had s tre s s e d ,
was th a t  R ussia  wanted to  p re s erv e  .Manchuria f o r  h e r s e l f  and
a t th e  same tim e to  compete e q u a lly  in  th e  re g io n  o f th e
Y a n g tze . A g e n u in e ly  r e c ip r o c a l  d iv is io n  th e  B r i t is h  m ight
1 . Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , T e l s . 252 and 253, 10 August 1898,
P 0 1 7 /1 3 4 1 . P a r t  of t e l . 253 i s  p u b lis h e d  in  A.& P . . [ 1 3 9 9 ] ,  
CIX, [ c . 9 3 2 9 ] ,  658.
2 . B lanche E .C . D u g d a le , A rth u r James B a lfo u r . [ 1 9 3 6 ] ,  I ,  265.
Mrs. Dugdale says th a t  th e  memorandum in  which t h is  occurs  
was w r it te n  a f t e r  B a lfo u r  "had s tu d ied  th e  q u e s tio n  a t  
c lo s e  q u a rte rs  f o r  f i v e  d ays ". T h is  suggests th a t  i t  was 
w r it t e n  on 16 o r 1.7 August.
3 . Ib id .
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be expected  to  c o n s id e r -  th e y  had been w i l l in g  to  do so w ith
1
th e  Germans e a r l i e r  in  th e  y e a r . I t  was Lessar #10 i n  h is
c o n v e rs a tio n  w ith  B a lfo u r  on 12 August suggested th a t  a
s o lu tio n  of th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  between th e  two c o u n tr ie s  m ight
be an agreement whereby England r e f r a in e d  from  p re s s in g  f o r
r a i lw a y  and m in ing concessions in  M anchuria and R ussia  d id
2
lik e w is e  In  th e  Yangtze re g io n .
B a lfo u r ,  s t i l l  in te n t  upon em phasizing th e  grave and
in a d m is s ib le  n a tu re  of the Russian a c t io n  re g a rd in g  the
Shanhaikwan-Newchwang ra l iway and no doubt s t i l l  f e e l in g
i n s u f f i c ie n t ly  acq u a in ted  w ith  th e  d e t a i ls  o f th e  c ase ,
r e f r a in e d  a t f i r s t  from  in d ic a t in g  th a t  such an arrangem ent
3
m ight be a c c e p ta b le . But in  the  memorandum w h ich  he drew up 
fo u r  or f i v e  days l a t e r  o u t l in in g  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e s  which  
B r i t a in  m ight adopt, he w rote th a t  " th e re  I s  much to  be s a id "
4
in  fa v o u r  of th e  id e a  of coming to  an arrangem ent w ith  R u s s ia . 
And on r e c e iv in g  a re p o r t  on 18 August of a c o n v e rs a tio n  in  
which M o u ra v ie ff  had a ls o  appeared to  endorse t h i s  id e a ,  B a lfo u r  
en q u ired  e th e r  he was c o rre c t in  u n d e rs tan d in g  M o u ra v ie ff  to
suggest as s s o lu t io n  a r e c ip r o c a l agreem ent of th e  k ind
1 . V ide supra p . I%9-
2 . B a lfo u r  to  S c o tt , (d e s p a tc h ), 12 August 1898 , A. & P . .
[1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX , LG .9 3 2 9 ] , 6 5 3 .
3 . I b i d . , 6 5 9 .
4 . D u g d a le , op. c i t . , I ,  265.
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suggested by Lessar and an u n d ers ta n d in g  th a t th e  Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank might f in a n c e  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  of th e  ra ilw a y
to  Kewchwang as long as the  l in e  was under C hinese c o n tro l and
was no t mortgaged to  a non-C hinese Company. " . . . I  th in k  perhaps
1
t h is  m ight be made th e  b as is  of a s e ttle m e n t"  he conc lu ded .
The Hong hong and Shangjiai B a ik  was e v id e n t ly  a lre a d y
2
a rra n g in g  to  accept some o th e r s e c u r ity  f o r  t h e i r  lo a n ,
B a lfo u r  however asked them to  suspend t h e i r  n e g o t ia t io n s  or
at le a s t  not to  make any m o d if ic a t io n s  in  th e  term s o f t h e i r
p r e l im in a r y  agreement u n t i l  th e re  was some in d ic a t io n  o f how
the n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  Russia were going to  tu r n  o u t. He was
u n w il l in g  th a t  th e re  should be any concession  to  th e  R ussian
o b je c tio n s  re g a rd in g  th e  Shsnhaikwan-Wewobwang r a ilw a y  u n le s s
th e re  was some assurance th a t  R ussia  was w i l l in g  to  e n te r
3
in to  a g e n e ra l agreem ent. Such an agreem ent r e a l l y  had a 
g re a t d e a l to  recommend i t  from  th e  B r i t is h  p o in t  of v iew  and 
i t  i s  e v id en t th a t  B a lfo u r  was a f r a id  th a t  R ussia  m ight lo se  
in t e r e s t  in  the id e a  I f  she won h e r  p o in t  re g a rd in g  th e  
Shanhaikwan-Newchwang ra l Iw ay . In  th e  event g g re a t many com­
p l ic a t io n s  d id  emerge to  o b s tru c t th e  c o n c lu s io n  of th e
4
n e g o t ia t io n s  and no agreement was reached u n t i l  A p r i l  1899,
1 . B a lfo u r  to  B o o tt, 19 August 1838, P . . [1 8 9 9 ] ,  CIX,
[ c . 9 3 2 9 ] ,  660-661.
2 . Macdonald to  B a lfo u r , 21 August 1898, A.& p . , [ 1 8 9 9 ] ,
[ c . 9 3 2 9 ] ,  661.
3 . B a lfo u r  to  Macdonald, T e l . 259, 29 August 1898, P017/1339.
4 . S a lis b u ry  to  B a x - Iro n s id e , 30 A p r i l  1899, Gooch and
T e m p e rle y , I ,  4 0 .
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E a r ly  in  Septem ber, how ever, th e  news th a t  th e  Emperor had 
approved th e  id e a  of an engagement seemed to  o f fe r  th e  B r i t is h  
some assurance of a s e ttle m e n t on th e  l in e s  which th ey  had  
chosen.
In d e e d , f o r t i f i e d  by the  hope o f such an agreem ent and 
by th e  f a i r l y  s a t is fa c to r y  outconie of t h e i r  u l t i  ,iatum t c  
C h in a , th e  Government may w a ll at t h is  t in s  have f e l t  ab le  t o  
en joy  e c e r ta in  sense of h a v in g  m a in ta in e d  th e  E r i t i s h  p o s i t io n  
and even of h av in g  made seme headway in  t  ha b a t t le  of concessions  
f i l l  oh had plagued them a l l  summer. The b a t t le  wes to  co n tin u e  
f o r  some tim e but f o r  a w h ile  at le a s t  th e re  was a b r ie f  
r e s p i t e .
"The 'midsummer madness’ on th e  su b jec t of concessions
is  r a th e r  p ass in g  away . . . "  observed H ic k s  Beach w ith  an
2
e v id e n t sense of r e l i e f  a t th e  ond of Septem ber. In  th e  
steps v liich  th e y  to o k  to  p ro te c t  B r i t is h  in t e r e s t s  in  th e  
c o m p e tit io n  th e  Government h ad , as t h is  rem ark suggests , been 
Im p e lle d  to  a c o n s id e ra b le  e x te n t by th o  p re s su re  o f p u b lic  
o p in io n . "P lease  c o l le c t  and send me n o t l a t e r  th a n  Monday
1. S c o tt to  B a lfo u r , 2 September 1323, A. d P . , [1 3 9 9 ] ,  C IX ,
[c.9329], 664. There  had been continued  m isu n d ers tan d in g  
between Macdonald end th e  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  re g a rd in g  the  
d e s i r a b i l i t y  of suspending th e  B ank's  n e g o t ia t io n s . On 
4 September however a F o re ig n  O ff ic e  o f f i c i a l  co'v^ented 
th a t  "M acdonald’ s in c a p a c ity  to  get a c e r ta in  p o in t  does
no t m a tte r  now th e re  i s  a p ro sp ect o f s e ttle m e n t a t S t .
P e te rs b u rg " . M inute on Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , T e l .279,
3 September 1893 , F017/1341.
2 . H ic k s  Beach, Memorandum, 23 September 1893, F017/1363.
"m orning a l l  th e  addresses ne h a vs re c e iv e d  from  
Chambers ol Commerce in  fa v o u r  of ra ilw a y  c o n s tru c tio n  
in  China d u rin g  th e  le s t  two m onths"! d ir e c te d  S a lis b u ry
a t one p o in t ,  B a lfo u r  sa id  in  August th a t  " a t  th e  p re s e n t
moment , , ,  we are  r e a l l y  f ig h t in g  a b a t t le  f o r  p r e s t ig e  
r a th e r  th an  f o r  m a te r ia l And I t  was
perhaps alm ost as much e q u es tio n  of m a in ta in in g  the Govern­
m en t's  p re s t ig e  in  th e  co u n try  as i t  was of m a in ta in in g  
B r i t a i n 's  p re s t ig e  In  C h in a.
T h is  aspect of the  m a tte r i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  n o t ic e a b le  
in  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f p r o je c ts  f o r  a ra i lw a y  from  Burma to  
Yunnan and th e  Y a n g tze . In form ed o p in io n  was g e n e r a lly  agreed
in  h o ld in g  th a t  any such r a ilw a y  was u n l ik e ly  to  be w o rth w h ile
3
even i f ,  as was doubted, i t s  c o n s tru c tio n  was p o s s ib le #
N e v e rth e le s s  th e re  were those #10 expected g re e t th in g s  of
such a ra i lw a y  and B e r t ie  recommended th e  in c lu s io n  in  th e
B r i t is h  u ltim atu m  of a req u es t f o r  th e  c o n ces s io n  of a r a i lw a y
c o n n ec tin g  Burma and. th e  Y angtze  -  "n o t th a t  i t  i s  l i k e l y  to
be f e a s ib le  as a com m ercial e n te r p r is e ,  but in  o rd e r t o
s a t is f y  8 n e r s is te n t  and n o isy  though perhaps sm all s e c tio n  o f
4
th e  p u b lic  a t home". Three weeks e a r l i e r  a group c a lle d  th e  
Yunnan Company had in form ed th e  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  o f t h e i r  d e s ire
1 . S a lis b u ry , Memorandum, 30 J u ly  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 6 1 .
2 . D u g d a le , o p .c i t . , I ,  265.
3 . C arey , a member of th e  Chinese Customs S e rv ic e  s ta tio n e d  a t
Szamso in  th e  extrem e south o f Yunnan, w r i t in g  p r iv a t e ly  
to  Gurzon s a id ; "The q u es tio n  of ra ilw a y s  to  Szemao is  
r e a l l y  not worth d isc u s s in g  . . .  every  parson  in aena  enough 
to  subscribe  to  such an i d i o t i c  p r o je c t  should be in c a r ­
cerated p ro m p tly  in  th e  n e a re s t lu n a t ic  asylum ". 10 March 
1898, P 0 1 7 /1 3 6 1 .
4 .  B e r t ie ,  memorandum, 17 August 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 62 .
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to  a rran g e  f o r  ih e  c o n s tru c t io n  of s r a i lw a y  from  Burma to
th e  Y a n g tze . S a lis b u ry  commented upon how h o p e le s s  th e  p r o je c t
seemed. "How ever", he concluded, " i f  peop le  can be fovmd to  
spend t h e i r  money on such an e n te r p r is e ,  by a l l  rn^ens 
l e t  ua encourage them . I t  w i l l  r e l ie v e  th e  Government 
end g r a t i f y  th e  Chambers of Com m erce".!
The concern oh g e n u in e ly  moved th e  B r i t is h  Government
so f a r  a a ra ilw a y s  were concerned was th e  p r o te c t io n  of t h e i r
t r a d e . O th erw ise  th ey  h^d l i t t l e  i n t r i n s i c  in t e r e s t  in  th e
m a tte r  th em se lves . S a lis b u ry  was p rep ared  to  fa c e  w ith
co m p ara tive  e q u an im ity  the f a c t  th a t  meat r a ilw a y s  In  Chine
m i ^ t  be b u i l t  by o th e rs . Th ere  wes even a s l ig h t  tendency
to  disparage the  r e e l  im portance o f the ?hole q u e s tio n .
"The fo rc e s  m oulding [ t h e ]  d e s t in ie s  [ o f  C hine end 
M an ch u ria j cannot indeed be a c c u ra te ly  e s t im a te d " ,  
w rote B a lfo u r , "but we may su re ly  say th a t  among 
them a re  not to  be e s tim a te d  th e  number o f s te e l  
r a i l s  we e x p o r t , o r th e  number o f l in e s  th a t  are  
managed by H n g ll ah e n g in e e rs ."  2
S trong  f e e l in g  on the s u b jec t in  B r i t a in  however re q u ire d  
more v ig o ro u s  ac tio n  th a n  t h e i r  own in c l in a t io n  might have 
d ic ta te d .  T h is  discrepancy w ould seem to  account in  la rg e  
measure f o r  the  welcome W iioh th e  Government accorded to  the  
id e e  of an agreement w ith  R ussia  h e re b y  each would r e f r a in  
from  press in g  f o r  concessions In  th e  a re a  in  # i lo h  the o th e r  
was p a r t ic u la r ly  in te re s te d , as f o r  t h e ir  e a r l i e r  in t e r e s t
1 . Yunnan Company to  S a lis b u ry , 26 J u ly  1898 , F C 17 /1561 .
Mlnut ® by S a ils b u ry •
2 . D u g d a le , o p .c i t . . X, 2 6 5 -2 6 6 .
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in  agreem ent w ith  Germany re g a rd in g  r a ilw a y s  in  C h in a . F o r
such an arrangem ent prom ised a t once to  s a t is f y  those  who
clam oured f o r  th e  e n e rg e tic  defence of B r i t is h  in t e r e s t s  in
th e  c o m p e tit io n  f o r  r a i lw a y  concessions and a t the  same tim e
to  save th e  Government from  being  In v o lv e d , by t h e i r  de fence
of those  in t e r e s t s ,  in  continued f r i c t i o n  w ith  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s .
The E r i t is h  d id  not re g a rd  t h e i r  sphere o f in f lu e n c e ,
1
or 's p h e re  of in t e r e s t '  as th ey  had p r e fe r re d  to  c a l l  i t ,  as
8 s tepp in g;-s tone to  more d e f in i t e  c o n tro l o f th a t  re g io n . The
p o s s ib i l i t y  was a llu d e d  to  o c c a s io n a lly . Gurzon in  a memorandum
on the  qu estio n  of a r a ilw a y  from  Burma to  the  Y angtze  sa id
th a t  " . . .  should our Yangtze sphere e v e r c r y s t a l l i z e  in to
a n y th in g  l i k e  a p r o te c to r a te  or even a c tu a l po ssess io n  
i t  m ight be d e s ira b le  to  have a ra ilw a y  to  b r in g  up 
Sikh g and Gurkhas from  I n d i a " .  2 But th e re  was no
d e s ir e  on bhe p a r t  of th e  Government f o r  such an outcome.
" . . .  mere t e r r i t o r i a l  expansion  has to a great extent 
ceased' to  have any charm f o r  th e  Government o f England"
S a lis b u ry  to ld  a d e p u ta t io n  from  th e  Chambers of Commerce in  
3
June. And B a lfo u r  w rote in  August th a t  "we want no more
4
frag m e n ts  of China f o r  o u rs e lv e s " .
E vents  at the  end of the  y e a r e l i c i t e d  e s t i l l  more 
e x p l i c i t  d isa v o w a l o f any such d e s ire  or in t e n t io n .  The
1. H a n s a rd 's  p a r lia m e n ta ry  D e b a te s , 4 th  S e r ie s , 29 A p r i l  1398 .
2 . C urzon, memorandum, 12 June 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 6 0 .
3 . The T im es . 15 June 1898.
4 . D u g d a le , o p .c i t . , I ,  266.
Em peror’ s r e f  or ni movement of the  summer months was suddenly
ended in  September by s coup d 'e t a t  in  which th e  Empress
Dowager r-ngumed c o n tro l of tho Government. The c o u n try  was in
a v e ry  u n s e tt le d  s ta te  in  th e  weeks th a t  fo llo w e d  and th e re  was
c o n s io e re b le  a n x ie ty  as to  what was go ing to  happen. Lord
C h a rle s  Beresforci was making an e n e rg e t ic  to u r  of Chins a t the
t im e , seeing  a l l  the  h igh  o f f i c i a l s  and d is c u s s in g  p r o je c ts
f o r  th e  re fo rm  of th e  Chinese army. In  th e  n o r th , he was much
Im pressed by G enera l Yuan S h ih -K a i and, a p p a re n tly  h a v in g  heard
th a t  th e  B r i t is h  in ten d ed  to  take  some d r a s t ic  s teps in  C h in a ,
he te le g ra p h e d  home: " . . .  I f  t r o u b le ,  and s tro n g  a c t io n
determ in ed  in  China I  cou ld  reach  P ek in g  one day w ith  
Yuan S h ih -K u i's  fo r c e ,  m utual c o n fid e n c e , f r ie n d s h ip .  
Through Yuan 3 iiih -K s i I  could m aint al n o rd e r , support 
d y n a s ty , c o n tro l Government which would have to  act 
under S ir  C laude M acdonald 's  o rd ers  -  w i l l  you a u th o r iz e  
me when the tim e  comes? P e r fe c t ly  p o s s ib le  p ro b a b ly  
w ith o u t a s h o t. . .  "1
H is  enthusiasm  met w ith  no response. "At th e  b e g in n in g
of th e  c e n tu ry  th e  id ea  would have been a t t r a c t iv e " ,  
r e p l ie d  S a lis b u ry , "but now, to  a ttem p t to  assume 
th e  Government of Chins in  d e fia n c e  of th e  mass of 
C hinese and of a l l  th e  European powers b es id es  
would be too exh au s tin g  fo i* E n g lan d ". 2
1 . Macdonald to  S a lis b u ry , T e l . 532 [s e n t a t B e re s fo rd ’ s
re q u e s t] 7 November 1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 1 ,
2 . S a lis b u ry  to  Macdonald, T e l . 313, 8 November 1898, P 0 1 7 /1 3 3 9 .
CONCLUSION
" 1-0 have h i t h e r t o  been favo u re d  w ith  one E a s te rn  
Q u es tio n , which we have alw ays endeavoured to  l u l l  
as something to o  p o rte n to u s  f o r  our im a g in a tio n , but 
of la t e  a F a r  E a s te rn  q u es tio n  has been super added, 
w hich , 1 co n fess , to  my apprehension  i s ,  in  th e  dim  
v is ta s  of f u t u r i t y ,  i n f i n i t e l y  g ra v e r th an  even th a t  
q u e s tio n  of wliich we have h i t h e r t o  known"# 1
Thus d id  Rosebery address th e  banquet of th e  R oya l Academy on
5 May 1895. I t  was only te n  days b e fo re  th a t  th e  B r i t is h  had
re fu s e d  to  jo in  R u s s ia  France  and Germany in  p r o te s t in g  a g a in s t
th e  Japanese a c q u is it io n  of th e  L ia o tu n g  P e n in s u la . The
q u e s tio n  o f the In te r v e n t io n  had shown how r e la t io n s  between
th e  European powers r a i^ t  be a f fe c te d  by a f f a i r s  in  th e  P a r
East and th e  s u b je c t was s t i l l  w e ig h in g  upon R o seb ery 's  m ind.
The p re v io u s  autumn he had p a in te d  a v iv id  p ic tu re  of th e
dangers  o f the  c o lla p s e  of C h in a , saying  "a h e a d le s s  C h in a , 
a China w ith o u t a Government o f any k in d , means such 
a scene of chaos and h o rro r  as th e  world perhaps has  
n ever c o n te m p la te d " .^  The apprehensions which he
expressed in  May seem to  r e f l e c t  a sense of the  dangers
in h e re n t  in  the  co m b in atio n  o f th e  two c ircum stances which
to g e th e r  la r g e ly  form ed th e  Chinese q u es tio n  o f th e se  y e a rs  -
th e  weakness of China on th e  one hand, and on the  o th e r  hand,
th e  grow ing in t e r e s t  and a m b itio n  of o th e r  Powers th ^ r e .
1 . The T im es . 6 May 1895.
2 . The T im es. 2? O ctober 1894.
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There were some who saw in  th e  s i t u a t io n  an o p p o rtu n ity  
f o r  B r i t a i n  to  t -k e  over C hina. But le a d e rs  of th e  Government 
were unoompre m is in g  in  t h e i r  d isa v o w al of any d e s ir e  f o r  
conquest or c o n tro l th e r e .  S a lis b u ry  et th e  end of 1898 
re p u d ia te d  P e re s fo rd 's  proposal th a t  th e  B r i t is '"  should assume 
c o n tro l of th e  Chinese Government j u st as K im b erley  had 
renounced s im ila r  suggestions d u rin g  th e  S ino-Japanese w ar.
" I  do not agree in  the n e c e s s ity  of em barking in  some 
g re a t scheme of In f lu e n c e  over C hina" K im b erley  had  
w r i t t e n .  "we must extend and p r o te c t  our tra d e  but 
we want n o th in g  more th an  t h a t " . !
B r i t is h  a c tio n s  b ear out t h e i r  a s s e r t io n s  th a t  tra d e  
was t h e i r  main concern in  C h in a . The q u es tio n s  which prom pted  
them to  ta k e  d r a s t ic  a c t io n  were in v a r ia b ly  th es e  i n  which  
th e re  was some d i r e c t  th r e a t  to  t h e i r  com m ercial in t e r e s t s .
T h is  i s  apparent in  t h e i r  d e c is io n  i n  O ctober 1894 to  r e s is t  
any Japanese a ttem p t to  a t ta c k  Shanghai, a d e c is io n  made 
w ith o u t h e s i t a t io n  in  ^ i t e  o f th e  d e s ire  to  c u l t iv a t e  Japanese 
f r ie n d s h ip  which was a lre a d y  e v id e n t . The s ig n if ic a n c e  of 
th e  d e c is io n  l a  a l l  th e  more p o in te d  when one remembers th e  
B r i t is h  r e fu s a l  s ix  months l a t e r  to  Jo in  the  p r o te s t  a g a in s t  
th e  c e s s io n  of the  L iao tu n g  P e n in s u la . There i s  an obvious  
d is t in c t io n  between the im portance o f th e  two cases from  th e  
p o in t  of view of B r i t is h  com m ercial In t e r e s t s .  In  th e
1 . P r iv a te  K im berley P ap ers , K im berley  to  C a p ta in  
C avend ish , 30 May 1895.
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L ia o tu n g  P e n s in u la , th ese  were co jp a r k t iv e ly  s m a ll. An a tta c k  
on '.h an gbsi, on th e  o th e r hand, would have been a d i r e c t  
in ju r y  to  B r ib la li  com mercial In te r o s ts  in  an a rea  vJier© th e y  
were vary g re a t .
In  the n e g o t ia t io n s  of the  t h i r d  in ca riin ity  lo a n , th e  
Government shovseo tne same quick response to  any developm ent 
which endangered B r i t is h  t r a d e . Rhan they le a rn e d  th a t  R ussia  
m ight meke th e  lo a n  on c o n d it io n s  wiiich would p ro b ab ly  g ive  
h e r c o n tro l of the Customs A d m in is tra t io n  in  thg f u t u r e ,  th e y  
abandoned t h e i r  p re v io u s  r e fu s a l  to  c o n s id e r g u a ra n te e in g  the  
lo a n  and proposed to  make i t  th em selves , a d e f in i t e  d e p a rtu re  
from  custom ary p r a c t ic e .
B u t, b e fo re  1896 a t any r a t e ,  th e re  was an e v id e n t  
d e s ire  th a t a f f a i r s  in  China ski ou Id  not be th e  occasion  of 
imdue exc item en t ana chat t h is  q u e s tio n , vlxich Rosebery had  
seen as a grave one on ly  in  "the  dim v is ta s  of f u t u r i t y " ,  
should no t be co n s id ered  an im m ed ia te ly  p re s s in g  one. " I  th in k  
we fo re s h o r te n  tim e  and d is ta n c e "  sa id  S a lis b u ry , .speaking a t  
th e  G u i ld h a l l  on 9 November 1895 s h o r t ly  a f t e r  r e p o r ts  of 
th e  c o n c lu s io n  of a Russo-Chine se C o n ven tio n , and he expressed
1
r e g r e t  th a t  th e re  atiould be "unnecessary d is tu rb a n c e  and a larm ".
B a lfo u r  in  h is  speech on th e  F a r  East two months l a t e r  spoke
2
of i t  as " th is  f a r  d is ta n t  r e g io n " . And a l l  a l ik e  to o k  up
1, The T im es , 10 November 1895.
2 . The T im es. 4 F e b ru a ry , 1896 .
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g la d ly  the r e f r a i n  " In  Asia th e re  I s  roo^ f o r  us a l l " .
I t  i s  c le a r  t h a t  the  B r i t i s h  were anxious t h a t  a f f a i r s  in  
China should not he a source of c o n f l i c t  between the European  
powers. One can sense s f e e l i n g  on t h e i r  p a r t  t h a t  i t  waa 
absurd t h a t  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  should s u f fe r  
cn account of the  slr.vPle re q u ire m e n ts  of p r o t e c t in g  t h e i r  
t r a d e  I n  C h ina. D e te rm in a t io n  to  safeguard t h e i r  commercial 
i n t e r e s t s  i s  c o n t i n u a l l y  a p p a re n t .  They adm itted  no qu es tio n  
of t h i s  in  t h e i r  oim m.nds. But a t the  same tim e t h e i r  n o l i c y  
i s  marked by the  a ttem pt to  o f f e r  an accommodating re  sponge 
t o  th e  am b it io n s  of the  o th e r  Powers.
T h is  was accompanied by rep eated  in s is te n c e  th a t  th e re  
was no in n a te  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  between the  two. In d e e d ,  
i m p l i c i t  in  much t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  said was the suggestion  
t h f t  I t  would be h eresy  f o r  o th e r  Powers to  have any in t e n t io n s  
a t v a r ia n c e  w ith  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of equal commercial o p p o r tu n ity  
which was the  c a r d in a l  d e s ire  of the IB r i t ls h .  T h is  may have  
been p a r t l y  a t o o l  of p o l ic y ;  an a ttem pt to  d isc o u ra g e  such 
i n t e n t io n s  by t a l k i n g  as i f  th e re  could be no q u e s t io n  of 
t h e i r  e x is te n c e .  But i t  a ls o  seems to  have been a genuine  
c o n v ic t  io n .
The o th er  c o n s id e ra t io n s  e n te r in g  in t o  the  B r i t i s h  v iew  
of th e  a c t i v i t y  of o th e r  Powers i n  China were complex. Under­
ly in g  many of them was the  simple f a c t  th a t  B r i t a i n  had 
numaroi;is I n t e r e s t s  in  many p a r t s  of the  world bes ides  C h ina.
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In d e e d , h e r  I n t e r e s t  i n  China wsf l im i t e d  in  comparison w ith  
many of h e r  i n t e r e s t s  e lsew here . I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  B r i t a i n  was 
not in  th e  p o s i t io n  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in  Chins which she h e ld  
i n  Ind .ie  s.nd p a r t s  of A f r i c a ,  h e r  w id9 spread i n t e r e s t s  were 
a lre a d y  th e  occasion of much, f r i c t i o n  w ith  o th e r  Powers and 
c onsequen tly  th e  d e s ir e  to  keep a f f a i r s  in  Chins from  becoming 
y e t  an o th er  source of d is p u te  was & n a tu r a l  e re .  T h is  can be 
seen at work very  p l a i n l y  i n  the d e l i b e r a t e  B r i t i s h  a b s te n t io n  
from  showing any o p p o s it io n  to  the German demand f o r  K ieochau,
8 q u e s t io n  which arose at a t im e  Then .Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s  
were a lre a d y  s tra in e d  on o th e r  accounts .
But the  country  w ith  th e  g r e a te s t  i n t e r e s t  i n  C hine,  
the  one whose a c t i v i t y  was r e a l l y  u n d e rn fii ln g  th? supremacy 
of in f lu e n c e  which B r i t a i n  had enjoyed th e r e  e a r l i e r  i n  the  
c e n tu ry ,  wa3 R ussia . Two c o n s id e ra t io n s  however b lu n ted  th e  
fo r c e  of the  o b je c t io n s  which B r i t a i n  migî:it o th e rw ise  have been 
disposed to  f e e l  tow ards Russian a c t i v i t y  in  Ohinn, One was 
the  f a c t  th a t  R ussian preoccupatio n  promised a le s s  a c t iv e  
Russian i n t e r e s t  in  C e n t r a l  A sia , thus a f f o r d in g  some r e l i e f  
to  the  P r i t i s h  i n  In d ia .  I t  a lso  bo ld  out hope of the s lacken­
in g  of R ussian in t e r e s t  i n  the ^ ee r  P a s t .  The second c o n s id e ra ­
t i o n ,  no doubt p a r t i c u l a r l y  co m p e ll in g  to  S a l is b u ry  w ith  h i s  
stro ng  sense of the  p r a c t i c a b le ,  was B r i t a i n ' s  i n a b i l i t y  to  
stand in  R u s s ia 's  way i n  C hina. con g ive  no promise
of p r o t e c t io n  age 1 ngt R u s s ia " , S a lisb u ry  to ld  'iacdonald ii^en
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th e  imminent Chinese r e f u s a l  of e B r i t i s h  Government lo an
on account of Russian th r e a ts  was reported ., "because she
th r e a te n s  a m i l i t a r y  move over the f r o n t i e r  a e a ln s t  iMhlch we
1
are  n e c e s s a r i ly  powerless"# T h is  lends more p o in te d
s ig n i f ic a n c e  t o  S a l is b u r y 's  statem ent i n  h i s  "Dying N a t io n s "
speech o n ly  th re e  months l a t e r  th a t  " . . .  we s h a l l  not be 
je a lo u s  i f  d e s o la t io n  and s t e r i l i t y  are  removed 
by the aggrandizem ent of a r i v a l  in  re g io n s  to  
which our arms cannot e x t e n d " . 2
One d i f f i c u l t y  arose from  th e  f a c t  t h a t  P ek ing , the  
seat of th e  Chinese Government, was i n  the extreme n o rth  of 
C h in a . The B r i t i s h  were d isposed to  lock upon th e  p e n e t r a t io n  
of Russian in f lu e n c e  i n  N o rth e rn  China as be ing  to  a la rg e  
e x te n t  i n e v i t a b l e .  But they could not a f fo r d  to  contem plate  
w ith  q u i te  the  same equan im ity  th e  e x c e p t io n a l  in f lu e n c e  # i lc h  
the  p o s i t io n  of Pek ing  gave Russia  over th e  Chinese Government, 
f o r  t h i s  was of consequence to  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s  in  a l l  p a r t s  
of C h in a . As th e  B r i t i s h  them selves  re c o g n ize d , the  Russian  
a c q u is i t io n  of P o rt  A rth u r  p ro b a b ly  added l i t t l e  i n  r e a l i t y  
to  th e  In f lu e n c e  which Russia a lre a d y  enjoyed a t f e k in g  by 
v i r t u e  of h e r  long common f r o n t i e r  w ith  C h in a . I n  appearances, 
how ever, i t  enhanced Russian in f lu e n c e  c o n s id e ra b ly .  Moreover 
th e  R ussian success appeared p a r  r ic o c h e t  as an a f f r o n t  to
1. S a l is b u ry  t o  Macdonald, T e l . 25, 1 F e b ru ary  1898, F 0 1 7 /1 3 3 8 .
2 . The T im es , 5 May 1898.
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B r i t a i n .  The B r i t i s h  d e c is io n  to  tak e  W e i-h a i  Wei was in s p ir e d  
hy th e  need which th e y  f e l t  to  a s s e r t  them selves  i n  fa c e  of  
th e  R ussian  success and hy t h e i r  concern to  iTphold t h e i r  
in f lu e n c e  at » e k in g .
The succession of events  In  th ese  y e a r s ,  th e  i n t e n s i f i c a ­
t i o n  of fo r e ig n  in t e r e s t  i n  China which was t h e i r  dominant  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  l e f t  no room to  doubt th a t  th e  unchallenged  
supremacy which B r i t a i n  had once enjoyed among f o r e ig n e r s  i n  
China was o th in g  of the  p a s t .  The B r i t i  ah Governm ent's  d e s ir e  
to  avo id  being  drawn in t o  the  c o n f l i c t s  w ith  o th e r  Powers, f o r  
# i lc h  the new c ircum stances  a ffo rd e d  such ample o p p o r tu n i ty ,  
was m a n ife s t  th ro u g h o u t. They sou^fit some r e l i e f  from  the  
f r i c t i o n  w ith  o th e r  Powers \ i i i c h  the c o m p e t it io n  f o r  concessions  
e n t a i le d  in  th e  more d e f i n i t e  a s s e r t io n  of t h e i r  s p e c ia l  
i n t e r e s t  in  the  r e g io n  of the  Yangtze  w h i ls t  s u s ta in in g  t h e i r  
e f f o r t s  t o  ensure th a t  t h e i r  t ra d e  should have equa l access
to  a l l  p a r t s  of C hina. " I  su b m it ,"  said  Curzon i n  the House 
of Commons on 1 March 1898, " th a t  we should . . .  
endeavour to  g ird  our lo in s  to  meet th e  new c o n d i t io n  
of a f f a i r s ,  and to  r e t a i n  i n  an age of c o m p a tit  on 
what we won i n  an age of m onopoly." T
1 . H a n s a rd 's  P a r l ia m e n ta ry  D ebates . 4 th  S e r ie s ,  L IV ,  332 .
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Although K im berley d id  a c o n s id e ra b le  amount of o r i g i n a l  
d r a f t i n g  i n  t h i s  p e r io d ,  he d id  not tske  i t  over e n t i r e l y  a t  
c r i t i c a l  moments, h is  in t e r e s t  showing i t s e l f  as much in  
c o r r e c t io n s  of d r a f t s  w r i t t e n  i n  the  f i r s t  in s ta n c e  by F o re ig n  
O f f ic e  o f f i c i a l s .
When th e  L ib e r a l  Government re  signed at th e  end of 
June B r i t a i n  was not in v o lv e d  i n  any im p o rta n t  n e g o t ia t io n s  
re g a rd in g  C hins. The T re a ty  of Shlmonoseki hmd been r a t i f i e d  
s ix  weeks e a r l i e r ;  th e  c o n tra c t  f o r  the  f i r s t  in d e m n ity  lo an  
was c l e a r l y  going to  Russia end '"ranee slthoujgh i t  had not  
been f i n a l l y  s igned; and the  news of the  F ra n c o -C h in e se 
C onvention  had on ly  Just been re ce iv e d  -  indeed th e  Government 
re s ig n e d  ju s t  as K im berley  was on the p o in t  of p r o te s t in g  to  
th e  French Government and consequently  i t  was l e f t  to  h i s  
successor to  ta k e  e c t i  on. Chinese a f f a i r s  thus  a f fo r d  l i t t l e  
i n  th e  way of s p e c i f ic  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of the  e f f e c t s  of th e  
change of Government upon p o l ic y .
S a l is b u ry  sew and i n i t i a l l e d  most papers r e l a t i n g  t o  
China from  the tim e th a t  he assumed o f f i c e  and h i s  m inutes  
an' d r a f t s  show th a t  he fo l lo w e d  th e  main n e g o t ia t io n s  f a i r l y  
c lo s e ly .  There i s  no comparison however between h i  a a c t i v i t y  
in  the f i r s t  two and s h a l f  y e a rs  o f th e  Government's o f f i c e  
end the  p a r t  wliioh he p layed  in  the  c r u c ia l  p e r io d  a f t e r  
November 1897. There  i s  a n o t ic e a b le  change upon th e  German 
o ccu p atio n  of Kiaochau; many of the  in s t r u c t io n s  a r is in g  
out o f t h a t  event were d r a f te d  by S a l is b u r y .  And th e n  from  
th e  and of December u n t i l  he became i l l  a t  the  end of 
F e b ru a ry ,  he took the conduct of a f f a i r s  almost e n t i r e l y  in t o  
h i s  own hands, in  the  months fo l lo w in g  h i s  r e tu r n  to  the  
F o re ig n  O f f ic e  a t the  end of A p r i l ,  cons tan t m inutes by 
S a lis b u ry  in d ic a te  t h a t  he continued to  d i r e c t  th e  conduct 
o f a f f a i r s  v e ry  c lo s e ly  a lthough he handled le s s  h im s e lf  
th a n  he had in  January and F e b ru a ry . R e la t io n s  w ith  o th e r  
Powers were not in v o lv e d  to  q u i te  the  same e x te n t  as th e y  
had been a t  th a t  t im e ,  moreover much of the business a r is in g  
from  the  c o m p e tit io n  f o r  concessions was n o t ,  on account of  
i t s  d e t a i le d  and p r a c t i c a l  c h a r a c te r ,  such as would be d e a l t  
w ith  by S a lis b u ry  p e r s o n a l ly .
B e r t i e ,  then A s s is ta n t  Under S e c re ta ry  and S u p erv is o r  
of the  A s i a t ic  S e c t io n  of the  American and A s ia t ic  D epartm ent,  
WAS th e  most im p o rta n t  of the  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  o f f i c i a l s  so 
f a r  as E r i t i s l i  p o l ic y  i n  Chine was concerned. H is  In f lu e n c e  
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  n o t ic e a b le  in  the  B r i t i s h  concern w ith  th e  
m aintenance of t h e i r  in f lu e n c e  i n  the Chinese Customs 
A d m in is t r a t io n .  I t  was he who urged th a t  s teps  should be 
ta k e n  to  ensure th a t  th e re  was a s u i ta b le  B r i t l s l i  successor 
to  S i r  Robert H a r t  and who re p e a te d ly  drew a t t e n t io n  to  th e
danger t o  B r i t i s h  I n t e r e s t s  of R ussie , P rance , or Germany 
t a k in g  advantage of hav ing  made s loan  to  China t o  c la im  th a t  
more of t h e i r  s u b jec ts  should be employed in  the  Custom 
S e r v ic e .  l%en H ic k s  Reach commented I n  F e b ru ary  1898 a f t e r  
th e  proposed B r i t i s h  Government lo an  to  China had been re fu sed  
t h a t  he cared very l i t t l e  who g o t  the lo a n  in  view of the  
concessions which B r i t a i n  had obta ined  from  the C hinese,
B e r t ie  s tressed  t h i s  p o in t  and i t  was upon h i s  suggestion  
t h a t  0»Conor was In s t r u c te d  to  d isc u s s  th e  c o n d it io n s  of the  
nroposed B r i t i s h  lo an  I n  h i s  n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  th e  Russians.
6 . The Satow Papers nt the  P u b l ic  Record O f f i c e .  P . R . 0 .3 0 /5 5 .
P . R . 0 .3 0 /5 5 /5  ; correspondence w ith  Consuls and le g a t io n
S t a f f ,  1895 -1 900 .
1 SI r  Ernest Satow was B r i t i s h  M in is te r  at  
T o k io  from 1895 to  1900. T h is  c o r re s ­
pondence i s  la r g e ly  concerned w ith  B r i t i s h  
p roceed in gs  in  Japan and i s  o f l i t t l e  
in t e r e s t  from the  p o in t  of v iew  of a f f a i r s  
i n  C hina. There  I s  however one in t e r e s t i n g  
l e t t e r  from  S a lis b u ry  to  Satow w r i t t e n  in  
October 1895 d is c u s s in g  th e  q u es tio n  of 
Japan 's  im portance to  B r i t a i n  and a lso  
th e  p a r t  th a t  Satow should p la y  in  
commercial m a t te r s . ]
C• P r iv a t e  K im berley Papers at K im berley  Rouse. Wymondham, 
N o r f o lk .
K im berley  was F o re ig n  S e c re ta ry  from  March 1894 u n t i l  
June 1895. H is  papers  f o r  t h i s  p e r io d  in c lu d e  correspondence  
w ith  Rosebery srd o th e r  members o f the  C ab inet end w ith  
many o f th e  B r i t i s h  d ip lo m a t ic  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  abroad.
There  l a  e memorandum of the  C a b in e t 's  d e c is io n  on 23 A p r i l  
1895 not to  Jo in  the  in t e r v e n t io n  of th e  Powers a g a in s t  
Japan. There  are a number of  p r iv a t e  te le g ra m s  t o  and 
from  O'Conor # i ic h  are p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e fu l  f o r  th e  in d ic a ­
t i o n  which th e y  g ive  of th e  B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e  In  th e  e a r ly  
stages of the  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  the  f i r s t  in d em n ity  lo an .
There  are  a ls o  l e t t e r s  and te leg ra m s  exchanged between  
Kim berley  and the F o re ig n  O f f ic e  at th e  t im e s  when he was 
at Wymondham and these  c o n ta in  some m a te r ia l  on the  genesis  
of th e  B r i t i s h  d e c is io n  in  October 1894 to  r e s i s t  any 
Japanese a ttem pt to  a t ta c k  S ie n g h a i.
The c h ie f  Value o f these  papers l i e s  In  t h e i r  more 
In fo rm a l and d i r e c t  exp res s io n  of the  m otives f o r  a c t io n  
end in  t h e i r  e x p l i c i t  c o n f i rm a t io n  of th in g s  which can 
only be deduced from th e  o f f i c i a l  r e c o rd s ."  Thus i t  i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  to  f in d  K im berley a c t u a l l y  s t a t i n g ,  w ith  
r e fe r e n c e  to  Japan, th a t  "onr p o l ic y  must be t o  make h e r  
our a l l y " .  F o r  the most p a r t  th e  steps taken  by the  
B r i t i s h  can be tre o e d  in  the  o f f i c i a l  a r c h iv e s .  Fo r  
example the v i t a l  papers  on the most im p o rta n t  B r i t i s h  
a c t io n  in  the  loan n e g o t ia t io n s ,  ( t h e i r  appeal to  th e  
R o th s c h ild s  and t h e i r  subsequent p ro p o s a l to China m d  
the  o th e r  Powers) are  in  the  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  re c o rd s ,  
K lm n e r le y 'a  papers  are however a v e ry  v a lu a b le  siJ%)nle- 
m entary source on the s u b je c t ;  the  correspondence w ith  
R o th s c h ild  adding in fo rm a t io n  on what happened a f t e r  the  
B r i t i s h  made t h e i r  p rop osal a m  th e  te le g ra m s  to  and 
from  O'Conor showing the  im portance which the  B r i t i s h  
a tta c h e d  to  th e  loan from  the b eg in n in g  of th e  n e g o t ia t io n s .
ISO
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A. Bsr 11 amenter:v Papers. Accounts end Papers.
1894 : Convention between G reat B r i t a i n  end C hina,
g iv in g  e f f e c t  to  A r t i c l e  I I  o f th e  
Convention of 24th Ju ly  1336, r e l a t i v e  
to  Burma and T i b e t .  signed at London,
1s t March 1894. R a t i f i c a t i o n s  exchanged 
a t  London, 23rd August 1394.
[ 1 8 9 4 ] ,  XGVI, [ n . 7 5 4 7 ] ,  p . 8 9 .
: Correspondence re s p e c t in g  the  A f f a i r s  of S ian .
L 18 9 4 ], XCVI, [ C .7 3 9 5 ] , ' p . 399.
1395 ; Caapfttoh from  H . r  ï a j a s t y ' s  i l a i a t a r  a t T ô k lô ,
fo rw a rd in g  a copy of th a  T r s a ty  of Paace 
eonoludad betwaen China and Japan, 17th  
A p r i l  1895.
[1 8 9 5 ] ,  C IX , [ C .7 7 1 4 ] ,  p .1 1 1 .
: Agreement between th e  Governments of G reat
B r i t a i n  and Russia w ith  regard  t o  th e  spheres  
of In f lu e n c e  of the tw o C o u n tr ie s  In  the  
re g io n  of the Pam irs. London, 11th March
1895.
[ 1 8 9 5 ] ,  C IX , [ C .7 6 4 3 ] ,  p . 159.
1836 ; L e t t e r  from the Government of In d ia  to  th e
S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  dated th e  6 th  day of May
1896, on th e  sub jec t of the  Agreement w ith  
France re s p e c t in g  Siam and the  % p e r  Mekong. 
[ 1 3 9 6 ] ,  U I ,  263 , p . 505.
! D e c la r a t io n  between G reat B r i t a i n  and France  
w ith  regard  to  th e  Kingdom of Siam and o th e r  
M a tte rs .  Signed a t London, 15th  January
1896.
[1 8 9 6 ] ,  XCV, [ C .8 0 1 0 ] ,  p . 8 3 .
1898 ! Correspondence r e s p e c t in g  th e  A f f a i r s  of China.
[1 8 9 3 ] ,  CV, [G .8 8 1 4 ] ,  p . 53.
: Agreement between Great B r i t a i n  and China
m o d ify in g  the Convention of 1st March IS 94,  
r e l a t i v e  to  Burmah and T h ib e t ,  w ith  Map.
Signed a t P ek ing , 4 th  February  1997. 
R a t i f i c a t i o n s  exchanged a t P ek ing , 5th June
1897.
[ l e s s ] ,  CV, [C .8 6  5 4 ] ,  p . 129.
: Despatch from H er M a je s ty ’ s M in is t e r  at
Pek ing  fo rw a rd in g  cop ies  o f th e  Notes  
exchanged w ith  th e  Chinese Government 
r e s p e c t in g  the  n o n -a l ie n a t io n  of the  
Yang-Tsze Region,
[ l 8 9 8 j ,  CV, tc .8 9 4 0 ] ,  p . 139.
: Daspatoh from  B ar M a je s ty 's  Ambassador at
8 t , P e te rs b u rg , en c lo s in g  an Agreement 
concluded between the  Chinese Government 
and th e  Husso-Ghinese Bank f o r  the  
C o n s tru c t io n  of th e  Manchurian R a ilw a y .  
L 1 8 9 0 j,  CV, [ 0 .8 7 7 7 j ,  p . 4 0 3 .
1899 ; Correspondence re s p e c t in g  th e  A f f a i r s  of
C hina.
11399J, GXX, LC .9 1 3 1 ] ,  n .2 5 1 .
; Convention between th e  United Kingdom and 
China re s p e c t in g  -V e i-H s i-W e i. Signed at  
P ek ing , 1st J u ly  1898. R a t i f i c a t i o n s  
exchsn^ed at London, 5 th  October 1898. 
[ 1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX , [ C .9 0 3 1 ] ,  p . 635 .
: Convention between th e  U n ited  Kingdom and
China r e s p e c t in g  an E x te n s io n  o f Hong Kong 
T e r r i t o r y ,  w ith  a Map. Signed a t P ek in g ,
9 th  June 1898. R a t i f i c a t i o n s  exchanged 
a t London, 6 th  Auszust 1898.
[1 8 9 9 ] ,  C IX , [ C . 9(387], p . 6 3 9 .
: Correspondence between H er M a je s ty 's  Govern­
ment and the Russian Government, w i th  
regard  to  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  R a ilw ay  i n t e r e s t s  
i n  C hina.
L 1 8 9 9 j ,  G ÎX , [ C .9 3 2 9 j ,  p . 6 45 .
The Annual S e r ie s  o f Trade R ep o rts , which c o n ta in  
r e p o r ts  by the  B r i t i s h  consuls on th e  t r a d e  a t th e  
v a r io u s  T r e a ty  P o r ts  in  C hina, are  a ls o  p u b lish ed  
i n  Accounts and Papers;
11896  
11896 
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, X C V II ,  [C .7 5B 1 ] and [C .7 8 2 S ] .  
, LXXXV, [ C .7 9 1 9 ] .
, iX K X IX , [G .8 3 7 7 ] .
, XCIV, IC .8 6 4 8 ] .
, XGIX, [C.9044J and [C .9 4 9 6 ] .
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The M is ce lla n eo u s  S e r ie s  of Trade R eports  in c lu d e  
th e  fo l lo w in g  r e p o r ts  which ere  of i n t e r e s t :
1897 : Correspondance re s p e c t in g  D ip lo m a t ic  and
C onsular A ss is tance  t o  B r i t i s h  Trade Abroad, 
11 8 9 7 ] .  L X X X V il l ,  L G .8 4 32 ],  p . l .
: Report on the  He venue and joxpenditure of
the  Chinese Empire by Mr. Consul Jamieson. 
1 1 8 9 7 ] ,  L X I X V I I I ,  [ 0 . 8 2 7 8 ] .
1899 ! Opinions of Her M a je s ty 's  D ip lo m a t ic  and
C onsular O f f ic e r s  on B r i t i s h  Trade Methods. 
[ 1 6 9 9 ] ,  XCVi, [C .9 0 7 8 ] ,  p . 619 .
The f i r s t  correspondence on Chinese at f a i r s  la id  
b e fo re  P a r l ia m e n t in  t h i s  p e r io d  was i n  A p r i l  1898: 
th e re  are no Blue Books co v e rin g  the p e r io d  from  1894 
to  th e  autumn of 1897. T h e r e a f t e r  th e r e  l a  a steady  
In c re a s e  i n  the  amount of pu b lish ed  correspondence.
T h is  correspond a to  the marked development of p u b l ic  
i n t e r e s t  i n  Chinese a f f a i r s ,  ju s t  as the  absence of  
Blue Books i n  the e a r l i e r  p e r io d  r e f l e c t s  and i s  
p ro b ab ly  to  a c o n s id e ra b le  e x te n t  th e  r e s u l t  of a 
com parative  absence o f p u b l ic  i n t e r e s t  I n  a f f a i r s  in  
China b e fo re  the  end of 1897. But th e  f a c t  th a t  no 
correspondence vms pu b lisb aa  cannot be a s cr ib e d  e n t i r e l y  
to  la c k  of I n t e r e s t .  A lthough p u b l ic  i n t e r e s t  may 
have d im in ish ed  again  a f te r w a r d s ,  th e  S lno-Japanese  
war of 1894-1895  had tu rn e d  European a t t e n t io n  to  the  
F a r  East and caused much concern . At t h a t  t im e  
however th e re  were p r a c t i c a l l y  no B r i t i s h  n e g o t ia t io n s  
re g a rd in g  China which had any p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t .  T h e i r  
a ttem p ts  to  p rev en t th e  war and subsequently  to  b r in g  
about peace n e g o t ia t io n s  were un su cc e ss fu l;  t h e i r  
d e c is io n  in  the  m a tte r  of the  in t e r v e n t io n  was a 
n e g a t iv e  one; and the f i r s t  in d em n ity  lo a n , w ith  
which the  F o re ig n  O f f ic e  was preoccupied  i n  May, was 
e v e n tu a l ly  made by Russia and i n  any event th e r e  was 
never any q u es tio n  of the  Government a c t u a l l y  making 
th e  lo a n  and th e  sub jec t was not one upon 1 oh th e  
correspondence which was l i k e l y  to  be p u b l is h e d .  At 
the  eno of tune 1895 the  L ib e r a l  Government res igned  
and S a lis b u ry  re tu rn e d  to  o f f i c e .  The n e g o t ia t io n s  
# i ic h  s ta r te d  s h o r t ly  a f te rw a rd s  f o r  th e  r e c t i f i c a t i o n  
of th e  Burma f r o n t i e r  and the opening of th e  West 
r i v e r  were not completed u n t i l  1897. Meanwhile th e re  
was B com parative  l u l l  in  the  g e n e ra l i n t e r e s t  i n  China
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u n t i l  th e  even ts  o f  th e  le s t  months of 1897 brought  
f a r  E a s te rn  a f f a i r s  to  th e  f o r e f r o n t  of a t t e n t io n  i n  
Europe.
I n  the subsequent Blue Books r e l a t i n g  to  China  
th e r e  i s ,  as has been n o ted , e " f a i r l y  f u l l  record  of 
even ts"  and " the  most im p o rta n t  . . .  om issions a re  of 
a type norm al i n  th e  Blue Books of the  p e r i o d " , !  Those 
c h a r a c t e r is t i c  om issions do however ta k e  much of the  
c o lo u r  out of th e  p i c t u r e .  S p e c u la t io n  i s  in e v i t a b l y  
cut out and the  sense o f the  t e n t a t i v e  c o n s id e ra t io n  
of V ar io u s  p o s s ib le  l i n e s  of a c t io n  # i lc h  g iv e s  th e  
documents of t h i s  p e r io d  much of t h e i r  in t e r e s t  does 
not emerge f u l l y  fra%  th e  p u b lish ed  correspondence.
Nor does the  f u l l  e x te n t  of the im portance which th e  
B r i t i s h  a ttached  to  the  loan  to  China proposed in  
January 1898, p a r t l y  no doubt because t h i s  p la n  had 
been superseded by o th e r  arrangem ents by th e  tim e  
t h a t  the  Blue Book was p u b l is h e d .  The o v e r tu re  to  
Russia In  the  same month i s  not recorded  and th e r e  i s  
only one despatch m entioning th e  a b o r t iv e  suggestions  
made in  A p r i l  and May of an agreement w ith  Germany 
re g a rd in g  r a i lw a y s  i n  C h in a .
I t  i s  in t e r e s t i n g  to  no te  e couple of a l t e r a t i o n s  
i n  the 1898 Blue Book. One r e f l e c t s  the B r i t i s h  d e s ir e  
to  c o n c i l i a t e  Germany a t th e  tim e th a t  t h i s  c o r r e s -  
P ondsnc@ wa s pub 11 shed • ‘-'‘^ hare Bs I f  our ' s o r i g i n e l
te le g ra m  to  Macdonald on 7 March read t h a t  " i f  th e  . 
Russians are  t o  have a le a s e  o f p o r t  A rth u r and 
T a lie n w a n  on the same term s as Germany of K iaochau, 
the  in f lu e n c e  of these  powers over th e  Government of 
P ek in g  11 be so in cre as ed  to  the d e tr im e n t  o f  
th a t  o f H er M a je s ty 's  Government th e  Flu© Book
v e rs io n  speaks only of " th e  in f lu e n c e  of R u s s ia " .2 
A nother a l t e r a t i o n  I s  i n d ic a t i v e  of the adjustm ent which 
even ts  had fo rce d  upon B r i t i s h  p o l i c y .  Macdonald had 
de s c rib e d  th e  German re q u es t f o r  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t ­
ment i n  Shantung as a "dangerous p re c e d e n t" .  I n  t h e  
Blue Book i t  became e "nove l p re c e d e n t" .
1. H . Tem perley  and L.M. Penson, A C entury  of D ip lo m a t ic
B I m.  Books. [ I 9 3 8 j ,  4 2 4 -4 3 6 .
2 . B a l fo u r  to  Macdonald, T e l . 56 S e c re t ,  7 March 1390,
F017 /13& 8; A . 6  P . . [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,  CV, [ C .8 8 1 4 ] ,  104.
3 .  Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,  T e l . 69 , 22 November 1897,
P 01 7 /1 314 ; A. à  r . . [ 1 8 9 8 ] ,  CV, [ C .8 3 1 4 ] ,  p#64 .
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Some of the  o th e r  c o n s id e ra t io n s  which e f fe c te d  
the  s e le c t io n  of correspondence ere  ind icabed  In  two 
te le g ra m s  from  Macdonald et th e  tim e th a t  the  1898 
Blue Boo# we a being c o m p iled . "Great d i f f i c u l t i e s  
w i l l  be caused me h e r e " ,  he te le g ra p h e d  on 15 
A p r i l ,  "by d is c lo s u re  of f r i e n d l y  c o n v e rs a t io n s  
w ith  I th s J  German M in is te r  end of c o n f i d e n t ia l  
d isc u s s io n s  w ith  [ t h e ]  Ysmen oni I t  m i l  tend  
to  make c o n f i d e n t ia l  r e l a t i o n s  bet wee r: me and 
th e  Yaman or any of my fo r e ig n  c o l le a g u e s  
im p o s s ib le . . . [W e e j  Yamen g r e a t ly  d i s l i k e  o f f i c i a l  
d is c lo s u r e s  of the k in d , to  which t h e i r  a t t e n t io n  
i s  prom ptly  drawn". (Macdonald to  S a l is b u r y ,
T e l . 12? [ r ] ,  15 A p r i l  1309, F 0 1 7 /1 3 4 3 ) .  And in  an o th er  
te leg ram  on the  same day he a ls o  p o in te d  out t h a t
" te leg ra m s  . . .  showing th a t  Chins made concessions  
only under p ressu re  are  d i f f i c u l t  to  r e c o n c i le  
w ith  re c e n t  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  u t te r a n c e s .
Any p u b l ic a t io n s  i n d ic a t in g  t h a t  H a r t  occupies  
h im s e l f  w ith  p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s  would be v e ry  
d e t r im e n ta l  to  h iu  and would have th e  worst  
p o s s ib le  e f f e c t * ' .  (Macdonald t o  S a l is b u r y ,
T e l . 128, 15 A p r i l  1898, P 0 1 7 /1 5 4 0 ) .
B. M in is tè r e  des A f f a i r e s  E t ra n g è re s. Documents 
D i p l orna11 que s. T î i  v rea  Ji
1998 : C h in e , 1894 -1 898 .
1399 ; C h in e , 1 898 -1899 .
G. P a re ra  R e la t in g  to  th e  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s  of the  
U nited  GtstTs*. 1,8§4-1898.
D. C o l le c t io n s  of Docume n ts .
-  B r i t  1 ah and i  o ra l  gn St a t e P s.p e r  s * vo ls .LXXXVl-XC  
(1 8 9 5 -1 8 9 8 )  c o n t ^ n  agreements concluded by China  
w ith  G reet b r i t e i n  and o th e r  Powers in  th es e  y e a rs ,  
most of which are a ls o  p u b lish ed  i n  Accounts and 
P a p e rs .
E a r l i e r  volumes of th e  B .F . S .P .c o n s u lte d  
in c lu d e  vol.XXX (1 6 4 1 -1 8 4 2 )  f o r  th e  T r e a ty  of 
Nanking and th e  G enera l R e g u la t io n s  o f T ra d e ;  
v o l.X X X I (1 3 4 2 -1 8 4 3 )  f o r  the  Supplem entary T r e a ty  
of CO:^merce and N a v ig a t io n ;  v o l . X L V I I I  (1 8 57 -1 8  58)  
f o r  th e  T r e a ty  of T ie n t s in  and th e  Agreement f o r  th e  
K e v is in n  of the  T a r i f f ;  and v c l . î X X I  (1 8 7 9 -1 8 8 0 )  f o r  
the  Chafoo Agreement of 1876.
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-  German D ip lo m a t ie  Documents. 1 3 7 1 -1 9 1 4 . S e lec ted  
ana t r a n s la te d  [ f ro m  D ie  grosse ' p o ï ï t ï k  d e r  
europMlachen K a b in e tte . '  1871 -1 9 14 . ] by B .T T s . Dugdsle.  
T v o ls .  Lone on 1928 -1931 .
-  Gooch, G.P. and Temper le y ,  11. v.V. : B r i t i s h  Documents 
on the O r ig in s  of the  War. 1896-19147  l l  v o ls .
Iiondon 1926 -1 9 38 . V o l . l  c o n ta ln s  1 m portant m e te r la  1 
ori th e  B r i t i e l l  o v e r tu re  to  Russia end the  t o k ln r  of 
W ei-hai %9l in  1898.
-  MaoMurray, J.V'.a , ( e d . )  : T r e a t i e s  and Agreements
w ith  and concerning China, 3 i i§ 4 - l9 1 9 .  V o l . I  : Menohn 
Periocl 1  Ï 0 9 4 - Ï 9 Ï i ' ) . ~%@w York 1921.
As w e l l  as agreements between China and f o r e ig n  Powers
and between f o r e ig n  Pouors c o n o s rn irg  C hine, t h i s  
c o l l e c t i o n  in c lu d e s  the a g re e m e n ts  f o r  the  loans and 
the  r a i lw a y  and o th e r  concessions arranged in  t h i s  
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